{
	"id": "2319e923-2a45-4c12-9411-6bc8ec736294",
	"created_at": "2026-10-25T02:56:31.35675Z",
	"updated_at": "2026-11-22T02:30:13.583692Z",
	"deleted_at": null,
	"sha1_hash": "9c3d90e57a7e19af94f305b7590fded4bc9c5db0",
	"title": "Behind Khmer Shadow: Targeted espionage against Cambodian government entities",
	"llm_title": "Behind Khmer Shadow: Targeted espionage against Cambodian government entities",
	"authors": "SubhajeetSingha, Acronis TRU",
	"file_creation_date": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
	"file_modification_date": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
	"file_size": 82351,
	"plain_text": "https://www.acronis.com/en/tru/posts/behind-khmer-shadow-targeted-espionage-against-cambodian-government-entities/\n\nBehind Khmer Shadow: Targeted espionage against Cambodian\n\ngovernment entities\n\nBy SubhajeetSingha\n\nPublished: 2026-06-10 · Archived: 2026-10-25 02:13:57 UTC\n\nAcronis TRU has identified two targeted campaigns against Cambodian government entities, with focus\n\non defense and military intelligence sectors, delivered by a cluster we’ve tracked as Khmer Shadow.\n\nBoth campaigns used a meeting-themed SFX archive to sideload a custom C++ loader we tracked as\n\nNIGHTFORGE, which decrypts and executes a Havoc Demon payload in memory.\n\nNIGHTFORGE has demonstrated a moderate level of sophistication, combining advanced defense-evasion\n\ntechniques such as NTDLL unhooking and Hell's Gate syscall resolution, a method that enables direct\n\nsystem calls and helps evade user-mode monitoring, with operational shortcomings that suggest the tool is\n\nstill under active development.\n\nThe group reused identical payloads and infrastructure across both campaigns with minimal retooling\n\nbetween targets.\n\nBased on targeting patterns, lure construction and operational characteristics, TRU has assessed with\n\nmoderate confidence that the activity is espionage motivated and likely aligned with regional intelligence\n\ncollection interests in Southeast Asia.\n\nIntroduction\n\nAcronis Threat Research Unit (TRU) has identified two espionage-focused campaigns targeting Cambodian\n\ngovernment entities in the defense and public works sectors. Both campaigns delivered a previously\n\nundocumented DLL-based loader, which we’ve tracked as NIGHTFORGE, through government-themed lures\n\npackaged in self-extracting (SFX) archives. Once executed, NIGHTFORGE decrypts and launches a Havoc\n\nDemon payload directly in memory.\n\nThe campaigns shared nearly identical tooling and infrastructure, with minimal changes between targets,\n\nsuggesting a low retooling tempo by the operator. Based on targeting patterns, lure construction and infrastructure\n\ncharacteristics, TRU has assessed with moderate confidence that the activity is espionage-motivated and likely\n\naligned with regional intelligence collection interests in Southeast Asia. We’ve tracked this previously unreported\n\ncluster as Khmer Shadow, based on its observed focus on Cambodian government entities.\n\nAttack chain\n\nFigure 1: Attack-Chain demonstration of the payload execution\n\nPage 1 of 9\n\nhttps://www.acronis.com/en/tru/posts/behind-khmer-shadow-targeted-espionage-against-cambodian-government-entities/\n\nThe attack chain begins with a suspected spear-phishing email delivering a compressed SFX archive named\n\nContact_Letter_To_Ms_Pech_ICB_Cambodia_On_Collaboration.pdf.exe. The archive bundles multiple benign\n\nlibrary files alongside a malicious DLL used for sideloading. The legitimate executable is\n\nVMwareNamespaceCmd.exe and the malicious DLL is vmtools.dll.\n\nOnce the victim executes the archive, an embedded script launches VMwareNamespaceCmd.exe, which sideloads\n\nvmtools.dll. NIGHTFORGE then establishes persistence, drops the Havoc Demon payload, and connects to the\n\ncommand-and-control (C2) server.