

# Teasing the Secrets From Threat Actors: Malware Configuration Parsing at Scale

By Mark Lim, Daniel Raygoza, Bob Jung

Published: 2023-05-03 · Archived: 2026-04-05 20:40:35 UTC

## Executive Summary

Configuration data that changes across each instance of deployed malware can be a gold mine of information about what the bad guys are up to. The problem is that configuration data in malware is usually difficult to parse statically from the file, by design. Malware authors know the intelligence value as they provide directives for how the malware should behave.

Malware is like most complex software systems in that there are many advantages for code reuse and abstraction. Therefore, it is not surprising to see that the concept of software configuration is pervasive across the various malware families we analyze. After all, it's pretty hard to imagine a stereotypical cybercriminal wanting to bother with recompiling their code to change an IP address or whatever else, when going after different targets.

But the good news is that statically armored configuration data can often easily be found and parsed directly from memory. We will cover a nice example of an IcedID (information stealer) configuration, how it was obfuscated and how we've extracted it.

Palo Alto Networks customers receive improved detection for the evasions discussed in this blog through Advanced WildFire. As we continue to parse and extract this information from malware families at scale, we hope to build out a pool of threat intelligence that will better help us understand the campaigns and tactics of the various threat actors who are targeting various organizations.

**Related Unit 42 Topics**

[Memory Detection](#)

## What Are Malware Configurations?

So what exactly do we mean by the term “configuration” when talking about malware? Outside the context of malware, we think of configuration in terms of defining how systems should behave. For example, we would consider the rules used to define which networking routes for a firewall are allowed, or which font size your web browser uses while you read this, as configurable information.

For malware, this is no different. Malware configurations are just collections of elements that define how a malware operates, such as the following:

- Command-and-control (C2) network addresses
- Passwords for remote administrators
- File paths in which to drop persistent payloads

The way these elements are embedded in malware components tends to be specific to each malware family. Also, they might evolve over time as malware undergoes development, or when malware authors change their build process.

Generally speaking, malware configuration elements tend to be the properties of malware that the authors want to make easily editable between campaigns and deployments without requiring manual code edits for each one. Malware configuration elements can also expose latent behaviors and malware infrastructure that are not typically observable under routine dynamic analysis.

Malware configurations have intelligence value for security practitioners because they provide insights into campaigns over time. In some cases, defenders could use them as actionable artifacts for network detection, or for identifying infected hosts. The successful extraction and validation of a malware configuration can also be used to reinforce our confidence when identifying a file as malicious.

Because malware configurations have value to security systems and defenders alike, it is state-of-practice for modern malware authors to protect their configuration elements using different techniques. These protections often include a blend of encryption, obfuscation and compression. They might also be layered with [evasive techniques](#).

This protection poses a significant challenge for malware configuration extractors that operate solely by using static analysis, because all of these protections must be detected and bypassed before extraction can be performed. Using an advanced dynamic analysis sandbox combined with intelligent runtime memory analysis makes it possible to bypass many of these protections and pinpoint the best opportunities to perform extraction.

When we represent and store these configurations using standardized schemas, it enables us to extract maximum value through automation, machine learning and interactive analysis. The [DC3-MWCP](#) library defines a schema for many of the most common configuration element types, and it provides a simple library for serialization to [JSON](#).

The [MITRE MAEC](#) and [STIX](#) projects also provide us with a more general vocabulary for representing malware configuration elements. This also allows us to correlate the elements with observable objects collected during dynamic analysis.

## IcedID Analysis

Let's look at one IcedID binary and how its configurations are encrypted.

Hash	05a3a84096bc2a5cf87d07ede96aff7fd5037679f9585fee9a227c0d9cbf51
------	--

This [particular attack chain](#), shown in Figure 1, was discovered in early November 2022. It delivered IcedID, an information stealer also known as Bokbot, as the final payload. This threat is well-known malware that has been attacking people since [2019](#).

The following diagram shows the infection chain.




Figure 1. IcedID infection chain.

Authors of IcedID took pains to hide their configurations. Recent samples of IcedID stage two would only be downloaded if the victim’s machine matched the requirements of the threat actor.

The configurations of IcedID consisted of C2 URLs and their campaign IDs. The C2 URLs included some that might not be revealed during the execution of the IcedID binaries. The campaign ID links IcedID samples back to specific threat actors.

