{
	"id": "66f7faf6-ed36-462a-a305-96265ee536a6",
	"created_at": "2026-04-10T03:21:01.553926Z",
	"updated_at": "2026-04-10T13:13:07.933726Z",
	"deleted_at": null,
	"sha1_hash": "93bdc185cccb4980de21b6a2410380d4e4fa8b73",
	"title": "Payload Threat Actor Ransomware",
	"llm_title": "",
	"authors": "",
	"file_creation_date": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
	"file_modification_date": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
	"file_size": 371292,
	"plain_text": "Payload Threat Actor Ransomware\r\nPublished: 2026-04-05 · Archived: 2026-04-10 02:07:48 UTC\r\nPayload Threat Actor\r\nThe current information about this new threat actor in the wild till this moment is little , but according to Ahmed Elessaway ,\r\nIt is active since 17-02-2026 and till this moment has targets between United States , Philippines , Mexico , United\r\nKingdom and Egypt , and it reached 26 victims.\r\nVictims\r\nSample information\r\nField Value\r\nFile name locker_esxi.elf\r\nFile format ELF64 Linux x86-64\r\nFile size 0x9BE0 (stripped on disk, 0x2097A8 mapped)\r\nMD5 f91cbdd91e2daab31b715ce3501f5ea0\r\nSHA1 0252819a4960c56c28b3f3b27bf91218ffed223a\r\nSHA256 bed8d1752a12e5681412efbb8283910857f7c5c431c2d73f9bbc5b379047a316\r\nExecutive Summary\r\nlocker_esxi.elf is a 64-bit Linux ELF ransomware binary targeting VMware ESXi hypervisor environments . The\r\nsample combines a robust cryptographic scheme Curve25519 ECDH and ChaCha20 with ESXi-specific VM enumeration via\r\nthe vmInventory.xml inventory file, graceful shutdown of running VMs before encryption, and a multi-threaded file\r\nencryption pipeline scaled to available CPU cores. The ransom note is delivered inside ESXi’s own web UI welcome.txt ,\r\nreplacing the host management interface greeting.\r\nString Decryption\r\nThe binary embeds its configuration as RC4-encrypted and base64-encoded blobs in the .rodata section. The RC4 key\r\nis the three-byte FBI. All sensitive strings , file paths , error messages and shell commands are decrypted at runtime\r\nthrough mw_w_RC4() .\r\nhttps://0x3obad.github.io/posts/payload-ransomware-writeup/\r\nPage 1 of 13\n\nFigure(1) mw_w_RC4() Decryption Function\r\nThe python decryption script below to decrypt data blobs in place in IDA to make the analysis more easier.\r\n1\r\n2\r\n3\r\n4\r\n5\r\n6\r\n7\r\n8\r\n9\r\n10\r\n11\r\n12\r\n13\r\n14\r\n15\r\n16\r\n17\r\n18\r\n19\r\n20\r\n21\r\n22\r\n23\r\n24\r\n25\r\n26\r\n27\r\n28\r\n29\r\n30\r\n31\r\n32\r\n33\r\n34\r\n35\r\n36\r\n37\r\n38\r\nimport idc\r\nimport idaapi\r\ndef rc4(key: bytes, data: bytes) -\u003e bytes:\r\n S = list(range(256))\r\n j = 0\r\n for i in range(256):\r\n j = (j + S[i] + key[i % len(key)]) % 256\r\n S[i], S[j] = S[j], S[i]\r\n result = bytearray()\r\n i = j = 0\r\n for byte in data:\r\n i = (i + 1) % 256\r\n j = (j + S[i]) % 256\r\n S[i], S[j] = S[j], S[i]\r\n result.append(byte ^ S[(S[i] + S[j]) % 256])\r\n return bytes(result)\r\nRC4_KEY = b\"FBI\"\r\nBLOBS = [\r\n (0x6093F0, 0x12),\r\n (0x6092A0, 33),\r\n (0x609288, 13),\r\n (0x609260, 14),\r\n (0x60925A, 5),\r\n (0x609250, 10),\r\n (0x609270, 18),\r\n (0x609300, 34),\r\n (0x609380, 43),\r\n (0x609330, 22),\r\n (0x609350, 28),\r\n (0x609220, 44),\r\n (0x6092D0, 30),\r\n (0x6093D0, 31),\r\n (0x6093B0, 20),\r\nhttps://0x3obad.github.io/posts/payload-ransomware-writeup/\r\nPage 2 of 13\n\n39\r\n40\r\n41\r\n42\r\n43\r\n44\r\n45\r\n46\r\n47\r\n48\r\n49\r\n50\r\n51\r\n52\r\n53\r\n54\r\n55\r\n56\r\n57\r\n58\r\n59\r\n60\r\n61\r\n62\r\n63\r\n64\r\n]\r\ndef patch_blob(ea: