

# Unix-like File Permission Manipulation Behavioral Chain

## Detection Strategy, Detection Strategy DET0351

Archived: 2026-04-05 12:41:27 UTC

### AN0998

Linux permission escalation behavioral chain: (1) Process creation of permission modification utilities (chmod, chown, chgrp, setfacl) with suspicious parameters indicating privilege escalation intent, (2) System call analysis revealing direct file metadata manipulation (chmod, fchmod, chown, fchown syscalls), (3) Extended attribute and ACL modifications targeting critical system paths, (4) Temporal correlation with subsequent file access or process execution from modified locations, (5) Anomalous permission patterns deviating from system baselines

### Log Sources

Data Component	Name	Channel
<a href="#">File Metadata</a> ( <a href="#">DC0059</a> )	auditd:SYSCALL	syscall in (chmod, fchmod, fchmodat, chown, fchown, fchownat, lchown, setxattr, lsetxattr, fsetxattr, removexattr, lremovexattr, fremovexattr)
<a href="#">Command Execution</a> ( <a href="#">DC0064</a> )	auditd:PROCTITLE	proctitle contains chmod, chown, chgrp, setfacl, or attr with suspicious parameters (777, 755, +x, -R)
<a href="#">Process Creation</a> ( <a href="#">DC0032</a> )	linux:osquery	process execution events for permission modification utilities with command-line analysis

### Mutable Elements

Field	Description
SuspiciousPermissionValues	Octal permission values indicating potential malicious intent - customize based on organizational security policy (default: 777, 755, 4755, 2755, 1755 for sticky/setuid/setgid)
CriticalSystemPaths	Linux filesystem paths requiring enhanced permission change monitoring - adapt to environment-specific critical directories (/etc, /usr/bin, /usr/sbin, /var, /opt, /root, /boot)

Field	Description
AuthorizedSystemAdministrators	User accounts and service accounts authorized for system-level permission modifications - maintain current list of legitimate administrators
TemporalCorrelationWindow	Time window for correlating permission changes with subsequent file access or process execution - adjust based on system performance (default: 300 seconds)
RecursiveOperationThreshold	Maximum depth or file count for recursive permission operations before triggering anomaly detection (-R flag monitoring)
ACLComplexityBaseline	Baseline complexity metrics for setfacl operations to detect anomalous extended ACL configurations
FileAccessFrequencyBaseline	Statistical baseline for normal file access patterns post-permission modification to detect privilege abuse

**AN0999**

macOS permission and attribute manipulation behavioral chain: (1) Process execution of permission utilities (chmod, chown, chgrp) or macOS-specific tools (chflags) with suspicious parameters, (2) System Integrity Protection (SIP) bypass attempts through permission modifications, (3) File flags manipulation (uchg, schg, hidden) for evasion or persistence, (4) Extended attribute (xattr) modifications affecting security metadata, (5) Unified log correlation with file system events and subsequent access patterns, (6) Gatekeeper and code signing bypass through permission/attribute manipulation

**Log Sources**

Data Component	Name	Channel
<a href="#">Process Creation (DC0032)</a>	macos:unifiedlog	process execution events for chmod, chown, chflags with parameter analysis and target path examination
<a href="#">File Modification (DC0061)</a>	fs:fsevents	file system events indicating permission, ownership, or extended attribute changes on critical paths. File system modification events with kFSEventStreamEventFlagItemChangeOwner, kFSEventStreamEventFlagItemXattrMod flags
<a href="#">File Metadata (DC0059)</a>	OpenBSM:AuditTrail	BSM audit events for file permission, ownership, and attribute modifications with user context

### Mutable Elements

Field	Description
SIPProtectedPaths	macOS system paths protected by SIP that should never have permission modifications - maintain current list based on macOS version (/System, /usr, /bin, /sbin)
SuspiciousFileFlags	chflags parameter combinations indicating potential evasive behavior - customize based on security requirements (uchg, schg, hidden, archived)
CriticalExtendedAttributes	Extended attributes requiring monitoring for unauthorized removal or modification (com.apple.quarantine, com.apple.metadata, com.apple.FinderInfo)
GatekeeperBypassIndicators	Patterns in permission/attribute changes that may indicate Gatekeeper bypass attempts
ApplicationBundleMonitoring	Scope of .app directory monitoring for internal permission modifications indicating bundle tampering
UnifiedLogRetentionPeriod	Log retention period for correlating permission changes with subsequent access patterns - balance storage with detection capability
FSEventsFilteringThreshold	File system event filtering threshold to manage high-volume environments while maintaining detection coverage

---

Source: <https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0351#AN0999>