

User Execution – Malicious Image (containers & IaaS) – pull/run → start → anomalous behavior (T1204.003), Detection Strategy DET0248

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AN0691

CONTAINERS (Docker/K8s/containerd): A user pulls an untrusted image from a public/unknown registry and then creates/starts a container from that image. Shortly after start, the container spawns unexpected utilities (e.g., curl/wget/bash/python), or makes outbound network connections atypical for the namespace/workload. The analytic correlates Image Creation/Download → Container Creation → Container Start → Command Execution/Network activity within a short window and with a consistent image digest.

Log Sources

Data Component	Name	Channel
Image Creation (DC0015)	containerd:events	Image pull from untrusted registry (name NOT IN allowlist) or new digest never seen before
Container Creation (DC0072)	kubernetes:audit	create: Pod/Container created with image tag 'latest' or mutable tag; imagePullPolicy=Always; noDigest=true
Container Start (DC0077)	kubernetes:events	start: ContainerStarted or Pulling image → Started container
Command Execution (DC0064)	auditd:SYSCALL	execve: Process in container namespace executes curl wget bash sh python nc with outbound args
Network Traffic Content (DC0085)	NSM:Flow	New egress from container IP/namespace to Internet or non-approved CIDRs/ASNs

Mutable Elements

Field	Description
ImageRegistryAllowList	Approved registries/namespaces (e.g., ECR/GCR/ACR org repos).
TimeWindow	Correlation window from image pull to container activity (e.g., ≤15m).
SuspiciousBinaries	Executables treated as high-risk when run in app containers (bash, sh, curl, wget, nc, powershell for Windows containers).

Field	Description
NamespaceScope	K8s namespaces that should never pull from Internet or run mutable tags.
OutboundCIDRBlockList	Destination networks/domains that should not be contacted by containers.

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IAAS (Cloud images/VMs): A new VM/instance is launched from a non-approved or newly-seen image (AMI/GCP Image/Azure Image). On first boot, cloud-init/user-data or embedded agents download code, spawn system utilities, or open outbound C2/mining traffic. The analytic correlates Instance/Image Creation → Instance Start → in-guest Process/Command Execution and/or anomalous network traffic.

Log Sources

Mutable Elements

Field	Description
ApprovedImageCatalog	Set of golden images/owners and digest/IDs allowed to launch.
UserDataInspection	Whether to alert when userData/cloud-init contains exec or download directives.
FirstBootWindow	Time after start considered first-boot (e.g., ≤30m) for correlation.
VMTagScope	Restrict detection to prod or internet-facing subnets to reduce noise.

Source: <https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0248#AN0692>