

APT29, IRON RITUAL, IRON HEMLOCK, NobleBaron, Dark Halo, NOBELIUM, UNC2452, YTTRIUM, The Dukes, Cozy Bear, CozyDuke, SolarStorm, Blue Kitsune, UNC3524, Midnight Blizzard, Group G0016

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Enterprise [T1548](#) [.002 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control](#)

[APT29](#) has bypassed UAC.^[30]

Enterprise [T1087](#) [.002 Account Discovery: Domain Account](#)

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) used PowerShell to discover domain accounts by executing `Get-ADUser` and `Get-ADGroupMember`.^{[24][15]}

[.004 Account Discovery: Cloud Account](#)

[APT29](#) has conducted enumeration of Azure AD accounts.^[31]

Enterprise [T1098](#) [.001 Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials](#)

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) added credentials to OAuth Applications and Service Principals.^{[32][24]}

[.002 Account Manipulation: Additional Email Delegate Permissions](#)

[APT29](#) has used a compromised global administrator account in Azure AD to backdoor a service principal with `ApplicationImpersonation` rights to start collecting emails from targeted mailboxes; [APT29](#) has also used compromised accounts holding `ApplicationImpersonation` rights in Exchange to collect emails.^{[33][27]}

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) added their own devices as allowed IDs for active sync using `Set-CASMailbox`, allowing it to obtain copies of victim mailboxes. It also added additional permissions (such as `Mail.Read` and `Mail.ReadWrite`) to compromised Application or Service Principals.^{[12][32][31]}

[.003 Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles](#)

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) granted `company administrator` privileges to a newly created service principle.^[24]

[.005 Account Manipulation: Device Registration](#)

[APT29](#) has enrolled their own devices into compromised cloud tenants, including enrolling a device in MFA to an Azure AD environment following a successful password guessing attack against a dormant account. [\[33\]](#)[\[34\]](#)

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) registered devices in order to enable mailbox syncing via the `Set-CASMailbox` command. [\[12\]](#)

Enterprise [T1583 .001 Acquire Infrastructure: Domains](#)

For the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) acquired C2 domains, sometimes through resellers. [\[10\]](#)[\[35\]](#)

For [Operation Ghost](#), [APT29](#) registered domains for use in C2 including some crafted to appear as existing legitimate domains. [\[22\]](#)

[.006 Acquire Infrastructure: Web Services](#)

[APT29](#) has registered algorithmically generated Twitter handles that are used for C2 by malware, such as [HAMMERTOSS](#). [APT29](#) has also used legitimate web services such as Dropbox and Constant Contact in their operations. [\[36\]](#)[\[18\]](#)

Enterprise [T1595 .002 Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning](#)

[APT29](#) has conducted widespread scanning of target environments to identify vulnerabilities for exploit. [\[13\]](#)

Enterprise [T1071 .001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols](#)

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) used HTTP for C2 and data exfiltration. [\[12\]](#)

Enterprise [T1560 .001 Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility](#)

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) used 7-Zip to compress stolen emails into password-protected archives prior to exfiltration; [APT29](#) also compressed text files into zipped archives. [\[12\]](#)[\[37\]](#)[\[24\]](#)

Enterprise [T1547 .001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](#)

[APT29](#) added Registry Run keys to establish persistence. [\[30\]](#)

Enterprise [T1037 Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts](#)

[APT29](#) has hijacked legitimate application-specific startup scripts to enable malware to execute on system startup. [\[27\]](#)

[.004 RC Scripts](#)

[APT29](#) has installed a run command on a compromised system to enable malware execution on system startup. [\[27\]](#)

Enterprise [T1110 .001 Brute Force: Password Guessing](#)

[APT29](#) has successfully conducted password guessing attacks against a list of mailboxes. [\[33\]](#)

[.003 Brute Force: Password Spraying](#)

[APT29](#) has conducted brute force password spray attacks. [\[20\]](#)[\[31\]](#)[\[34\]](#)

