Weekly Intelligence Report – 12 December 2025 - CYFIRMA
Archived: 2026-04-05 15:33:51 UTC
Published On : 2025-12-12
Ransomware of the week
CYFIRMA Research and Advisory Team would like to highlight ransomware trends and insights gathered while
monitoring various forums. This covers a variety of topics that can be pertinent to your company, including
technology, geography, and industries.
Type: Ransomware
Target Technologies: Windows
Targeted Countries: United States, India, Turkey, Peru, Mexico
Targeted Industries: Manufacturing, Technology, Financial Services, Public Sector, Business Services
Introduction
CYFIRMA Research and Advisory Team has found Black Shrantac Ransomware while monitoring various
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underground forums as part of our Threat Discovery Process.
Black Shrantac Ransomware
Researchers have identified Black Shrantac as a ransomware strain that encrypts files, alters their names, and
leaves victims unable to access their data. In testing, it was observed that the malware replaces original filenames
with random character strings and appends the “.shrt” extension, ex., converting “1.jpg” into something like
“0WeRZQJSTkOAnYP4.shrt.” After completing encryption, Black Shrantac changes the desktop wallpaper and
generates a ransom message titled “shrt.readme.txt,” signaling that the victim’s data has been both encrypted and
extracted from the system.
Screenshot of files encrypted by ransomware (Source: Surface Web)
The ransom note states that the attackers seek payment in Bitcoin and presents the extortion as a “business
transaction.” Victims are told they may submit a few small, non-critical files to verify the attackers’ ability to
decrypt. The message includes Tor- based communication portals, Tox contact information, and explicit warnings
not to rename files or reboot systems, claiming such actions could cause irreversible damage. It also threatens to
leak or sell stolen data if no contact is made, while emphasizing that access to negotiation credentials is required
to proceed.
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The appearance of Black Shrantac ‘s ransom note (shrt.readme.txt) (Source: Surface Web)
The appearance of Black Shrantac’s data leak site (Source: Surface Web)
The following are the TTPs based on the MITRE Attack Framework
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Tactic Technique ID Technique Name
Execution T1053 Scheduled Task/Job
Execution T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
Execution T1129 Shared Modules
Persistence T1053 Scheduled Task/Job
Persistence T1112 Modify Registry
Privilege Escalation T1053 Scheduled Task/Job
Privilege Escalation T1134 Access Token Manipulation
Defense Evasion T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
Defense Evasion T1036 Masquerading
Defense Evasion T1070 Indicator Removal
Defense Evasion T1112 Modify Registry
Defense Evasion T1134 Access Token Manipulation
Defense Evasion T1202 Indirect Command Execution
Credential Access T1003 OS Credential Dumping
Credential Access T1552.001 Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files
Discovery T1057 Process Discovery
Discovery T1082 System Information Discovery
Discovery T1083 File and Directory Discovery
Discovery T1614 System Location Discovery
Collection T1005 Data from Local System
Collection T1114 Email Collection
Command and Control T1071 Application Layer Protocol
Command and Control T1090 Proxy
Impact T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact
Relevancy and Insights:
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The ransomware primarily affects the Windows operating system, which is commonly utilized in enterprise
environments across multiple industries.
The ransomware maintains a long-term presence on the system by creating and modifying Windows
scheduled tasks, which allow it to automatically execute even after restarts or user logins. It sets tasks to
run with SYSTEM-level privileges and uses recurring triggers such as hourly or logon events. By doing so,
the malware ensures its payload is consistently launched, enabling it to finish encryption, re-establish
control, or run additional malicious actions without relying on user interaction.
Detect-debug-environment: The ransomware technique is used to determine if it is being monitored in
environments such as sandboxes, virtual machines, or under debugging tools. To perform this check, the
malware may look for specific processes, drivers, or artifacts linked to analysis tools, measure timing to
spot inconsistencies, or scan for system traits uncommon in real user machines. When such conditions are
identified, the malicious program can modify its behavior, such as pausing execution, shutting down, or
withholding key payload actions to avoid detection and make detailed analysis more difficult.
ETLM Assessment:
CYFIRMA’s assessment indicates that Black Shrantac is currently a capable and structured ransomware strain,
featuring strong file-encryption behavior, randomized filename rewriting, data theft, scheduled-task persistence,
and multi-channel communication through TOR and Tox. Its ransom delivery methods, wallpaper replacement,
and extortion approach closely align with modern double-extortion families, showing that it already operates with
a mature set of features designed for disruption and financial gain. Given this foundation, its evolution is likely to
focus on strengthening its resilience, expanding its reach, and improving its ability to evade security controls.
As it evolves, Black Shrantac could adopt more effective anti-analysis strategies, incorporate automated lateral-movement techniques, and enhance its data- exfiltration processes to increase the pressure placed on victims.
Future variants may introduce cloud-targeting capabilities, broader system-recovery destruction, and more robust
encryption or obfuscation layers to hinder forensic investigation. By integrating modular components or adapting
its infrastructure, the ransomware could become more scalable, harder to detect, and increasingly difficult for
defenders to contain across enterprise environments.
Sigma rule:
title: Suspicious Schtasks Schedule Types tags:
– attack.privilege-escalation
– attack.persistence
– attack.execution
– attack.t1053.005 logsource:
product: windows category: process_creation
detection: selection_img:
– Image|endswith: ‘\schtasks.exe’
– OriginalFileName: ‘schtasks.exe’ selection_time:
CommandLine|contains:
– ‘ ONLOGON ‘
– ‘ ONSTART ‘
– ‘ ONCE ‘
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– ‘ ONIDLE ‘
filter_privs: CommandLine|contains:
– ‘NT AUT’ # This covers the usual NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
– ‘ SYSTEM’ # SYSTEM is a valid value for schtasks hence it gets it’s own value with
space
– ‘HIGHEST’
condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_* falsepositives:
– Legitimate processes that run at logon. Filter according to your environment level: high
(Source: Surface Web)
IOCs:
Kindly refer to the IOCs section to exercise control of your security systems.
