#StopRansomware: Cuba Ransomware | CISA
Published: 2023-01-05 · Archived: 2026-04-05 20:31:15 UTC
Summary
Actions to take today to mitigate cyber threats from ransomware:
• Prioritize remediating known exploited vulnerabilities.
• Train users to recognize and report phishing attempts.
• Enable and enforce phishing-resistant multifactor authentication.
Note: This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) is part of an ongoing #StopRansomware effort to publish advisories for
network defenders that detail various ransomware variants and ransomware threat actors. These #StopRansomware
advisories include recently and historically observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of
compromise (IOCs) to help organizations protect against ransomware. Visit stopransomware.gov to see all
#StopRansomware advisories and to learn more about other ransomware threats and no-cost resources.
The FBI and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) are releasing this joint CSA to disseminate
known Cuba ransomware IOCs and TTPs associated with Cuba ransomware actors identified through FBI investigations,
third-party reporting, and open-source reporting. This advisory updates the December 2021 FBI Flash: Indicators of
Compromise Associated with Cuba Ransomware.
Note: While this ransomware is known by industry as “Cuba ransomware,” there is no indication Cuba ransomware actors
have any connection or affiliation with the Republic of Cuba.
Since the release of the December 2021 FBI Flash, the number of U.S. entities compromised by Cuba ransomware has
doubled, with ransoms demanded and paid on the increase.
This year, Cuba ransomware actors have added to their TTPs, and third-party and open-source reports have identified a
possible link between Cuba ransomware actors, RomCom Remote Access Trojan (RAT) actors, and Industrial Spy
ransomware actors.
FBI and CISA encourage organizations to implement the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this CSA to reduce
the likelihood and impact of Cuba ransomware and other ransomware operations.
Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 649 kb.
For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see:
AA22-335A.stix (STIX 148 kb).
(Updated December 12, 2022) AA22-335A-2.stix (STIX, 67 kb). (End of Update.)
Technical Details
Overview
Since the December 2021 release of FBI Flash: Indicators of Compromise Associated with Cuba Ransomware, FBI has
observed Cuba ransomware actors continuing to target U.S. entities in the following five critical infrastructure sectors:
Financial Services, Government Facilities, Healthcare and Public Health, Critical Manufacturing, and Information
Technology. As of August 2022, FBI has identified that Cuba ransomware actors have:
Compromised 101 entities, 65 in the United States and 36 outside the United States.
Demanded 145 million U.S. Dollars (USD) and received 60 million USD in ransom payments.
Cuba Ransomware Actors’ Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
As previously reported by FBI, Cuba ransomware actors have leveraged the following techniques to gain initial access into
dozens of entities in multiple critical infrastructure sectors:
Known vulnerabilities in commercial software [T1190 ]
https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa22-335a
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Phishing campaigns [T1566 ]
Compromised credentials [T1078 ]
Legitimate remote desktop protocol (RDP) tools [T1563.002 ]
After gaining initial access, the actors distributed Cuba ransomware on compromised systems through Hancitor —a loader
known for dropping or executing stealers, such as Remote Access Trojans (RATs) and other types of ransomware, onto
victims’ networks.
Since spring 2022, Cuba ransomware actors have modified their TTPs and tools to interact with compromised networks and
extort payments from victims.[1 ],[2 ]
Cuba ransomware actors have exploited known vulnerabilities and weaknesses and have used tools to elevate privileges on
compromised systems. According to Palo Alto Networks Unit 42,[2 ] Cuba ransomware actors have:
Exploited CVE-2022-24521 in the Windows Common Log File System (CLFS) driver to steal system tokens and
elevate privileges.
Used a PowerShell script to identify and target service accounts for their associated Active Directory Kerberos ticket.
The actors then collected and cracked the Kerberos tickets offline via Kerberoasting [T1558.003 ].
Used a tool, called KerberCache, to extract cached Kerberos tickets from a host’s Local Security Authority Server
Service (LSASS) memory [T1003.001 ].
Used a tool to exploit CVE-2020-1472 (also known as “ZeroLogon”) to gain Domain Administrative privileges
[T1068 ]. This tool and its intrusion attempts have been reportedly related to Hancitor and Qbot.