Enterprise [T1651 Cloud Administration Command](#)

[APT29](#) has used Azure Run Command and Azure Admin-on-Behalf-of (AOBO) to execute code on virtual machines. [\[31\]](#)

Enterprise [T1059 .001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell](#)

[APT29](#) has used encoded PowerShell scripts uploaded to [CozyCar](#) installations to download and install [SeaDuke](#). [\[38\]](#)[\[30\]](#)[\[39\]](#)[\[16\]](#)

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) used PowerShell to create new tasks on remote machines, identify configuration settings, exfiltrate data, and execute other commands. [\[12\]](#)[\[40\]](#)[\[24\]](#)

[.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell](#)

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) used `cmd.exe` to execute commands on remote machines. [\[12\]](#)[\[40\]](#)

[.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic](#)

For the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) wrote malware such as [Sibot](#) in Visual Basic. [\[13\]](#)

[.006 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python](#)

[APT29](#) has developed malware variants written in Python. [\[38\]](#)

[.009 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Cloud API](#)

[APT29](#) has leveraged the Microsoft Graph API to perform various actions across Azure and M365 environments. They have also utilized AADInternals PowerShell Modules to access the API [\[19\]](#)

Enterprise [T1586 .002 Compromise Accounts: Email Accounts](#)

[APT29](#) has compromised email accounts to further enable phishing campaigns and taken control of dormant accounts. [\[41\]](#)[\[33\]](#)

[.003 Compromise Accounts: Cloud Accounts](#)

[APT29](#) has used residential proxies, including Azure Virtual Machines, to obfuscate their access to victim environments. [\[33\]](#)

Enterprise [T1584 .001 Compromise Infrastructure: Domains](#)

For the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) compromised domains to use for C2. [\[10\]](#)

Enterprise [T1136 .003 Create Account: Cloud Account](#)

[APT29](#) can create new users through Azure AD. ^[31]

Enterprise [T1555 .003 Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers](#)

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) stole users' saved passwords from Chrome. ^[24]

Enterprise [T1213 Data from Information Repositories](#)

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) accessed victims' internal knowledge repositories (wikis) to view sensitive corporate information on products, services, and internal business operations. ^[24]

[.003 Code Repositories](#)

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) downloaded source code from code repositories. ^[42]

Enterprise [T1005 Data from Local System](#)

[APT29](#) has stolen data from compromised hosts. ^[27]

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) extracted files from compromised networks. ^[12]

Enterprise [T1001 .002 Data Obfuscation: Steganography](#)

During [Operation Ghost](#), [APT29](#) used steganography to hide the communications between the implants and their C&C servers. ^[22]

Enterprise [T1074 .002 Data Staged: Remote Data Staging](#)

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) staged data and files in password-protected archives on a victim's OWA server. ^[12]

Enterprise [T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](#)

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) used 7-Zip to decode their [Raindrop](#) malware. ^[43]

Enterprise [T1587 .001 Develop Capabilities: Malware](#)

[APT29](#) has used unique malware in many of their operations. ^{[3][30][19][27]}

For the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) used numerous pieces of malware that were likely developed for or by the group, including [SUNBURST](#), [SUNSPOT](#), [Raindrop](#), and [TEARDROP](#). ^{[9][11][37]}

For [Operation Ghost](#), [APT29](#) used new strains of malware including [FatDuke](#), [MiniDuke](#), [RegDuke](#), and [PolyglotDuke](#). ^[22]

[.003 Develop Capabilities: Digital Certificates](#)

[APT29](#) has created self-signed digital certificates to enable mutual TLS authentication for malware. ^{[25][26]}

Enterprise [T1484 .002 Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Trust Modification](#)

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) changed domain federation trust settings using Azure AD administrative permissions to configure the domain to accept authorization tokens signed by their own SAML signing certificate. [\[15\]\[44\]](#)

Enterprise [T1482 Domain Trust Discovery](#)

