

Sugar Ransomware, a new RaaS

By Jason Reaves

Published: 2022-02-01 · Archived: 2026-04-05 20:44:56 UTC




8 min read

Feb 1, 2022

By: Joshua Platt, Jonathan Mccay and Jason Reaves

Press enter or click to view image in full size



An actor recently has been starting up a RaaS solution that appears to primarily focus on individual computers instead of entire enterprises but is also reusing objects from other ransomware families. Not a lot has been discussed about this ransomware but we did find a tweet mentioning one of the samples[3] during our research.

Crypter

We will go over the crypter being used because it has code reuse from the ransomware itself which makes it significantly more interesting than your typical crypter. The crypter has what initially looks like RC4 encryption leading to APLib decompression but as we dug in it turns out to be a modified version of RC4.


The encoded data can be seen with the key prepended to the data:

- Key Length
- Key
- Length of Encrypted Binary
- Start of Encrypted Binary

10 00 00 00	4A 7D 45 C8 25 32 9B DE AB 9B 45 7AJ}EÈ%2>P«>Ez	
1D 3B C1 52	30 D3 00 00	40 A6 FF 9D A0 2A 95 21	.;ÁR0Ó..@ ÿ..*·!
10 92 66 E2 46 46 C1 CE	75 7E E5 EF D6 8D 2D CB	. 'fâFFÁÎu~âïÖ.-Ë	
61 60 62 33 30 22 F5 01	A5 43 10 37 13 BE 6C F6	a`b30"ö.¥C.7.¼lö	
36 9D 63 4E E8 99 BF 20	53 B1 12 45 FA 7C CD E8	6.cNè™¿·S±.Eú Íè	
4F 0E 6C 08 EA B1 75 43	B7 62 74 C4 09 54 3F 13	O.l.ê±uC·btÄ.T?.	
42 F1 75 82 DA D1 7D C5	18 D1 9B B5 AC 2C 51 15	Bñu,ÚŃ}Á.Ñ>μ-,Q.	
EC 3C 1A A9 6A 36 05 0E	82 0B DC EB C5 F6 39 D1	ì<.0j6..,ÜëÄö9Ń	
98 15 8F D2 0D EC 36 51	99 BD C1 2E 81 30 2A C5	~..0.ì6Q™½Á..0*Á	
B8 8B 73 E1 90 DE 98 7A	EA 17 21 F0 A1 A1 AE 05	.<sá.b~zê.!đj¡®.	
FD D2 66 51 56 33 98 5F	80 79 5D 43 BE D8 03 89	ýòfQV3~_€y]C%0.‰	

As we mentioned above the encryption algorithm first looks like RC4, it sets up the SBOX:

Press enter or click to view image in full size



SBOX initialization

However starting with the KSA block is where things change:

```
loc_401227:  
push    edi  
call    sub_4010B3  
mov     edx, ds:lpAddress  
movzx   esi, al  
pop     ecx  
mov     cl, [edx+edi*4]  
mov     eax, [edx+esi*4]  
mov     [edx+edi*4], eax  
dec     edi ; Loads from back instead of front  
mov     eax, ds:lpAddress  
movzx   ecx, cl  
mov     [eax+esi*4], ecx  
cmp     edi, 1  
jge     short loc_401227
```

Custom KSA

The algorithm cycles through the SBOX during KSA from back to front, it also leverages a simple bitwise OR loop to build a value which is used to bitwise AND against the working value from the key, if the value is greater than or equal to the current SBOX iteration then it will continue to the next value in the key. Afterwards it begins a custom version of PRGA that involves some extra shuffling based on four values from the post KSA SBOX.

```
mov     ecx, ds:lpAddress  
mov     edi, [ebp+var_8]  
mov     esi, [ebp+dwSize]  
mov     eax, [ecx+4]  
mov     [ecx+400h], eax  
mov     ecx, ds:lpAddress  
mov     eax, [ecx+0Ch]  
mov     [ecx+404h], eax  
mov     ecx, ds:lpAddress  
mov     eax, [ecx+14h]  
mov     [ecx+408h], eax  
mov     ecx, ds:lpAddress  
mov     eax, [ecx+1Ch]  
mov     [ecx+40Ch], eax  
movzx   eax, ds:byte_401A68  
mov     ecx, ds:lpAddress  
mov     eax, [ecx+eax*4]  
mov     [ecx+410h], eax
```