We will go through the following steps to extract the configurations found in the IcedID stage one and two binaries:

1. Unpack the IcedID binary
2. Locate the encrypted configuration data blob
3. Extract the encryption key
4. Decrypt the configuration data blob with the encryption key

### Unpacking IcedID Stage One

IcedID stage one unpacks itself by first allocating memory using the VirtualAlloc function. This is followed by erasing the allocated memory using the Memset function, as shown in Figure 2. Finally, it copies the unpacked data to the allocated memory using the Memmove function.

To dump the unpacked data, we set a breakpoint at Memmove. The second argument of Memmove contains the address of the unpacked data. Figure 2 also shows the DOS MZ header of the unpacked IcedID stage one in the right-hand side of the hex dump.

```

.text:000000180004754 les     eax, [r13+400]
.text:000000180004755 cmp     r1d, eax
.text:000000180004756 jz      loc_180004811
.text:000000180004757 mov     rdx, [rsp+rdi+arg_50]
.text:000000180004758 mov     rcx, rdx
.text:000000180004759 xor     ecx, ecx
.text:000000180004760 mov     r8, MEM_COMMIT or MEM_RESERVE ; lpAddress
.text:000000180004761 mov     edx, [rbx+1C0h] ; flAllocationType
.text:000000180004762 les     r9d, [eax+0000_EXECUTE_READWRITE] ; dwSize=0x9000
.text:00000018000477D call    cs:VirtualAlloc
.text:000000180004781 mov     r8d, [rbx+1C0h] ; Size=0x9000
.text:000000180004782 xor     edx, edx ; Val=0x0
.text:00000018000478C mov     rcx, rax ; addr allocated by VirtualAlloc
.text:000000180004792 mov     [rbx+60h], rax
.text:000000180004796 call    memset
.text:000000180004799 mov     rax, [rbx+30h]
.text:0000001800047A3 cmp     [rbx+60h], rax
.text:0000001800047A5 ja      short loc_1800047B6
.text:0000001800047A5 or      qword ptr [rbx+200h], 3F63h
.text:0000001800047B6 loc_1800047B6:
.text:0000001800047B6 mov     rax, [rbx+200h] ; CODE XREF: FH_Unpack+E91j
.text:0000001800047B7 mov     rdx, [rbx+30h]
.text:0000001800047C4 mov     rcx, [rax+10h]
.text:0000001800047D2 sub     rcx, 2500h
.text:0000001800047D2 add     [rdx+60h], rcx
.text:0000001800047D6 mov     rax, [rbx+30h]
.text:0000001800047E1 mov     rdx, [rbx+30h] ; Src:addr of unpacked data
.text:0000001800047E1 mov     rcx, [rbx+60h] ; addr allocated by VirtualAlloc
.text:0000001800047E8 mov     r8d, [rax+34h] ; Size=0x400
.text:0000001800047E8 call    memmove

```

```

0000000000000000  EE FE EE FE EE FE EE FE  00 04 F9 E7 CC 7D 00 30  ..FE..FE..FE..FE..0004F9E7CC7D0030
0000000000000000  4D 5A 90 00 03 00 00 00  04 00 00 00 FF FF 00 00  MZ.....
0000000000000000  88 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ..8.....
0000000000000000  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  .....
0000000000000000  90 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 E8 00 00 00  ..90.....E8...
0000000000000000  0E 1F BA 0E 00 04 09 CD  21 B8 01 4C CD 21 54 68  ..Th
0000000000000000  69 73 20 70 72 6F 67 72  61 60 20 63 61 6E 6E 6F  is program canno
0000000000000000  74 00 C1 65 20 72 75 6E  20 69 6E 20 44 4F 53 20  e-be-run in DOS-
0000000000000000  6D 6F 64 65 2E 00 00 0A  24 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  mode...
0000000000000000  D9 FD CC 0F 9D 9C A2 5C  9D 9C A2 5C 9D 9C A2 5C  ..
0000000000000000  BA 5A D9 5C 9F 9C A2 5C  FB F3 5F 5C 9C A2 5C  ..
0000000000000000  89 F7 A3 5D 9A 9C A2 5C  9D 9C A3 5C 8F 9C A2 5C  ..
0000000000000000  5F E9 A8 5D 96 9C A2 5C  5F E9 A2 5D 9C 9C A2 5C  ..Rich...
0000000000000000  5F E9 A8 5D 9C 9C A2 5C  52 69 63 68 9D 9C A2 5C  ..
0000000000000000  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ..FE..d...
0000000000000000  AB F3 5F 63 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 FA 00 22 20  ..
0000000000000000  08 02 0E 1D 00 3A 00 00  00 0E 00 00 02 00 00 00  ..
0000000000000000  AB 2A 00 00 1B 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00  ..
0000000000000000  00 10 00 00 02 00 00 00  05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ..
0000000000000000  E0 63 00 68 00 00 00 00  48 64 00 64 00 00 00 00  ..h...Hd..d...
0000000000000000  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 A8 00 00 00  ..
0000000000000000  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ..
0000000000000000  00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 10 00 00 00  ..
0000000000000000  E0 63 00 70 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 10 00 00 00  ..
0000000000000000  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ..
0000000000000000  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ..

