**HOME** **ABOUT US** **CAREERS** **PUBLICATIONS** **ALERTS AND TIPS** **RELATED RESOURCES** **C³ VP** # Alert (TA17-164A) More Alerts ## HIDDEN COBRA – North Korea’s DDoS Botnet Infrastructure **Original release date: June 13, 2017 | Last revised: June 14, 2017** #### Systems Affected **Networked Systems** #### Overview **This joint Technical Alert (TA) is the result of analytic efforts between the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).** **This alert provides technical details on the tools and infrastructure used by cyber actors of the North Korean government to target the media, aerospace, financial,** **and critical infrastructure sectors in the United States and globally. Working with U.S. Government partners, DHS and FBI identified Internet Protocol (IP) addresses** **associated with a malware variant, known as DeltaCharlie, used to manage North Korea’s distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) botnet infrastructure. This alert** **contains indicators of compromise (IOCs), malware descriptions, network signatures, and host-based rules to help network defenders detect activity conducted by** **the North Korean government. The U.S. Government refers to the malicious cyber activity by the North Korean government as HIDDEN COBRA.** **If users or administrators detect the custom tools indicative of HIDDEN COBRA, these tools should be immediately flagged, reported to the DHS National** **Cybersecurity Communications and Integration Center (NCCIC) or the FBI Cyber Watch (CyWatch), and given highest priority for enhanced mitigation. This alert** **identifies IP addresses linked to systems infected with DeltaCharlie malware and provides descriptions of the malware and associated malware signatures. DHS** **and FBI are distributing these IP addresses to enable network defense activities and reduce exposure to the DDoS command-and-control network. FBI has high** **confidence that HIDDEN COBRA actors are using the IP addresses for further network exploitation.** **This alert includes technical indicators related to specific North Korean government cyber operations and provides suggested response actions to those indicators,** **recommended mitigation techniques, and information on reporting incidents to the U.S. Government.** **For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see:** **IOCs (.csv)** **IOCs (STIX)** #### Description **Since 2009, HIDDEN COBRA actors have leveraged their capabilities to target and compromise a range of victims; some intrusions have resulted in the exfiltration** **[of data while others have been disruptive in nature. Commercial reporting has referred to this activity as Lazarus Group[1]](https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/collection/Actor-Lazarus-Group-0bf5e50d24445f94d6b2d744dc6c63a2)** **and Guardians of Peace.** **[[2]](https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/operation-blockbuster-unveils-the-actors-behind-the-sony-attacks)** **DHS and FB** **assess that HIDDEN COBRA actors will continue to use cyber operations to advance their government’s military and strategic objectives. Cyber analysts are** **encouraged to review the information provided in this alert to detect signs of malicious network activity.** **Tools and capabilities used by HIDDEN COBRA actors include DDoS botnets, keyloggers, remote access tools (RATs), and wiper malware. Variants of malware and** **[tools used by HIDDEN COBRA actors include Destover,[3]](https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/destover-destructive-malware-has-links-attacks-south-korea)** **[Wild Positron/Duuzer,[4]](https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/duuzer-back-door-trojan-targets-south-korea-take-over-computers)** **[and Hangman.[5]](https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/09/zero-day_hwp_exploit.html)** **[DHS has previously released Alert TA14-353A, [6] which](https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA14-353A)** **contains additional details on the use of a server message block (SMB) worm tool employed by these actors. Further research is needed to understand the full** **breadth of this group’s cyber capabilities. In particular, DHS recommends that more research should be conducted on the North Korean cyber activity that has been** **reported by cybersecurity and threat research firms.** **HIDDEN COBRA actors commonly target systems running older, unsupported versions of Microsoft operating systems. The multiple vulnerabilities in these older** **systems provide cyber actors many targets for exploitation. These actors have also used Adobe Flash player vulnerabilities to gain initial entry into users’** **environments.** **HIDDEN COBRA is known to use vulnerabilities affecting various applications. These vulnerabilities include:** **CVE-2015-6585: Hangul Word Processor Vulnerability** **CVE-2015-8651: Adobe Flash Player 18.0.0.324 and 19.x Vulnerability** **CVE-2016-0034: Microsoft Silverlight 5.1.41212.0 Vulnerability** **CVE-2016-1019: Adobe Flash Player 21.0.0.197 Vulnerability** **CVE-2016-4117: Adobe Flash Player 21.0.0.226 Vulnerability** **We recommend that organizations upgrade these applications to the latest version and patch level. If Adobe Flash or Microsoft Silverlight is no longer required, we** **recommend that those applications be removed from systems.