

# Salesforce Data Exfiltration, Campaign C0059

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Enterprise [T1020 Automated Exfiltration](#)

During [Salesforce Data Exfiltration](#), threat actors used API queries to automatically exfiltrate large volumes of data.<sup>[1]</sup>

Enterprise [T1671 Cloud Application Integration](#)

During [Salesforce Data Exfiltration](#), threat actors deceived victims into authorizing malicious connected apps to their organization's Salesforce portal.<sup>[1][2]</sup>

Enterprise [T1059 .006 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python](#)

During [Salesforce Data Exfiltration](#), threat actors used custom applications developed in python.<sup>[2]</sup>

Enterprise [T1586 .002 Compromise Accounts: Email Accounts](#)

During [Salesforce Data Exfiltration](#), threat actors used compromised emails to create Salesforce trial accounts.<sup>[2]</sup>

Enterprise [T1213 .004 Data from Information Repositories: Customer Relationship Management Software](#)

During [Salesforce Data Exfiltration](#), threat actors accessed and exfiltrated sensitive information from compromised Salesforce instances.<sup>[2]</sup>

Enterprise [T1587 .001 Develop Capabilities: Malware](#)

During [Salesforce Data Exfiltration](#), threat actors created malicious applications within Salesforce trial accounts, typically Python scripts with similar function to the Salesforce Data Loader.<sup>[1][2]</sup>

Enterprise [T1585 Establish Accounts](#)

During [Salesforce Data Exfiltration](#), threat actors created Salesforce trial accounts to register their malicious applications.<sup>[2]</sup>

[.002 Email Accounts](#)

During [Salesforce Data Exfiltration](#), threat actors registered emails shinycorp@tuta[.]com and shinygroup@tuta[.]com to send victims extortion demands.<sup>[2]</sup>

Enterprise [T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service](#)

During [Salesforce Data Exfiltration](#), threat actors exfiltrated data via legitimate Salesforce API communication channels including the Salesforce Data Loader application.<sup>[2][1]</sup>

Enterprise [T1083 File and Directory Discovery](#).

During [Salesforce Data Exfiltration](#), threat actors queried customers' Salesforce environments to identify sensitive information for exfiltration.<sup>[1]</sup>

Enterprise [T1656 Impersonation](#)

During [Salesforce Data Exfiltration](#), threat actors impersonated IT support personnel in voice calls with victims at times claiming to be addressing enterprise-wide connectivity issues.<sup>[2][1]</sup>

Enterprise [T1036 Masquerading](#)

During [Salesforce Data Exfiltration](#), threat actors used voice calls to socially engineer victims into authorizing a modified version of the Salesforce Data Loader app.<sup>[2]</sup>

Enterprise [T1588 .002 Obtain Capabilities: Tool](#)

During [Salesforce Data Exfiltration](#), threat actors initially relied on the legitimate Salesforce Data Loader app for data exfiltration.<sup>[2][1]</sup>

Enterprise [T1598 .004 Phishing for Information: Spearphishing Voice](#)

During [Salesforce Data Exfiltration](#), threat actors initiated voice calls with victims to socially engineer them into authorizing malicious applications or divulging sensitive credentials.<sup>[1][2]</sup>

Enterprise [T1090 Proxy](#)

During [Salesforce Data Exfiltration](#), threat actors used Mullvad VPN IPs to proxy voice phishing calls.<sup>[2]</sup>

[.003 Multi-hop Proxy](#).

During [Salesforce Data Exfiltration](#), threat actors used [Tor](#) IPs for voice calls and for the collection of stolen data.<sup>[2]</sup>

Enterprise [T1608 .005 Stage Capabilities: Link Target](#)

During [Salesforce Data Exfiltration](#), threat actors established an Okta phishing panel which victims were tricked into accessing from mobile phones or work computers during social engineering calls.<sup>[1][2]</sup>

Enterprise [T1078 .002 Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts](#)

During [Salesforce Data Exfiltration](#), threat actors used compromised credentials for lateral movement.<sup>[1][2]</sup>