After custom KSA

```
add     eax, [ecx+408h]
and     eax, 0FFh
mov     [ecx+408h], eax
mov     edx, ds:lpAddress
mov     eax, [edx+410h]
mov     ecx, [edx+408h]
mov     bl, [edx+eax*4]
add     bl, [edx+ecx*4]
mov     eax, [edx+40Ch]
add     bl, [edx+eax*4]
mov     eax, [ebp+var_4]
movzx   eax, byte ptr [esi+eax]
mov     [edx+40Ch], eax
mov     esi, ds:lpAddress
mov     eax, [esi+404h]
mov     ecx, [esi+400h]
mov     edx, [esi+eax*4]
add     edx, [esi+ecx*4]
movzx   eax, bl
and     edx, 0FFh
mov     ebx, 0FFh
mov     eax, [esi+eax*4]
mov     ecx, [esi+edx*4]
xor     ecx, [esi+eax*4]
xor     ecx, [esi+40Ch]
mov     [esi+410h], ecx
mov     eax, ds:lpAddress
mov     ecx, [ebp+var_4]
mov     esi, [ebp+var_C]
mov     al, [eax+410h]
mov     [ecx], al
inc     ecx
mov     [ebp+var_4], ecx
dec     edi
jnz     loc_4012C9
```

Custom PRGA

Unpacking code:

```
import yara
from pefile import PE
from struct import unpack
from apilib import Decompress
from io import BytesIO
from sys import argvdef main():
    filepath = argv[1]
    readbin = open(filepath, 'rb').read()

    rule = yara.compile(
        source='rule sugar_RaaS_crypter { strings: '
        '$57B = { C7 [1] 08 04 00 00 05 00 00 00 A1 [4] C7 [1] 0C 04 00 00 07 00 00 00 A1 [4] C7 [1]
        '$EP = { C2 04 00 6A 00 E8 [4] 33 [1] C2 04 } '
        '$AP = { E8 2C 00 00 00 3D 00 7D 00 00 73 0A 80 FC 05 73 06 83 F8 7F } '
        'condition: filesize < 200KB and uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x4550 and :
```

```
)
yara_match = rule.match(data=readbin)

if yara_match != {}:
    try:
        pe = PE(filepath)
    except:
        print('not valid PE')
        exit()
        dsect = [
            pe.sections[i].get_data() for i in range(len(pe.sections)) if pe.sections[i].Name.rsplit
            ][0]

        klen = unpack('I', dsect[:4])[0]
    key = dsect[4:4+klen]
    elen = unpack('I', dsect[4+klen:8+klen])[0]
    ebin = dsect[klen+8:klen+8+elen]

    apbin = custom_decryption(key, ebin)
    decrypted_bin = Decompress(BytesIO(apbin)).do()

    fspl = filepath.split('/')[-1]
    fn = fspl.split('.')[0] + '_unpacked.' + fspl.split('.')[1] if '.' in fspl else fspl + '_unp
    fp = '/'.join(filepath.split('/')[:-1]) + '/' + fn
    out = open(fp, 'wb')
    out.write(decrypted_bin)

def custom_decryption(key, data):
    sbox = [i for i in range(256)]
    kb = [key[i % len(key)] for i in range(256)]    c = 255
    j = 0
    t = 0
    o = b''

    while c > 0:
        v = 1

        while v < c:
            v = (v|1) + v

        d = (t + kb[j % 256]) % 256
        b = (d & v) % 256
        j += 1

        if b > c:
            t = d
            continue

        sbox[c], sbox[b] = sbox[b], sbox[c]

        t = d
        c -= 1
```


```
    eb = sbox + [sbox[1]] + [sbox[3]] + [sbox[5]] + [sbox[7]] + [sbox[t]]    for i in range(len(data)
    eb[257] = (eb[257] + eb[eb[256]]) % 256
    eb[256] = (eb[256] + 1) % 256
    b1 = eb[eb[260]]
    eb[eb[260]] = eb[eb[257]]
    eb[eb[257]] = eb[eb[259]]
    eb[eb[259]] = eb[eb[256]]
    eb[eb[256]] = b1
    eb[258] = (eb[b1] + eb[258]) % 256
    b1 = (((eb[eb[258]] + eb[eb[259]]) % 256) + eb[eb[260]]) % 256
    eb[260] = data[i]
    v = (eb[eb[256]] + eb[eb[257]]) % 256
    x1 = eb[v] ^ eb[eb[b1]]
    x2 = x1 ^ data[i]
    eb[259] = x2
    o += bytes([x2])

    return o


main()
```

Ransomware Sample

The malware is written in Delphi but the interesting part from a RE perspective was the reuse of the same routine from the crypter as part of the string decoding in the malware, this would lead us to believe that they have the same dev and the crypter is probably part of the build process or some service the main actor offers to their affiliates.



