{
	"id": "5b3719ae-2663-4fce-901d-c1ebe11d4e21",
	"created_at": "2026-04-06T00:08:59.443506Z",
	"updated_at": "2026-04-10T13:11:58.126297Z",
	"deleted_at": null,
	"sha1_hash": "87926341b4b1c3e0a346a80979929e5270769261",
	"title": "Widespread malware campaign seeks to silently inject ads into search results, affects multiple browsers | Microsoft Security Blog",
	"llm_title": "",
	"authors": "",
	"file_creation_date": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
	"file_modification_date": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
	"file_size": 2858304,
	"plain_text": "Widespread malware campaign seeks to silently inject ads into\r\nsearch results, affects multiple browsers | Microsoft Security Blog\r\nBy Microsoft Threat Intelligence\r\nPublished: 2020-12-10 · Archived: 2026-04-02 11:00:36 UTC\r\nA persistent malware campaign has been actively distributing an evolved browser modifier malware at scale since\r\nat least May 2020. At its peak in August, the threat was observed on over 30,000 devices every day. The malware\r\nis designed to inject ads into search engine results pages. The threat affects multiple browsers—Microsoft Edge,\r\nGoogle Chrome, Yandex Browser, and Mozilla Firefox—exposing the attackers’ intent to reach as many Internet\r\nusers as possible.\r\nWe call this family of browser modifiers Adrozek. If not detected and blocked, Adrozek adds browser extensions,\r\nmodifies a specific DLL per target browser, and changes browser settings to insert additional, unauthorized ads\r\ninto web pages, often on top of legitimate ads from search engines. The intended effect is for users, searching for\r\ncertain keywords, to inadvertently click on these malware-inserted ads, which lead to affiliated pages. The\r\nattackers earn through affiliate advertising programs, which pay by amount of traffic referred to sponsored\r\naffiliated pages.\r\nFigure 1. Comparison of search results pages on an affected machine and one with Adrozek running.\r\nCybercriminals abusing affiliate programs is not new—browser modifiers are some of the oldest types of threats.\r\nHowever, the fact that this campaign utilizes a piece of malware that affects multiple browsers is an indication of\r\nhow this threat type continues to be increasingly sophisticated. In addition, the malware maintains persistence and\r\nexfiltrates website credentials, exposing affected devices to additional risks.\r\nhttps://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2020/12/10/widespread-malware-campaign-seeks-to-silently-inject-ads-into-search-results-affects-multiple-browsers/\r\nPage 1 of 12\n\nSuch a sustained, far-reaching campaign requires an expansive, dynamic attacker infrastructure. We tracked 159\r\nunique domains, each hosting an average of 17,300 unique URLs, which in turn host more than 15,300 unique,\r\npolymorphic malware samples on average. In total, from May to September 2020, we recorded hundreds of\r\nthousands of encounters of the Adrozek malware across the globe, with heavy concentration in Europe and in\r\nSouth Asia and Southeast Asia. As this campaign is ongoing, this infrastructure is bound to expand even further.\r\nFigure 2. Geographic distribution of Adrozek encounters from May to September 2020.\r\nEffectively protecting against rampant, persistent campaigns like this that incorporate multiple components,\r\npolymorphism, and evolved malware behavior requires advanced, behavior-based detection and visibility across\r\nthe whole attack chain rather than specific components. Microsoft Defender Antivirus, the built-in endpoint\r\nprotection solution on Windows 10, blocks this threat using behavior-based, machine learning-powered\r\nprotections. For enterprises, Microsoft 365 Defender provides deep visibility into malicious behaviors.  In this\r\nblog, we’ll share our in-depth analysis of this campaign, including the distribution architecture and malware\r\nbehavior, and provide recommended defenses.