According to Palo Alto Networks Unit 42, Cuba ransomware actors use tools to evade detection while moving laterally
through compromised environments before executing Cuba ransomware. Specifically, the actors, “leveraged a dropper that
writes a kernel driver to the file system called ApcHelper.sys. This targets and terminates security products. The dropper was
not signed; however, the kernel driver was signed using the certificate found in the LAPSUS NVIDIA leak." [T1562.001 ].
[2 ]
In addition to deploying ransomware, the actors have used “double extortion” techniques, in which they exfiltrate victim
data, and (1) demand a ransom payment to decrypt it and, (2) threaten to publicly release it if a ransom payment is not made.
[2 ]
Cuba Ransomware Link to RomCom and Industrial Spy Marketplace
Since spring 2022, third-party and open-source reports have identified an apparent link between Cuba ransomware actors,
RomCom RAT actors, and Industrial Spy ransomware actors:
According to Palo Alto Networks Unit 42, Cuba ransomware actors began using RomCom malware, a custom RAT,
for command and control (C2).[2 ]
Cuba ransomware actors may also be leveraging Industrial Spy ransomware. According to third-party reporting,
suspected Cuba ransomware actors compromised a foreign healthcare company. The threat actors deployed Industrial
Spy ransomware, which shares distinct similarities in configuration to Cuba ransomware. Before deploying the
ransomware, the actors moved laterally using Impacket and deployed the RomCom RAT and Meterpreter Reverse
Shell HTTP/HTTPS proxy via a C2 server [T1090 ].
Cuba ransomware actors initially used their leak site to sell stolen data; however, around May 2022, the actors began
selling their data on Industrial Spy’s online market for selling stolen data.[2 ]
RomCom actors have targeted foreign military organizations, IT companies, food brokers and manufacturers.[3 ][4 ] The
actors copied legitimate HTML code from public-facing webpages, modified the code, and then incorporated it in spoofed
domains [T1584.001 ], which allowed the RomCom actors to:
Host counterfeit Trojanized applications for
SolarWinds Network Performance Monitor (NPM),
KeePass password manager,
PDF Reader Pro, (by PDF Technologies, Inc., not an Adobe Acrobat or Reader product), and
Advanced IP Scanner software;
Deploy the RomCom RAT as the final stage.
INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE
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See tables 1 through 5 for Cuba ransomware IOCs that FBI obtained during threat response investigations as of late August
2022. In addition to these tables, see the publications in the References section below for aid in detecting possible
exploitation or compromise.
Note: For IOCs as of early November 2021, see FBI Flash: Indicators of Compromise Associated with Cuba Ransomware.
Table 1: Cuba Ransomware Associated Files and Hashes, as of Late August 2022
File Name File Path File Hash
netping.dll c:\windows\temp SHA256: f1103e627311e73d5f29e877243e7ca203292f9419303c661aec57745e