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) used the `Get-AcceptedDomain` PowerShell cmdlet to enumerate accepted domains through an Exchange Management Shell. [\[12\]](#) They also used [AdFind](#) to enumerate domains and to discover trust between federated domains. [\[24\]\[37\]](#)

Enterprise [T1568 Dynamic Resolution](#)

[APT29](#) has used Dynamic DNS providers for their malware C2 infrastructure. [\[27\]](#)

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) used dynamic DNS resolution to construct and resolve to randomly-generated subdomains for C2. [\[12\]](#)

Enterprise [T1114 .002 Email Collection: Remote Email Collection](#)

[APT29](#) has collected emails from targeted mailboxes within a compromised Azure AD tenant and compromised Exchange servers, including via Exchange Web Services (EWS) API requests. [\[33\]\[27\]](#)

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) collected emails from specific individuals, such as executives and IT staff, using `New-MailboxExportRequest` followed by `Get-MailboxExportRequest`. [\[12\]\[13\]](#)

Enterprise [T1573 Encrypted Channel](#)

[APT29](#) has used multiple layers of encryption within malware to protect C2 communication. [\[16\]](#)

Enterprise [T1585 .001 Establish Accounts: Social Media Accounts](#)

For [Operation Ghost](#), [APT29](#) registered Twitter accounts to host C2 nodes. [\[22\]](#)

Enterprise [T1546 .003 Event Triggered Execution: Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription](#)

[APT29](#) has used WMI event subscriptions for persistence. [\[30\]](#)

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) used a WMI event filter to invoke a command-line event consumer at system boot time to launch a backdoor with `rundll32.exe`. [\[37\]\[44\]](#)

During [Operation Ghost](#), [APT29](#) used WMI event subscriptions to establish persistence for malware. [\[22\]](#)

[.008 Event Triggered Execution: Accessibility Features](#)

[APT29](#) used sticky-keys to obtain unauthenticated, privileged console access. [\[30\]\[45\]](#)

Enterprise [T1048 .002 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol](#)

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) exfiltrated collected data over a simple HTTPS request to a password-protected archive staged on a victim's OWA servers.^[12]

Enterprise [T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application](#)

[APT29](#) has exploited CVE-2019-19781 for Citrix, CVE-2019-11510 for Pulse Secure VPNs, CVE-2018-13379 for FortiGate VPNs, and CVE-2019-9670 in Zimbra software to gain access.^{[13][23]}

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) exploited CVE-2020-0688 against the Microsoft Exchange Control Panel to regain access to a network.^{[12][13]}

Enterprise [T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution](#)

[APT29](#) has used multiple software exploits for common client software, like Microsoft Word, Exchange, and Adobe Reader, to gain code execution.^{[3][13][18]}

Enterprise [T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](#)

[APT29](#) has exploited CVE-2021-36934 to escalate privileges on a compromised host.^[39]

Enterprise [T1133 External Remote Services](#)

[APT29](#) has used compromised identities to access networks via VPNs and Citrix.^{[23][33]}

For the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) used compromised identities to access networks via SSH, VPNs, and other remote access tools.^{[10][24]}

Enterprise [T1083 File and Directory Discovery](#)

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) obtained information about the configured Exchange virtual directory using `Get-WebServicesVirtualDirectory`.^[12]

Enterprise [T1606 .001 Forge Web Credentials: Web Cookies](#)

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) bypassed MFA set on OWA accounts by generating a cookie value from a previously stolen secret key.^[12]

[.002 Forge Web Credentials: SAML Tokens](#)

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) created tokens using compromised SAML signing certificates.^[32]
^[15]

Enterprise [T1589 .001 Gather Victim Identity Information: Credentials](#)

For the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) conducted credential theft operations to obtain credentials to be used for access to victim environments.^[24]

Enterprise [T1665 Hide Infrastructure](#)