\n\nThe key difference between the two campaigns was the decoy document. The campaign targeting Cambodia's\n\nInformation Collection Bureau (ICB) included a decoy PDF, while the campaign targeting the Ministry of Public\n\nWorks and Transport did not.\n\nTechnical details\n\nInitial analysis and delivery mechanism\n\nFigure 2: Execution script found inside the SFX-compressed executable\n\nThe investigation began with the detection of\n\nContact_Letter_To_Ms_Pech_ICB_Cambodia_On_Collaboration.pdf.exe on VirusTotal, a SFX archive\n\nmasquerading as a PDF document. Once extracted, the archive contained a malicious script responsible for\n\nexecuting the loader, deleting all DLL files, the decoy PDF and remaining artifacts including the SFX archive\n\nitself from disk, a basic cleanup routine used by the threat actor to hide its tracks.\n\nPivoting on the vmtools.dll hash, the VMwareNamespaceCmd.exe binary, the SFX file structure, and the upload\n\ntime, we identified a second sample uploaded to VirusTotal from Cambodia within a similar timeframe. The\n\nsecond archive, named CN_Contact_Work_Cambodia's_Ministry_of_Public_Works_and_Transport.pdf,\n\nshared an identical file structure and the same sideloading chain.\n\nVictimology for both campaigns was deduced from the archive filenames, the decoy document content and the\n\nnamed recipient in the lure letter, which collectively pointed to the Information Collection Bureau under\n\nCambodia's Ministry of National Defense for the first campaign, and the Ministry of Public Works and Transport\n\nfor the second. The only notable difference between the two was the absence of a decoy document in the second\n\ncampaign.\n\nLooking into the decoy\n\nOf the two campaigns, only the operation targeting Cambodia's military intelligence apparatus included a decoy\n\ndocument. No decoy was present in the campaign targeting the Ministry of Public Works and Transport.\n\nFigure 3a, 3b and 3c: Decoy letter snippet (Chen Minglong / Ms. Pech Nget)\n\nWhen analyzing the decoy document, we found that the letter is addressed to Ms. Pech Nget, who appears to work\n\nunder the Information Collection Bureau (ICB) of Cambodia's Ministry of National Defense. The sender signs off\n\nas Chen Minglong from a \"Development and Investment Division\" based in Beijing. We could not find any public\n\nPage 2 of 9\n\nhttps://www.acronis.com/en/tru/posts/behind-khmer-shadow-targeted-espionage-against-cambodian-government-entities/\n\ntrace of either individual, which suggests the operator may have fabricated both personas to lend credibility to the\n\nlure.\n\nLooking at the content of the decoy, the letter talks about an upcoming \"mission in May 2026\" and lays out three\n\nareas of proposed coordination: setting up a data exchange protocol between the sender's division and the ICB,\n\ndiscussing what technical resources the ICB team can provide and sorting out clearances and meetings for a site\n\nvisit with MOD personnel. It reads like any routine bilateral cooperation email between China and Cambodia,\n\nexactly the kind of thing someone in defense coordination would open without a second thought. Notably, the\n\nletter references an individual named \"Youthy\" and an \"EOD Administrative team.\" Although we could not\n\nindependently verify either reference, their inclusion suggests the operator attempted to incorporate organization-\n\nspecific details into the lure to enhance its credibility.\n\nDLL sideloading\n\nFigure 4: VMwareNamespaceCmd.exe digital signature\n\nFigure 5: DLL export table\n\nWhen the victim executes the SFX archive, VMwareNamespaceCmd.exe and the malicious vmtools.dll are placed\n\nin the same directory. VMwareNamespaceCmd.exe is a legitimate VMware-signed binary that statically imports\n\nseveral functions from vmtools.dll. As a result, Windows automatically loads the malicious DLL before the\n\napplication begins execution.