int, plaintext: bytes) -\u003e None:\r\n for offset, byte in enumerate(plaintext):\r\n idc.patch_byte(ea + offset, byte)\r\n idc.patch_byte(ea + len(plaintext), 0)\r\ndef make_string(ea: int, length: int) -\u003e None:\r\n idaapi.del_items(ea, idaapi.DELIT_SIMPLE, length + 1)\r\n idc.create_strlit(ea, ea + length + 1)\r\ndef main():\r\n for ea, size in BLOBS:\r\n data = idc.get_bytes(ea, size)\r\n if data is None:\r\n continue\r\n plaintext = rc4(RC4_KEY, data)\r\n patch_blob(ea, plaintext)\r\n make_string(ea, size)\r\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\r\n main()\r\nDecrypted strings:\r\nShow List\r\nTechnical Analysis\r\nAnti-Analysis \u0026 Defense Evasion\r\nMalware immediately at beginning checks if debugger attached to the process by opening /proc/self/status and reads lines\r\nuntil it finds TracerPid: , if the integer following that field is non-zero so debugger is attached , execution branches to\r\ndelete itself.\r\nhttps://0x3obad.github.io/posts/payload-ransomware-writeup/\r\nPage 3 of 13\n\nFigure(2) Malware checking for debugger\r\nCryptographic Scheme\r\nThe cryptographic scheme takes stages before doing the actual encryption such as encryption public key extraction ,\r\ngathering CPU capabilities , encryption routine selection , thread-pool initialization and finally multi-thread\r\nencryption job.\r\nThe malware encodes its public key via Base-64 encoding shown in figure below , which reveling the public encryption key\r\nis 3E67A9F94526785C31C543BE3F4DC7039E7C3F764F65637C6C22B85F3357B575 .\r\nFigure(3) Public Key Extraction\r\nGathering CPU Capabilities\r\nThe malware wants to run ChaCha20 as fast as possible, so before any encryption happens it probes the CPU for SIMD\r\ncapabilities and stores a function pointer to the fastest available implementation. Every subsequent file encryption call goes\r\nthrough that pointer without re-checking.\r\nhttps://0x3obad.github.io/posts/payload-ransomware-writeup/\r\nPage 4 of 13\n\nFigure(4) Gathering CPU Capabilities The function queries processor feature flags via CPUID and XGETBV :\r\nChecks SSE2 support via EDX bit 26 .\r\nChecks AVX support via ECX bits 28/27 .\r\nUses XGETBV to confirm OS-level AVX state (XSAVE enabled state validation).\r\nQueries extended features CPUID leaf 7 to detect AVX2 support (EBX bit 5).\r\nThe resulting capability mask is built as:\r\nbit 0 value 0 so SSE2 available.\r\nbit 1 value 1 so AVX usable.\r\nbit 2 value 4 so AVX2 available. This behavior is consistent with performance-aware malware or protected\r\nloaders that adapt cryptographic implementations based on host hardware capabilities.\r\nEncryption Routine Variants\r\nBased on the CPU capabilities it decides between which routine will handle the encryption logic.\r\nFigure(5) Encryption routine selection\r\nmw_chacha20_scalar\r\nPure scalar implementation using 32-bit general-purpose registers ( EAX , EBX , ECX , etc.)\r\nEntire ChaCha20 state maintained as individual integers (heavily stack-spilled).\r\nRotations implemented manually via __ROL4__ (shift + OR).\r\nProcesses 1 block (64 bytes) per iteration.\r\nBlock counter increments by +1.\r\nSimple control flow:\r\nSingle loop of 10 double-rounds.\r\nhttps://0x3obad.github.io/posts/payload-ransomware-writeup/\r\nPage 5 of 13\n\nFollowed by a separate add-back phase.\r\nXOR with plaintext performed 4 bytes at a time.\r\nMost portable but least performant variant.\r\nmw_chacha20_sse2\r\nUses 128-bit XMM registers with VEX-encoded SSE instructions: vpaddd , vpxor , vpshufd , vpslld , vpsrld .