

# BlackCat Ransomware | Highly-Configurable, Rust-Driven RaaS On The Prowl For Victims

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BlackCat (*aka* AlphaVM, AlphaV) is a newly established RaaS (Ransomware as a Service) with payloads written in Rust. While BlackCat is not the first ransomware written in the Rust language, it joins a small (yet growing) sliver of the malware landscape making use of this popular cross-platform language.

First [appearing](#) in late November, BlackCat has [reportedly](#) been attacking targets in multiple countries, including Australia, India and the U.S, and demanding ransoms in the region of \$400,000 to \$3,000,000 in Bitcoin or Monero.

## BlackCat Ransomware Overview

In order to attract affiliates, the authors behind BlackCat have been heavily marketing their services in well-known underground forums.

BlackCat operators maintain a victim blog as is standard these days. The blog hosts company names and any data leaked in the event that the victims do not agree to cooperate.

Current data indicates primary delivery of BlackCat is via 3rd party framework/toolset (e.g., Cobalt Strike) or via exposed (and vulnerable) applications. BlackCat currently supports both Windows and Linux operating systems.

## BlackCat Configuration Options

Samples analyzed (to date ) require an “access token” to be supplied as a parameter upon execution. This is similar to threats like [Egregor](#), and is often used as an anti-analysis tactic. This ‘feature’ exists in both the Windows and Linux versions of BlackCat.

However, the BlackCat samples we analyzed could be launched with any string supplied as the access token. For example:

```
Malware.exe -v --access-token 12345
```

The ransomware supports a visible command set, which can be obtained via the `-h` or `--help` parameters.

```
C:\Users\admin1\Desktop>worldwideStrata.exe --help
C:\Users\admin1\Desktop>
USAGE:
  [OPTIONS] [SUBCOMMAND]
OPTIONS:
  --access-token <ACCESS_TOKEN>      Access Token
  --child                             Run as child process
  --drag-and-drop                     Invoked with drag and drop
  --drop-drag-and-drop-target         Drop drag and drop target batch file
  -h, --help                          Print help information
  --log-file <LOG_FILE>              Enable logging to specified file
  --no-net                             Do not discover network shares on Windows
  --no-prop                           Do not self propagate(worm) on Windows
  --no-prop-servers <NO_PROP_SERVERS>... Do not propagate to defined servers
  --no-vm-kill                        Do not stop VMs on ESXi
  --no-vm-snapshot-kill              Do not wipe VMs snapshots on ESXi
  --no-wall                           Do not update desktop wallpaper on Windows
  -p, --paths <PATHS>...            Only process files inside defined paths
  --propagated                        Run as propagated process
  --ui                                 Show user interface
  -v, --verbose                       Log to console
```

BlackCat command line options

As seen above, the executable payloads support a variety of commands, many of which are VMware-centric.

```
--no-prop                Do not self propagate(worm) on Windows
--no-prop-servers <NO_PROP_SERVERS> Do not propagate to defined servers
--no-vm-kill             Do not stop VMs on ESXi
--no-vm-snapshot-kill   Do not wipe VMs snapshots on ESXi
--no-wall                Do not update desktop wallpaper on Windows
```

In verbose mode ( -v ) the following output can be observed upon launch of the BlackCat payloads:

```
C:\Users\admin1\Desktop>worldwideStrata.exe --ui --access-token 12345 -v
C:\Users\admin1\Desktop>18:37:13 [INFO] locker::core::stack: Starting Supervisor
8:37:13 [INFO] locker::core::stack: Starting Discoverer
8:37:13 [INFO] locker::core::stack: Starting File Unlockers
8:37:13 [INFO] locker::core::stack: Starting File Processing Pipeline
8:37:13 [INFO] locker::core::pipeline::chunk_workers_supervisor: spawned_workers=2
8:37:13 [INFO] locker::core::pipeline::file_worker_pool: spawned_file_dispatchers=2
8:37:13 [INFO] locker::core::pipeline::file_worker_pool: spawned_chunk_work_infrastructure=2
8:37:13 [INFO] locker::core::stack: Detecting Other Instances
8:37:13 [INFO] locker::core::stack: Starting Cluster Service
8:37:13 [INFO] locker::core::stack: Connecting to Cluster
8:37:13 [INFO] locker::core::cluster: server=16992236885994352848
8:37:13 [INFO] locker::core::stack: This is a Master Process
8:37:13 [INFO] locker::core::stack: Starting Platform
8:37:13 [INFO] encrypt_app::windows: Bootstrap Routine
8:37:13 [INFO] locker::core::os::windows::privilege_escalation: win7_plus=true
8:37:13 [INFO] locker::core::os::windows::privilege_escalation: token_is_admin=false
8:37:13 [INFO] locker::core::os::windows::privilege_escalation: token_is_domain_admin=true
8:37:13 [INFO] locker::core::os::windows::privilege_escalation: masquerade_peb
8:37:13 [INFO] locker::core::os::windows::privilege_escalation: uac_bypass::shell_exec="worldwideStrata.exe",Some("\\-
i" \ "--access-token" \ "12345" \ "-v"),Some("C:\Users\admin1\Desktop")
8:37:14 [INFO] locker::core::os::windows::privilege_escalation: escalate-success
```