\n\nOne of the first functions called by the binary is VmCheck_IsVirtualWorld. The attacker-controlled DLL exports\n\nthis function and returns TRUE, causing the VMware application to continue operating normally while\n\nNIGHTFORGE executes under the context of a trusted VMware-signed process.\n\nNIGHTFORGE loader\n\nAnalysis of vmtools.dll showed that it acts as a custom loader, which decrypts and executes a shellcode payload\n\nstored in a companion file, ultimately launching the next stage of the infection chain.\n\nFigure 6: IDA Imports view showing vmtools.dll imports\n\nDespite minor differences in how the payload is stored across the two campaigns, the NIGHTFORGE loader is\n\nnearly identical in both samples. While the DLL exports multiple functions, execution ultimately passes through\n\nVmCheck_IsVirtualWorld, which serves as the loader's primary entry point.\n\nFigure 7: PEB ImagePathName resolution\n\nRather than calling GetModuleFileName, the loader resolves the full image path of the running executable directly\n\nfrom the Process Environment Block (PEB) via ImagePathName, retrieving it as a Unicode string.\n\nFigure 8: IsRunningFromStagedLocation and other code logic\n\nOnce the path is retrieved, the loader runs through three key functions: checking if it's running from the intended\n\npersistence directory, hiding the foreground window, then loading and executing the shellcode from disk.\n\nPage 3 of 9\n\nhttps://www.acronis.com/en/tru/posts/behind-khmer-shadow-targeted-espionage-against-cambodian-government-entities/\n\nFigure 9\n\nNext, the IsRunningFromStagedLocation function compares the current image path against the temp directory and\n\nthe Windows directory. Running from temp means it hasn't staged yet. Running from the Windows directory\n\nconfirms it's already sitting in its persistence location under VMwareNamespace and can proceed with payload\n\ndecryption and execution.\n\nFigure 10: HideForegroundWindowAndCheckInteractive function inside the loader\n\nThe function we renamed HideForegroundWindowAndCheckInteractive checks whether an active foreground\n\nwindow is present and hides it to reduce the loader's visibility to the user. It also verifies that the current session is\n\ninteractive, ensuring the payload executes only when a user is actively logged in rather than in a headless or\n\nsandboxed environment. If these checks succeed, execution is transferred to LoadDecryptAndExecutePayload.\n\nLoadDecryptAndExecutePayload is responsible for the core stages of the infection chain. It first unhooks NTDLL\n\n(NT Layer Dynamic-Link Library), then decrypts the encoded shellcode stored on disk, and finally executes the\n\npayload in memory using direct syscalls.\n\nFigure 11a and 11b: LoadDecryptAndExecutePayload and NTDLL unhooking\n\nThe loader obtains a handle to the in-memory copy of ntdll, loads a clean copy directly from disk, and maps it into\n\nmemory using the CreateFileMappingW and MapViewOfFile APIs. It then walks the PE section headers to locate\n\nthe .text section and overwrites the in-memory copy with the clean version from disk. This technique of\n\nunhooking the NTDLL is therefore used to remove the inline hooks that have been placed on the NTDLL\n\nfunctions, which is basically an anti-malware bypass technique. Then it goes ahead and reads the file size of the\n\nencoded shellcode file on the disk using APIs such as GetFileSize.\n\nFigure 12a and 12b: Hell's Gate syscall resolution\n\nNext, it resolves syscall numbers at runtime using Hell's Gate, locating NtAllocateVirtualMemory,\n\nNtWriteVirtualMemory, NtCreateThreadEx and NtWaitForSingleObject via GetProcAddress and scanning each\n\nstub for the 4C 8B D1 B8 signature to extract the syscall number and syscall instruction address.\n\nFigure 13: XOR Key Derivation\n\nNext, once the syscalls have been resolved via the Hell's Gate technique, the code decodes the encoded shellcode\n\nblob present on disk using a simple XOR method. It reads the first 8 bytes of the encrypted file and XORs them\n\nagainst a hardcoded magic value (42 3A 4B 5C F0 EA 72 18) to derive an 8-byte key, then decrypts the remaining\n\ncontents using a rolling 8-byte XOR with that derived key.