\r\nImplements 4-way parallelism each XMM lane represents one block and processes 4 blocks simultaneously.\r\nCounter initialization: uses vpaddq with precomputed constants to generate 4 parallel counters.\r\nBlock counter increments by +4 per iteration.\r\nRotation strategy:\r\nBit rotations via shift+OR.\r\nLane permutations via vpshufd (shuffles 0x93 , 0x4E , 0x39 ).\r\nOutput: XOR and writes using XMM registers 16 bytes per store.\r\nLoop structure:\r\nOuter loop 256-byte aligned chunks (4×64).\r\nTail loop remaining 64-byte blocks.\r\nSub-64-byte remainder handled via stack buffer staging.\r\nmw_chacha20_avx2\r\nFully utilizes 256-bit YMM registers.\r\nImplements 8-way parallelism each YMM lane holds one word across 8 blocks.\r\nSetup phase: vbroadcasti128 used to duplicate key/state across YMM lanes.\r\nAdvanced data movement: vperm2i128 enables cross-lane shuffling (critical for 8-block transposition).\r\nBlock counter increments by +8 per iteration.\r\nRotation optimization: uses vpshufb with precomputed masks which faster than shift+OR.\r\nOutput: writes 32 bytes per store (double SSE2 throughput).\r\nLoop hierarchy:\r\nMain loop 512-byte aligned chunks (8×64)\r\nSecondary loop 128-byte tail\r\nFinal stage fine-grained remainder handling (branching per 32-byte boundary)\r\nAnd the figure below explains the stages of every routine\r\nhttps://0x3obad.github.io/posts/payload-ransomware-writeup/\r\nPage 6 of 13\n\nsame inputs: ctx (key+nonce+counter), plaintext ptr, ciphertext ptr, length\r\nmw_chacha20_scalar\r\n1 block per iteration\r\n64 bytes of keystream\r\n16 × 32-bit integers\r\nin CPU registers\r\n20 rounds (10 double)\r\nADD + XOR + ROL32\r\nAdd initial state\r\nXOR 64 bytes plaintext\r\ncounter++ → repeat\r\nthroughput: 1×\r\nany x86-64 CPU\r\nmw_chacha20_sse2\r\n4 blocks per iteration\r\n256 bytes of keystream\r\nXMM registers (128-bit)\r\n4 × 32-bit lanes each\r\nSame 20 rounds\r\nPADDD + PXOR + PSRLD\r\nAdd + XOR\r\n4 blocks simultaneously\r\ncounter += 4 → repeat\r\nthroughput: ~4×\r\nrequires SSE2 (bit 0)\r\nmw_chacha20_avx2\r\n8 blocks per iteration\r\n512 bytes of keystream\r\nYMM registers (256-bi\r\n8 × 32-bit lanes each\r\nSame 20 rounds\r\nVPADDD + VPXOR +\r\nAdd + XOR\r\n8 blocks simultaneously\r\ncounter += 8 → repeat\r\nthroughput: ~8×\r\nrequires AVX2 (bit 2)\r\nall three functions are identical in what they compute — only how many blocks run in parallel differs\r\npartial final block (remainder bytes) handled separately in mw_chacha20_avx2_partial_block_xor\r\nFigure(6) ChaCha20 Three Variants\r\nThread Pool Execution\r\nThe sample initializes a multi-threaded processing pipeline by creating a thread pool sized at 2× the number of CPU\r\ncores, indicating intent for high-throughput file operations.\r\nIt accepts an optional command-line exclusion list (-i) , allowing specific ports to be skipped during execution suggesting\r\noperator-controlled targeting or selective encryption.\r\nThe malware then accesses a VMware ESXi configuration file (/etc/vmware/hostd/vmInventory.xml) , with both the file\r\npath and XPath query (//configentry) RC4-obfuscated , It parses \u003cconfigentry\u003e nodes to extract port identifiers\r\n(used as directory references) datastore paths(VM storage locations).\r\nThe malware then iterates over collected directories and:\r\nEnumerates files within each directory.\r\nSkips files already marked as encrypted (suffix .xx0001).