```

Figure 2. Unpacking IcedID stage one.

## Locating the Encrypted Configuration Data Blob

Next, we located the encrypted configuration data blob using the unpacked stage one IcedID. While debugging the unpacked IcedID stage one file, we set a breakpoint at the address that called WinHttpConnect, as shown in Figure 3. The address pointed to by register RDI contains the string of the C2 URL.

```
IcedID_05a3.dll:000000000113C18
IcedID_05a3.dll:000000000113C18 loc_113C18: ; CODE XREF: sub_113BA0+61fj
IcedID_05a3.dll:000000000113C18 ; sub_113BA0+6A1fj
IcedID_05a3.dll:000000000113C18 mov rax, cs:off_1170F8
IcedID_05a3.dll:000000000113C1F xor r9d, r9d ; dwReserved
IcedID_05a3.dll:000000000113C21 movzx r8d, word ptr [rdi+18h] ; nServerPort=0x1BB=443
IcedID_05a3.dll:000000000113C22 mov rcx, r15 ; HINTERNET
IcedID_05a3.dll:000000000113C2A mov rdx, [rdi] ; pszwServerName='bayernbadabum.com'
IcedID_05a3.dll:000000000113C2D call WinHttpConnect, winhttp_WinHttpConnect
IcedID_05a3.dll:000000000113C2F mov r12, rax
```

Figure 3. Debugging IcedID stage one.

By [backtracing the code](#), we located a function that used the decrypted configuration as shown in Figure 4.

```
00007FEF33339E8 lea r9, [rsp+238h+arg_8]
00007FEF33339F3 lea r8, [rsp+238h+Block]
00007FEF33339FB lea rcx, [rsp+238h+var_154]
00007FEF3333A03 call sub_7FEF33346F4
00007FEF3333A08 test eax, eax
00007FEF3333A0A jz short loc_7FEF3333A89
00007FEF3333A0C cmp [rsp+238h+arg_8], 400h
```

Figure 4. Tracing code in IcedID stage one.

Tracing the code flow back, we found the loop that decrypted the configuration, as shown in Figure 5.

```
text:000007FEF33339CD Config_decryption_loop:
text:000007FEF33339CD lea rdx, Encrypted_Config
text:000007FEF33339D4 mov al, [rcx+rdx+40h] ; Xor Key
text:000007FEF33339D8 xor al, [rcx+rdx] ; Xor Byte
text:000007FEF33339E0 mov [rsp+rcx+238h+var_158], al
text:000007FEF33339E2 inc rcx
text:000007FEF33339E5 cmp rcx, 20h ; config length
text:000007FEF33339E9 jb short Config_decryption_loop
```

Figure 5. Configuration decryption loop for IcedID stage one.

The instruction at 0x7FEF33339CD loaded the address of the encrypted configuration data blob (Encrypted\_Config) into register RDX.

## Extracting the Encryption Key

The instruction at 0x7FEF33339D4 reads the encryption key. The key is 0x40 bytes offset from the address of Encrypted\_Config. We also learned the configuration is 0x20 bytes long. An XOR [loop](#) was used to decrypt the configuration.

## Decrypting the Configuration Data Blob With the Encryption Key

After gathering the encryption key, the encrypted data blob and the decryption routine, we can now decrypt the configuration using the following script shown in Figure 6.

```

1  from struct import *
2
3  enc_config_blob = "3a415bc8cb53f146a2b969d00ce010bc20ba588dca4cb27778b17acf8e339c71f7607a9dd
4  bytes_enc_config_blob = bytes.fromhex(enc_config_blob)
5
6  key_offset = 0x40
7  config_len = 0x20
8  bytes_enc_config = bytes_enc_config_blob[:config_len]
9  bytes_key = bytes_enc_config_blob[key_offset:key_offset+config_len]
10 bytes_clr_config = []
11
12 for x in range(config_len):
13     byte_clr = bytes_enc_config[x] ^ bytes_key[x]
14     bytes_clr_config.append(byte_clr)
15 bytes_clr_config = bytes(bytes_clr_config)
16
17 Campaign_ID = unpack('I',bytes_clr_config[0:4])
18 C2_url = (bytes_clr_config[4:]).decode('utf-8')
19
20 print(f"Campaign ID :{Campaign_ID[0]}")
21 print(f"C2 url :{(C2_url)}")
22

