

# RhadaManthys Stealer Spreading Via Google Ads: Key Insights

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
CRIL analyzes Rhadamanthys Stealer, a new strain of malware spread via Google Ads to steal users' sensitive information.

## Evasive Infostealer leveraging Phishing and Spam Campaigns for its Delivery

Threat Actors (TAs) are increasingly using spam emails and phishing websites to trick users into downloading malware such as Stealer and Remote Access Trojan (RAT) to infect users' machines and steal sensitive information.

Cyble Research & Intelligence Labs (CRIL) is actively monitoring various stealer malware and publishing blogs about them to inform and educate its readers.

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Recently, we came across a new [strain](#) of malware called “Rhadamanthys Stealer.” This stealer variant is active, and the TA behind the malware stealer is selling this under the Malware as a Service (MaaS) model.

Rhadamanthys stealer spreads by using Google [Ads](#) that redirect the user to phishing websites that mimic popular software such as Zoom, AnyDesk, Notepad++, Bluestacks, etc. It can also spread via spam email containing an attachment for delivering the malicious payload.

## Spam Email

The Rhadamanthys stealer infection starts through spam emails containing a PDF attachment named “Statement.pdf” as shown in the figure below.





Figure 1 – Spam Email with PDF Attachment

When opening the attachment present in the spam email, it displays a message indicating it is an “Adobe Acrobat DC Updater” and includes a download link labelled “Download Update,” as shown below.






Figure 2 – PDF document with a download link

When a user clicks the “Download Update” link, it downloads a [malware](#) executable from an URL “<https://zolotayavitrina.com/Jan-statement.exe>” into the Downloads folder.

Upon execution of the “Jan-statement.exe” file, it runs the stealer and allows it to [steal sensitive information](#) from the victim’s machine. The figure below illustrates the process tree of the Rhadamanthys stealer that was delivered via a spam email.




Figure 3 – Process tree of spam email downloads Stealer

## Phishing Sites

The TAs behind this campaign also created a highly convincing phishing webpage impersonating legitimate websites to trick users into downloading the [stealer malware](#), which carries out malicious activities. The link to these phishing websites spreads through [Google ads](#). We have observed several phishing domains created to spread this malware. Some of the following:

- [bluestacks-install\[.\]com](#)
- [zoomus-install\[.\]com](#)
- [install-zoom\[.\]com](#)
- [install-anydesk\[.\]com](#)

- *install-anydesk[.]com*
- *zoom-meetings-install[.]com*
- *zoom-meetings-download[.]com*
- *anydleslk-download[.]com*
- *zoomvideo-install[.]com*
- *zoom-video-install[.]com*
- *istaller-zoom[.]com*
- *notepad.hasankahrimanoglu[.]com[.]tr*

The [phishing websites](#) further downloads an installer file disguised as a legitimate installer downloading the respective applications. When installing the respective application, it also silently installs the stealer malware without the user’s knowledge. The below figure shows the process tree of the malicious AnyDesk installer deploying Rhadamanthys stealer.




Figure 4 – Process tree of malicious AnyDesk installing Stealer

## Payload Analysis

Upon execution of the installer file, it creates a folder named “ST” in the *%temp%* location and drops two hidden binary executable files.

- *Initialize 4.exe*
- *Runtime Broker.exe*

The loader “Runtime Broker.exe” is a 32-bit PyInstaller executable with SHA256: *db66fc58c07ba0cbe1b9c2db770179d0d931e5bf73838da9c915581661d4c1a*.

The additional information is shown in the figure below.




Figure 5 – Static file details of “Runtime Broker.exe”

Upon execution of “Runtime Broker.exe”, it drops multiple Python-supporting files in the %temp% folder.

These files include “.pyc”, “.pyd”, and “.dll” files, which were extracted from the PyInstaller executable as shown below.




Figure 6 – Extracted files of PyInstaller executable

The “Binary\_Stub\_Replacer.pyc” is a python compiled file which contains obfuscated raw data that will be de-obfuscated using replace function and then converted into Binary and ASCII format for getting the second stage malicious python code as shown below.



Figure 7 – Decompiled python content of Binary\_Stub\_Replacer.pyc

The decoded python code contains an embedded base64-encoded content which is a shellcode. When executed, this python code decodes the base64-encoded stub, creating a new Portable Executable (PE) payload file. The PE file is

then injected into a new “Runtime Broker.exe” process using the CreateThread() API function, as shown in the image below.