[APT29](#) uses compromised residential endpoints, typically within the same ISP IP address range, as proxies to hide the true source of C2 traffic.^[34]

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) set the hostnames of their C2 infrastructure to match legitimate hostnames in the victim environment. They also used IP addresses originating from the same country as the victim for their VPN infrastructure.^[9]

Enterprise [T1562 .001 Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools](#)

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) used the service control manager on a remote system to disable services associated with security monitoring products.^[37]

[.002 Impair Defenses: Disable Windows Event Logging](#)

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#), used `AUDITPOL` to prevent the collection of audit logs.^[37]

[.004 Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify System Firewall](#)

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) used `netsh` to configure firewall rules that limited certain UDP outbound packets.^[37]

[.008 Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Cloud Logs](#)

[APT29](#) has disabled Purview Audit on targeted accounts prior to stealing emails from Microsoft 365 tenants.^[33]

Enterprise [T1070 .004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion](#)

[APT29](#) has used `SDelete` to remove artifacts from victim networks.^[30]

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) routinely removed their tools, including custom backdoors, once remote access was achieved.^[9]

[.006 Indicator Removal: Timestomp](#)

[APT29](#) has used timestomping to alter the Standard Information timestamps on their web shells to match other files in the same directory.^[27]

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) modified timestamps of backdoors to match legitimate Windows files.^[37]

[.008 Indicator Removal: Clear Mailbox Data](#)

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) removed evidence of email export requests using `Remove-MailboxExportRequest`.^[12]

Enterprise [T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer](#)

[APT29](#) has downloaded additional tools and malware onto compromised networks.^{[30][25][3][27]}

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) downloaded additional malware, such as [TEARDROP](#) and [Cobalt Strike](#), onto a compromised host following initial access.^[9]

Enterprise [T1680 Local Storage Discovery](#)

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) used `fsutil` to check available free space before executing actions that might create large files on disk.^[37]

Enterprise [T1036 .004 Masquerading: Masquerade Task or Service](#)

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) named tasks

`\Microsoft\Windows\SoftwareProtectionPlatform\EventCacheManager` in order to appear legitimate.^[12]

[.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location](#)

[APT29](#) has renamed malicious DLLs with legitimate names to appear benign; they have also created an Azure AD certificate with a Common Name that matched the display name of the compromised service principal.^{[17][33]}

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) renamed software and DLLs with legitimate names to appear benign.^{[12][40]}

Enterprise [T1556 .007 Modify Authentication Process: Hybrid Identity](#)

[APT29](#) has edited the `Microsoft.IdentityServer.Servicehost.exe.config` file to load a malicious DLL into the AD FS process, thereby enabling persistent access to any service federated with AD FS for a user with a specified User Principal Name.^[46]

Enterprise [T1621 Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation](#)

[APT29](#) has used repeated MFA requests to gain access to victim accounts.^{[47][34]}

Enterprise [T1027 .001 Obfuscated Files or Information: Binary Padding](#)

[APT29](#) used large size files to avoid detection by security solutions with hardcoded size limits.^[17]

[.002 Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing](#)

[APT29](#) used UPX to pack files.^[30]

[.003 Obfuscated Files or Information: Steganography](#)

During [Operation Ghost](#), [APT29](#) used steganography to hide payloads inside valid images. ^[22]

[.006 Obfuscated Files or Information: HTML Smuggling](#)

[APT29](#) has embedded an ISO file within an HTML attachment that contained JavaScript code to initiate malware execution. ^[39]

Enterprise [T1588 .002 Obtain Capabilities: Tool](#)

[APT29](#) has obtained and used a variety of tools including [Mimikatz](#), [SDelete](#), [Tor](#), [meek](#), and [Cobalt Strike](#). ^{[30][3][27]}

Enterprise [T1003 .002 OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager](#)

[APT29](#) has used the `reg save` command to save registry hives. ^[27]

[.004 OS Credential Dumping: LSA Secrets](#)