```

OUTPUT    TERMINAL    DEBUG CONSOLE    PROBLEMS

PowerShell 7.1.3  
Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.

https://aka.ms/powershell  
Type 'help' to get help.

PS C:\Users\RE> & "C:/Program Files (x86)/Python38/python.exe" c:/Users/RE/samples/icedid\_ida/Config\_decoder.py  
Campaign ID :1139942657  
C2 url :bayernbadabum.com  
PS C:\Users\RE> █

Figure 6. Configuration decryption script for IcedID stage one.

The decrypted IcedID stage 1 configuration has the following format, as shown in Figure 7.

```

1  struct IcedID_installer_config
2  {
3      DWORD Campaign_ID;
4      unsigned char C2_url[0x1c];
5  }

```

Figure 7. IcedID stage one configuration format.

From the decrypted configuration, we can extract the following IoCs:

C2 URL	bayernbadabum[.]com
Campaign ID	1139942657

Now, we will decrypt the configuration for the IcedID stage two binary.

## Unpacking the IcedID Stage Two Binary

As the IcedID stage two binary uses the same packer as stage one, we will not repeat the unpacking steps here.

### Locating the Encrypted Configuration Data Blob

We set a breakpoint at the address that calls Winhttpconnect, as shown in Figure 8.




Figure 8. Debugging IcedID stage two.

After tracing the code, we located the function that used the decrypted configuration, as shown in Figure 9.




Figure 9. Tracing code in IcedID stage two.

### Extracting the Encryption Key

Tracing the code flow even further back, we found the function that decrypts the configuration. The first few instructions located the encrypted configuration blob. The encrypted blob is 0x25c bytes long. The encryption key is the last 0x10 bytes of the encrypted configuration blob, as shown in Figure 10.




Figure 10. Loading the encryption key for IcedID stage two.

After retrieving the encryption key, the next step is the loop to decrypt the encrypted blob, as shown in Figure 11.




Figure 11. Configuration decryption loop for IcedID stage two.

## Decrypting the Configuration Data Blob With the Encryption Key

We replicated the instructions in the decryption loop using Python. After gathering the encryption key, encrypted data blob and the decryption routine, we can now decrypt the configuration using the following script (shown in Figure 12).

```

17 def rotate_key(key, x, y):
18     temp_key = bytearray()
19     temp_value = key[y:y + 4]
20     temp_value = struct.unpack("I",temp_value)[0]
21
22     rotate_value = (temp_value & 7) & 0xFF
23     temp_value = key[x:x + 4]
24     temp_value = struct.unpack("I",temp_value)[0]
25     temp_value = ror(temp_value, rotate_value, 32)
26     temp_value += 1
27     temp_value_X = struct.pack("I",temp_value)
28
29     rotate_value = (temp_value & 7) & 0xFF
30     temp_value = key[y:y + 4]
31     temp_value = struct.unpack("I",temp_value)[0]
32     temp_value = ror(temp_value, rotate_value, 32)
33     temp_value += 1
34     temp_value_Y = struct.pack("I",temp_value)
35
36     temp_key = key[:x] + temp_value_X + key[x + 4:]
37     temp_key = temp_key[:y] + temp_value_Y + temp_key[y + 4:]
38
39     return temp_key
40
41 def decrypt(data, size, key):
42     outList = bytearray()
43
44     for i in range(size):
45         x = (i & 3)
46         y = ((i + 1) & 3)
47
48         c = key[y * 4] + key[x * 4]
49         c = (c ^ data[i]) & 0xFF
50
51         outList = outList + struct.pack("B",c)
52         key = rotate_key(key, x * 4, y * 4)
53
54     return outList

```

OUTPUT TERMINAL DEBUG CONSOLE PROBLEMS

```

PS C:\Users\RE> & "C:/Program Files (x86)/Python38/python.exe" c:/Users/RE/samples/icedid_ida/Blog/a903/Config_decode.py
{'BuildID': 1139942657, 'uri': '/news/', 'c2_urls': ['newscommercde.com', 'spkdeutshnewsupp.com', 'germanysupportspk.com', 'nrwmarkettoys.com']}
PS C:\Users\RE>

```

Figure 12. Configuration decryption script for IcedID stage two. Note: Jquinn147 and myrtus0x0 published a similar configuration decryption script for IcedID in May 2021, called IcedDecrypt ([GitHub](#)).

