A Baza Valentine’s Day | Proofpoint US By February 11, 2021 Proofpoint Threat Research Team Published: 2021-02-11 · Archived: 2026-04-05 14:39:45 UTC In 2020, Proofpoint observed an increase in BazaLoader campaign volume peaking in October. During that time, we observed specific campaigns correlated to public reports of affiliate campaigns delivering BazaLoader and associated with Ryuk ransomware infections. Notably, in January 2021, Proofpoint researchers observed a few of BazaLoader campaigns leveraging Valentine's Day themes such as flowers and lingerie. The attack chains required an unusual amount of human interaction before a payload was delivered. While we track a fair amount of BazaLoader delivered by TA800 and TA572, these campaigns are not associated with either TA800 or TA572 and are likely leveraged by other affiliates.  BazaLoader Origin  BazaLoader is a downloader written in C++ whose primary function is to download and execute additional modules. It was first observed in the wild in April 2020 and since has steadily been adopted by more actors. Proofpoint has observed at least six variants of Bazaloader signaling active and continued development. One of the earliest BazaLoader variants Proofpoint researchers identified used ".bazar" top-level domains for command-and-control communication. The ".bazar" TLDs are associated with cryptocurrency DNS named Emercoin using Blockchain services reported in early April 2020. Today, we do not see the same association to cryptocurrency infrastructure, but it is relevant to its provenance.   Valentine’s Day   Proofpoint researchers have spotted multiple BazaLoader campaigns in January and February 2021 involving the tactic of heavily relying on human interaction with different sites, PDF attachments, and email lures. There were a range of lure and subject topics, including compact storage devices, office supplies, pharmaceutical supplies, and sports nutrition, but what stuck out were campaigns that were timely and relevant to the upcoming Valentine’s Day holiday. The campaigns were spread across a diverse set of companies and sectors.    Valentine’s Day, while not abused to the level of other holidays, presents an opportunity for a variety of actors. The FBI Boston field office has posted public warnings of romance scams. While this is not a romance scam, it is an example of social engineering well-timed with the Valentine’s Day holiday. Infection Chain   Figure 1: Infection Chain  The infection chain is consistent in the latest campaigns. The websites the user would browse to are fake, but the actors took care to have the physical addresses in the below images match a near-legitimate location. For example, Ajour Lingerie is not located at 1133 50th St, Brooklyn, NY 11219, but this address is in physical proximity to a legitimate website and physical business called the Lingerie Shop.  https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/baza-valentines-day Page 1 of 13 Figure 2: physical address to digital website  Lingerie at Ajour  This campaign delivered PDF attachments that references a specific customer order number and associated purchased items which entices the recipient to go to the Ajour Lingerie website. If the user visits the website and navigates to the "Contact Us" page, they are then given the option to enter the order number in the order ID. If entered, the contact page then redirects the user to the landing page that links to and explains how to open the Excel sheet. The Excel sheet contains macros that, if enabled by the user, will download BazaLoader.    Figure 3: Email Lure  https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/baza-valentines-day Page 2 of 13 Figure 4: Ajour Lingerie  https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/baza-valentines-day Page 3 of 13 Figure 5: Landing Page  https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/baza-valentines-day Page 4 of 13 Figure 6: Enable Content to deliver BazaLoader  Flowers at Rose World  This campaign is nearly identical—enticing users to check an order number. The campaign delivered PDF attachments with references to purchases at the Rose World website. If the user visits the website, navigates to "Contact Us", and enters the order number in the order ID, the site will redirect the user to a landing page. This landing page links to and explains how to open the Excel sheet. The Excel sheet contains macros that, if enabled, will download BazaLoader.  https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/baza-valentines-day Page 5 of 13 Figure 7: Rose World Customer Order Email    Figure 8: Invoice with website  https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/baza-valentines-day Page 6 of 13 Figure 9: Rose World contact page and enter your order number  https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/baza-valentines-day Page 7 of 13 Figure 10: Enable Macros to receive Bazaloader  Conclusion:  Proofpoint researchers have observed a steady growth in actors using BazaLoader as a 1st stage downloader. In addition to the uptick in BazaLoader distribution, there is active development of BazaLoader, particularly during the month of October 2020.  These recent BazaLoader campaigns exemplify affiliate actors leveraging a loader that is increasingly popular and https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/baza-valentines-day Page 8 of 13 more reliant on human interaction. Further, the social engineering features rely on the timeliness of the Valentine’s Day holiday and the intrinsic user curiosity to see what they may have ordered. From a technical point of view, we have provided a number of IOCs and ET signatures below as this malware family is used to execute on any number of actor or affiliate intentions, actions, and objectives.   