BlackCat ransomware run in verbose mode

## BlackCat Execution and Encryption Behaviour

Immediately upon launch, the malware will attempt to validate the existence of the previously mentioned access-token, followed by querying for the system UUID ( wmic ).

Those pieces of data are concatenated together into what becomes the ‘Access key’ portion of their recovery URL displayed in the ransom note. In addition, on Windows devices, BlackCat attempts to delete VSS (Volume Shadow Copies) as well as enumerate any accessible drives to search for and encrypt eligible files.

Other configuration parameters are evaluated before proceeding to execute multiple privilege escalation methods, based on the OS identified by `wmic` earlier. These methods are visible at the time of execution and include the use of the [Com Elevation Moniker](#).

It is at this point that BlackCat will attempt to terminate any processes or services listed within the configuration such as any processes which may inhibit the encryption process. There are also specific files and directories that are excluded from encryption. Much of this is configurable at the time of building the ransomware payloads.

The targeted processes and services are noted in the `kill_processes` and `kill_services` sections respectively. File and folder exclusions are handled in the `exclude_directory_names` section.

To further illustrate, the following were extracted from sample `d65a131fb2bd6d80d69fe7415dc1d1fd89290394 / 74464797c5d2df81db2e06f86497b2127fda6766956f1b67b0dcea9570d8b683` :

### Kill\_Processes

backup	memtas	mepocs	msexchange
sql	svc\$	veeam	vss

### Kill\_Services

agntsvc	dbeng50	dbsnmp	encsvc
excel	firefox	infopath	isqlplussvc
msaccess	mspub	mydesktopqos	mydesktopservice
notepad	ocautoupds	ocomm	ocssd
onenote	oracle	outlook	powerpnt
sqbcoreservice	sql	steam	synctime
tbirdconfig	thebat	thunderbird	visio
winword	wordpad	xfssvcon	

### Exclude\_Directory\_Names

\$recycle.bin	\$windows.~bt	\$windows.~ws	386
adv	all users	ani	appdata
application data	autorun.inf	bat	bin

boot	boot.ini	bootfont.bin	bootsect.bak
cab	cmd	com	config.msi
cpl	cur	default	deskthemepack
diagcab	diagcfg	diagpkg	dll
drv	exclude_file_extensions: [themepack	exclude_file_names: [desktop.ini	exe
google	hlp	hta	icl
icns	ico	iconcache.db	ics
idx	intel	key	ldf
lnk	lock	mod	mozilla
mpa	msc	msi	msocache
msp	msstyles	msu]	nls
nomedia	ntldr	ntuser.dat	ntuser.dat.log]
ntuser.ini	ocx	pdb	perflogs
prf	program files	program files (x86)	programdata
ps1	public	rom	rtp
scr	shs	spl	sys
system volume information	theme	thumbs.db	tor browser
windows	windows.old]	wpx	

BlackCat also spawns a number of its own processes, with syntax (for Windows) as follows:

```

WMIC.exe (CLI interpreter)  csproduct get UUID
cmd.exe (CLI interpreter)  /c "reg add HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanmanSer

cmd.exe (CLI interpreter)  /c "wmic csproduct get UUID"
cmd.exe (fsutil.exe)       /c "fsutil behavior set SymlinkEvaluation R2L:1"
fsutil.exe                 behavior set SymlinkEvaluation R2L:1
cmd.exe (fsutil.exe)       /c "fsutil behavior set SymlinkEvaluation R2R:1"

```

The `fsutil` -based modifications are meant to allow for use of both remote and local symlinks. BlackCat enables ‘remote to local’ and ‘remote to remote’ capability.

```

fsutil.exe          behavior set SymlinkEvaluation R2R:1
cmd.exe (vssadmin.exe) /c "vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet"
reg.exe (CLI interpreter) add HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanmanServer\Parameters\
                    vssadmin.exe /c "C:\Users\admin1\Desktop\worldwideStrata.exe"
vssadmin.exe       delete shadows /all /quietcmd.exe (ARP.EXE) /c "arp -a"

```

Some more recently-built copies have a few additions. For example, in sample

```
c1187fe0eaddee995773d6c66bcb558536e9b62c / c3e5d4e62ae4eca22f8f3c8cbec12757f78107e91e85404611548e06e40
```

we see the addition of:

```

wmic.exe Shadowcopy Delete"
"iisreset.exe /stop"
bcdedit.exe /set {default} recoveryenabled No

```

Much like other fine details, all this can be adjusted or configured by the affiliates at the time of building the payloads.