RECOMMENDATIONS
STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS
Implement competent security protocols and encryption, authentication, or access credentials
configurations to access critical systems in your cloud and local environments.
Ensure that backups of critical systems are maintained, which can be used to restore data in case a need
arises.
MANAGEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS
A data breach prevention plan must be developed considering, (a) the type of data being managed by the
company; (b) the remediation process; (c) where and how the data is stored; (d) if there is an obligation to
notify the local authority.
To reduce the risk of credentials being compromised, enable multifactor authentication (MFA) and zero-trust architecture.
Foster a culture of cybersecurity, where you encourage and invest in employee training so that security is
an integral part of your organization.
TACTICAL RECOMMENDATIONS
Update all applications/software regularly with the latest versions and security patches alike.
Incorporate the Sigma rule for threat detection and monitoring, which will assist in identifying and tracking
suspicious activity as well as detecting anomalies in log events.
Build and undertake safeguarding measures by monitoring/ blocking the IOCs and strengthening defence
based on the tactical intelligence provided.
Trending Malware of the Week
Type: Remote Access Trojan (RAT) | Objectives: Espionage & Credential Theft | Target Technology: Windows OS
| Target Geography: Global
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CYFIRMA collects data from various forums, based on which the trend is ascertained. We identified a few
popular malwares that were found to be distributed in the wild to launch cyberattacks on organizations or
individuals.
Active Malware of the week
This week, “CastleRAT” is trending.
Overview of CastleRAT Malware
CastleRAT is a newly observed remote access trojan that surfaced in early 2025 and has quickly gained attention
for its flexible design and wide applicability across different attack campaigns. Distributed in both lightweight
Python builds and more robust C- compiled versions, the malware is built to give attackers a discreet entry into
Windows systems while avoiding common security controls. Its creators have designed CastleRAT to blend into
normal system behavior, enabling it to operate quietly while establishing communication with remote servers
controlled by the attacker.
Once active on a device, CastleRAT collects essential system details and maintains constant communication with
its operator, allowing remote actions to be executed without the user’s awareness. It can capture on-screen
information, monitor typed input, and access clipboard contents, activities that can reveal credentials, financial
details, or other sensitive data. The malware also supports the delivery of additional tools from the attacker’s
server and can open a hidden command interface, enabling further manipulation of the compromised system. Its
ability to disguise itself as legitimate software components further strengthens its persistence.
The progression of CastleRAT demonstrates how contemporary adversaries are shifting toward highly flexible and
low-visibility tooling to broaden their operational reach. Its preference for masked system activity, quietly re-launched browsers, and subtle data exchange methods reveal a clear focus on avoiding conventional security
controls. For enterprise environments, this underscores the growing need to scrutinize irregular workstation
behavior, enhance endpoint observability, and maintain well-rehearsed incident response procedures. In an era
where intrusion techniques are becoming more seamless and unobtrusive, CastleRAT represents the kind of
streamlined yet impactful threat that reinforces the critical role of early anomaly detection and behavior-driven
defensive measures.
Attack Method
While the initial access method remains unclear, upon activation, CastleRAT performs an initial reconnaissance
routine, collecting key host identifiers such as system metadata, user information, machine-specific GUIDs, and
public IP details retrieved from an external lookup service. This data is transmitted to the command-and-control
infrastructure as part of its periodic beaconing cycle. Subsequently, the malware launches multiple internal
threads, each responsible for executing a distinct malicious function. Notably, early-stage tasks include the
continuous monitoring of clipboard activity, enabling the silent acquisition of copied credentials, cryptocurrency
information, and other sensitive artefacts that naturally pass through clipboard use.
As the intrusion progresses, CastleRAT shifts from passive surveillance to covert interactive manipulation. It
intercepts clipboard operations and synthesizes paste actions to route harvested data through trusted user-facing
applications, thereby embedding exfiltration within normal device behavior. In parallel, it employs RC4-based
encryption to secure its communication with the C2 server, downloading DLL-based modular components and
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executing them through legitimate Windows utilities, granting the operator a concealed remote shell environment.
This shell is constructed through redirected inter-process communication pipes, allowing commands to be issued
and responses retrieved without displaying any visible terminal window or generating conspicuous user-side
activity.
CastleRAT further strengthens its presence by enabling a range of persistent surveillance and privilege-access
features. It configures system-level hooks to capture keystrokes, stores intercepted input within temporary files
prior to encryption and exfiltration, and periodically captures screenshots of the active desktop. Malware also
manipulates browser behavior by terminating active sessions and silently spawning Chromium-based instances
with audio-restrictive parameters, facilitating visual or auditory monitoring while minimizing user alerts. To
ensure continued operation across system restarts, it registers a scheduled task that reinstates the malware at
startup, thereby establishing durable persistence.
In its later operational phase, the malware expands its communication flexibility by leveraging legitimate web
platforms as dead-drop locations for secondary configuration and tasking. Additionally, it employs an advanced
privilege-escalation technique that abuses service-level behavior to identify privileged process handles, duplicate
them, and integrate them into newly spawned malware instances. This handle-stealing approach enables elevated
access and in-memory manipulation with limited on-disk evidence, complicating detection and forensic
reconstruction. Collectively, these behaviors reflect a methodical attack methodology designed to maintain long-term, covert control through a combination of surveillance, stealthy system manipulation, and resilient
communication mechanisms.
