


## Anchor and Lazarus together again?

By Jason Reaves

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On 6 July 2020 SanSec reported that North Korea APT group dubbed Lazarus/HIDDEN COBRA, was performing MageCart style attacks against websites[1].

Two mentions in their report are interesting, PaperSource and FocusCamera[1].

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


Photo Credit: [SanSec](https://sansec.io)

The entire North Korea link appears to hinge on a IP reuse for an IP in LeaseWeb which is a weak link for attribution but sometimes there could be non public details about the incident. The more interesting aspect to this is some context that we can provide to the story, namely the connection to TrickBot/Anchor. You may recall that this would not be the first time this [CyberCrime crew has been caught working with Lazarus](#).

Also interesting from the article “The malware was removed within 24 hours but a week later, the very same malware resurfaced on the same store.”[1] which would suggest the attackers had a foothold or “Anchor” into the environment.

## FocusCamera

This name immediately stood out after reading the SanSec report, it came up during our previous work revolving around PowerTrick[4] which is the powershell framework developed and utilized by TrickBot/Anchor actors. The company appears to of been initially breached by TrickBot around October 2019 and actors then began using PowerTrick to pivot around.

```
3|C:\WINDOWS\system32|NYIT581|FC\NYIT581$|NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM|4C4C4544-004C-4310-8031-CAC04F575231|M
```

PowerTrick bot listing network devices:

```
\\101718-1628
\\101718-1900
\\11012018-1018
```

\\111218-1913  
\\ABE-NEW  
\\CONNCESHIPSRV  
\\CONNECTSHIP  
\\DES-0001  
\\FBARETURN  
\\FCNYAV1 fcnyav1  
\\FCNYMAIL1  
\\FOCUSCA-782GU8N  
\\FOCUSCA-9146562  
\\FOCUSCA-MGL6500  
\\FOCUSCA-QHRB0KS  
\\FOCUSCA-UIHGRK3  
\\LKWD-20  
\\MICHAELBACK  
\\MONSOONSERVER  
\\NAS-BF-27-4E nas-BF-27-4E  
\\NASBACKUP nasbackup  
\\NEW01  
\\NY-061418-1757  
\\NY-062918-1421  
\\NY-100318-1432  
\\NY-AMZ-002  
\\NY-AMZN-060618 Hudy kryman  
\\NY-BUY-003  
\\NY-BUYER-AA yoni Baum  
\\NY-CONF-01  
\\NY-CONF-02  
\\NY-CONF-03  
\\NY-ER-CCTV-SCRN  
\\NY-KIT-070318 miriam mozyrskiy  
\\NY-KIT-BILECKI  
\\NY-LGSTC-PHILIP  
\\NY-MARKETING Isaac Shalev  
\\NY-MINCHA  
\\NY-REFURB-0001  
\\NYACCT-0001  
\\NYACCT162  
\\NYACT004  
\\NYACT179  
\\NYACT180  
\\NYACT183  
\\NYACT188  
\\NYACT189  
\\NYASS178A  
\\NYASST159  
\\NYASST193

\\NYBUY0001 Robert Silberman - Buyer  
\\NYBUY078  
\\NYBUY102  
\\NYBUY148  
\\NYBUY149  
\\NYBUY151  
\\NYBUY151A  
\\NYBUY153  
\\NYBUY165  
\\NYBUY209  
\\NYBUY210  
\\NYBUY303  
\\NYBUY306  
\\NYBUY307  
\\NYBUY331  
\\NYBUY333  
\\NYBUY343  
\\NYBYD151A  
\\NYCAMERA01  
\\NYCUSV049A  
\\NYCUSV065  
\\NYCUSV071  
\\NYCUSV084  
\\NYDC  
\\NYDOMAINCTRL  
\\NYEBAY002  
\\NYEBAY128  
\\NYEBAY345  
\\NYFBA349  
\\NYFBA351  
\\NYGOV101  
\\NYHR007  
\\NYIT054 Chaim Geller  
\\NYIT087  
\\NYIT097  
\\NYIT335  
\\NYIT350  
\\NYIT353  
\\NYIT355  
\\NYIT355A  
\\NYIT581  
\\NYKEYACCESS NYKEYACCESS.FC.LOCAL  
\\NYKIT-001  
\\NYMAN164A  
\\NYMGMT-RBERG  
\\NYMGMT243BBB  
\\NYOVER007

```
\\NYRCV001
\\NYRTNS141
\\NYRTNS281
\\NYRTNS285
\\NYSALES349
\\NYVIRTUALPC05
\\NYWAL347
\\NYWARE282A
\\NYWEB0001      car byers
\\REFURDBASE
\\SCRAPER-PC
\\STORE-01      Cashier-01
\\STORE-02      Cashier-02
\\STR-CCTV
\\VIEWPOINT
\\VMWAREVC
\\WHSE1
\\WINDOWS-0SD9E3K
\\WINDOWS-16M2FRN
\\WINDOWS-102SBEG
\\WINDOWS-8510D2Q
\\WINDOWS-HSDST7A
\\WINDOWS-I2SBFRI
\\WINDOWS-JNI13EQ
\\WINDOWS-Q88PP4L
\\WINDOWS-SQFPH6T
The command completed successfully.
```

## PaperSource

We have reason to believe that PaperSource was also initially TrickBot and later Anchor and MemScrapers which is their POS component of the Anchor Framework previously detailed[5].

Press enter or click to view image in full size

```
2020-09-10 14:24:56 | PS-1040-POS1.papersource.local (W617601-64) 192.168.4.101 64.198.154.74 //
```

PaperSource MemScrapers infection

Given these revelations we have two possibilities:

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— The SanSec NK attribution is incorrect and TrickBot actors are also interested in leveraging jsSniffers against victim websites in MageCart style attacks.

— The SanSec NK attribution is correct and this is one more example of Lazarus being involved in TrickBot infected institutions.

By: Jason Reaves and Joshua Platt

## References

1. <https://www.zdnet.com/article/trickbot-gang-is-now-a-malware-supplier-for-north-korean-hackers/>
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4. <https://www.darkreading.com/vulnerabilities---threats/trickbot-group-adds-new-powershell-based-backdoor-to-arsenal/d/d-id/1336769>
5. <https://labs.sentinelone.com/the-deadly-planeswalker-how-the-trickbot-group-united-high-tech-crimeware-apt/>

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Source: <https://medium.com/walmartglobaltech/anchor-and-lazarus-together-again-24744e516607>