The decrypted IcedID stage two configuration has the following format, shown in Figure 13.

```

1  struct IcedID_installer_config
2  {
3      DWORD Campaign_ID;
4      DWORD uri_len;
5      unsigned char uri[uri_len];
6      unsigned char null[]; //padding of null bytes
7      unsigned char C2_1_url_len[0x1];
8      unsigned char C2_1_url[C2_1_url_len];
9      unsigned char C2_2_url_len[0x1];
10     unsigned char C2_2_url[C2_2_url_len];
11     unsigned char C2_3_url_len[0x1];
12     unsigned char C2_3_url[C2_3_url_len];
13     unsigned char null[]; //padding of null bytes
14 }

```

Figure 13. Configuration format for IcedID stage two.

From the decrypted configuration, we can extract the following indicators of compromise (IoCs):

C2 URLs	<p>newscommercde[.]com</p> <p>spkdeutshnewsupp[.]com</p> <p>germanysupportspk[.]com</p> <p>nrrwmarkettoys[.]com</p>
C2 URI	news
Campaign ID	1139942657

We have manually decrypted the configuration for both the IcedID stage one and two binaries.

## Scaling Up

Now that we’ve discussed the work of figuring out how to target the configuration data in memory, the next challenge is to figure out how to perform this at scale. The massive scale of most malware processing systems means that most practitioners looking to build out a configuration extraction system will need to be careful about adding additional overhead. This means that we will need a mechanism to intelligently identify only the samples of interest for each parser, so we’re not unnecessarily running dozens of parsers across millions of samples.

We think a reasonable approach to this problem involves using intelligent runtime memory analysis, as it provides us with excellent visibility into the secrets malware authors want to protect. A typical workflow for our malware configuration extractors includes the following activities:

- Scanning memory and/or other dynamic analysis artifacts
- Applying a noise filter on the results to identify the best candidates for extraction

- Performing extraction using the best fitting module and storing the results for reporting and indexing

Generalizing this common workflow presented us with the opportunity to make the following improvements:

- Optimizing the search phase by only scanning analysis data once in most cases
- Applying abstractions and reusable code for many common tasks
- Limiting the impact of modules with problematic inputs or other bugs
- Giving our security researchers visibility into the performance of their modules

The following example shows some of the IoCs from a recent IcedID extractor after being deployed at scale. Having a nice framework for deploying configuration extractors means that once you are finished crafting a configuration extraction script, it's time to kick your feet up and relax while hundreds of configurations flow into your malware configuration database.