The following are the TTPs based on the MITRE Attack Framework for Enterprise
Tactic (ID)
Technique
ID
Technique Name
Execution T1559 Inter-Process Communication
Persistence T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
Privilege Escalation T1548.002
Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account
Control
Defense Evasion T1036 Masquerading
Defense Evasion T1218.011 System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32
Credential Access T1056.001 Input Capture: Keylogging
Discovery T1082 System Information Discovery
Collection T1115 Clipboard Data
Collection T1185 Browser Session Hijacking
Collection T1125 Video Capture
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Collection T1113 Screen Capture
Command and
control
T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
Command and
control
T1102.001 Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver
INSIGHTS
Evolving Tradecraft in Covert Intrusions
CastleRAT highlights how modern threat groups increasingly prioritize quiet, embedded operations over loud or
disruptive attacks. Instead of relying on flashy techniques, the malware’s workflow is designed to mimic the
natural rhythm of a host system, allowing malicious activity to blend with routine behavior. This shift shows how
attackers are refining their methods to maintain uninterrupted access by shaping their tools around subtlety,
patience, and operational camouflage.
Blending Surveillance with Everyday User Interactions
One notable aspect of CastleRAT’s behavior is the way it aligns its data-gathering and system-interaction
capabilities with actions that users commonly perform. By structuring its monitoring functions to mirror ordinary
digital tasks, it reduces the likelihood of drawing attention or triggering suspicion. This integration demonstrates a
growing trend toward threats that study and replicate the flow of user activity, turning familiar interactions into
windows for silent observation.
Leveraging Legitimate System Pathways for Credibility
CastleRAT’s reliance on native components and standard system mechanisms reflects a broader pattern in threat
operations: the use of trusted pathways to maintain legitimacy. Rather than introducing unfamiliar tools, the
malware anchors itself to processes and utilities that already exist on the device, making its presence appear
routine. This strategic piggybacking on built-in system behavior underscores how contemporary attackers
increasingly depend on the credibility of the host environment itself to maintain persistence and avoid scrutiny.
ETLM ASSESSMENT
From an ETLM perspective, CYFIRMA assesses that the emergence of Castle RAT indicates a future in which
traditional desktop environments will require markedly stronger scrutiny. As organizational workflows become
more dependent on continuous workstation usage for communication, remote access, and integrated business
applications, adversaries are likely to advance techniques that blend malicious activity into routine user behavior.
This evolution will make it increasingly difficult for enterprises to determine whether system actions originate
from legitimate employees or from an attacker operating unobtrusively within the same environment.
Consequently, organizations may be compelled to adopt more rigorous validation mechanisms for ordinary
workstation interactions and re-evaluate long-standing assumptions regarding endpoint trust. As professional
ecosystems grow more interconnected, campaigns resembling Castle RAT may gradually reshape confidence in
day-to-day desktop activity, prompting both users and security teams to approach familiar system behavior with
heightened caution.
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IOCs:
Kindly refer to the IOCs Section to exercise controls on your security systems.
YARA Rules
rule CastleRAT_IOC_Only
{
meta:
author = “CYFIRMA” date = “2025-12-08”
description = “IOC-only YARA rule for detecting CastleRAT samples”
sha256_1 = “963c012d56c62093d105ab5044517fdcce4ab826f7782b3e377932da1df6896d”
sha256_2 = “f2ff4cbcd6d015af20e4e858b0f216c077ec6d146d3b2e0cbe68b56b3db7a0be”
sha256_3 = “4ef63fa536134ad296e83e37f9d323beb45087f7d306debdc3e096fed8357395”
sha256_4 = “282fa3476294e2b57aa9a8ab4bc1cc00f334197298e4afb2aae812b77e755207”
strings:
// Dummy byte patterns to keep rule valid – modify as needed
$a = { 00 }
condition: any of them
}
Recommendations:
STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS
Strengthen Endpoint Visibility and Control: Establish an enterprise-wide strategy that prioritizes
continuous monitoring of desktop endpoints, focusing on behavioral anomalies rather than signature-based
detection. This includes integrating telemetry from EDR, SIEM, and identity systems to create a unified
visibility layer.
Adopt Zero-Trust for Workstation Interactions: Implement a long-term shift toward authentication models
that verify each action, not just user identity. This includes device posture validation, contextual access
decisions, and mandatory verification for sensitive transactions initiated from workstations.
Prioritize Secure Remote Access Architecture: Reassess remote access pathways and privileged
workstation operations, ensuring that attackers exploiting Castle RAT–like capabilities cannot pivot
laterally. This may require segmentation of administrative workstations, hardened remote sessions, and
isolation of critical functions.
Invest in Threat Intelligence Integration: Incorporate structured threat intelligence feeds that track RAT
evolution, affiliate behaviors, and distribution trends. This supports proactive risk modeling and informs
strategic readiness for emerging variants.
MANAGEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS
Enhance User Activity Validation Processes: Introduce verification workflows for high-risk or finance-related actions performed on desktops, reducing the likelihood of fraudulent transactions executed through
covert remote-control modules.
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Implement Rigorous Workstation Hardening Policies: Enforce policies that restrict unnecessary
executables, disable unused services, and limit installation privileges. Routine audits should be scheduled
to validate compliance across departments.
Strengthen Monitoring of Remote Interaction Indicators: Equip security teams with alerting mechanisms
that flag suspicious screen-control activity, unauthorized command execution, or unusual process behavior
that could indicate RAT-driven manipulation.
Develop Workforce Awareness for Endpoint Deception Tactics: Provide management- driven training
programs that help employees recognize subtle signs of system manipulation, unexpected interface
behavior, or unexplained performance shifts that may accompany covert RAT activity.
Regularly Test Incident Response Preparedness: Conduct periodic tabletop and technical exercises centered
around RAT compromise scenarios. These exercises should validate escalation paths, containment
procedures, and communication protocols across management layers.
TACTICAL RECOMMENDATIONS
Deploy EDR Rules for Remote-Control Behavior: Configure detection logic for patterns such as
unauthorized screen-capture calls, simulated input events, hidden window creation, and abnormal
persistence mechanisms commonly linked to RAT activity.
Harden PowerShell and Scripting Environments: Enforce constrained language mode, disable unapproved
modules, and log all script block activity. Many RATs rely on script- based loaders, making this a critical
layer of defense.