\r\nhttps://0x3obad.github.io/posts/payload-ransomware-writeup/\r\nPage 7 of 13\n\nSubmits remaining files as jobs to the thread pool for encryption via mw_encrypt_file .\r\nFigure(7) Malware encrypts files and suffix .xx0001\r\nEach worker thread on startup calls prctl(PR_SET_NAME, \"FBIthread-pool-%d\") — the thread name string FBIthread-pool-%d is embedded in plaintext and is a notable forensic indicator. On wakeup, a thread dequeues a job, executes it as\r\njob-\u003efn(job-\u003earg) , frees the job struct, and decrements the active-job counter. If the active count drops to zero, a\r\npthread_cond_signal is fired to unblock any waiting caller of threadpool wait.\r\nEncryption Routine\r\nThe function implements a targeted, in-place ransomware encryption workflow optimized for ESXi/VMware environments .\r\nIt exclusively processes files larger than 5 GB, effectively filtering for virtual disk images such as VMDK while ignoring\r\nsmaller files, indicating deliberate high-value targeting.\r\nEach file undergoes a per-file Curve25519 ECDH key exchange , generating a unique ephemeral key pair and deriving a\r\nChaCha20 encryption key from a decoded attacker public key. This ensures strong cryptographic isolation, preventing\r\ndecryption without attacker-controlled material.\r\nEncryption is performed partially across 5 segments, each up to 1 GB, using a 1 MB sliding buffer and executed in-place (no\r\ntemporary files). The ChaCha20 keystream is synchronized with file offsets, enabling deterministic decryption while\r\nsignificantly reducing processing time—typical optimizing for speed on large datasets.\r\nhttps://0x3obad.github.io/posts/payload-ransomware-writeup/\r\nPage 8 of 13\n\nFigure(8) Encryption routine\r\nPost-encryption, the malware appends a 56-byte footer containing the ephemeral public key, lightly obfuscated using RC4\r\n3-byte key (“FBI”) . This serves as metadata for decryption while providing minimal resistance to static extraction.\r\nSensitive key material is explicitly wiped from memory, reflecting anti-forensic intent.\r\nFigure(9) Metadata For Decryption\r\nRansom Note\r\nThe ransom note inside ESXi’s own web UI welcome.txt , replacing the host management interface greeting.\r\n1\r\n2\r\n3\r\n4\r\n5\r\n6\r\n7\r\n8\r\n9\r\n10\r\n11\r\n12\r\n13\r\n14\r\n15\r\nWelcome to Payload!\r\nThe next 72 hours will determine certain factors in the life of your company:\r\nthe publication of the file tree, which we have done safely and unnoticed by all of you,\r\nand the publication of your company's full name on our luxurious blog.\r\nNONE of this will happen if you contact us within this time frame and our negotiations are favorable.\r\nWe are giving you 240 hours to:\r\n1. familiarize yourself with our terms and conditions,\r\n2. begin negotiations with us,\r\n3. and successfully conclude them.\r\nThe timer may be extended if we deem it necessary (only in the upward direction).\r\nOnce the timer expires, all your information will be posted on our blog.\r\nATTENTION!\r\nhttps://0x3obad.github.io/posts/payload-ransomware-writeup/\r\nPage 9 of 13\n\n16\r\n17\r\n18\r\n19\r\n20\r\n21\r\n22\r\n23\r\n24\r\n25\r\n26\r\n27\r\n28\r\n29\r\n30\r\n31\r\n32\r\n33\r\n34\r\n35\r\n36\r\n37\r\n38\r\n39\r\n40\r\n41\r\n42\r\n43\r\nContacting authorities, recovery agencies, etc. WILL NOT HELP YOU!\r\nAt best, you will waste your money and lose some of your files, which they will carefully take to restore!\r\nYou should also NOT turn off, restart, or put your computer to sleep.\r\nIn the future, such mistakes can make the situation more expensive and the files will not be restored!