After the SBOX is initialized same as we previously discussed in the crypter we can see the same customized process for RC4 KSA and PRGA performed as was shown in the crypter section.



Custom KSA

Because of the way Delphi lays out their strings decoding them is a pretty straight forward process using the same sort of code as the crypter, we just need to find each string and key pair.

```
if __name__ == "__main__":
    data = open(sys.argv[1], 'rb').read()
    curr = 0
    t = data.find(b'\xff\xff\xff\xff')
    done = False
    while not done and t:
        curr += t
        (a,b) = struct.unpack_from('<II', data[curr:])
        if b > 1000:
            continue
        key = data[curr+8:curr+8+b]
        next = data[curr+8+b:].find(b'\xff\xff\xff\xff')
        curr += 8+b+next
        (a2,b2) = struct.unpack_from('<II', data[curr:])
        if b2 > 1000:
            continue
```

```
blob = data[curr+8:curr+8+b2]
curr += 8+b2
try:
    print(decode_data(key,data))
except:
    pass
t = data[curr:].find(b'\xff\xff\xff\xff')
if t == -1:
    done = True
```

Convert above to python3

Get Jason Reaves's stories in your inbox

Join Medium for free to get updates from this writer.

Remember me for faster sign in

Decoded strings:

```
browser
Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
notepad.exe
desktop
--c=show
--net=0
[+] Process started.
software\
.txt
single
network
-data=
\cmd.txt
c:\
Your ID:
Your support onion(TOR) url:
[+] Preconfig done:
    Work type -
[+] Network communication started - 1.
[+] Network communication started - 2.
[+] Main encryption started.
```

Ransom Note Comparison

The ransomware note has some striking similarities to Revil[1] but also some differences and misspellings:

---=== Welcome. Again. ===---

[-] Whats HapPen? [-]

Your files are encrypted, and currently unavailable. You can check it: all files on your system has
By the way, everything is possible to recover (restore), but you need to follow our instructions. Otl

[+] What guarantees? [+]

Its just a business. We absolutely do not care about you and your deals, except getting benefits. If
To check the ability of returning files, You should go to our website. There you can decrypt one fil
If you will not cooperate with our service - for us, its does not matter. But you will lose your time

[+] How to get access on website? [+]

You have two ways:

1) [Recommended] Using a TOR browser!

- a) Download and install TOR browser from this site:
- b) Open our website:

2) If TOR blocked in your country, try to use VPN! But you can use our secondary website. For this:

- a) Open your any browser (Chrome, Firefox, Opera, IE, Edge)
- b) Open our secondary website:

Warning: secondary website can be blocked, thats why first variant much better and more available.

When you open our website, put the following data in the input form:

Key:

!!! DANGER !!!

DON'T try to change files by yourself, DON'T use any third party software for restoring your data or
!!! !!! !!!

ONE MORE TIME: Its in your interests to get your files back. From our side, we (the best specialists
!!! !!! !!!

This new RaaS ransom note from

sample(4a97bc8111631795cb730dfe7836d0afac3131ed8a91db81dde5062bb8021058):

[+] Whats Happen? [+]

Your files are encrypted, and currently unavailable. You can check it: all files on your system has
By the way, everything is possible to recover (restore), but you need to follow our instructions. Otl
return your data (NEVER).

[+] What guarantees? [+]

Its just a business. We absolutely do not care about you and your deals, except getting benefits. If
work and liabilities - nobody will not cooperate with us. Its not in our interests.

To check the ability of returning files, You should go to our website. There you can decrypt 1-5 fil

our guarantee.

If you will not cooperate with our service - for us, its does not matter. But you will lose your time just we have the private key. In practise - time is much more valuable than money.

[+] How to get access on website? [+]

You can open our site by the shortcut "SUPPORT (TOR_BROWSER)" created on the desktop.

Also as the second option you can install the tor browser:

- a) Download and install TOR browser from this site: <https://torproject.org/>
- b) Open our website. Full link will be provided below.

!!! DANGER !!!


DONT try to change files by yourself, DONT use any third party software for restoring your data or anything may entail damage of the private key and, as result, The Loss all data.

!!! !!! !!!

ONE MORE TIME: Its in your interests to get your files back. From our side, we (the best specialists for restoring, but please should not interfere.