\n\nFigure 14: Shellcode injection via direct syscalls\n\nFurther the decrypted shellcode is then injected into the current process by allocating RWX memory via\n\nNtAllocateVirtualMemory, writing the payload into it with NtWriteVirtualMemory, and spawning a new thread\n\nthrough NtCreateThreadEx. At that point the loader's job is done, and execution moves to establish persistence.\n\nPersistence\n\nPage 4 of 9\n\nhttps://www.acronis.com/en/tru/posts/behind-khmer-shadow-targeted-espionage-against-cambodian-government-entities/\n\nBefore diving into the next stage involving the shellcode, we found that the loader uses a slightly interesting way\n\nto establish persistence.\n\nFigure 15a, 15b and 15c: COM-based persistence used in NIGHTFORGE\n\nWe saw that it is using COM APIs for persistence. Initially it calls CoInitialize to set up the COM library, then\n\nuses CoCreateInstance to create an instance of the Task Scheduler service. It then calls ITaskService::Connect\n\nthrough the vtable to establish a connection, followed by ITaskService::GetFolder to access the root task folder\n\nwith the path \"\\\".\n\nFrom there it builds the scheduled task definition with a registration trigger configured with a start boundary of\n\n\"2010-01-01T00:00:00\", a repetition interval of \"PT10M\" (every 10 minutes), and a duration of \"P1D\" (one day).\n\nIt sets the executable action pointing to the loader's path in the staged directory, and finally calls\n\nITaskFolder::RegisterTaskDefinition with the TASK_CREATE_OR_UPDATE flag to register the task under the\n\nname \"VMwareNamespace\", which blends in with legitimate VMware entries in the task scheduler.\n\nKaynLdr and the Demon\n\nFigure 16: Code depicting KaynLdr\n\nAnalysis of the decoded payload revealed that the penultimate stage is KaynLdr, a well-known open-source\n\nreflective loader used to load the final-stage Havoc Demon implant.\n\nFigure 17: Code depicting KaynLdr’s FindEmbeddedPE function\n\nThe first part of this reflective loader looks for an embedded PE file inside its own code address and validates the\n\noutcome until a valid MZ header is found. For ease, we have renamed this function to FindEmbeddedPE.\n\nFigure 18a and 18b\n\nFollowed by another function, which uses the PEB and walks the InLoadOrderModuleList via PEB_LDR_DATA\n\nto enumerate all loaded modules in the current process. For each module, it hashes the BaseDllName using a\n\nDJB2 hashing algorithm with a hardcoded seed constant of 5381 followed by, comparing the result against a\n\nprecomputed hash value to locate ntdll.dll.\n\nFigure 19: Code depicting walking the PEB InLoadOrderModuleList and hashing each module's\n\nBaseDllName\n\nOnce the base address of ntdll.dll is resolved, the loader walks its export table to find three functions it needs:\n\nLdrLoadDll, NtAllocateVirtualMemory and NtProtectVirtualMemory, matching each export name against\n\nprecomputed hash values. With these in hand, it parses the embedded PE's headers, allocates a fresh region of\n\nmemory and copies each section into place at its expected virtual address. If the image lands at a different base\n\nthan the author originally intended, the loader patches up all the absolute addresses by walking the relocation\n\ntable.\n\nThe loader then sets the right page protections on each section, executable for code, read-write for data and read-\n\nonly where appropriate, before handing off execution to the DLL's DllMain entry point. From this point on, the\n\nPage 5 of 9\n\nhttps://www.acronis.com/en/tru/posts/behind-khmer-shadow-targeted-espionage-against-cambodian-government-entities/\n\nactual Havoc Demon implant is running entirely in memory, with no trace of the decrypted payload ever written to\n\ndisk. Well, an important aspect of KaynLdr being used is that it erases the DOS and NT Header. Therefore, we\n\nextracted the final payload using a simple python script to get the last stage Havoc Demon.