Block Untrusted Binary Execution Paths: Apply application control policies (AppLocker/WDAC) to
prevent execution from user directories, temp folders, and uncommon system paths often leveraged by
droppers and loaders.
Monitor for Suspicious Parent–Child Process Chains: Set alerts for anomalous process relationships, such
as browsers launching unknown executables or system utilities spawning network-enabled processes.
Enforce Network-Level Isolation for Compromised Hosts: Create automated playbooks in SOAR to
quarantine endpoints that exhibit command-and-control–like traffic, unexpected beacons, or encrypted
outbound connections to untrusted domains.
Inspect Outbound Traffic for Behavioral IoCs: Implement rules for unusual DNS patterns, long-lived
HTTP sessions, unidentified TLS certificates, and low-frequency beaconing intervals that may signal RAT
communication.
Regularly Validate Integrity of Critical System Files: Conduct automated hash- checking and file integrity
monitoring on key directories to detect unauthorized modification or stealthy persistence methods.
Implement Least-Privilege Local Access Controls: Remove local admin rights from standard employees,
restrict the creation of scheduled tasks, and prevent unauthorized registry changes that RATs often exploit
for persistence.
Increase Logging Granularity for Input/Interaction Events: Enable enhanced logging for keyboard, mouse,
and accessibility feature toggles to identify abnormal remote manipulation activity.
Create SOC Playbooks for RAT Containment: Prepare rapid-action procedures that include isolating the
host, collecting volatile memory, extracting network indicators, validating credential exposure, and
initiating forensic triage to prevent lateral spread.
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Weekly Intelligence Trends/Advisory
1. Weekly Attack Types and Trends
Key Intelligence Signals:
Attack Type: Ransomware Attacks, Spear-phishing, Vulnerabilities & Exploits, Data Leaks.
Objective: Unauthorized Access, Data Theft, Data Encryption, Financial Gains, Espionage.
Business Impact: Data Loss, Financial Loss, Reputational Damage, Loss of Intellectual Property,
Operational Disruption.
Ransomware – INC Ransomware, Lynx Ransomware| Malware – CastleRAT
INC Ransomware – One of the ransomware groups.
Lynx Ransomware – One of the ransomware groups.
Please refer to the trending malware advisory for details on the following:
Malware – CastleRAT
Behavior – Most of these malwares use phishing and social engineering techniques as their initial attack
vectors. Apart from these techniques, exploitation of vulnerabilities, defense evasion, and persistence
tactics are being observed
2. Threat Actor in Focus
Iranian Threat Actor MuddyWater – Expanding Attack Surface
Threat Actor: MuddyWater
Attack Type: Connection Proxy, Credential Dumping, Exploitation of Vulnerabilities, Spear-phishing,
Living off the Land (LOTL).
Objective: Information theft, Espionage
Suspected Target Technology: Office Suites Software, Operating System, Web Application, Huawei
Suspected Target Geography: Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, Central Asia, Egypt, Georgia, India,
Iran, Islamic Republic of Iraq, Islamic Republic of Israel, Jordan, Korea, Mali, Middle East, Pakistan,
Republic of Russia, Saudi Arabia, Southwest Asia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates,
United States
Suspected Target Industries: Aerospace & Defense, Agriculture, Capital Goods, Consumer Services,
Energy Equipment & Services, Finance, Food, Gaming, High Tech, IT Service Providers, Individuals,
Media & Entertainment, Military, NGO, Natural Resources, Oil & Gas, Politics, Telecommunication
Services, Transportation, Construction, Cryptocurrency, Education, Engineering, Government, Healthcare,
Metals.
Business Impact: Data Theft, Operational Disruption, Reputational Damage
About the Threat Actor
MuddyWater is an APT group that primarily targets victims in the Middle East, employing in-memory attack
techniques via PowerShell. Their operations fall under the “Living off the Land” category, as they avoid creating
new binaries on the victim’s system, which helps maintain a low detection profile and minimal forensic footprint.
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The threat actor continues to expand its attack surface by diversifying its tooling, initial access vectors, and
regional targeting.
Details on Exploited Vulnerabilities
CVE ID Affected Products CVSS Score Exploit Links
CVE-2017- 0199 Microsoft Office 7.8 link1, link2, link3
CVE-2017- 8759 Microsoft .NET Framework 7.8 link
CVE-2017-11882 Microsoft Office 7.8 link
CVE-2017-17215 Huawei HG532 8.8 –
CVE-2020- 0688 Microsoft Exchange software 8.8 link1, link2
TTPs based on MITRE ATT&CK Framework
Tactic ID Technique
Resource
Development
T1588.002 Obtain Capabilities: Tool
Resource
Development
T1583.006 Acquire Infrastructure: Web Services
Initial Access T1566.001 Phishing: Spear phishing Attachment
Initial Access T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application
Initial Access T1566.002 Phishing: Spear phishing Link
Execution T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
Execution T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell
Execution T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic
Execution T1059.006 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python
Execution T1059.007 Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript
Execution T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation
Execution T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link
Execution T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File
Execution T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution
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Execution T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
Execution T1559.001 Inter-Process Communication: Component Object Model
Execution T1559.002 Inter-Process Communication: Dynamic Data Exchange
Persistence T1547.001
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup
Folder
Persistence T1574.001 Hijack Execution Flow: DLL
Persistence T1137.001 Office Application Startup: Office Template Macros
Persistence T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
Privilege Escalation T1548.002 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control
Privilege Escalation T1547.001
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup
Folder
Privilege Escalation T1574.001 Hijack Execution Flow: DLL
Privilege Escalation T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
Defense Evasion T1218.003 System Binary Proxy Execution: CMSTP
Defense Evasion T1218.005 System Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta
Defense Evasion T1548.002 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control
Defense Evasion T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
Defense Evasion T1574.001 Hijack Execution Flow: DLL
Defense Evasion T1562.001 Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools
Defense Evasion T1036.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
Defense Evasion T1027.010 Obfuscated Files or Information: Command Obfuscation
Defense Evasion T1027.003 Obfuscated Files or Information: Steganography