shar.bat  
MD5: 4c32ef0836a0af7025e97c6253054bca
SHA256: a7c207b9b83648f69d6387780b1168e2f1eabd23ae6e162dd700ae8112
Psexesvc.exe   SHA256: 141b2190f51397dbd0dfde0e3904b264c91b6f81febc823ff0c33da980b
1.bat    
216155s.dll    
23246s.bat   SHA256: 02a733920c7e69469164316e3e96850d55fca9f5f9d19a241fad906466
23246s.dll   SHA256: 0cf6399db55d40bc790a399c6bbded375f5a278dc57a143e4b21ea3f40
23246st.dll   SHA256: f5db51115fa0c910262828d0943171d640b4748e51c9a140d06ea81ae6
259238e.exe    
31-100.bat    
3184.bat    
3184.dll    
45.dll  
SHA256:
857f28b8fe31cf5db6d45d909547b151a66532951f26cda5f3320d2d4461b583
4ca736d.exe    
62e2e37.exe    
64.235.39.82    
64s.dll    
7z.sfx    
7zCon.sfx    
7-zip.chm    
82.ps1    
9479.bat   SHA256: 08eb4366fc0722696edb03981f00778701266a2e57c40cd2e9d765bf8b
9479p.bat   SHA256: f8144fa96c036a8204c7bc285e295f9cd2d1deb0379e39ee8a84145311
9479p.ps1   SHA256: 88d13669a994d2e04ec0a9940f07ab8aab8563eb845a9c13f2b0fec497
a.exe
  MD5: 03c835b684b21ded9a4ab285e4f686a3
SHA1: eaced2fcfdcbf3dca4dd77333aaab055345f3ab4
SHA256: 0f385cc69a93abeaf84994e7887cb173e889d309a515b55b2205805bdf
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SHA256: 0d5e3483299242bf504bd3780487f66f2ec4f48a7b38baa6c6bc8ba16e
SHA256: 7e00bfb622072f53733074795ab581cf6d1a8b4fc269a50919dda63502
SHA256: af4523186fe4a5e2833bbbe14939d8c3bd352a47a2f77592d8adcb5696
a220.bat    
a220.dll   SHA256: 8a3d71c668574ad6e7406d3227ba5adc5a230dd3057edddc4d0ec5f813
a82.exe   SHA256: 4306c5d152cdd86f3506f91633ef3ae7d8cf0dd25f3e37bec43423c4742
a91.exe   SHA256: 3d4502066a338e19df58aa4936c37427feecce9ab8d43abff4a7367643a
a99.exe   SHA256: f538b035c3de87f9f8294bec272c1182f90832a4e86db1e47cbb1ab26c9
aa.exe    
aa2.exe    
aaa.stage.16549040.dns.alleivice.com    
add2.exe    
advapi32.dll    
agent.13.ps1    
agent.bat   SHA256: fd87ca28899823b37b2c239fbbd236c555bcab7768d67203f86d37ede1
agent.dll    
agent13.bat    
agent13.ps1   SHA256: 1817cc163482eb21308adbd43fb6be57fcb5ff11fd74b344469190bb48
agent64.bin   SHA256: bff4dd37febd5465e0091d9ea68006be475c0191bd8c7a79a44fbf4b995
agsyst121.bat    
agsyst121.dll    
all.bat   SHA256: ecefd9bb8b3783a81ab934b44eb3d84df5e58f0289f089ef6760264352
all.dll   SHA256: db3b1f224aec1a7c58946d819d729d0903751d1867113aae5cca87e38c
anet.exe  
SHA1: 241ce8af441db2d61f3eb7852f434642739a6cc3
SHA256: 74fbf3cc44dd070bd5cb87ca2eed03e1bbeec4fec644a25621052f0a73a
SHA256: b160bd46b6efc6d79bfb76cf3eeacca2300050248969decba139e9e1cbe
SHA256: f869e8fbd8aa1f037ad862cf6e8bbbf797ff49556fb100f2197be4ee196a
App.exe    
appnetwork.exe    
AppVClient.man    
aswSP_arPot2    
aus.exe  
SHA256: 0c2ffed470e954d2bf22807ba52c1ffd1ecce15779c0afdf15c292e3444c
SHA256: 310afba59ab8e1bda3ef750a64bf39133e15c89e8c7cf4ac65ee463b26b
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av.bat   SHA256: b5d202456ac2ce7d1285b9c0e2e5b7ddc03da1cbca51b5da98d9ad72e
c2.ps1    
c2.ps1    
cdzehhlzcwvzcmcr.aspx    
check.exe    
checkk.exe    
checkk.txt   SHA256: 1f842f84750048bb44843c277edeaa8469697e97c4dbf8dc571ec55226