\r\nWe DO NOT recommend doing anything with the files, as this will make it difficult to recover them later!\r\nWhen contacting us:\r\nyou can request up to 3 files from the file tree,\r\nyou can request up to 3 encrypted files up to 15 megabytes\r\nso that we can decrypt them and you understand that we can do it.\r\nFirst, you should install Tor Browser:\r\n1. Open: https://www.torproject.org/download\r\n2. Choose your OS and select it\r\n3. Run installer\r\n4. Enjoy!\r\nIn countries where tor is prohibited, we recommend using bridges,\r\nwhich you can take: https://bridges.torproject.org/\r\nYou can read:\r\n[NOPE 3eb] (Tor)\r\nTo start negotiations, go to [NOPE] and login:\r\nUser: [snip]\r\nPassword: [snip]\r\nYour ID to verify: [snip]\r\nMITRE ATT\u0026CK Coverage\r\nID Technique Description\r\nT1622 Debugger Evasion TracerPid check + self-deletion\r\nT1027 Obfuscated Files/Info RC4 string obfuscation\r\nT1036.005 Process Masquerading prctl thread name spoofing\r\nT1070.004 File Deletion Self-deletes binary on detection\r\nT1082 System Info Discovery CPUID, sysconf\r\nT1083 File and Directory Discovery opendir / readdir64\r\nT1486 Data Encrypted for Impact ChaCha20\r\nT1490 Inhibit System Recovery Targets VMDK / datastore images\r\nT1059.004 Unix Shell Execution vim-cmd via system()\r\nIOCs\r\nhttps://0x3obad.github.io/posts/payload-ransomware-writeup/\r\nPage 10 of 13\n\nFiles bearing .xx0001 extension on ESXi datastores\r\n56-byte footer containing hex magic 70 61 79 6C 6F 61 64 00\r\nProcesses named FBIthread-pool-0, FBIthread-pool-1, … visible in ps/top\r\nRansom note present at /usr/lib/vmware/hostd/docroot/ui/welcome.txt\r\nYARA Rule\r\n1\r\n2\r\n3\r\n4\r\n5\r\n6\r\n7\r\n8\r\n9\r\n10\r\n11\r\n12\r\n13\r\n14\r\n15\r\n16\r\n17\r\n18\r\n19\r\n20\r\n21\r\n22\r\n23\r\n24\r\n25\r\n26\r\n27\r\n28\r\n29\r\n30\r\n31\r\n32\r\n33\r\n34\r\n35\r\n36\r\n37\r\n38\r\n39\r\n40\r\n41\r\n42\r\n43\r\nrule payload_ransomware\r\n{\r\n meta:\r\n description = \"Payload ESXi Ransomware\"\r\n author = \"Abdullah Islam @0x3oBAD\"\r\n date = \"2026-04-07\"\r\n md5 = \"f91cbdd91e2daab31b715ce3501f5ea0\"\r\n sha256 = \"bed8d1752a12e5681412efbb8283910857f7c5c431c2d73f9bbc5b379047a316\"\r\n malware_family = \"Payload Ransomware\"\r\n target_platform = \"Linux / VMware ESXi\"\r\n detection_phases = \"pre-install dropper, execution, lateral-movement artifact\"\r\n strings:\r\n $curve25519_clamp = { C0 ?? F8 ?? ?? ?? ?? 40 }\r\n $chacha20_const = \"expand 32-byte k\" ascii\r\n $proc_status = \"/proc/self/status\" ascii\r\n $tracer_field = \"TracerPid:\" ascii\r\n $proc_exe = \"/proc/self/exe\" ascii\r\n $esxi_note = \"/usr/lib/vmware/hostd/docroot/ui/welcome.txt\" ascii\r\n $urandom = \"/dev/urandom\" ascii\r\n $vim_cmd = \"vim-cmd vmsvc/power.off %d \u003e /dev/null 2\u003e\u00261\" ascii\r\n $esxi_inventory = \"/etc/vmware/hostd/vmInventory.xml\" ascii\r\n $xpath_query = \"//ConfigEntry\" ascii\r\n $vmx_field = \"vmxCfgPath\" ascii\r\n $ext = \".xx0001\" ascii nocase\r\n $footer_magic = { 70 61 79 6C 6F 61 64 00 }\r\n $thread_name = \"FBIthread-pool-%d\" ascii\r\n $thpool_init_oom = \"thpool_init(): Could not allocate memory for thread pool\" ascii\r\n $thpool_job_oom = \"thpool_add_work(): Could not allocate memory for new job\" ascii\r\n $thpool_sigusr = \"thread_do(): cannot handle SIGUSR1\" ascii\r\n $bsem_err = \"bsem_init(): Binary semaphore can take only values 1 or 0\" ascii\r\n $pubkey_1 = \"TnJqU2F5RFFYREpPTURkUGx5Q3NMem0yNlZKM0s1aks=\" ascii\r\n $pubkey_2 = \"Pmep+UUmeFwxxUO+P03HA558P3ZPZWN8bCK4XzNXtXU=\" ascii\r\n $pubkey_head = \"W2M6q8YwDKCcSvBj7YRjVNtSI/PO22G+\" ascii\r\n $key_err_1 = \"[!] invalid key size\" ascii\r\n $key_err_2 = \"[!] base64 pubkey decode failed\" ascii\r\nhttps://0x3obad.github.io/posts/payload-ransomware-writeup/\r\nPage 11 of 13\n\n44\r\n45\r\n46\r\n47\r\n48\r\n49\r\n50\r\n51\r\n52\r\n53\r\n54\r\n55\r\n56\r\n57\r\n58\r\n59\r\n60\r\n61\r\n62\r\n63\r\n64\r\n65\r\n66\r\n67\r\n68\r\n69\r\n70\r\n71\r\n72\r\n73\r\n74\r\n75\r\n76\r\n77\r\n78\r\n79\r\n80\r\n81\r\n82\r\n83\r\n84\r\n85\r\n86\r\n87\r\n88\r\n89\r\n90\r\n91\r\n92\r\n93\r\n94\r\n95\r\n96\r\n97\r\n98\r\n $libxml2 = \"libxml2.so.2\" ascii\r\n $b64_alpha = \"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/\" ascii\r\n $segment_loop_5 = { B? 05 00 00 00 [0-16] 3? 05 }\r\n $flock_lockex = { B? 02 00 00 00 [0-8] E8 ?? ?? ?? ?? }\r\n condition:\r\n uint32(0) == 0x464C457F\r\n and uint8(4) == 2\r\n and uint8(5) == 1\r\n and uint16(0x12) == 0x3E\r\n and (\r\n (\r\n filesize == 39904\r\n and all of ($pubkey_1, $pubkey_2, $pubkey_head)\r\n )\r\n or (\r\n $proc_status\r\n and $tracer_field\r\n and $proc_exe\r\n and (\r\n any of ($pubkey_1, $pubkey_2, $pubkey_head)\r\n or ($key_err_1 and $key_err_2)\r\n )\r\n and 1 of ($chacha20_const, $curve25519_clamp, $b64_alpha)\r\n )\r\n or (\r\n $vim_cmd\r\n and $esxi_inventory\r\n and $xpath_query\r\n and (\r\n $esxi_note\r\n or ($thpool_init_oom and $thread_name)\r\n or ($flock_lockex and $ext)\r\n )\r\n and (\r\n #esxi_note + #vmx_field + #xpath_query + #ext\r\n + #thread_name + #thpool_init_oom + #thpool_job_oom\r\n + #thpool_sigusr + #bsem_err + #key_err_1\r\n + #key_err_2 + #proc_exe + #urandom + #libxml2 \u003e= 5\r\n )\r\n )\r\n or (\r\n $chacha20_const\r\n and $curve25519_clamp\r\n and $urandom\r\n and 2 of ($vim_cmd, $esxi_inventory, $thread_name, $xpath_query)\r\n )\r\n or (\r\n $segment_loop_5\r\n and $flock_lockex\r\n and $footer_magic\r\n and 1 of ($esxi_inventory, $vim_cmd, $ext)\r\nhttps://0x3obad.github.io/posts/payload-ransomware-writeup/\r\nPage 12 of 13\n\n99\r\n100\r\n101\r\n102\r\n103\r\n104\r\n )\r\n or (\r\n $footer_magic at (filesize - 56 + 24)\r\n )\r\n )\r\n}\r\nConclusion\r\nlocker_esxi.elf is a targeted ESXi ransomware focused on encrypting large VM disk files (\u003e5 GB) for maximum\r\nimpact. It uses Curve25519 + ChaCha20 with per-file keys, ensuring strong cryptographic isolation. The malware leverages\r\nmulti-threading and SIMD optimizations to accelerate encryption across systems. It demonstrates environment awareness by\r\nparsing VMware configs and shutting down VMs before encryption. Overall, it is a highly efficient, enterprise-focused\r\nransomware designed for rapid disruption of virtualized infrastructure.\r\nSource: https://0x3obad.github.io/posts/payload-ransomware-writeup/\r\nhttps://0x3obad.github.io/posts/payload-ransomware-writeup/\r\nPage 13 of 13",
	"extraction_quality": 1,
	"language": "EN",
	"sources": [
		"Malpedia"
	],
	"origins": [
		"web"
	],
	"references": [
		"https://0x3obad.github.io/posts/payload-ransomware-writeup/"
	],
	"report_names": [
		"payload-ransomware-writeup"
	],
	"threat_actors": [],
	"ts_created_at": 1775791261,
	"ts_updated_at": 1775826787,
	"ts_creation_date": 0,
	"ts_modification_date": 0,
	"files": {
		"pdf": "https://archive.orkl.eu/93bdc185cccb4980de21b6a2410380d4e4fa8b73.pdf",
		"text": "https://archive.orkl.eu/93bdc185cccb4980de21b6a2410380d4e4fa8b73.txt",
		"img": "https://archive.orkl.eu/93bdc185cccb4980de21b6a2410380d4e4fa8b73.jpg"
	}
}