Figure 8 – Decoded payload from base64 stub

The below image shows the details of the shellcode, which is a 32-bit executable file compiled with Microsoft visual C/C++ compiler, as shown below.




Figure 9 – Payload file details

Upon execution, the shellcode begins by creating a mutex object to ensure that only one copy of the malware is running on the victim’s system at any given time. It then checks if it is running on a virtual machine, such as VMware

or VirtualBox, by searching for strings associated with virtual machine environments, as shown in the figure below.



Figure 10 – AntiVM related strings

This check is designed to prevent the malware from being detected and analyzed in a virtual environment. If the malware detects that it is running in a controlled environment, it will terminate its execution. Otherwise, it will continue and perform the stealer activity as intended.

After the check, the shellcode further drops a DLL file named "nsis\_unsibcfb0.dll" in the %temp% folder and launches it using the "rundll32.exe" with specific parameters shown in the figure below.




Figure 11 – Dropped DLL file execution

While investigating this malware, we observed that a steganography image was downloaded from the remote server. We suspect the shellcode decrypts the steganography image to get the actual Rhadamanthys payload. The memory of rundll32.exe contains all the malicious code responsible for stealer activities.

The Rhadamanthys stealer now starts collecting system information by executing a series of Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) queries. The collected information includes the computer name, username, OS version, RAM, CPU information, HWID, time zone, user and keyboard language, and others.

After gathering system details, the malware queries the directories of the installed browsers on the victim’s machine and searches for browser-related files such as browsing history, bookmarks, cookies, auto-fills, login credentials, etc. It targets different browsers such as Brave, Edge, Chrome, Firefox, Opera Software, Sleipnir5, Pale Moon, CocCoc, etc.

### Crypto Wallets

This stealer malware is also designed to target various crypto wallets and collects information from them. While the malware can target a wide range of crypto wallets, the observed stealer samples were found to have specific functionality to target the following crypto wallets:

- *Armory*
- *Binance*
- *Bitcoin*
- *Bytecoin*
- *Electron*
- *Qtum-Electrum*
- *Solar wallet*
- *WalletWasabi*
- *Zap*
- *Zecwallet Lite*
- *Zcash*

Also, the Rhadamanthys stealer steals data from the following crypto wallet browser extensions, which are hard coded in the stealer binary, as shown in the image below.