IOCs   IOC  IOC Type  Description  First Observed  hxxps[://]cacla2006[.]org/achlom/hamin[.]php  URL  Excel Payload  January 29, 2021  447b4c867b7147afe178d73adf8113fc33f6399f03707e4308efa36e0859bf86  SHA256  BazaLoader Hash  January 29, 2021  hxxps://52[.]12[.]160[.]92/exceed/requested7/ppd15  C&C  BazaLoader C&C  January 29, 2021  hxxps://34[.]220[.]204[.]73/exceed/requested7/ppd15  C&C  BazaLoader C&C  January 29, 2021  hxxps[://]www[.]cutedigitalphotography[.]com/vitrum/caretas[.]php  URL  Excel Payload  January 29, 2021  b6e5f8a1d01bfa0524707ed914409ccb6d28137f05467b3fccb52af02e510f34  SHA256  BazaLoader Hash  January 29, 2021  hxxps[://]18[.]188[.]232[.]155/leading/crisis26/snow11  C&C  BazaLoader C&C  January 29, 2021  hxxps[://]18[.]188[.]232[.]155/investigate/discharge/partially2  C&C  BazaLoader C&C  January 29, 2021  hxxps[://]homeprojectplanning[.]com/germes/sanertl[.]php  URL  Excel Payload  February 1, 2021  https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/baza-valentines-day Page 9 of 13 fd142ad1919c5ca254b75745739a72aaec509afdd74715139ecc60266d7fdd3e  SHA256  BazaLoader Hash  February 1, 2021  hxxps[://]52[.]12[.]160[.]92/blog/entry/361446  C&C  BazaLoader C&C  February 1, 2021  hxxps[://]52[.]12[.]160[.]92/goods/itemid/124324  C&C  BazaLoader C&C  February 1, 2021  hxxps[://]54[.]190[.]50[.]234/organization/round_table  C&C  BazaLoader C&C  February 1, 2021  hxxps[://]34[.]220[.]167[.]220/organization/round_table  C&C  BazaLoader C&C  February 1, 2021  hxxps[://]18[.]236[.]86[.]87/organization/round_table  C&C  BazaLoader C&C  February 1, 2021  hxxps[://]34[.]212[.]73[.]169/organization/round_table  C&C  BazaLoader C&C  February 1, 2021  hxxps[://]morrislibraryconsulting[.]com/favicam/gertnm[.]php  URL  Excel Payload  February 8, 2021  b4acd05efadb07351ad853233220bf7f5dd13fbc26fd065d56925c05a42f1927  SHA256  BazaLoader Hash  February 8, 2021  hxxps[://]34[.]210[.]71[.]206/news/article/12422  C&C  BazaLoader C&C  February 8, 2021  hxxps[://]34[.]210[.]71[.]206/artists/id/13131  C&C  BazaLoader C&C  February 8, 2021  hxxps[://]acegikbcggin[.]bazar/news/article/12422  C&C  BazaLoader C&C  February 8, 2021  https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/baza-valentines-day Page 10 of 13 hxxps[://]acegilbcggio[.]bazar/news/article/12422  C&C  BazaLoader C&C  February 8, 2021  hxxps[://]horsehospital[.]com/assebles/hamnab[.]php  URL  Excel Payload  February 8, 2021  b5d7dc4e53f5242e6354c9e20bba1e49d2b34261f706a8c9c9e1b6b18bff348b  SHA256  BazaLoader Hash  February 8, 2021  hxxps[://]34[.]210[.]71[.]206/home/static  C&C  BazaLoader C&C  February 8, 2021  ET Signatures  SID   Name   2844993   ETPRO TROJAN bazaloader Variant CnC Activity   2844992   ETPRO TROJAN bazaloader Variant CnC Activity   2844991   ETPRO TROJAN bazaloader Variant CnC Activity   2844795   ETPRO TROJAN bazaBackdoor Variant CnC (Checkin)   2844794   ETPRO TROJAN Possible bazaloader CnC Activity M3   2844766   ETPRO TROJAN Possible bazaloader CnC Activity M2   2844765   ETPRO TROJAN Possible bazaloader CnC Activity M1   2844764   ETPRO TROJAN SSL/TLS Certificate Observed (bazaloader)   2844763   ETPRO TROJAN SSL/TLS Certificate Observed (bazaloader)   https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/baza-valentines-day Page 11 of 13 2844355   ETPRO TROJAN Observed bazaLoader User-Agent   2844246   ETPRO TROJAN bazar Backdoor CnC Activity   2843035   ETPRO TROJAN bazaBackdoor Variant CnC Activity M3   2843034   ETPRO TROJAN bazaBackdoor Variant CnC Activity M2   2843033   ETPRO TROJAN bazaLoader Variant CnC Activity M1   2842090   ETPRO TROJAN bazaLoader CnC (Download Request)   2842073   ETPRO TROJAN bazaBackdoor Variant CnC (Checkin)   2031085   ET TROJAN bazaloader Variant Activity   2031084   ET TROJAN bazaloader Variant Activity   2030988   ET TROJAN Observed Malicious SSL Cert (bazaLoader CnC)   2030820   ET TROJAN Observed Malicious SSL Cert (bazar Backdoor)   2030270   ET TROJAN Observed Malicious DNS Query (bazarLoader/Team9 Backdoor CnC Domain)   2030269   ET TROJAN Observed Malicious DNS Query (bazarLoader/Team9 Backdoor CnC Domain)   2030268   ET TROJAN Observed Malicious DNS Query (bazarLoader/Team9 Backdoor CnC Domain)   2030267   ET TROJAN Observed Malicious DNS Query (bazarLoader/Team9 Backdoor CnC Domain)   2030045   ET TROJAN bazaR CnC Domain in DNS Lookup   https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/baza-valentines-day Page 12 of 13 2030044   ET TROJAN bazaR CnC Domain in DNS Lookup   2030043   ET TROJAN bazaR CnC Domain in DNS Lookup   2030042   ET TROJAN bazaR CnC Domain in DNS Lookup   2030041   ET TROJAN bazaR CnC Domain in DNS Lookup   2029973   ET INFO Observed DNS Query for EmerDNS TLD (.bazar)   Source: https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/baza-valentines-day https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/baza-valentines-day Page 13 of 13 https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/baza-valentines-day Figure 10: Enable Macros to receive Bazaloader Conclusion: Proofpoint researchers have observed a steady growth in actors using BazaLoader as a 1st stage downloader. In addition to the uptick in BazaLoader distribution, there is active development of BazaLoader, particularly during the month of October 2020. These recent BazaLoader campaigns exemplify affiliate actors leveraging a loader that is increasingly popular and Page 8 of 13