\n\nFigure 20: Code depicting API Hashing\n\nAs analysis of the Havoc Demon payload revealed numerous capabilities consistent with the open-source Havoc\n\nC2 framework, including API hashing and other standard implant functionality. Given that these features have\n\nbeen extensively documented elsewhere, we focus on extracting and analyzing the agent configuration embedded\n\nwithin the payload.\n\nFigure 21a and 21b: Havoc Demon config extractor output\n\nUpon extracting the Demon agent configuration from the embedded DLL, we found that the implant\n\ncommunicates with its C2 server at www[.]sharingfile[.]cloud over HTTPS on port 443 using POST requests.\n\nThe operator has set up the agent to look like normal browser traffic, using a Chrome user-agent string and\n\nstandard browser headers that all point back to the same domain. The C2 traffic rotates across five endpoints\n\ndesigned to look like sections of a news website: /national, /world, /sport, /download and /regular. For post-\n\nexploitation tasks, the agent spawns gpupdate.exe as its sacrificial process for injection, which is a legitimate\n\nWindows binary that wouldn't look out of place on the target machine.\n\nFigure 22: Havoc Demon HTTP headers\n\nFollowed by which, we found that the demon implant is configured with HTTP headers that make its traffic look\n\nlike someone browsing a website in Chrome. The user-agent mimics Chrome 131 on Windows 10, and the Origin\n\nand Referrer headers both point to sharingfile[.]cloud. It also sends Sec-Fetch headers that browsers normally\n\ninclude on every page of visit. The goal is simple: make the C2 traffic blend in with everyday web browsing, so it\n\nslips past network monitoring without raising suspicion.\n\nInfrastructural artifacts\n\nThe Havoc Demon, dropped from the NIGHTFORGE Loader via KaynLdr, was observed communicating with\n\nsharingfile[.]cloud over port 443, extracted directly from the implant's config.\n\nFigure 23: Information related to the C2 domain\n\nFurther pivoting, we found that the domain sharingfile[.]cloud was registered through NameSilo and currently sits\n\nbehind CloudFlare's CDN, which acts as a reverse proxy to mask the true origin of the C2 server. On the\n\nCloudFlare edge, the domain resolves to 172.67.129[.]134 and returns a 403 Forbidden response with the page\n\ntitle \"Attention Required! | CloudFlare\", suggesting the operator configured CloudFlare's bot protection to filter\n\nout unwanted visitors and scanners.\n\nFigure 24: CriminalIP view of sharingfile[.]cloud\n\nFurther investigation using CriminalIP revealed the origin server behind CloudFlare at 193.169.240[.]38, hosted\n\nby SERVER.UA LLC in Mykolayiv, Ukraine. The server runs Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0, exposes only port 443,\n\nPage 6 of 9\n\nhttps://www.acronis.com/en/tru/posts/behind-khmer-shadow-targeted-espionage-against-cambodian-government-entities/\n\nand returns a bare 404 response with a content length of just 18 bytes when accessed directly. A CloudFlare Origin\n\nCertificate tied to sharingfile[.]cloud is installed on the server, which we assess with moderate confidence\n\nconfirms it as the backend for the C2 domain. The JARM fingerprint\n\n3fd21b20d00000021c43d21b21b43de0a012c76cf078b8d06f4620c2286f5e was then used for further pivoting.\n\nFigure 25: Origin server details using CriminalIP\n\nFigure 26: JARM pivot on Shodan\n\nPivoting on the JARM fingerprint through Shodan returned only two results at the time of our search. The first\n\nwas our known C2 server at 193.169.240[.]38, hosted in Kyiv, Ukraine, serving sharingfile[.]cloud on port 443.\n\nThe second was a previously unknown server at 104.193.255[.]99, hosted in Santa Clara, United States, serving\n\nlinkednewsapi[.]top on port 8443.