# Inside TeamTNT’s Impressive Arsenal: A Look Into A TeamTNT Server **[anomali.com/blog/inside-teamtnts-impressive-arsenal-a-look-into-a-teamtnt-server](https://www.anomali.com/blog/inside-teamtnts-impressive-arsenal-a-look-into-a-teamtnt-server)** Research | October 6, 2021 by Anomali Threat Research ----- _Authored By: Tara Gould_ ## Key Findings Anomali Threat Research has discovered an open server to a directory listing that we attribute with high confidence to the German-speaking threat group, TeamTNT. The server contains source code, scripts, binaries, and cryptominers targeting Cloud environments. Other server contents include Amazon Web Services (AWS) Credentials stolen from TeamTNT stealers are also hosted on the server. This inside view of TeamTNT infrastructure and tools in use can help security operations teams to improve detection capabilities for related attacks, whether coming directly from TeamTNT or other cybercrime groups leveraging their tools. ## Overview Anomali Threat Research has identified a TeamTNT server open to directory listing. The server was used to serve scripts and binaries that TeamTNT use in their attacks, and also for the IRC communications for their bot. The directory appears to have been in use since at least August 2021 and was in use as of October 5, 2021. The contents of the directory contain metadata, scripts, source code, and stolen credentials. ----- TeamTNT is a German-speaking, cryptojacking threat group that targets cloud environments. The group typically uses cryptojacking malware and have been active since at least April 2020.[1] TeamTNT activity throughout 2021 has targeted AWS, Docker, GCP, Linux, Kubernetes, and Windows, which corresponds to usual TeamTNT activity.[2] ## Technical Analysis ### Scripts (/cmd/) ----- **_Figure 1 - Overview of /cmd/_** Contained on the server are approximately 50 scripts, most of which are already documented, located in the /cmd/ directory. The objective of the scripts vary and include the following: AWS Credential Stealer Diamorphine Rootkit IP Scanners Mountsploit Scripts to set up utils Scripts to setup miners Scripts to remove previous miners ----- **_Figure 2 - Snippet of AWS Credential Stealer Script_** Some notable scripts, for example, is the script that steals AWS EC2 credentials, shown above in Figure 2. The AWS access key, secret key, and token are piped into a text file that is uploaded to the Command and Control (C2) server. **_Figure 3 - Chimaera_Kubernetes_root_PayLoad_2.sh_** Another interesting script is shown in Figure 3 above, which checks the architecture of the system, and retrieves the XMRig miner version for that architecture from another open TeamTNT server, 85.214.149[.]236. ----- ### Binaries (/bin/) ----- **_Figure 4 - Overview of /bin_** Within the /bin/ folder, shown in Figure 4 above, there is a collection of malicious binaries and utilities that TeamTNT use in their operations. Among the files are well-known samples that are attributed to TeamTNT, including the Tsunami backdoor and a XMRig cryptominer. Some of the tools have the source code located on the server, such as TeamTNT Bot. The folder /a.t.b contains the source code for the TeamTNT bot, shown in Figures 5 and 6 below. In addition, the same binaries have been found on a TeamTNT Docker, noted in Appendix A. **_Figure 5 - Screenshot of TeamTNTbot.c_** ----- **_Figure 6 - Bot Commands_** [Lasty, the /bin/ folder also contains utilities including masscan, ngrok, peirates, pnscan,](https://github.com/inguardians/peirates) wget, zgrab. These utilities will be used to aid in