** **The indicators provided with this alert include IP addresses determined to be part of the HIDDEN COBRA botnet infrastructure, identified as DeltaCharlie. The** **[DeltaCharlie DDoS bot was originally reported by Novetta in their 2016 Operation Blockbuster Malware Report.[7]](https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf)** **This malware has used the IP addresses** **identified in the accompanying .csv and .stix files as both source and destination IPs. In some instances, the malware may have been present on victims’ networks** **for a significant period.** #### Technical Details ----- **executables, changing its own configuration, updating its own binaries, terminating its own processes, and activating and terminating denial-of-service attacks.** **Further details on the malware can be found in Novetta’s report.** #### Detection and Response **HIDDEN COBRA IOCs related to DeltaCharlie are provided within the accompanying .csv and .stix files of this alert. DHS and FBI recommend that network** **administrators review the IP addresses, file hashes, network signatures, and YARA rules provided, and add the IPs to their watchlist to determine whether malicious** **activity has been observed within their organization.** **When reviewing network perimeter logs for the IP addresses, organizations may find numerous instances of these IP addresses attempting to connect to their** **systems. Upon reviewing the traffic from these IP addresses, system owners may find that some traffic corresponds to malicious activity and some to legitimate** **activity. System owners are also advised to run the YARA tool on any system they suspect to have been targeted by HIDDEN COBRA actors. Additionally, the** **appendices of this report provide network signatures to aid in the detection and mitigation of HIDDEN COBRA activity.** #### Network Signatures and Host-Based Rules **This section contains network signatures and host-based rules that can be used to detect malicious activity associated with HIDDEN COBRA actors. Although** **created using a comprehensive vetting process, the possibility of false positives always remains. These signatures and rules should be used to supplement** **analysis and should not be used as a sole source of attributing this activity to HIDDEN COBRA actors.** #### Network Signatures **alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"DPRK_HIDDEN_COBRA_DDoS_HANDSHAKE_SUCCESS"; dsize:6; flow:established,to_server; content:"|18 17 e9 e9 e9 e9|";** **fast_pattern:only; sid:1; rev:1;)** **________________________________________________________________** **alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"DPRK_HIDDEN_COBRA_Botnet_C2_Host_Beacon"; flow:established,to_server; content:"|1b 17 e9 e9 e9 e9|"; depth:6;** **fast_pattern; sid:1; rev:1;)** **________________________________________________________________** #### YARA Rules **"strings:** **$rsaKey = {7B 4E 1E A7 E9 3F 36 4C DE F4 F0 99 C4 D9 B7 94** **A1 FF F2 97 D3 91 13 9D C0 12 02 E4 4C BB 6C 77** **48 EE 6F 4B 9B 53 60 98 45 A5 28 65 8A 0B F8 39** **73 D7 1A 44 13 B3 6A BB 61 44 AF 31 47 E7 87 C2** **AE 7A A7 2C 3A D9 5C 2E 42 1A A6 78 FE 2C AD ED** **39 3F FA D0 AD 3D D9 C5 3D 28 EF 3D 67 B1 E0 68** **3F 58 A0 19 27 CC 27 C9 E8 D8 1E 7E EE 91 DD 13** **B3 47 EF 57 1A CA FF 9A 60 E0 64 08 AA E2 92 D0}** **condition: any of them"** **________________________________________________________________** **"strings:** **$STR1 = "Wating" wide ascii** **$STR2 = "Reamin" wide ascii** **$STR3 = "laptos" wide ascii** **condition: (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D or uint16(0) == 0xCFD0 or uint16(0) == 0xC3D4 or uint32(0) == 0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and 2 of them}"** **________________________________________________________________** **"strings:** **$randomUrlBuilder = { 83 EC 48 53 55 56 57 8B 3D ?? ?? ?? ?? 33 C0 C7 44 24 28 B4 6F 41 00 C7 44 24 2C B0 6F 41 00 C7 44 24 30 AC 6F 41 00 C7 44 24 34** **A8 6F 41 00 C7 44 24 38 A4 6F 41 00 C7 44 24 3C A0 6F 41 00 C7 44 24 40 9C 6F 41 00 C7 44 24 44 94 6F 41 00 C7 44 24 48 8C 6F 41 00 C7 44 24 4C 88 6F** **41 00 C7 44 24 50 80 6F 41 00 89 44 24 54 C7 44 24 10 7C 6F 41 00 C7 44 24 14 78 6F 41 00 C7 44 24 18 74 6F 41 00 C7 44 24 1C 70 6F 41 00 C7 44 24 20 6C** **6F 41 00 89 44 24 24 FF D7 99 B9 0B 00 00 00 F7 F9 8B 74 94 28 BA 9C 6F 41 00 66 8B 06 66 3B 02 74 34 8B FE 83 C9 FF 33 C0 8B 54 24 60 F2 AE 8B 6C 24** **5C A1 ?? ?? ?? ?? F7 D1 49 89 45 00 8B FE 33 C0 8D 5C 11 05 83 C9 FF 03 DD F2 AE F7 D1 49 8B FE 8B D1 EB 78 FF D7 99 B9 05 00 00 00 8B 6C 24 5C F7** **F9 83 C9 FF 33 C0 8B 74 94 10 8B 54 24 60 8B FE F2 AE F7 D1 49 BF 60 6F 41 00 8B D9 83 C9 FF F2 AE F7 D1 8B C2 49 03 C3 8B FE 8D 5C 01 05 8B 0D ??** **?? ?? ?? 89 4D 00 83 C9 FF 33 C0 03 DD F2 AE F7 D1 49 8D 7C 2A 05 8B D1 C1 E9 02 F3 A5 8B CA 83 E1 03 F3 A4 BF 60 6F 41 00 83 C9 FF F2 AE F7 D1 49** **BE 60 6F 41 00 8B D1 8B FE 83 C9 FF 33 C0 F2 AE F7 D1 49 8B FB 2B F9 8B CA 8B C1 C1 E9 02 F3 A5 8B C8 83 E1 03 F3 A4 8B 7C 24 60 8D 75 04 57 56 E8** **?? ?? ?? ?? 