Crypto browser wallet	Extension ID	Crypto browser wallet	Extension ID
MyTonWallet	fldfpgipfncgndfolcbkdeeknbbbnhcc	Oasis Wallet	ppdadbejkjmfnefldpcdjhnkpbjkikoip
Exodus Wallet	aholpfdialjgfhomihkjbmjgidlcnno	Goby	jnkelfanjkeadonecabehalmbgpfodjm
Trust Wallet	egjidjbpplglichdcondcbdnbeepgdph	StarMask	mfbhebgoclkghbffdldpobeajmbecfk
ZilPay wallet	fbekallmnjoeggkfjkbebpineneilec	Eternl	kmhchipebfpmpgmihbkpjmImmoameka
MetaMask	ejbabakoplchlghecdalmeeeajnimhm	Wombat	amkmjmmfdddogmhjloimipbofnfjih
Bitcoin	dmdimapfghaakeibppbfeokhgoikeoci	Hycon Lite Client	bcopgchhojmggmffilplmbdicihaihkp
Flint Wallet	nhhobjmcbchnmgfblbdfabcbgknlkj	Crypto.com	hifafgmccdpekplomjkkfgodnhcellj
X-Wallet	bofddndhbegljegmpmnlbhcjofmjgbn	Keeper Wallet	lpiilbniabackdjcionkobglmddfbco
Stargazer Wallet	pgiaagfkgcbtnmiiolekcfmljdagdhcm	Teza Station Wallet	aiifbnfbobpmeekipheeiimdpnpgpp
Theta Wallet	ckelpdlfgochnkdgikcgbimdcfgpkhgk	SteemKeychain	jhgngkkipaallpehbhohjmkbojofjmeid
BitKeep	jiidiaalihmmhdjgbnbgdfflelocpak	Jaxx Liberty	cjelfplplebdjjenljpjclbmjkfcffne
Pali Wallet	mgffkfbidihjpoaomajlbgchddlicgpn	ZilPay	klnaejjgbimbhlepnhpmaofohgkpgkd
TON Wallet	nphplpgoakhhjchkhmiggakijnkhfnd	Yoroi Wallet	akoiaibnepcedcplijmiamnaigbepmcb
KardiaChain Wallet	pdadjkfgcagfbcemcpcbkalnfnepbnk	Ronin Wallet	fnjhmkhmkbjkabbndcnogagobneec
Fractal Wallet	agechnindjilpcclelhbpbjgobnopf	Rabet	hgmoaheomcjnaheggkfafnjilfcefbmo
ArConnect	einnioafmpimabjcdiinlhmijaionap	Auvtas Wallet	klbgaboailngkikfaglicepkfckcpa
Swash	cmndjbecilbocjfbifbifhngkdmjgog	Liquality Wallet	kpfopkelmapcoipemfendmdcghnegimn
Nash	onofpnbbkehpmmoabgpcpmigafmnmjhl	Nifty Wallet	jbdacocneiiimbjlgalhcelgbejmnd
XDEFI Wallet	hmeobnfnfcmkdcmlbgagmfjfoieaf	Oxygen - Atomic Crypto Wallet	fhilaheimglgnddkjofkcbgekenbh
BitClip	ijmpgkjfbfhoebgogfifebnmejmfbml	Crocobit Wallet	pnlfjmlcjdgkddcegcincndfgegekcke
DAppPlay	lodccjbdhfakaekdiahmedfbieldgik	Finnie	cjmknjdjhagcfbpiemnkdpomccnjbmlj
LeafWallet	cihmoadaighcejopammfmbddcmdekje	Slope Wallet	pocmplpaccanhnmlbbkpgfliimjligo
OneKey	infeboajfghbjpbeppbkgnabfdkdaf	XDCPay	bocpokimicclpaiekeneaeelehdjllfo
Byone	nlgbhdfgdhgbiamfdmbikcdghidoadd	Solflare Wallet	bhhhhlbepdkbapadjdnnojkbgioiodbic
Cyano Wallet	dkdedlpgdmmkkfjabffeganiaeamfkkm	Sollet	fhmfendgdocmbmfikdcogofphimnkno
TezBox - Tezos Wallet	mnfifekajgofkckjemidiaeconkjeh	GuildWallet	nanjmdknhkinifnkgdcggcfndhaammj
Temple - Tezos Wallet	ookjlbkijinhpmnjffcofjonbfbgaoc	Guarda	hpglfhghfnhbgpdenjgmdgoeiappafln
KHC	hclfpincppdclinealmandijcmnkbgn	BitApp Wallet	fihkakfobkmkjopchpfgcmhfmnmfpi
Nabox Wallet	nknhiehlkippafakaeklbeglecifhad	Math Wallet	afbcbjppbfadlkmhmdchkeeodmamcflc
ICONex	flpicilemgbhmfalicajoohlkkenfel	OKEx Wallet	mcohilncbfahbmgdjkpbemcciollgcge
Polymesh Wallet	jojhfcoedkpkjlfimdfabpfdjaoolaf	EQUAL Wallet	blnieiffboillknjnegopjghkgoapac
Auro Wallet	cnmamaachppnkjgnildpdmkaakejnhae	MOBOX WALLET	fckkdbjnkoioeeddlapcalpionmalo
Keplr	dmkamcknogkcdffhbddcghachkejeap	Phantom	bfnaelmomeimhlpmgjnjophhpkkoljpa
Clover Wallet	nhnkbkjgkigadomkphalanndcapjk	Coinbase Wallet	hnfanknocfeofbddgcijnmhnfnkdnaad
NeoLine	cphlglmgameodnhkjdmkpanlelnlohao	TronLink	ibnejdfjmmkpcnlpebklmknkoeiohofec
Saturn Wallet	nkddgncdjgicddamfgcmfnlhccnimig	MetaMask	nkbihfboegaeaoehlefnkodbefgpgknn
MEW CX	nlbmnijcnlegkijpcjclmcfggfefdmd	Binance Wallet	fhbohimaelbohpbjblcdcngcnapndodjp
iWallet	knchdigobghenbbaddojinnaogfppfj	Coin98 Wallet	aeachknmefphecpcionboohckonoeeimg

Figure 12 – Targeted Crypto wallets with the extension ID

The stealer also targets various applications such as FTP clients (CoreFTP, WinSCP), email clients (Foxmail, Thunderbird, Outlook, TrulyMail, GmailNotifierPro), File managers (Total commanders), password managers (RoboForm, KeePass), VPN services (NordVPN, ProtonVPN, Windscribe VPN, OpenVPN), messaging applications (Tox, Discord, Telegram) and others. Additionally, it captures screenshots of the victim’s machine using the *BitBlit()* API function. Finally, it sends all the collected stolen information to the attacker’s C&C server.