carrying out the malicious activity. ### Metadata (/in/) The folder /in/, shown below in Figure 7, contains interesting data which includes two subfolders, AWS/ and results/. Inside of this folder appears to contain lists of S3 buckets and stolen AWS credentials shown in Figure 8 and Figure 9 below, coming from the scripts mentioned above. A file named “ngrok.authkeys.txt”, shown in Figure 10 below, displays an error of a failure to bind to a TLS tunnel with an account name. Although it is unclear if these are stolen credentials, TeamTNT have previously been reported to scan targets to steal ngrok credentials.[3] Two text files, docker_ips.txt and weave_uniq.txt, contain lists of IPs, with the Docker file totaling 13,282 IP addresses. Another file “HoneyPots.txt” contains data referring to 484 Docker containers. ----- **_Figure 7 - Directory of /in/_** ----- **_Figure 8 - AWS Stolen Credentials_** **_Figure 9 - Example of Stolen Credentials File_** ----- **_Figure 10 - ngrok.authkeys.txt_** ## Conclusion TeamTNT is a highly-active group that continues to evolve and target cloud infrastructure. The discovery of their infrastructure gives insight into their toolsets. It is unknown at this time whether TeamTNT have purposefully left this server open to directory listing, and why. However this is not the first time TeamTNT server has been open, as reported by Unit42 in June 2021.[4] Furthermore, the group appears unbothered with having their toolset publicized, and will engage with security researchers on Twitter, even giving recommendations of how the tools should be utilized.[5] ## Endnotes [1] “Tracking The Activities of TeamTNT,” Trend Micro, accessed October 5, 2021, published July 20, 2021, https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/white_papers/wp-tracking-theactivities-of-teamTNT.pdf. [2] “TeamTNT With New Campaign Aka “Chimaera”,” accessed October 5, 2021, published September 8, 2021, https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/teamtnt-with-newcampaign-aka-chimaera. [3] ”TeamTNT Actively Enumerating Cloud Environments to Infiltrate Organizations,” Palo Alto, accessed October 6, 2021, published June 4, 2021, https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/teamtnt-operations-cloud-environments/. [4] Ibid. [5] “HildeGard@TeamTNT,” Twitter, accessed October 6, 2021, published September 9, 2021, https://twitter.com/HildeTNT/status/1436026656695672839. [6] “Malicious Docker Images Still Used For Malicious Purposes,” CounterCraft, accessed October 5, 2021, published September 29, 2021, https://www.countercraftsec.com/blog/post/using-malicious-docker-images-more-teamtntdocker-abuse/. ## IOCs ----- ### Hashes 91917fec033047a97a64be297454e6d7 ./init/r.sh 644749dda45caedda59f32f7991f0ffd ./cmd/grab/aws2.sh 7756f215ec37b1f545d1d8648a6d78d0 ./cmd/grab/aws-cloud.sh 273ef84fbe3d495bff371e64cbf74b36 ./cmd/grab/aws.sh b20ab8eb3c3db7d20cecf44024762bd2 ./cmd/Setup.User.curl.sh 1f6353c16d11e0e841129d55dfd9ac74 ./cmd/Setup_WeaveScope.sh fb3346a3cb6add01efade50b53dd211f ./cmd/Setup_RainBow_Miner.sh ee9c391c98dee5331ac467854f0ae262 ./cmd/Kubernetes_root_PayLoad_2.2.sh bcf76b649b5c6016b4071d197b1ce111 ./cmd/setup_moneroocean_miner.sh 7cced044d94a7ac6415598e663b46b26 ./cmd/Setup_ETH_MinerService.sh e85c28315dcdae18ab273775c29cefa7 ./cmd/gpu/ati.sh 26870afb9524e1ab2eb396d15a222676 ./cmd/gpu/nvidia.sh 27fd3a594fd66f4c113ab1f70a95f82e ./cmd/gpu/c3pool_gpu.sh a8415b189839b9585193e2b2ec63d6f3 ./cmd/DockerAPI-SSH-BreakOut.sh 45fc2131a4e60bb7545a2b1b235d66ef ./cmd/Kubernetes_root_PayLoad_1.sh f7b90d0f91ed25806d49ca281a7db10c ./cmd/init.sh 940c1c591677efbe91d165751296dddd ./cmd/ld.so.preload.sh 4f476e9ea8aed60e29bf06ffe758f841 ./cmd/Setup_ETH_Miner.sh 9ca7f7e428ff5e3dbe943efe8ed0df31 ./cmd/GRABBER_google-cloud.sh e2fcb71452e7e4057d144bd1c525432a ./cmd/CLEAN.TeamTNT.sh c491a19742c352b2c6221037dfac7a4a ./cmd/GRABBER_aws-cloud.sh 3bfed4e4d3b828c427629f764d65bd57 ./cmd/setup/all.glib.sh 66d63fc99fb80c7a1fb67f712582725b ./cmd/setup/docker.ethminer.sh 26870afb9524e1ab2eb396d15a222676 ./cmd/setup/nvidia.sh 846b5ff8a0f64b9af3d22157cb437a5c ./cmd/setup/all.golang.sh ----- 701bc6594b2e06952451d266ced2032a ./cmd/setup/ngrok.sh 03c43133db24a7b3f1e8a4d5c268668d ./cmd/setup/tmate.sh 39ea1f63f9ae414c56ab3dc66a7569cd ./cmd/setup/apt.zgrab.sh 64bcf5dc015e53c868950204e2cae3f1 ./cmd/setup/all.tsh.sh 779a0bd628b67834116309bf3b3278ed ./cmd/setup/docker.sh de036084f92920a921bc2a43b82a8149 ./cmd/Kubernetes_temp_PayLoad_1.sh 4090469125917070c22203b7d973f52e ./cmd/Kubernetes.LAN.IP.Range.sh 406caa94137d5c1e18b9ee7d5c72d72d ./cmd/clean/jupyter.sh b62fbf2f2a7859e69deeb75fa1153b41 ./cmd/clean/TeamTNT.sh 0d173ab9281f013221a94b4289443a16 ./cmd/Kubernetes_temp_PayLoad_2.sh d88c87f1afb6de12d885fc0fbc33b605 ./cmd/Kubernetes_scan_LAN_IPs.sh a0c7366cd907197702aed089463af482 ./cmd/install-NVIDIA-driver.sh 287794e108f3a4b07654ce83f6f41b38 ./cmd/Kubernetes_root_PayLoad_2.sh 15d4150a3190e0630a6182a882be5cad ./cmd/fix/nameserver.sh fd65800ea90386abbdd2b099cb4cdb45 ./cmd/fix/systemfix.sh 419c721fd5eb8f740cb1f971af5dc745 ./cmd/init_main_root.sh d2c6d0fed174f4cbb09d1596e46258a6 ./cmd/MOUNTSPLOIT_V2.sh.txt c491a19742c352b2c6221037dfac7a4a ./cmd/GRABBER_aws-cloud2.sh 51a4ba442533bd0d69e0da7dd46e3d9c ./cmd/clean.sh fefbc41c9514a9a4f4c4e88ead3ebd89 ./cmd/ssh_user.sh 3f9466ee106e947a4cea13d57ce96ed1 ./cmd/exp/ssh.rsa.sh fffe69fabf5d014579686d8bc790e70f ./cmd/exp/ssh.axx.sh 80f3f20d5923c3a35022f065da9ea924 ./cmd/Setup_tmate.sh e275c26583f08e6fdbb6045c7b2db647 ./cmd/CLEAN.other.miners.sh 68df6dc236a2f8d7231ca362b89148fe ./cmd/ssh_user2.sh 7d91732b7c8feced0ea698c83769e51d ./bin/ngrok/aarch64 ----- 0429e95cf9e7f631c944f23f82b89b54 ./bin/ngrok/x86_64 5cdd0e39fc9be0a13134f26aba70ede1 ./bin/golang/go1.12.7.linux-386.tar.gz 23bad8d12c43fc3e3a0568dbc8f19c85 ./bin/ethminer/cuda-9-x86_64.tar.gz ae929d06265be0310c3f2eb6c44314d7 ./bin/a.t.b/TeamTNTbot.c 11d85a39722734273adb7a0b21ac29a6 ./bin/a.t.b/aarch64 5e4424e2a11e53e36eb10eff417fd19a ./bin/a.t.b/jupyter cffb2c0fbb0bb4a98024a682a982199b ./bin/a.t.b/x86_64 2c22a520cd1ed4fc8e249d333724412d ./bin/xmrig.tar.gz 777e1d9b717d339a7582e06ab28d0dd3 ./bin/bot_root/aarch64 bdb404a243e374cda8948a5480f263e6 ./bin/bot_root/x86_64 d901256374ddd1770270971856bf735a ./bin/masscan/x86_64.rpm 7400bf51827682ec6a43b2d1c0a93eca ./bin/masscan/aarch64.rpm c1d28488c149ad232ad3073605eeaf35 ./bin/masscan/aarch64.apk ce43c3c74bde98127a91cd0224f1fa26 ./bin/masscan/masscan.sh 87b30ac544d39a044b66ef103f36c357 ./bin/masscan/aarch64 422385becd4e08062b56f57afbc5ae6b ./bin/masscan/x86_64 d4314256672783e773171fd25ac21f78 ./bin/pnscan/aarch64.deb f7a515b639dc08d8061fa56ffacbecac ./bin/pnscan/x86_64.deb 3102067a3822ff1c3c17999e3e2b602d ./bin/pnscan/x86_64.rpm db8bc741c40388270bd88cfa1ff2aa41 ./bin/pnscan/aarch64 d3ba2c41757b203ad0a12d1028074bbf ./bin/pnscan/pnscan.tar.gz 89d7c2db1f892139ee567d7ae29133a9 ./bin/pnscan/x86_64 d3fae6436a45bfbc22fda8bcb66b27c0 ./bin/zgrab/ppc64le 79b8b3d73c8e8c4b1f74a48a617690db ./bin/zgrab/i386 d5869c7c642aff3d91839aaa3f4b0671 ./bin/zgrab/aarch64 26c8f6597826fbdebb5df4cd8cd34663 ./bin/zgrab/x86_64 ----- bc4084451fcf1439a23a081e32a6c532 ./bin/pei/pei32 07179295144082d0291759d5cf2d19c2 ./bin/pei/pei64 d9dd55f66b3d783864f21684c612b406 ./bin/tshd/x86_64 3634fd8b0be6de05eb6df806a4f7b11e ./bin/bot/TNT_gpu bd703ac4ea6ec7127fc9b8f8ce4d7c1e ./bin/bot/SSHSPR 13e2c82ecd3bfee92c75f30cf0f40cdc ./bin/bot/chimaera.cc_Version2.c 1221631e5fd5628435b6dfef15899fce ./bin/bot/chimaera.cc 73a9c6eaa8afc2b02699f172f294b496 ./bin/bot/TNT_gpu.c 29c0f22199b6abb07f5f2a6a6037396b ./bin/bot/AWS 13e2c82ecd3bfee92c75f30cf0f40cdc ./bin/bot/chimaera.cc.c cd7a98f04de9713b602c314743e5bf55 ./bin/bot/TeamTNTbot.c 5718175711512e3fb20f5cf556c57924 ./bin/src/scope 677000fb99bf02e3c477a4349df76319 ./bin/src/log_clean.c 068f3a272598e55dc02382818f4de70e ./bin/src/master.zip b767837f26b23ec978c1c8b42f9457a1 ./bin/src/rbm.zip 3c61212d7bfb2c27834bb1d36c389273 ./bin/src/tsh.tar.gz 7950de1f8f013cf3bf2c4eaa8ff4a3e5 ./bin/src/bash.tar.gz 1dc06ba731199951436705f4969e5b4e ./bin/src/dia/Makefile 8ab4cecc4fbf10a1de46a5f0823e0a94 ./bin/src/dia/chimaeraxmr.h 7d4ee4e30088c680b9a50e3924ecce20 ./bin/src/dia/chimaeraxmr.c b62ce36054a7e024376b98df7911a5a7 ./bin/src/xmrig.so 4b05c9ad17a82104dba978ab68cec49a ./bin/src/chimaeraxmr.tar.gz 1254351aa752d5876ad225243bed69a8 ./CHIMAERA/bin/xmrigCC/kuben3.tar.gz ### Network 45.9.148.182 45.9.148.182/cmd 45.9.148.182/CHIMAERA ----- 45.9.148.182/bin 45.9.148.182/in 45.9.148.182/init 51.79.226.64 85.214.149.236 (appears to have been compromised) ## MITRE ATT&CK TTPs Technique ID Name Execution T1059.004 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix T1609 Container Administration Command Defense Evasion T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information T1070.003 Indicator Removal on Host: Clear Command History T1070.004 Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information T1027.002 Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing T1036.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Names or Locations Credential Access T1552.001 Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files T1552.004 Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys T1552.005 Unsecured Credentials: Instance Metadata API Discovery T1046 Network Service Scanning T1082 System Information Discovery Command and Control T1071 Application Layer Protocol T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1219 Remote Access Software T1102 Web Service Impact T1496 Resource Hijacking ----- ## Appendix A ### Docker Images TeamTNT are also hosting malicious docker images on a Docker repo named “alpineos”. The account contains 25 images, which includes XMRig, a reverse shell, moneroocean, kubepwn, and TeamTNTbot builder. In some of these images the scripts are reaching out to the scripts described above. In September 2021, CounterCraft released research on the “alpinos/dockerapi” image.[6] **_Figure 11 - TeamTNT Docker Repo_** Docker Image alpineos/dockerapi alpineos/wscopescan alpineos/dsbo alpineos/xxcrace alpineos/firstt alpineos/scopeppc64le alpineos/tntxmrigbuilder ----- alpineos/simpledockerxmr alpineos/ttdft alpineos/tntbotbuilder alpineos/minion alpineos/xmrigcc alpineos/fluxfaxpax alpineos/scopeaarch64 alpineos/scanaround alpineos/kirito alpineos/kndb alpineos/jupyter alpineos/java alpineos/revs alpineos/lftk alpineos/basicxmr alpineos/lft alpineos/weavescope ## Appendix B [Source code available for TeamTNTBot.c,](https://gist.github.com/tgould0/87b21ece2f5e39229f35ee045f733b15) [chimaera.cc_Version2.c, and](https://gist.github.com/tgould0/d208f27c0ad17ae5db7bd12a08812c03#file-chimaera-cc_version2-c) [TNT_GPU.c.](https://gist.github.com/tgould0/068077771d835eb667b71d9d7da997f0) ----- Topics: Research -----