\n\nBoth servers returned identical responses: a bare 404 with the same server header, the same Vary: Cookie header,\n\nand a body of exactly 18 bytes. Both ran Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0 and were protected by CloudFlare Origin\n\nCertificates issued by the same certificate authority. The combination of an identical JARM fingerprint, a\n\nmatching server stack, an identical response structure, and shared certificate characteristics leads us to assess with\n\nmoderate confidence that linkednewsapi[.]top is operated by the same threat cluster. The domain had no prior\n\npublic reporting or VirusTotal detections at the time of discovery. While none of these indicators alone are\n\nsufficient to establish common ownership, their combination provides moderate-confidence evidence of\n\noperational linkage.\n\nFigure 27: C2 infrastructure overlap timeline\n\nHere is an overlap timeline between the two C2 servers we identified. The operator set up sharingfile[.]cloud first,\n\nwith its CloudFlare Origin Certificate going live in early December 2025. About eight weeks later, a second\n\ncertificate was issued for linkednewsapi[.]top, which tells us they were already spinning up a second server by late\n\nJanuary. Things picked up in March: on March 10, the SSL certificate for sharingfile[.]cloud showed up in\n\nhistorical records for the first time, and that same day lines up with the compile timestamp on the Havoc Demon\n\nDLL we extracted, which had the domain baked into its config. Three weeks after that, on March 31, the\n\ncertificate on the same domain was rotated.\n\nAttribution and confidence\n\nAttribution in threat intelligence is never straightforward. Threat groups routinely borrow, share, and outright copy\n\neach other's tools and techniques, and a TTP match alone is rarely enough to pin an operation on a specific actor.\n\nWith that in mind, we approached this campaign cautiously, looking at the full picture rather than any single\n\nartifact.\n\nThe use of vmtools.dll as a sideloaded DLL is worth calling out specifically because it has been seen before, most\n\nnotably by APT29 in a campaign against European diplomats in early 2025, and by groups like Mustang\n\nPanda and PatchWork. The filename is a natural choice for anyone abusing VMware-signed binaries since\n\nvmtools.dll ships with VMware tools and appears on HijackLibs as a known sideloading target. We noted this\n\nPage 7 of 9\n\nhttps://www.acronis.com/en/tru/posts/behind-khmer-shadow-targeted-espionage-against-cambodian-government-entities/\n\noverlap but do not treat it as an attribution indicator, as independent selection of the same well-known sideloading\n\ntarget is entirely plausible.\n\nThe targeting profile, lure construction and operational characteristics observed across both campaigns are\n\nconsistent with an espionage-focused actor operating in Southeast Asia. The campaigns were deliberately aimed at\n\nCambodian government entities in the defense and public works sectors, indicating a clear intelligence collection\n\nobjective. At the same time, the combination of a custom C++ loader, KaynLdr and Havoc Demon does not\n\nclosely resemble any previously documented cluster we track, and the infrastructure shows no meaningful overlap\n\nwith known threat groups.\n\nAs a result, we are not attributing this activity to any known actor at this time. Acronis TRU tracks the activity\n\nas a previously unreported cluster, which we designate Khmer Shadow, and will continue monitoring for\n\nadditional activity that may provide stronger attribution opportunities.\n\nConclusion: Advanced evasion, limited operational security\n\nUltimately, this campaign reflects a cluster that prioritized stealth over operational security. While Khmer Shadow\n\nemployed advanced evasion techniques, including NTDLL unhooking, Hell's Gate syscall resolution, and DLL\n\nsideloading, it repeatedly reused the same payloads and infrastructure across multiple targets. This inconsistency\n\nenabled infrastructure correlation and ultimately led to the identification of additional cluster-controlled assets\n\nthrough JARM-based pivoting.