client32.exe    
comctl32 .dll    
comp2.ps1    
comps2.ps1    
cqyrrxzhumiklndm.aspx    
defendercontrol.exe    
ff.exe   SHA256: 1b943afac4f476d523310b8e3afe7bca761b8cbaa9ea2b9f01237ca4652
File __agsyst121.dll    
File __aswArPot.sys    
File __s9239.dll    
File_agsyst121.dll    
File_aswArPot.sys    
File_s9239.dll    
ga.exe    
gdi32 .dll    
geumspbgvvytqrih.aspx    
IObit UNLOCKER.exe    
kavsa32.exe  
MD5: 236f5de8620a6255f9003d054f08574b
SHA1: 9b546bd99272cf4689194d698c830a2510194722
kavsyst32.exe    
kernel32.dll    
komar.bat  
SHA256:
B9AFE016DBDBA389000B01CE7645E7EEA1B0A50827CDED1CBAA48FB
komar.dll    
komar121.bat    
komar121.dll    
komar2.ps1   SHA256: 61971d3cbf88d6658e5209de443e212100afc8f033057d9a4e79000f6f
komar64.dll  
SHA256:
8E64BACAF40110547B334EADCB0792BDC891D7AE298FBFFF136712579
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mfcappk32.exe    
newpass.ps1   SHA256: c646199a9799b6158de419b1b7e36b46c7b7413d6c35bfffaeaa8700b2
npalll.exe   SHA256: bd270853db17f94c2b8e4bd9fa089756a147ed45cbc44d6c2b0c78f361
ole32.dll    
oleaut32.dll    
open.bat  
SHA256:
2EB3EF8A7A2C498E87F3820510752043B20CBE35B0CBD9AF3F69E8B8F
open.exe    
pass.ps1   SHA256: 0afed8d1b7c36008de188c20d7f0e2283251a174261547aab7fb56e31d
pdfdecrypt.exe    
powerview.ps1    
prt3389.bat   SHA256: e0d89c88378dcb1b6c9ce2d2820f8d773613402998b8dcdb024858010
ra.ps1   SHA256: 571f8db67d463ae80098edc7a1a0cad59153ce6592e42d370a45df46f1
rg1.exe    
Rg2.exe    
rundll32    
s64174.bat  
SHA256: 10a5612044599128981cb41d71d7390c15e7a2a0c2848ad751c3da1cb
SHA256: 1807549af1c8fdc5b04c564f4026e41790c554f339514d326f8b55cb7b
s64174.dll    
s9239.bat    
s9239.dll    
shell32.dll    
stel.exe    
syskav64.exe    
sysra64,exe    
systav332.bat   SHA256: 01242b35b6def71e42cc985e97d618e2fabd616b16d23f7081d575364d
TC-9.22a.2019.3.exe    
TeamViewer.exe    
testDLL.dll    
tug4rigd.dll   SHA256: 952b34f6370294c5a0bb122febfaa80612fef1f32eddd48a3d0556c4286
UpdateNotificationPipeline.002.etl    
user32.dll    
v1.bat    
v2.bat    
v3.bat    
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veeamp.exe   SHA256: 9aa1f37517458d635eae4f9b43cb4770880ea0ee171e7e4ad155bbdee0
version.dll    
vlhqbgvudfnirmzx.aspx    
wininet.dll    
wlog.exe    
wpeqawzp.sys    
y3lcx345.dll    
zero.exe   SHA256: 3a8b7c1fe9bd9451c0a51e4122605efc98e7e4e13ed117139a13e4749e
     
     
Table 2: Cuba Ransomware Associated Email Addresses, as of Late August 2022
Email Provider Email Addresses
Cuba-supp[.]com admin@cuba-supp[.]com
Encryption-support[.]com admin@encryption-support[.]com
Mail.supports24[.]net inbox@mail.supports24[.]net
Table 3: Cuba Ransomware Associated Jabber Address, as of Late August 2022
cuba_support@exploit[.]im
Table 4: IP Addresses Associated with Cuba Ransomware, as of Late August 2022
Note: Some of these observed IP addresses are more than a year old. FBI and CISA recommend vetting or investigating
these IP addresses prior to taking forward-looking action such as blocking.