Defense Evasion T1027.004 Obfuscated Files or Information: Compile After Delivery
Defense Evasion T1218.011 System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32
Credential Access T1555 Credentials from Password Stores
Credential Access T1555.003 Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers
Credential Access T1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory
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Credential Access T1003.004 OS Credential Dumping: LSA Secrets
Credential Access T1003.005 OS Credential Dumping: Cached Domain Credentials
Credential Access T1552.001 Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files
Discovery T1083 File and Directory Discovery
Discovery T1057 Process Discovery
Discovery T1033 System Owner/User Discovery
Discovery T1049 System Network Connections Discovery
Discovery T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery
Discovery T1087.002 Account Discovery: Domain Account
Discovery T1082 System Information Discovery
Discovery T1518 Software Discovery
Discovery T1518.001 Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery
Lateral Movement T1210 Exploitation of Remote Services
Collection T1113 Screen Capture
Collection T1560.001 Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility
Collection T1074.001 Data Staged: Local Data Staging
Command and
Control
T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
Command and
Control
T1132.001 Data Encoding: Standard Encoding
Command and
Control
T1573.001 Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography
Command and
Control
T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
Command and
Control
T1104 Multi-Stage Channels
Command and
Control
T1090.002 Proxy: External Proxy
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Command and
Control
T1219 Remote Access Tools
Command and
Control
T1102.002 Web Service: Bidirectional Communication
Exfiltration T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
Latest Developments Observed
The threat actor is suspected of targeting organizations in Israel and Egypt, leveraging a custom Fooder loader
designed to deploy the MuddyViper backdoor. The campaign appears to focus on enhancing defense evasion and
maintaining long-term persistence within compromised environments. Once deployed, the MuddyViper backdoor
enables extensive post-compromise activity, including system information collection, execution of files and shell
commands, file transfer operations, and the exfiltration of Windows login credentials and browser-stored data.
ETLM Insights
MuddyWater, a well-established Iranian threat actor, continues to demonstrate increasing operational maturity,
with recent insights showing expanded regional targeting, greater use of custom loaders, and a growing reliance
on compromised credentials and exposed services for initial access. Their campaigns frequently combine living-off-the-land techniques with modular backdoors to maintain persistence, evade detection, and enable long-term
espionage activities. Overall, the threat actor represents a persistent, adaptive, and geopolitically motivated cyber-espionage threat.
The actor’s primary objectives center on information theft and strategic intelligence collection, including:
Sustaining long-term access to government and critical infrastructure networks.
Gathering political, military, and strategic intelligence.
Monitoring and surveillance of energy, telecommunications, and high- technology ecosystems.
IOCs:
Kindly refer to the IOCs section to exercise control of your security systems.
YARA Rules
rule APT_MuddyWater_Generic
{
meta:
description = “Generic detection for MuddyWater malware families (PowGoop, MuddyViper, loaders)”
author = “CYFIRMA”
threat_actor = “MuddyWater (Iran)” date = “2025-01-01”
strings:
// Common MuddyWater PowerShell patterns
$ps1 = “IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString” nocase
$ps2 = “FromBase64String” nocase
$ps3 = “Invoke-Expression” nocase
$ps4 = “System.Net.WebRequest” nocase
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// MuddyViper / Fooder loader artifacts (publicly documented)
$mv1 = “MuddyViper” wide ascii
$mv2 = “FooderLoader” wide ascii
$mv3 = “viper_execute” ascii
// Known C2-related patterns (genericized)
$c2_1 = “/gate.php” ascii
$c2_2 = “/index.php?id=” ascii
// MuddyWater obfuscation markers
$obf1 = “PowerShell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass” nocase
$obf2 = “Add-Type -TypeDefinition” nocase
// DLL loader characteristics
$dll1 = “ExportedFunction” ascii
$dll2 = “LoadLibraryA” ascii condition:
(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) and 3 of ($ps*) and
1 of ($mv* or $dll* or $obf* or $c2_*)
}
Recommendations Strategic
Incorporate Digital Risk Protection (DRP) as part of the overall security posture to proactively defend
against impersonations and phishing attacks.
Assess and deploy alternatives for an advanced endpoint protection solution that provides
detection/prevention for malware and malicious activities that do not rely on signature-based detection
methods.
Management
Look for email security solutions that use ML- and AI-based anti-phishing technology for BEC protection
to analyze conversation history to detect anomalies, as well as computer vision to analyze suspect links
within emails.
Regularly reinforce awareness of unauthorized attempts with end-users across the environment and
emphasize the human weakness in mandatory information security training sessions.
Tactical
Build and undertake safeguarding measures by monitoring/ blocking the IOCs and strengthening defence
based on the tactical intelligence provided.
For better protection coverage against email attacks (like spear phishing, business email compromise, or
credential phishing attacks), organizations should augment built-in email security with layers that take a
materially different approach to threat detection.
Protect accounts with multi-factor authentication. Exert caution when opening email attachments or
clicking on embedded links supplied via email communications, SMS, or messaging.
Patch software/applications as soon as updates are available. Where feasible, automated remediation
should be deployed since vulnerabilities are one of the top attack vectors.
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Add the YARA rule for threat detection and monitoring, which will help to detect anomalies in log events,
identify and monitor suspicious activities.
3. Major Geopolitical Developments in Cybersecurity
US and Canadian intelligence agencies outline a Chinese hacking campaign
The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the National Security Agency (NSA), and the
Canadian Centre for Cyber Security have jointly released a report on a Chinese state-sponsored malware
campaign dubbed BRICKSTORM. BRICKSTORM is a sophisticated backdoor that targets both VMware vSphere
environments (primarily vCenter servers and ESXi hosts) and Windows systems. Once attackers gain access to a
compromised vCenter management console, they can steal cloned virtual machine snapshots to extract credentials
offline and deploy hidden, rogue virtual machines for persistent access and further operations.