[APT29](#) has used the `reg save` command to extract LSA secrets offline. ^[27]

[.006 OS Credential Dumping: DCSync](#)

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) used privileged accounts to replicate directory service data with domain controllers. ^{[44][37][24]}

Enterprise [T1069 .002 Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups](#)

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) used [AdFind](#) to enumerate domain groups. ^[24]

Enterprise [T1566 .001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment](#)

[APT29](#) has used spearphishing emails with an attachment to deliver files with exploits to initial victims. ^{[3][18][39][16]}

[.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Link](#)

[APT29](#) has used spearphishing with a link to trick victims into clicking on a link to a zip file containing malicious files. ^{[30][18][48]}

[.003 Phishing: Spearphishing via Service](#)

[APT29](#) has used the legitimate mailing service Constant Contact to send phishing e-mails. ^[18]

Enterprise [T1057 Process Discovery](#)

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) used multiple command-line utilities to enumerate running processes. ^{[12][37][24]}

Enterprise [T1090 .001 Proxy: Internal Proxy](#)

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) used SSH port forwarding capabilities on public-facing systems, and configured at least one instance of [Cobalt Strike](#) to use a network pipe over SMB. [\[24\]\[43\]](#)

[.002 Proxy: External Proxy](#)

[APT29](#) uses compromised residential endpoints as proxies for defense evasion and network access. [\[34\]](#)

[.003 Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy](#)

A backdoor used by [APT29](#) created a [Tor](#) hidden service to forward traffic from the [Tor](#) client to local ports 3389 (RDP), 139 (Netbios), and 445 (SMB) enabling full remote access from outside the network and has also used TOR. [\[30\]\[31\]](#)

[.004 Proxy: Domain Fronting](#)

[APT29](#) has used the meek domain fronting plugin for [Tor](#) to hide the destination of C2 traffic. [\[30\]](#)

Enterprise [T1021 .001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol](#)

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) used RDP sessions from public-facing systems to internal servers. [\[24\]](#)

[.002 Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares](#)

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) used administrative accounts to connect over SMB to targeted users. [\[24\]](#)

[.006 Remote Services: Windows Remote Management](#)

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) used WinRM via PowerShell to execute commands and payloads on remote hosts. [\[43\]](#)

[.007 Remote Services: Cloud Services](#)

[APT29](#) has leveraged compromised high-privileged on-premises accounts synced to Office 365 to move laterally into a cloud environment, including through the use of Azure AD PowerShell. [\[49\]](#)

Enterprise [T1018 Remote System Discovery](#)

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) used [AdFind](#) to enumerate remote systems. [\[37\]](#)

Enterprise [T1053 .005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task](#)

[APT29](#) has used named and hijacked scheduled tasks to establish persistence. [\[30\]](#)

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) used `scheduler` and `schtasks` to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement. They manipulated scheduled tasks by updating an existing legitimate task to

execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration. [APT29](#) also created a scheduled task to maintain [SUNSPOT](#) persistence when the host booted. [\[12\]\[9\]\[11\]](#)

Enterprise [T1505 .003 Server Software Component: Web Shell](#)

[APT29](#) has installed web shells on exploited Microsoft Exchange servers. [\[13\]\[27\]](#)

Enterprise [T1528 Steal Application Access Token](#)

[APT29](#) uses stolen tokens to access victim accounts, without needing a password. [\[34\]](#)

Enterprise [T1649 Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates](#)

[APT29](#) has abused misconfigured AD CS certificate templates to impersonate admin users and create additional authentication certificates. [\[50\]](#)

Enterprise [T1558 .003 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting](#)

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) obtained Ticket Granting Service (TGS) tickets for Active Directory Service Principle Names to crack offline. [\[37\]](#)

Enterprise [T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie](#)

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) stole Chrome browser cookies by copying the Chrome profile directories of targeted users. [\[24\]](#)

Enterprise [T1553 .002 Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing](#)