## C&C Panel

The below figure shows the Rhadamanthys stealer’s active C&C panel.




Figure 13 – Rhadamanthys stealer C&C panel

## Conclusion

Information stealers are malicious software used to gain unauthorized access to corporate networks, which has become a serious concern. [Threat Actors](#) use various techniques to deploy their malicious payloads into the victim's system. In this case, we observed that the TAs used spam email and phishing websites to deliver the Rhadamanthys Stealer, designed to steal sensitive information from the victim's machine. Additionally, it was also noticed that the malware spreads via Google Ads. It is crucial for users to exercise caution when receiving spam emails or to visit [phishing websites](#) and to verify the source before downloading any applications.

Cyble Research and Intelligence Labs will continue monitoring the new malware strains in the wild and update blogs with actionable intelligence to protect users from such notorious attacks.

## Our Recommendations

- The initial infection may happen via spam emails or phishing websites, so enterprises should use security products to detect phishing emails and websites.
- Avoid downloading pirated software from Warez/Torrent websites. The "Hack Tool" present on sites such as YouTube, Torrent sites, etc., contains such malware.
- Use strong passwords and enforce [multi-factor authentication](#) wherever possible.
- Turn on the automatic software update feature on your computer, mobile, and other connected devices.
- Use a reputed anti-virus and [internet security](#) software package on your connected devices, including PC, laptop, and mobile.
- Refrain from opening untrusted links and email attachments without first verifying their authenticity.
- Educate employees on protecting themselves from threats like phishing/untrusted URLs.
- Block URLs that could be used to spread the malware, e.g., Torrent/Warez.
- Monitor the beacon on the network level to block data exfiltration by malware or TAs.

## MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques

Tactic	Technique ID	Technique Name
Initial Access	<a href="#">T1598</a>	Spearphishing Attachment
Execution	<a href="#">T1204</a> <a href="#">T1059</a>	User Execution Command and Scripting Interpreter
Privilege Escalation	<a href="#">T1055</a>	Process Injection
Defense Evasion	<a href="#">T1218</a> <a href="#">T1027</a> <a href="#">T1497</a>	Rundll32 Obfuscated Files or Information Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
Credential Access	<a href="#">T1003</a> <a href="#">T1056</a> <a href="#">T1552</a>	OS Credential Dumping Input Capture Credentials in Registry
Discovery	<a href="#">T1082</a> <a href="#">T1518</a> <a href="#">T1083</a> <a href="#">T1087</a>	System Information Discovery Security Software Discovery File and Directory Discovery Account Discovery
Collection	<a href="#">T1005</a> <a href="#">T1114</a>	Data from Local System Email Collection
Command and Control	<a href="#">T1071</a> <a href="#">T1095</a> <a href="#">T1105</a>	Application Layer Protocol Non-Application Layer Protocol Ingress Tool Transfer

## Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Indicators	Indicator Type	Description
046981c818bd26e7c28b12b998847038e6b64c44df6645438dae689d75fb0269	Sha256	Spam email
4f4b5407d607ee32e00477a9f4294600ca86b67729ff4053b95744433117fccf	Sha256	Spam email
4a55c833abf08ecfe4fb3a7f40d34ae5aec5850bc2d79f977c8ee5e8a6f450d4	Sha256	PDF attachment (Statement.pdf)
093a58f36c075644d1dc8856acdefad7fd22332444b6aa07fee2ad615d50b743	Sha256	AnyDesk.msi
db66fc58c07ba0ccbe1b9c2db770179d0d931e5bf73838da9c915581661d4c1a	Sha256	Runtime Broker.exe
fe99a49596fc6f841b7605021da6fce7f6c817d5247d880227f790388a7cabe4	Sha256	Shellcode exe

Source: <https://blog.cyble.com/2023/01/12/rhadamanthys-new-stealer-spreading-through-google-ads/>