\n\nDetection by Acronis\n\nAcronis detects and blocks both the NIGHTFORGE loader and the Havoc Demon payload as high-severity\n\nthreats.\n\nIndicators of compromise\n\nSHA256: Contact_Letter_To_Ms_Pech_ICB_Cambodia_On_Collaboration.pdf.exe\n\n1852120a84a328edd1995e633dfd2009867898a8e3f0b385e2490cf21c77a994\n\nCN_Contact_Work_Cambodia's_Ministry_of_Public_Works_and_Transport.pdf\n\nb3e853eee14fb7948c6907888ee07139085ba9af4231c30e97ff6236b86ca024\n\nHavoc Payloads 90bbfa9e7af176b85d110f4f1789cae6777fcb60813b047133c8f12caa344a17\n\n15278c52f4e0d8b5bbfe288a5e826ab2ebeaedb7fb85572940cf1263e384761f\n\nPaths used for persistence: %LOCALAPPDATA%\\VMwareNamespace\\\n\nScheduled task:   Task name: VMwareNamespace\n\nTrigger: Daily, starting 2010-01-01T00:00:00, repeat every PT10M for P1D\n\nLogon type: TASK_LOGON_INTERACTIVE_TOKEN\n\nPrevious task name (cleaned up by loader): driver\n\nPage 8 of 9\n\nhttps://www.acronis.com/en/tru/posts/behind-khmer-shadow-targeted-espionage-against-cambodian-government-entities/\n\nC2 domains:\n\nwww[.]sharingfile[.]cloud\n\nlinkednewsapi[.]top\n\nC2 origin IPs:\n\n193[.]169[.]240[.]38        (SERVER.UA LLC, Kyiv, Ukraine)\n\n104[.]193[.]255[.]99        (Hosting Solution Ltd., Santa Clara, U.S.)\n\nSource: https://www.acronis.com/en/tru/posts/behind-khmer-shadow-targeted-espionage-against-cambodian-government-entities/\n\nPage 9 of 9",
	"extraction_quality": 1,
	"language": "EN",
	"sources": [
		"Malpedia"
	],
	"origins": [
		"web"
	],
	"references": [
		"https://www.acronis.com/en/tru/posts/behind-khmer-shadow-targeted-espionage-against-cambodian-government-entities/"
	],
	"report_names": [
		"behind-khmer-shadow-targeted-espionage-against-cambodian-government-entities"
	],
	"threat_actors": [
		{
			"id": "9b625e2d-a092-420f-a17f-a8a7d1bbe934",
			"created_at": "2026-09-17T02:00:03.779046Z",
			"updated_at": "2026-11-22T02:00:14.089383Z",
			"deleted_at": null,
			"main_name": "IRON HEMLOCK",
			"aliases": [
				"APT29",
				"ATK7",
				"Blue Kitsune",
				"Cozy Bear",
				"The Dukes",
				"UNC2452",
				"YTTRIUM"
			],
			"source_name": "Secureworks:IRON HEMLOCK",
			"tools": [
				"CosmicDuke",
				"CozyCar",
				"CozyDuke",
				"DiefenDuke",
				"FatDuke",
				"HAMMERTOSS",
				"LiteDuke",
				"MiniDuke",
				"OnionDuke",
				"PolyglotDuke",
				"RegDuke",
				"RegDuke Loader",
				"SeaDuke",
				"Sliver"
			],
			"source_id": "Secureworks",
			"reports": null
		},
		{
			"id": "20d3a08a-3b97-4b2f-90b8-92a89089a57a",
			"created_at": "2022-10-25T15:50:23.548494Z",
			"updated_at": "2026-11-22T02:00:11.516969Z",
			"deleted_at": null,
			"main_name": "APT29",
			"aliases": [
				"APT29",
				"IRON RITUAL",
				"IRON HEMLOCK",
				"NobleBaron",
				"Dark Halo",
				"NOBELIUM",
				"UNC2452",
				"YTTRIUM",
				"The Dukes",
				"Cozy Bear",
				"CozyDuke",
				"SolarStorm",
				"Blue Kitsune",
				"UNC3524",
				"Midnight Blizzard"
			],
			"source_name": "MITRE:APT29",
			"tools": [
				"PinchDuke",
				"ROADTools",
				"WellMail",
				"CozyCar",
				"Mimikatz",
				"Tasklist",
				"OnionDuke",
				"FatDuke",
				"POSHSPY",
				"EnvyScout",
				"SoreFang",
				"GeminiDuke",
				"reGeorg",
				"GoldMax",
				"FoggyWeb",
				"SDelete",
				"PolyglotDuke",
				"AADInternals",
				"MiniDuke",
				"SeaDuke",
				"Sibot",
				"RegDuke",
				"CloudDuke",
				"GoldFinder",
				"AdFind",
				"PsExec",
				"NativeZone",
				"Systeminfo",
				"ipconfig",
				"Impacket",
				"Cobalt Strike",
				"PowerDuke",
				"QUIETEXIT",
				"HAMMERTOSS",
				"BoomBox",
				"CosmicDuke",
				"WellMess",
				"VaporRage",
				"LiteDuke"
			],
			"source_id": "MITRE",
			"reports": null
		},
		{
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