BlackCat configurations are not necessarily tailored to the target operating system. In the Linux variants we have analyzed to date, there are Windows-specific process, service, and file references in the `kill_processes` , `kill_services` , and `exclude_directory_names` .

The following excerpt is from sample `f8c08d00ff6e8c6adb1a93cd133b19302d0b651afd73ccb54e3b6ac6c60d99c6` .

```


"kill_services": ["mepocs", "mentas", "veeam", "svc3", "backup", "sql", "vss", "msexchange"],
"kill_processes": ["encsvc", "thebat", "mydesktopqos", "xfsvccon", "firefox", "infopath", "winword", "steam", "synctime", "notepad", "ocomm", "onenote", "mspub", "thunderbird", "sgntsv", "sql", "excel", "powerpnt", "outlook", "wordpad", "dbeng50", "isqlplusvc", "sqbcoreservice", "oracle", "ocautoups", "dbsnmp", "msaccess", "tbirdconfig", "ocssd", "aydesk", "topservice", "visio"],
"exclude_directory_names": ["system volume information", "intel", "$windows-ns", "application data", "$recycle bin", "mozilla", "program files (x86)", "program files", "$wind", "dows.-bt", "public", "msocache", "windows", "default", "all users", "tor browser", "programdata", "boot", "config.msi", "google", "perflogs", "appdata", "windows.old"], "exclude_f", "ile_names": ["desktop.ini", "autorun.inf", "ntldr", "bootsect.bak", "thumbs.db", "boot.ini", "ntuser.dat", "iconcache.db", "bootfont.bin", "ntuser.dat.log"], "excl", "ude_file_extensions": ["themepack", "nls", "diagpkg", "msi", "lnk", "exe", "cab", "scr", "bat", "drv", "rtsp", "msp", "prf", "msc", "ico", "key", "ocx", "diagcab", "diagcfg", "pdb", "wp", "hip", "icns", "rom", "dll", "msstyles", "mod", "ps1", "ics", "hta", "bin", "cmd", "ani", "386", "lock", "cur", "idx", "sys", "com", "deskthemepack", "shs", "ldf", "theme", "mpa", "nomedi", "a", "spl", "cpl", "adv", "icl", "msu"], "exclude_file_path_wildcard": [], "enable_network_discovery": true, "enable_self_propagation": true, "enable_set_wallpaper": true, "enable_", "esxi_vm_kill": true, "enable_esxi_vm_snapshot_kill": false, "strict_include_paths": [

```

### Linux variant configuration

Specific encryption logic is not necessarily novel either and is somewhat configurable by the affiliate at the time of building the ransomware payloads. BlackCat supports both ChaCha20 and AES encryption schemes.


Extensions on encrypted files can vary across samples. Examples observed include `.dkrpx75` , `.kh1ftzx` and `.wpzlbji` .



BlackCat ransomware execution chain (Windows version)


## Post-Infection, Payment and Portal

Infected clients will be greeted with a ransom note as well as a modified desktop image.



BlackCat's modified desktop image


Infected users are instructed to connect to the attackers' payment portal via TOR.



BlackCat ransom note

The ransom note informs the victim that not only have files been encrypted but data has been stolen.

Victim's are threatened with data leakage if they refuse to pay and provided with a list of data types that have been stolen.



In theory, once victims connect to the attacker's portal, they are able to communicate and potentially acquire a decryption tool. Everything on the BlackCat portal is tied back to the specific target ID, which must be supplied correctly from the URL in the ransom note.

## Conclusion

In its relatively short time on the radar, BlackCat has carved a notable place for itself amongst mid-tier ransomware actors. This group knows their craft and are cautious when selecting partners or affiliates. It is possible that some of the increased affiliation and activity around BlackCat is attributed to other actors migrating to BlackCat as larger platforms fizzle out (Ryuk, Conti, LockBit and REvil).