193.23.244[.]244 144.172.83[.]13 216.45.55[.]30
94.103.9[.]79 149.255.35[.]131 217.79.43[.]148
192.137.101[.]46 154.35.175[.]225 222.252.53[.]33
92.222.172[.]39 159.203.70[.]39 23.227.198[.]246
92.222.172[.]172 171.25.193[.]9 31.184.192[.]44
10.13.102[.]1 185.153.199[.]169 37.120.247[.]39
10.13.102[.]58 192.137.100[.]96 37.44.253[.]21
10.133.78[.]41 192.137.100[.]98 38.108.119[.]121
10.14.100[.]20 192.137.101[.]205 45.164.21[.]13
103.114.163[.]197 193.34.167[.]17 45.32.229[.]66
103.27.203[.]197 194.109.206[.]212 45.86.162[.]34
104.217.8[.]100 195.54.160[.]149 45.91.83[.]176
107.189.10[.]143 199.58.81[.]140 64.52.169[.]174
108.170.31[.]115 204.13.164[.]118 64.235.39[.]82
128.31.0[.]34 209.76.253[.]84 79.141.169[.]220
128.31.0[.]39 212.192.241[.]230 84.17.52[.]135
131.188.40[.]189 213.32.39[.]43 86.59.21[.]38
https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa22-335a
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141.98.87[.]124 216.45.55[.]3  
Table 5: Cuba Bitcoin Wallets Receiving Payments, as of Late August 2022
bc1q4vr25xkth35qslenqwd7aw020w85qrvlrhv7hc
bc1q5uc0fdnz0ve5pg4nl4upa9ly586t6wmnghfe7x
bc1q6rsj3cn37dngypu5kad9gdw5ykhctpwhjvun3z
bc1q6zkemtyyrre2mkk23g93zyq98ygrygvx7z2q0t
bc1q9cj0n9k2m282x0nzj6lhqjvhkkd4h95sewek83
bc1qaselp9nhejc3safcq3vn5wautx6w33x0llk7dl
bc1qc48q628t93xwzljtvurpqhcvahvesadpwqtsza
bc1qgsuf5m9tgxuv4ylxcmx8eeqn3wmlmu7f49zkus
bc1qhpepeeh7hlz5jvrp50uhkz59lhakcfvme0w9qh
bc1qjep0vx2lap93455p7h29unruvr05cs242mrcah
bc1qr9l0gcl0nvmngap6ueyy5gqdwvm34kdmtevjyx
bc1qs3lv77udkap2enxv928x59yuact5df4t95rsqr
bc1qyd05q2m5qt3nwpd3gcqkyer0gspqx5p6evcf7h
bc1qzz7xweq8ee2j35tq6r5m687kctq9huskt50edv
bc1qvpk8ksl3my6kjezjss9p28cqj4dmpmmjx5yl3y
bc1qhtwfcysclc7pck2y3vmjtpzkaezhcm6perc99x
bc1qft3s53ur5uq5ru6sl3zyr247dpr55mnggwucd3
bc1qp7h9fszlqxjwyfhv0upparnsgx56x7v7wfx4x7
bc1q4vr25xkth35qslenqwd7aw020w85qrvlrhv7hc
bc1q5uc0fdnz0ve5pg4nl4upa9ly586t6wmnghfe7x
bc1q6rsj3cn37dngypu5kad9gdw5ykhctpwhjvun3z
bc1q6zkemtyyrre2mkk23g93zyq98ygrygvx7z2q0t
bc1q9cj0n9k2m282x0nzj6lhqjvhkkd4h95sewek83
bc1qaselp9nhejc3safcq3vn5wautx6w33x0llk7dl
bc1qc48q628t93xwzljtvurpqhcvahvesadpwqtsza
bc1qgsuf5m9tgxuv4ylxcmx8eeqn3wmlmu7f49zkus
bc1qhpepeeh7hlz5jvrp50uhkz59lhakcfvme0w9qh
bc1qjep0vx2lap93455p7h29unruvr05cs242mrcah
bc1qr9l0gcl0nvmngap6ueyy5gqdwvm34kdmtevjyx
bc1qs3lv77udkap2enxv928x59yuact5df4t95rsqr
bc1qyd05q2m5qt3nwpd3gcqkyer0gspqx5p6evcf7h
bc1qzz7xweq8ee2j35tq6r5m687kctq9huskt50edv
See figure 1 for an example of a Cuba ransomware note.
Figure 1: Sample Cuba Ransom Note 2, as of late August 2022
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Greetings! Unfortunately we have to report that your company were
compromised. All your files were
encrypted and you can’t restore them without our private key. Trying
to restore it without our help may
cause complete loss of your data. Also we researched whole your
corporate network and downloaded all
your sensitive data to our servers. If we will not get any contact
from you in the next 3 days we will public
it in our news site.
You can find it there (
https[:]// cuba4ikm4jakjgmkeztyawtdgr2xymvy6nvgw5cglswg3si76icnqd.onion/ )
Tor Browser is needed ( https[:]//www.torproject.org/download/ )
Also we respect your work and time and we are open for communication.
In that case we are ready to discuss
recovering your files and work. We can grant absolute privacy and
compliance with agreements by our side.
Also we can provide all necessary evidence to confirm performance of
our products and statements.