!!! !!! !!!

Another similarity we can find but to a different ransomware family is to Cl0p, below is the Cl0p decryptor page[2].



Comparing it to this new RaaS shows a striking similarity:

Press enter or click to view image in full size



The file encryption piece for samples we analyzed appear to be using SCOP encryption algorithm.

From the ransomware sample:

```
loc_41C8D6:
xor     ebx, ebx
mov     bl, al
add     ebx, 3
mov     esi, [ebp+var_14]
mov     ebx, [esi+ebx*4+200h]
mov     [ebp+var_10], ebx
add     al, cl
xor     ecx, ecx
mov     cl, al
add     ecx, 3
mov     ebx, [ebp+var_14]
mov     esi, [ebx+ecx*4+200h]
mov     ecx, [ebp+var_4]
mov     ecx, [ecx+edx*4]
add     ecx, [ebp+var_10]
add     ecx, esi
mov     ebx, [ebp+var_8]
mov     [ebx+edx*4], ecx
xor     ecx, ecx
mov     cl, [ebp+var_9]
mov     ebx, [ebp+var_14]
mov     ecx, [ebx+ecx*4+0Ch]
add     ecx, esi
inc     [ebp+var_9]
xor     ebx, ebx
mov     bl, al
add     ebx, 3
mov     edi, [ebp+var_14]
mov     [edi+ebx*4+200h], ecx
mov     ebx, esi
add     al, bl
inc     edx
dec     [ebp+var_18]
jnz     short loc_41C8D6
```

SCOP from GPLib[4]:

```
loc_41A5AA:  
xor     ebx, ebx  
mov     bl, cl  
add     ebx, 3  
mov     ebx, [eax+ebx*4+200h]  
mov     [ebp+var_10], ebx  
add     cl, dl  
xor     edx, edx  
mov     dl, cl  
add     edx, 3  
mov     esi, [eax+edx*4+200h]  
mov     edx, [ebp+var_4]  
mov     ebx, [ebp+var_14]  
mov     edx, [edx+ebx*4]  
add     edx, [ebp+var_10]  
add     edx, esi  
mov     ebx, [ebp+var_8]  
mov     edi, [ebp+var_14]  
mov     [ebx+edi*4], edx  
xor     edx, edx  
mov     dl, [ebp+var_9]  
mov     edx, [eax+edx*4+0Ch]  
add     edx, esi  
inc     [ebp+var_9]  
xor     ebx, ebx  
mov     bl, cl  
add     ebx, 3  
mov     [eax+ebx*4+200h], edx  
mov     ebx, esi  
add     cl, bl  
inc     [ebp+var_14]  
dec     [ebp+var_18]  
jnz     short loc_41A5AA
```

IOCs

bottomcdnfiles.com
cdnmegafiles.com
179.43.160.195
chat5sqrnzqewampznybomgn4hf2m53tybkarxk4sfaktwt7oqpkcvyd.onion
82.146.53.237
sugarpanel.space15a7fb45f703d5315320eef132f3151873055161
5816a77bf4f8485bfdab1803d948885f76e0c926fed9da5ac02d94e62af8b145
320eefd378256d6e495cbd2e59b7f205d5101e7f
18cb9b218bd23e936128a37a90f2661f72c820581e4f4303326705b2103714a9
e835de2930bf2708a3a57a99fe775c48f851fa8f
1318aeaea4f2f4299c21699279ca4ea5c8fa7fc38354dd2b80d539f21836df5a
98137dd04e4f350ee6d2f5da613f365b223a4f49
aa41e33d3f184cedaaaabb5e16c251e90a6c4ff721a599642dc5563a57550822
a4854ce87081095ab1f1b26ff16817e446d786af
4a97bc8111631795cb730dfe7836d0afac3131ed8a91db81dde5062bb8021058

c31a0e58ae70f571bf8140db8a1ab20a7f566ab5
315045e506eb5e9f5fd24e4a55cda48d223ac3450037586ce6dab70afc8ddfc9

References

1:https://raw.githubusercontent.com/cado-security/DFIR_Resources_REvil_Kaseya/main/Config/Ransomware_Note.txt

2:<https://malwarewarrior.com/how-to-remove-cl0p-ransomware-and-decrypt-cl0p-files/>

3:<https://twitter.com/avman1995/status/1459915441766211601>

4:<https://torry.net/pages.php?id=519>

Source: <https://medium.com/walmartglobaltech/sugar-ransomware-a-new-raas-a5d94d58d9fb>