34	87b7f4970787ed87929787c1f80efaec1a...	23967...	/audio/ agropereprawwo.best heffertopper.best cwertoposler.cyou ...
35	8e24d045946252edb2fd63d83136d8264...	23967...	/audio/ agropereprawwo.best heffertopper.best cwertoposler.cyou ...
36	13ad7de7f561825af82ab9ba920f82b729...	15084...	/audio/ chainoftheapril.cyou unprofessional.club
37	6966dce3e94a2451284d8dcfb801b3846...	14765...	/audio/ chinadefdoing.best musiciange.club
38	884fe75824ad10d800fd85d46b54c8e45c...	15259...	/audio/ colombosuede.club colossuueded.top
39	ee0e26f57329033b24a27ff67198392ebb...	30928...	/audio/ eveningstarz.top visitgeece.space tourtogreexce.space ...
40	fb3a40e249ebffa480b40c6cddb2c2b7b9...	26460...	/audio/ felpojdhf8980.cyou azoperfdeoti85.xyz
41	4015c3bdb45127f210d6e9f6b1607c804d...	26833...	/audio/ funnymemos.shop trythisshop.club shopoholics.best ...
42	f44d8201ad5ca7c3a78c086935fa2d9d9c...	63706...	/audio/ gelevandren.cyou greenflopper.best qassertolik.top ...
43	bc8d2e218ffa72a1788e5270167dcca9d3...	63706...	/audio/ gelevandren.cyou greenflopper.best qassertolik.top ...
44	77b5b0edb6f4d4a067ec9275af9f6167a8...	41633...	/audio/ ifitislovenosad.cyou nomersimore.pw
45	1430b28b39a4f495c8a88aeb49ca5b843...	26934...	/audio/ karimorodrigo.pw airtopolos.best
46	8c739e65dc85200ada649701d0996174...	26934...	/audio/ karimorodrigo.pw airtopolos.best
47	bdbc3850d100b517146a20b896e65eb2...	26934...	/audio/ karimorodrigo.pw airtopolos.best
48	db74e599d75da93640754f39f6795950a...	26934...	/audio/ karimorodrigo.pw airtopolos.best
49	6ac0970d4b2a3ff0a279f1632c28c31f2f3...	15622...	/audio/ maseratipirosh.top tyre87.cyou
50	c0ebb6d2b3647426b5b712c0ab956f8f85...	15622...	/audio/ maseratipirosh.top tyre87.cyou
51	40c60fa13696155e04dab4d6086d32c3b...	25826...	/audio/ pashamasha.top pohindra.online
52	b83b84fc4d0cee9ab6a9c39246ae46d79...	25826...	/audio/ pashamasha.top pohindra.online
53	15f9a0d1de7639255ce230e648ae2254e...	25826...	/audio/ pashamasha.top pohindra.online
54	0728a76feb93a8bf5b5edc9335655f93f4...	21850...	/audio/ revopilte3.club aweragiprooslk.cyou
55	20fbdedefb0334ad02265234f4defe6e43...	21850...	/audio/ revopilte3.club aweragiprooslk.cyou
56	c7a41aaae47af9ebc6bcabb267e1d11d9...	21850...	/audio/ revopilte3.club aweragiprooslk.cyou
57	f0ad9320f60ef590cee3e78900264c7099...	21850...	/audio/ revopilte3.club aweragiprooslk.cyou
58	0f5a33610c5449b4aba2aed5fa2e68833b...	13494...	/audio/ sadammanopore.cyou everyonemustbe.pw daskurilla.pw ...
59	c90020154188cc9bf10812b623ae2d063...	13494...	/audio/ sadammanopore.cyou everyonemustbe.pw daskurilla.pw ...
60	e0171caf630b9e1d6d57f18699db78bfc4...	13494...	/audio/ sadammanopore.cyou everyonemustbe.pw daskurilla.pw ...
61	e7bea91d8b15c7d6aa87857fa4062e863...	13494...	/audio/ sadammanopore.cyou everyonemustbe.pw daskurilla.pw ...
62	a09d8c487a135b973af532247d62f46695...	26148...	/audio/ timerdisclaimer.pw experementummo.pw
63	d25e3a7ed538968e9b78367cd8f8d20f8f...	26148...	/audio/ timerdisclaimer.pw experementummo.pw
64	7ca44cc3821b27376d9a179cad523d5dc...	20212...	/audio/ ujkio145.cyou aslopoer45.cyou
65	112ed5790a916786c7ccc38dc5a321a34...	49505...	/audio/ willizoo.website zaxhasshira.uno goodywelli.uno ...
66	7bc9ca1d59daf3ba1369bebf24b073c725...	49505...	/audio/ willizoo.website zaxhasshira.uno goodywelli.uno ...
67	8c0b7114b76837e81323022ab04faafe29...	49505...	/audio/ willizoo.website zaxhasshira.uno goodywelli.uno ...
68	fc19eaec8edd0d5565f6b3ef1082d36ec...	49505...	/audio/ willizoo.website zaxhasshira.uno goodywelli.uno ...

Figure 14. IoCs from IcedID samples.

## Conclusion

Thank you for joining us in this overview of malware configurations and why we are working hard to parse this information at scale in Advanced WildFire. Reverse engineering variants of each malware family allow us to build out parsers to extract meaningful and relevant data for all of them at scale.

There is a staggering amount of diversity among payloads in the malware landscape, which makes the task of supporting them all more or less impossible. Where possible, we use metrics-based approaches to prioritize focus on the malware families and variants most relevant to our customers. In this ongoing area of research, our team will continue to expand support for new malware families and variants.

Palo Alto Networks customers receive protections from threats such as those discussed in this post with [Advanced WildFire](#).

## Indicators of Compromise

05a3a84096bc2a5cf87d07ede96aff7fd5037679f9585fee9a227c0d9cbf51

---

Source: <https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/teasing-secrets-malware-configuration-parsing>