Feel free to contact us with quTox ( https[:]//tox.chat/download.html )
Our ToxID: 37790E2D198DFD20C9D2887D4EF7C3E295188842480192689864DCCA3C8BD808A18956768271
Alternative method is email: inbox@mail.supports24[.]net
Mark your messages with your personal ID:
Additional resources to detect possible exploitation or compromise:
Palo Alto Networks Novel News on Cuba Ransomware: Greetings From Tropical Scorpius
BlackBerry blog RomCom Threat Actor Abuses KeePass and SolarWinds to Target Ukraine and Potentially the
United Kingdom
BlackBerry blog Unattributed RomCom Threat Actor Spoofing Popular Apps Now Hits Ukrainian Militaries
MITRE ATT&CK TECHNIQUES
Cuba ransomware actors use the ATT&CK techniques listed in Table 6. Note: For details on TTPs listed in the table, see FBI
Flash Indicators of Compromise Associated with Cuba Ransomware.
Resource Development
Technique Title ID Use
Compromise Infrastructure:
Domains
T1584.001 Cuba ransomware actors use compromised networks to conduct
their operations.
Initial Access
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Technique Title ID Use
Valid Accounts T1078
Cuba ransomware actors have been known to use compromised
credentials to get into a victim’s network.
External Remote Services T1133
Cuba ransomware actors may leverage external-facing remote
services to gain initial access to a victim’s network.
Exploit Public-Facing Application T1190
Cuba ransomware actors are known to exploit vulnerabilities in
public-facing systems.
Phishing T1566
Cuba ransomware actors have sent phishing emails to obtain
initial access to systems.
Execution
Technique Title ID Use
Command and Scripting Interpreter:
PowerShell
T1059.001 Cuba ransomware actors have used PowerShell to escalate
privileges.
Software Deployment Tools T1072
Cuba ransomware actors use Hancitor as a tool to spread
malicious files throughout a victim’s network.
Privilege Escalation
Technique Title ID Use
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation T1068
Cuba ransomware actors have exploited ZeroLogon to gain
administrator privileges.[2 ]
Defense Evasion
Technique Title ID Use
Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify
Tools
T1562.001 Cuba ransomware actors leveraged a loader that disables
security tools within the victim network.
Lateral Movement
Technique Title ID Use
Remote Services Session: RDP
Hijacking
T1563.002
Cuba ransomware actors used RDP sessions to move laterally.
Credential Access
Technique Title ID Use
Credential Dumping: LSASS
Memory
T1003.001 Cuba ransomware actors use LSASS memory to retrieve stored
compromised credentials.
Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets:
Kerberoasting
T1558.003 Cuba ransomware actors used the Kerberoasting technique to
identify service accounts linked to active directory.[2 ]
Command and Control
Technique Title ID Use
Proxy: Manipulate Command and
Control Communications
T1090
Industrial Spy ransomware actors use HTTP/HTTPS proxy via a
C2 server to direct traffic to avoid direct connection. [2 ]
Mitigations
FBI and CISA recommend network defenders apply the following mitigations to limit potential adversarial use of common
system and network discovery techniques and to reduce the risk of compromise by Cuba ransomware:
https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa22-335a
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Implement a recovery plan to maintain and retain multiple copies of sensitive or proprietary data and servers in a
physically separate, segmented, and secure location (i.e., hard drive, storage device, the cloud).
Require all accounts with password logins (e.g., service account, admin accounts, and domain admin accounts) to
comply with National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) standards for developing and managing
password policies.
Use longer passwords consisting of at least 8 characters and no more than 64 characters in length.
Store passwords in hashed format using industry-recognized password managers.
Add password user “salts” to shared login credentials.
Avoid reusing passwords.
Implement multiple failed login attempt account lockouts.
Disable password “hints.”
Refrain from requiring password changes more frequently than once per year.
Note: NIST guidance suggests favoring longer passwords instead of requiring regular and frequent password
resets. Frequent password resets are more likely to result in users developing password “patterns” cyber
criminals can easily decipher.
Require administrator credentials to install software.
Require multifactor authentication for all services to the extent possible, particularly for webmail, virtual private
networks, and accounts that access critical systems.
Keep all operating systems, software, and firmware up to date. Timely patching is one of the most efficient and
cost-effective steps an organization can take to minimize its exposure to cybersecurity threats. Prioritize patching
SonicWall firewall vulnerabilities and known exploited vulnerabilities in internet-facing systems. Note: SonicWall
maintains a vulnerability list that includes Advisory ID, CVE, and mitigation. Their list can be found at
psirt.global.sonicwall.com/vuln-list .