83 C4 08 C6 04 3E 2E 8B C5 C6 03 00 5F 5E 5D 5B 83 C4 48 C3 }** **condition: $randomUrlBuilder"** **________________________________________________________________** #### Impact ----- **disruption to regular operations,** **financial losses incurred to restore systems and files, and** **potential harm to an organization’s reputation.** #### Solution Mitigation Strategies **Network administrators are encouraged to apply the following recommendations, which can prevent as many as 85 percent of targeted cyber intrusions. The** **mitigation strategies provided may seem like common sense. However, many organizations fail to use these basic security measures, leaving their systems open to** **compromise:** **1.** **Patch applications and operating systems – Most attackers target vulnerable applications and operating systems. Ensuring that applications and operating** **systems are patched with the latest updates greatly reduces the number of exploitable entry points available to an attacker. Use best practices when updating** **software and patches by only downloading updates from authenticated vendor sites.** **2.** **Use application whitelisting – Whitelisting is one of the best security strategies because it allows only specified programs to run while blocking all others,** **including malicious software.** **3.** **Restrict administrative privileges – Threat actors are increasingly focused on gaining control of legitimate credentials, especially credentials associated with** **highly privileged accounts. Reduce privileges to only those needed for a user’s duties. Separate administrators into privilege tiers with limited access to other** **tiers.** **4.** **Segment networks and segregate them into security zones – Segment networks into logical enclaves and restrict host-to-host communications paths. This** **helps protect sensitive information and critical services, and limits damage from network perimeter breaches.** **5.** **Validate input – Input validation is a method of sanitizing untrusted input provided by users of a web application. Implementing input validation can protect** **against the security flaws of web applications by significantly reducing the probability of successful exploitation. Types of attacks possibly averted include** **Structured Query Language (SQL) injection, cross-site scripting, and command injection.** **6.** **Use stringent file reputation settings – Tune the file reputation systems of your anti-virus software to the most aggressive setting possible. Some anti-virus** **products can limit execution to only the highest reputation files, stopping a wide range of untrustworthy code from gaining control.** **7.** **Understand firewalls – Firewalls provide security to make your network less susceptible to attack. They can be configured to block data and applications from** **certain locations (IP whitelisting), while allowing relevant and necessary data through.** #### Response to Unauthorized Network Access **Enforce your security incident response and business continuity plan. It may take time for your organization’s IT professionals to isolate and remove threats to** **your systems and restore normal operations. Meanwhile, you should take steps to maintain your organization’s essential functions according to your business** **continuity plan. Organizations should maintain and regularly test backup plans, disaster recovery plans, and business continuity procedures.** **Contact DHS or your local FBI office immediately. To report an intrusion and request resources for incident response or technical assistant, you are encouraged** **to contact DHS NCCIC (NCCICCustomerService@hq.dhs.gov or 888-282-0870), the FBI through a local field office, or the FBI’s Cyber Division (CyWatch@fbi.gov** **or 855-292-3937).** #### Protect Against SQL Injection and Other Attacks on Web Services **To protect against code injections and other attacks, system operators should routinely evaluate known and published vulnerabilities, periodically perform software** **updates and technology refreshes, and audit external-facing systems for known web application vulnerabilities. They should also take the following steps to harden** **both web applications and the servers hosting them to reduce the risk of network intrusion via this vector.** **Use and configure available firewalls to block attacks.** **Take steps to secure Windows systems, such as installing and configuring Microsoft’s Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) and Microsoft** **AppLocker.** **Monitor and remove any unauthorized code present in any www directories.** **Disable, discontinue, or disallow the use of Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) and Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) as much as** **possible.** **Remove unnecessary HTTP verbs from web servers. Typical web servers and applications only require GET, POST, and HEAD.** **Where possible, minimize server fingerprinting by configuring web servers to avoid responding with banners identifying the server software and version** **number.** **Secure both the operating system and the application.** **Update and patch production servers regularly.** **Disable potentially harmful SQL-stored procedure calls.