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) was able to get [SUNBURST](#) signed by SolarWinds code signing certificates by injecting the malware into the SolarWinds Orion software lifecycle. [\[9\]](#)

[.005 Subvert Trust Controls: Mark-of-the-Web Bypass](#)

[APT29](#) has embedded ISO images and VHDX files in HTML to evade Mark-of-the-Web. [\[39\]](#)

Enterprise [T1195 .002 Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain](#)

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) gained initial network access to some victims via a trojanized update of SolarWinds Orion software. [\[51\]\[9\]\[13\]\[37\]](#)

Enterprise [T1218 .005 System Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta](#)

[APT29](#) has use `mshta` to execute malicious scripts on a compromised host. [\[39\]](#)

[.011 System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32](#)

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) used `Rundll32.exe` to execute payloads. [\[32\]\[37\]](#)

Enterprise [T1016 .001 System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery](#)

[APT29](#) has ensured web servers in a victim environment are Internet accessible before copying tools or malware to it.^[27]

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) used [GoldFinder](#) to perform HTTP GET requests to check internet connectivity and identify HTTP proxy servers and other redirectors that an HTTP request travels through.^[10]

Enterprise [T1199 Trusted Relationship](#)

[APT29](#) has compromised IT, cloud services, and managed services providers to gain broad access to multiple customers for subsequent operations.^[31]

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) gained access through compromised accounts at cloud solution partners, and used compromised certificates issued by Mimecast to authenticate to Mimecast customer systems.^{[13][24]}

Enterprise [T1552 .004 Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys](#)

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) obtained PKI keys, certificate files, and the private encryption key from an Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) container to decrypt corresponding SAML signing certificates.^{[44][13]}

Enterprise [T1550 .001 Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token](#)

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) used compromised service principals to make changes to the Office 365 environment.^[24]

[.003 Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Ticket](#)

[APT29](#) used Kerberos ticket attacks for lateral movement.^[30]

[.004 Use Alternate Authentication Material: Web Session Cookie](#)

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) used stolen cookies to access cloud resources and a forged `duo-sid` cookie to bypass MFA set on an email account.^{[12][24]}

Enterprise [T1204 .001 User Execution: Malicious Link](#)

[APT29](#) has used various forms of spearphishing attempting to get a user to click on a malicious link.^{[18][48]}

[.002 User Execution: Malicious File](#)

[APT29](#) has used various forms of spearphishing attempting to get a user to open attachments, including, but not limited to, malicious Microsoft Word documents, .pdf, and .lnk files.^{[3][39][16]}

Enterprise [T1078 Valid Accounts](#)

[APT29](#) has used a compromised account to access an organization's VPN infrastructure.^[33]

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) used different compromised credentials for remote access and to move laterally.^{[9][10][13]}

[.002 Domain Accounts](#)

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) used domain administrators' accounts to help facilitate lateral movement on compromised networks.^[24]

For [Operation Ghost](#), [APT29](#) used stolen administrator credentials for lateral movement on compromised networks.^[22]

[.003 Local Accounts](#)

[APT29](#) targets dormant or inactive user accounts, accounts belonging to individuals no longer at the organization but whose accounts remain on the system, for access and persistence.^[34]

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) used compromised local accounts to access victims' networks.^[24]

[.004 Cloud Accounts](#)

[APT29](#) has gained access to a global administrator account in Azure AD and has used `Service Principal` credentials in Exchange.^{[33][27]}

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) used a compromised O365 administrator account to create a new Service Principal.^[24]

Enterprise [T1102 .002 Web Service: Bidirectional Communication](#)

For [Operation Ghost](#), [APT29](#) used social media platforms to hide communications to C2 servers.^[22]

Enterprise [T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation](#)

[APT29](#) used WMI to steal credentials and execute backdoors at a future time.^[30]

During the [SolarWinds Compromise](#), [APT29](#) used WMI for the remote execution of files for lateral movement.^[44]
^[37]

Source: <https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016>