ETLM Assessment:
No specific APT designation (e.g., Volt Typhoon) has been publicly tied to the campaign yet, but it aligns with
broader Chinese campaigns against critical infrastructure and especially accessing government entities and their
classified data. The campaign highlights ongoing Chinese efforts to compromise virtualization infrastructure for
espionage and long-term network persistence.
4. Rise in Malware/Ransomware and Phishing
INC Ransomware Impacts YAZAKI Corp
Attack Type: Ransomware
Target Industry: Manufacturing
Target Geography: Japan
Ransomware: INC Ransomware
Objective: Data Theft, Data Encryption, Financial Gains
Business Impact: Financial Loss, Data Loss, Reputational Damage
Summary:
CYFIRMA observed in an underground forum that a company from Japan, YAZAKI Corp
(https[:]//www[.]yazaki-group[.]com/), was compromised by INC Ransomware. The Yazaki Group is a global
company best known for being a leading supplier of automotive wire harnesses, but it also produces other
products like environmental systems and instrumentation equipment. The compromised dataset includes a wide
range of sensitive information, such as confidential documents, client data, non-disclosure agreements (NDAs),
financial and operational records, corporate and HR data (including employee medical records), business
agreements, development materials, technical drawings, technological production requirements, and complete
documentation related to the manufacturing of parts for various clients. The total volume of exposed data is
estimated to be approximately 350 GB.
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Source: Dark Web
Relevancy & Insights:
INC Ransomware, also known as Incransom, is a cyber threat that emerged in mid-2023. Incransom uses
strong encryption algorithms to lock files, making recovery without the decryption key virtually
impossible. The ransomware typically appends specific file extensions to encrypted files, signalling that
they have been compromised.
Incransom is commonly distributed through:
Phishing emails: Containing malicious attachments or links that, when opened, deploy the ransomware.
Malicious downloads: From compromised websites or software packages.
The INC Ransomware group primarily targets countries such as the United States of America, Canada,
Germany, Australia, and the United Kingdom.
The INC Ransomware group primarily targets industries, such as Healthcare, Government & Civic,
Professional Goods & Services, Information Technology, and Consumer Goods & Services.
Based on the INC Ransomware victims list from 1st Jan 2025 to 09th December 2025, the top 5 Target
Countries are as follows:
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The Top 10 Industries most affected by the INC Ransomware victims list from 1st Jan 2025 to 09th
December 2025 are as follows:
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ETLM Assessment:
Based on recent assessments by CYFIRMA, INC Ransomware represents a significant threat within the evolving
landscape of ransomware attacks. Its use of strong encryption methods and double extortion tactics highlights the
increasing sophistication of cybercriminal operations. Organizations are advised to enhance their cybersecurity
measures by implementing robust defenses against phishing attacks, maintaining updated security protocols, and
monitoring for unusual network activity to mitigate risks associated with this and other ransomware variants.
Continuous vigilance is essential to protect against the threats posed by emerging ransomware groups like INC
Ransomware.
Lynx Ransomware Impacts TOC Co., Ltd
Attack Type: Ransomware
Target Industry: Real Estate, Transportation and Logistics
Target Geography: Japan
Ransomware: Lynx Ransomware
Objective: Data Theft, Data Encryption, Financial Gains
Business Impact: Financial Loss, Data Loss, Reputational Damage
Summary:
CYFIRMA observed in an underground forum that a company from Japan, TOC Co., Ltd (www[.]toc[.]co[.]jp),
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was compromised by Lynx Ransomware. The TOC Building is a commercial facility that provides a
comprehensive floor guide, event information, and tenant details for visitors. The building hosts a variety of shops
and services, including clothing stores, kitchenware, and cafes. It aims to attract a diverse clientele, including
families and individuals looking for shopping and entertainment options. The compromised data contains
confidential and sensitive information belonging to the organization.
Source: Dark Web
Relevancy & Insights:
The Lynx Ransomware is confirmed to use a hybrid encryption approach, with AES-128 in CTR mode for
fast file encryption and Curve25519 Donna for robust asymmetric key exchange, ensuring files are only
recoverable with the attacker’s private key.
Lynx provides a comprehensive platform for affiliates, including tools for managing victims, negotiating
ransoms, and sharing access with sub-affiliates.
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The Lynx Ransomware group primarily targets countries such as the United States of America, Germany,
Canada, the United Kingdom, and Singapore.
The Lynx Ransomware group primarily targets industries, including Professional Goods & Services,
Manufacturing, Consumer Goods & Services, Information Technology, and Real Estate & Construction.
Based on the Lynx Ransomware victims list from 1st Jan 2025 to 09th December 2025, the top 5 Target
Countries are as follows:
The Top 10 Industries most affected by the Lynx Ransomware victims list from 1st Jan 2025 to 09th
December 2025 are as follows:
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ETLM Assessment:
According to CYFIRMA’s assessment, Lynx ransomware has emerged as a significant threat in the cybersecurity
landscape, leveraging advanced encryption and double extortion tactics to target small and medium-sized
businesses. Its structured affiliate program and versatile ransomware toolkit make it a formidable force in the
RaaS ecosystem.
5. Vulnerabilities and Exploits
Vulnerability in PgBouncer
Attack Type: Vulnerabilities & Exploits
Target Technology: Server application
Vulnerability: CVE-2025-12819
CVSS Base Score: 7.5 Source
Vulnerability Type: Untrusted Search Path
Summary: The vulnerability allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary SQL commands.
Relevancy & Insights:
The vulnerability exists due to the usage of an untrusted search path passed via the search_path parameter in the
StartupMessage.
Impact:
A remote non-authenticated attacker can send a specially crafted request during authentication and execute
arbitrary SQL commands in the database.