** **Sanitize and validate input to ensure that it is properly typed and does not contain escaped code.** **Consider using type-safe stored procedures and prepared statements.** **Audit transaction logs regularly for suspicious activity.** **Perform penetration testing on web services.** **Ensure error messages are generic and do not expose too much information.** #### Permissions, Privileges, and Access Controls **System operators should take the following steps to limit permissions, privileges, and access controls.** **Reduce privileges to only those needed for a user’s duties.** **Restrict users’ ability (permissions) to install and run unwanted software applications, and apply the principle of “Least Privilege” to all systems and services.** **Restricting these privileges may prevent malware from running or limit its capability to spread through the network.** **Carefully consider the risks before granting administrative rights to users on their own machines.** **Scrub and verify all administrator accounts regularly.** **Configure Group Policy to restrict all users to only one login session, where possible.** **Enforce secure network authentication, where possible.** **Instruct administrators to use non-privileged accounts for standard functions such as web browsing or checking webmail.** ----- **as when tunneled through a secondary virtual private network (VPN) with lower privileges.** **Audit existing firewall rules and close all ports that are not explicitly needed for business. Specifically, carefully consider which ports should be connecting** **outbound versus inbound.** **Enforce a strict lockout policy for network users and closely monitor logs for failed login activity. Failed login activity can be indicative of failed intrusion** **activity.** **If remote access between zones is an unavoidable business need, log and monitor these connections closely.** **In environments with a high risk of interception or intrusion, organizations should consider supplementing password authentication with other forms of** **authentication such as challenge/response or multifactor authentication using biometric or physical tokens.** #### Logging Practices **System operators should follow these secure logging practices.** **Ensure event logging, including applications, events, login activities, and security attributes, is turned on or monitored for identification of security issues.** **Configure network logs to provide adequate information to assist in quickly developing an accurate determination of a security incident.** **Upgrade PowerShell to new versions with enhanced logging features and monitor the logs to detect usage of PowerShell commands, which are often** **malware-related.** **Secure logs in a centralized location and protect them from modification.** **Prepare an incident response plan that can be rapidly administered in case of a cyber intrusion.** #### References **[[1] IBM. Actor Lazarus Group – Blog Post by IBM X-Force Exchange.](https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/collection/Actor-Lazarus-Group-0bf5e50d24445f94d6b2d744dc6c63a2)** **[[2] Alien Vault. Operation Blockbuster Unveils the Actors Behind the Sony Attacks.](https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/operation-blockbuster-unveils-the-actors-behind-the-sony-attacks)** **[[3] Symantec. Destover: Destructive Malware has links back to attacks on South Korea.](https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/destover-destructive-malware-has-links-attacks-south-korea)** **[[4] Symantec. Duuzer back door Trojan targets South Korea to take over computers.](https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/duuzer-back-door-trojan-targets-south-korea-take-over-computers)** **[[5] FireEye. Zero-Day HWP Exploit.](https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/09/zero-day_hwp_exploit.html)** **[[6] US-CERT. Alert (TA14-353A) Targeted Destructive Malware. Original Release Date: 12/19/2014 | Last revised: 9/30/2016](https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA14-353A)** **[[7] Novetta. Operation Blockbuster Destructive Malware Report.](https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf)** #### Revisions **June 13, 2017: Initial Release** **This product is provided subject to this** **Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.** **Was this document helpful?** **Yes | Somewhat | No** ### I Want To **Report incidents** **Share indicators** **Report phishing** **[Report malware](https://malware.us-cert.gov/)** **[Report software vulnerabilities](https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/html/report-a-vulnerability/)** ### Subscribe to Alerts **Receive security alerts, tips, and other updates.** **Enter your email address** **Sign UpSign Up** **Mailing Lists and** **Feeds** ### Contact Us (888) 282-0870 **[Send us email](mailto:info@us-cert.gov)** **Download PGP/GPG keys** **Enter your email address** **Home** **FAQ** **Contact Us** **Traffic Light Protocol** **PCII** **DHS Privacy Policy** **Disclaimer** **Accessibility** **Get a PDF Reader** **[US-CERT is part of the Department of Homeland Security.](https://www.dhs.gov)** **Sign UpSign Up** -----