Segment networks to prevent the spread of ransomware. Network segmentation can help prevent the spread of
ransomware by controlling traffic flows between—and access to—various subnetworks and by restricting adversary
lateral movement.
Identify, detect, and investigate abnormal activity and potential traversal of the indicated ransomware with a
networking monitoring tool. To aid in detecting the ransomware, implement a tool that logs and reports all network
traffic, including lateral movement activity on a network. Endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools are
particularly useful for detecting lateral connections as they have insight into common and uncommon network
connections for each host.
Install, regularly update, and enable real time detection for antivirus software on all hosts.
Review domain controllers, servers, workstations, and active directories for new and/or unrecognized accounts.
Audit user accounts with administrative privileges and configure access controls according to the principle of least
privilege.
Disable unused ports.
Consider adding an email banner to emails received from outside your organization.
Disable hyperlinks in received emails.
Implement time-based access for accounts set at the admin level and higher. For example, the Just-in-Time (JIT)
access method provisions privileged access when needed and can support enforcement of the principle of least
privilege (as well as the Zero Trust model). JIT sets a network-wide policy in place to automatically disable admin
accounts at the Active Directory level when the account is not in direct need. Individual users may submit their
requests through an automated process that grants them access to a specified system for a set timeframe when they
need to support the completion of a certain task.
Disable command-line and scripting activities and permissions. Privilege escalation and lateral movement often
depend on software utilities running from the command line. If threat actors are not able to run these tools, they will
have difficulty escalating privileges and/or moving laterally.
Maintain offline backups of data, and regularly maintain backup and restoration. By instituting this practice, the
organization ensures they will not be severely interrupted, and/or only have irretrievable data.
Ensure all backup data is encrypted, immutable (i.e., cannot be altered or deleted), and covers the entire
organization’s data infrastructure.
RESOURCES
Stopransomware.gov is a whole-of-government approach that gives one central location for ransomware resources
and alerts.
https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa22-335a
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Resource to mitigate a ransomware attack: CISA-Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC)
Joint Ransomware Guide.
No-cost cyber hygiene services: Cyber Hygiene Services and Ransomware Readiness Assessment .
REPORTING
FBI is seeking any information that can be shared, to include boundary logs showing communication to and from foreign IP
addresses, a sample ransom note, communications with ransomware actors, Bitcoin wallet information, decryptor files,
and/or a benign sample of an encrypted file.
FBI and CISA do not encourage paying ransom as payment does not guarantee victim files will be recovered. Furthermore,
payment may also embolden adversaries to target additional organizations, encourage other criminal actors to engage in the
distribution of ransomware, and/or fund illicit activities. Regardless of whether you or your organization have decided to pay
the ransom, FBI and CISA urge you to promptly report ransomware incidents immediately. Report to a local FBI Field
Office, or CISA at us-cert.cisa.gov/report.
DISCLAIMER
The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. FBI and CISA do not endorse any
commercial product or service, including any subjects of analysis. Any reference to specific commercial products, processes,
or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement,
recommendation, or favoring by FBI or CISA.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
FBI and CISA would like to thank BlackBerry, ESET, The National Cyber-Forensics and Training Alliance (NCFTA), Palo
Alto Networks, and PRODAFT for their contributions to this CSA.
References
[1] Palo Alto Networks: Tropical Scorpius
[2] Palo Alto Networks: Novel News on Cuba Ransomware - Greetings From Tropical Scorpius
[3] BlackBerry: Unattributed RomCom Threat Actor Spoofing Popular Apps Now Hits Ukrainian Militaries
[4] BlackBerry: RomCom Threat Actor Abuses KeePass and SolarWinds to Target Ukraine and Potentially the United
Kingdom
Revisions
December 1, 2022: Initial Version|December 12, 2022: Added new IP addresses and IOCs
Source: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa22-335a
https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa22-335a
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bc1qzz7xweq8ee2j35tq6r5m687kctq9huskt50edv See figure 1 for an example of a Cuba ransomware note.  
Figure 1: Sample Cuba Ransom Note 2, as of late August 2022
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