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Affected Products:
https[:]//www[.]pgbouncer[.]org/changelog.html#pgbouncer- 125x
Recommendations:
Monitoring and Detection: Implement monitoring and detection mechanisms to identify unusual system behavior
that might indicate an attempted exploitation of this vulnerability.
TOP 5 AFFECTED TECHNOLOGIES OF THE WEEK
This week, CYFIRMA researchers have observed significant impacts on various technologies due to a range of
vulnerabilities. The following are the top 5 most affected technologies.
ETLM Assessment
Vulnerability in PgBouncer can pose significant threats to user privacy and database security. This can impact
various industries globally, including technology, finance, healthcare, and enterprise IT. Ensuring the security of
PgBouncer is crucial for maintaining the integrity and protection of PostgreSQL database connections worldwide.
Therefore, addressing these vulnerabilities is essential to safeguarding connection pooling, authentication
mechanisms, and database performance management across different geographic regions and sectors.
6. Latest Cyber-Attacks, Incidents, and Breaches
NightSpire Ransomware attacked and published the data of Pioneer Ocean Freight Co., Ltd.
Threat Actor: NightSpire Ransomware
Attack Type: Ransomware
Objective: Data Leak, Financial Gains
Target Technology: Web Applications
Target Industry: Transportation and Logistics
Target Geography: Thailand
Business Impact: Operational Disruption, Data Loss, Financial Loss, Potential Reputational Damage
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Summary:
Recently, we observed that NightSpire Ransomware attacked and published the data of Pioneer Ocean Freight Co.,
Ltd (https[:]//pioneergroup[.]in[.]th/) on its dark web website. Pioneer Group is a freight-forwarding and logistics
company based in Thailand, providing sea-air freight forwarding, customs brokerage, inland & heavy- cargo
transport, warehousing, packaging, and project-cargo services. The data leak resulting from the ransomware attack
includes billing information (both incoming and outgoing), employee data, financial records, and other sensitive
and confidential information. The total size of the compromised data is approximately 5 GB.
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Source: Dark Web
Relevancy & Insights:
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NightSpire employs a double extortion strategy, encrypting data and threatening to leak stolen information
unless a ransom is paid. This approach is typical of modern ransomware groups and adds pressure on
victims to comply with demands.
NightSpire’s operations show strong influences from existing Ransomware-as-a- Service (RaaS) models,
suggesting they might be an emerging group or a rebrand of an existing actor.
ETLM Assessment:
According to CYFIRMA’s assessment, NightSpire is a new ransomware group that emerged in early 2025,
marking itself as a formidable player in the rapidly evolving ransomware landscape. Despite its recent appearance,
NightSpire has already gained attention for its aggressive tactics and well-structured operations.
7. Data Leaks
Bank Mandiri Data Advertised on a Leak Site
Attack Type: Data leak
Target Industry: Financial Services
Target Geography: Indonesia
Objective: Financial Gains
Business Impact: Data Loss, Reputational Damage
Summary: The CYFIRMA research team has identified claims from a threat actor operating under the name
“BreachLaboratory,” who alleges responsibility for compromising Bank Mandiri.
Bank Mandiri is Indonesia’s largest bank by assets, providing a broad range of banking and financial services to
both corporate clients and individual customers across the country.
According to the threat actor’s claims, more than 18,000 financial records were leaked. The exposed data
reportedly includes:
Personal customer information
SWIFT code: BMRIIDJA
Account setup and configuration details
Account balance information
Fee-related data
Debit card usage records
These allegations suggest a significant exposure of sensitive financial and customer- related information.Top of
FormBottom of Form
The authenticity of this breach remains unverified at the time of reporting, as the claim originates solely from the
threat actor.
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Source: Underground Forums
ThankQCamping Data Advertised on a Leak Site
Attack Type: Data leak
Target Industry: Outdoor Recreation and Travel
Target Geography: South Korea
Objective: Data Theft, Financial Gains
Business Impact: Data Loss, Reputational Damage
Summary:
The CYFIRMA Research team has observed claims made by a threat actor identified as “888,” who alleges
responsibility for a cybersecurity breach involving ThankQCamping. ThankQCamping is a well-known camping
service platform in South Korea, reportedly serving over one million users nationwide. According to the threat
actor, the incident took place in December 2025.
The actor claims that unauthorized access to ThankQCamping’s systems resulted in the theft of proprietary
information, specifically the company’s source code. At the time of this report, there is no independent
confirmation of the incident. The details shared are based solely on the threat actor’s statements, and the
authenticity of the breach has not yet been verified.
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Source: Underground Forums
Relevancy & Insights:
Financially motivated cybercriminals are continuously looking for exposed and vulnerable systems and
applications to exploit. A significant number of these malicious actors congregate within underground forums,
where they discuss cybercrime and trade stolen digital assets. Operating discreetly, these opportunistic attackers
target unpatched systems or vulnerabilities in applications to gain access and steal valuable data. Subsequently, the
stolen data is advertised for sale within underground markets, where it can be acquired, repurposed, and utilized
by other malicious actors in further illicit activities.
ETLM Assessment:
The threat actor known as “888” is a highly active and sophisticated group specializing in data-leak operations.
Multiple credible reports link the group to a series of security breaches involving unauthorized system access and
the sale of stolen data across dark web marketplaces. Their activities reflect the persistent and rapidly evolving
cyber threats emerging from underground communities. These incidents reinforce the need for organizations to
strengthen their cybersecurity posture through continuous monitoring, advanced threat-intelligence capabilities,
and proactive defense measures to safeguard sensitive data and critical infrastructure.
Recommendations: Enhance the cybersecurity posture by:
1. Updating all software products to their latest versions is essential to mitigate the risk of vulnerabilities
being exploited.
2. Ensure proper database configuration to mitigate the risk of database-related attacks.
3. Establish robust password management policies, incorporating multi-factor authentication and role-based
access to fortify credential security and prevent unauthorized access.