Actors utilizing BlackCat know their targets well and make every attempt to stealthily compromise enterprises. Prevention by way of powerful, modern, endpoint security controls are a must. The SentinelOne [Singularity Platform](#) is capable of detecting and preventing BlackCat infections on both Windows and Linux endpoints.

## Indicators of Compromise

### SHA256

0c6f444c6940a3688ffc6f8b9d5774c032e3551ebbccb64e4280ae7fc1fac479  
13828b390d5f58b002e808c2c4f02fdd920e236cc8015480fa33b6c1a9300e31  
15b57c1b68cd6ce3c161042e0f3be9f32d78151fe95461eedc59a79fc222c7ed  
1af1ca666e48afc933e2eda0ae1d6e88ebd23d27c54fd1d882161fd8c70b678e  
28d7e6fe31dc00f82cb032ba29aad6429837ba5efb83c2ce4d31d565896e1169

2cf54942e8cf0ef6296deaa7975618dadff0c32535295d3f0d5f577552229ffc  
38834b796ed025563774167716a477e9217d45e47def20facb027325f2a790d1  
3d7cf20ca6476e14e0a026f9bdd8ff1f26995cdc5854c3adb41a6135ef11ba83  
4e18f9293a6a72d5d42dad179b532407f45663098f959ea552ae43dbb9725cbf  
59868f4b346bd401e067380cac69080709c86e06fae219bfb5bc17605a71ab3f  
731adcf2d7fb61a8335e23dbee2436249e5d5753977ec465754c6b699e9bf161  
74464797c5d2df81db2e06f86497b2127fda6766956f1b67b0dcea9570d8b683  
7b2449bb8be1b37a9d580c2592a67a759a3116fe640041d0f36dc93ca3db4487  
7e363b5f1ba373782261713fa99e8bbc35ddd97e48799c4eb28f17989da8d8e  
bd337d4e83ab1c2cacb43e4569f977d188f1bb7c7a077026304bf186d49d4117  
c3e5d4e62ae4eca2bfca22f8f3c8cbec12757f78107e91e85404611548e06e40  
c8b3b67ea4d7625f8b37ba59eed5c9406b3ef04b7a19b97e5dd5dab1bd59f283  
cefea76dfdbb48cfe1a3db2c8df34e898e29bec9b2c13e79ef40655c637833ae  
f815f5d6c85bcbc1ec071dd39532a20f5ce910989552d980d1d4346f57b75f89  
f8c08d00ff6e8c6adb1a93cd133b19302d0b651afd73ccb54e3b6ac6c60d99c6

### SHA1

087497940a41d96e4e907b6dc92f75f4a38d861a  
11203786b17bb3873d46acae32a898c8dac09850  
2a53525eeb7b76b3d1bfe40ac349446f2add8784  
45212fa4501ede5af428563f8043c4ae40faec76  
57a6dfd2b021e5a4d4fe34a61bf3242ecee841b3  
5869820f261f76eafa1ba00af582a9225d005c89  
5c6ca5581a04955d8e4d1fa452621fbc922ecb7b  
655c2567650d2c109fab443de4b737294994f1fd  
783b2b053ef0345710cd2487e5184f29116e367c  
89060eff6db13e7455fee151205e972260e9522a  
9146a448463935b47e29155da74c68d16e0d7031  
94f025f3be089252692d58e54e3e926e09634e40  
a186c08d3d10885ebb129b1a0d8ea0da056fc362  
c1187fe0eaddee995773d6c66bcb558536e9b62c  
ce5540c0d2c54489737f3fefdbf72c889ac533a9  
d65a131fb2bd6d80d69fe7415dc1d1fd89290394  
da1e4a09a59565c5d62887e0e9a9f6f04a18b5f4  
e17dc8062742878b0b5ced2145311929f6f77abd  
e22436386688b5abe6780a462fd07cd12c3f3321  
f466b4d686d1fa9fed064507639b9306b0d80bbf

### MITRE ATT&CK

- [T1027.002](#) – Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing
- [T1027](#) – Obfuscated Files or Information
- [T1007](#) – System Service Discovery
- [T1059](#) – Command and Scripting Interpreter
- [TA0010](#) – Exfiltration

[T1082](#) – System Information Discovery

[T1490](#) – Inhibit System Recovery

[T1485](#) – Data Destruction

[T1078](#) – Valid Accounts

[T1486](#) – Data Encrypted For Impact

[T1140](#) – Encode/Decode Files or Information

[T1202](#) – Indirect Command Execution

[T1543.003](#) – Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service

[T1550.002](#) – Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash

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Source: <https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/blackcat-ransomware-highly-configurable-rust-driven-raas-on-the-prowl-for-victims/>