8. Other Observations
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The CYFIRMA Research team observed that SuKarne, a Mexican multinational corporation and a major player in
the global meat processing industry with reported revenues of $6.8 billion, has allegedly been compromised. A
threat actor attempting to sell data on a dark web forum claims to have exported a database containing over 1
million rows of user and business information. The dataset is currently listed for sale for $1,000.
According to the actor, the compromised data includes 300,000+ unique mobile numbers and 34,000+ unique
email addresses. Based on the sample logs provided, the exposed fields appear to cover:
Full names (Nombre, Apellidos)
Physical addresses (Street, City, State, Zip Code)
Email addresses (Personal and corporate)
Phone and mobile numbers
Dates of birth
Tax IDs (RFC) and National Identity Codes (CURP)
Bank account numbers and financial keys (No. Cuenta Bancaria, Clave de Banco)
Job titles and department details
Annual revenue figures and credit limits
The authenticity of this breach remains unverified at the time of reporting, as the claim originates solely from the
threat actor.
Source: Underground Forums
The CYFIRMA Research team has identified claims from a threat actor alleging a data breach involving
Volkswagen Mandi, which the actor describes as the target of a cyber incident in December 2025. The claim was
posted on a cybercrime forum, where the threat actor asserts that a large database was exfiltrated from the affected
entity. Although the actor explicitly references “Volkswagen Mandi”— potentially pointing to a dealership located
in Mandi, Himachal Pradesh, or an internally labeled database—the breadth of the sample data raises concerns of
a much wider impact. Data samples reportedly contain addresses from multiple Indian states, including
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Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Madhya Pradesh, and Kerala, indicating that the breach may involve a centralized CRM
or lead management system connected to Volkswagen operations across India.
According to the threat actor, the allegedly compromised dataset consists of more than 2.5 million records,
encompassing approximately 1.7 million unique phone numbers and 2.1 million unique email addresses. The
structure and identifiers present in the data suggest it may originate from a Customer Relationship Management
(CRM) platform, with references to systems such as Salesforce and Zoho. If accurate, the exposure could have
significant implications due to the volume and sensitivity of the information involved.
The data allegedly exposed in the breach includes the following categories:
Identity Information:
Salutations, first and last names, titles, and other personal identifiers.
Contact Details:
Mobile numbers, landline phone numbers, fax numbers, and both business and personal email addresses.
Physical Address Information:
Complete mailing, billing, and shipping addresses, including street details, cities, states/provinces, postal/ZIP
codes, and countries.
Vehicle-Related Information:
Vehicle Identification Numbers (VINs), vehicle details, registration numbers, and test drive history.
Account and Dealer Data:
Account IDs, account owners, dealer codes, dealer city information, and system identifiers such as Zoho IDs and
Data.com keys.
Internal and Operational Records:
Lead source information, purchase agreements, warranty details, service manager names, customer feedback, and
service-related logs.
At the time of reporting, these claims remain unverified and are based solely on assertions made by the threat
actor. Further validation is required to confirm the authenticity, scope, and impact of the alleged breach.
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Source: Underground Forums
STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS
Attack Surface Management should be adopted by organisations, ensuring that a continuous closed-loop
process is created between attack surface monitoring and security testing.
Delay a unified threat management strategy – including malware detection, deep learning neural networks,
and anti-exploit technology – combined with vulnerability and risk mitigation processes.
Incorporate Digital Risk Protection (DRP) in the overall security posture that acts as a proactive defence
against external threats targeting unsuspecting customers.
Implement a holistic security strategy that includes controls for attack surface reduction, effective patch
management, and active network monitoring, through next-generation security solutions and a ready-to-go
incident response plan.
Create risk-based vulnerability management with deep knowledge about each asset. Assign a triaged risk
score based on the type of vulnerability and criticality of the asset to help ensure that the most severe and
dangerous vulnerabilities are dealt with first.
MANAGEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS
Take advantage of global Cyber Intelligence, providing valuable insights on threat actor activity, detection,
and mitigation techniques.
Proactively monitor the effectiveness of risk-based information security strategy, the security controls
applied, and the proper implementation of security technologies, followed by corrective actions,
remediations, and lessons learned.
Consider implementing Network Traffic Analysis (NTA) and Network Detection and Response (NDR)
security systems to compensate for the shortcomings of EDR and SIEM solutions.
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Detection processes are tested to ensure awareness of anomalous events. Timely communication of
anomalies and continuously evolved to keep up with refined ransomware threats.
TACTICAL RECOMMENDATIONS
Patch software/applications as soon as updates are available. Where feasible, automated remediation
should be deployed since vulnerabilities are one of the top attack vectors.
Consider using security automation to speed up threat detection, improved incident response, increased the
visibility of security metrics, and rapid execution of security checklists.
Build and undertake safeguarding measures by monitoring/ blocking the IOCs and strengthening defences
based on the tactical intelligence provided.
Deploy detection technologies that are behavioral anomaly-based to detect ransomware attacks and help to
take appropriate measures.
Implement a combination of security control such as reCAPTCHA (completely Automated Public Turing
test to tell Computers and Humans Apart), Device fingerprinting, IP backlisting, Rate-limiting, and
Account lockout to thwart automated brute-force attacks.
Ensure email and web content filtering uses real-time blocklists, reputation services, and other similar
mechanisms to avoid accepting content from known and potentially malicious sources.
Situational Awareness – Cyber News
Please find the Geography-Wise and Industry-Wise breakup of cyber news for the last 5 days as part of the
situational awareness pillar.
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For situational awareness intelligence and specific insights mapped to your organisation’s geography, industry, and
technology, please access DeCYFIR.
Source: https://www.cyfirma.com/news/weekly-intelligence-report-12-december-2025/#:~:text=well%2Dstructured%20operations.-,7.%20Dat
a%20Leaks,-Bank%20Mandiri%20Data
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