\r\nDistribution infrastructure\r\nThe Adrozek malware is installed on devices through drive-by download. In our tracking of the Adrozek campaign\r\nfrom May to September 2020, we saw 159 unique domains used to distribute hundreds of thousands of unique\r\nmalware samples. Attackers relied heavily on polymorphism, which allows attackers to churn huge volumes of\r\nsamples as well as to evade detection.\r\nWhile many of the domains hosted tens of thousands of URLs, a few had more than 100,000 unique URLs, with\r\none hosting almost 250,000. This massive infrastructure reflects how determined the attackers are to keep this\r\ncampaign operational.\r\nhttps://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2020/12/10/widespread-malware-campaign-seeks-to-silently-inject-ads-into-search-results-affects-multiple-browsers/\r\nPage 2 of 12\n\nFigure 3. Number of URLs and number of files hosted on Adrozek domains with at least 100 files.\r\nThe distribution infrastructure is also very dynamic. Some of the domains were up for just one day, while others\r\nwere active for longer, up to 120 days. Interestingly, we saw some of the domains distributing clean files like\r\nProcess Explorer, likely an attempt by the attackers to improve the reputation of their domains and URLs, and\r\nevade network-based protections.\r\nInstallation\r\nAttackers use this sprawling infrastructure to distribute hundreds of thousands of unique Adrozek installer\r\nsamples. Each of these files is heavily obfuscated and uses a unique file name that follows this format:\r\nsetup_\u003capplication name\u003e_\u003cnumbers\u003e.exe.\r\nFigure 4. Adrozek attack chain\r\nWhen run, the installer drops an .exe file with a random file name in the %temp% folder. This file in drops the\r\nmain payload in the Program Files folder using a file name that makes it look like a legitimate audio-related\r\nhttps://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2020/12/10/widespread-malware-campaign-seeks-to-silently-inject-ads-into-search-results-affects-multiple-browsers/\r\nPage 3 of 12\n\nsoftware. We have observed the malware use various names like Audiolava.exe, QuickAudio.exe, and\r\nconverter.exe. The malware is installed like a usual program that can be accessed through Settings\u003eApps \u0026\r\nfeatures, and registered as a service with the same name.\r\nFigure 5. Adrozek installed as a program that can be accessed through the Apps \u0026 features setting\r\nModifying browser components\r\nOnce installed, Adrozek makes multiple changes to the browser settings and components. These changes allow the\r\nmalware to inject ads into search engine result pages.\r\nExtensions\r\nThe malware makes changes to certain browser extensions. On Google Chrome, the malware typically modifies\r\n“Chrome Media Router”, one of the browser’s default extensions, but we have seen it use different extensions.\r\nEach extension on Chromium-based browsers has a unique 32-character ID that users can use to locate the\r\nextension on machines or on the Chrome Web store. On Microsoft Edge and Yandex Browser, it uses IDs of\r\nlegitimate extensions, such as “Radioplayer” to masquerade as legitimate. As it is rare for most of these extensions\r\nto be already installed on devices, it creates a new folder with this extension ID and stores malicious components\r\nin this folder. On Firefox, it appends a folder with a Globally Unique Identifier (GUID) to the browser extension.\r\nIn summary, the paths and extension IDs used by the malware for each browser are below:\r\nhttps://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2020/12/10/widespread-malware-campaign-seeks-to-silently-inject-ads-into-search-results-affects-multiple-browsers/\r\nPage 4 of 12\n\nBrowser Extension paths examples\r\nMicrosoft\r\nEdge\r\n%localappdata%\\Microsoft\\Edge\\User\r\nData\\Default\\Extensions\\fcppdfelojakeahklfgkjegnpbgndoch\r\nGoogle\r\nChrome\r\n%localappdata%\\Google\\Chrome\\User\r\nData\\Default\\Extensions\\pkedcjkdefgpdelpbcmbmeomcjbeemfm (might vary)\r\nMozilla\r\nFirefox\r\n%appdata%\\Roaming\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\\u003cprofile\u003e\\Extensions\\\r\n{14553439-2741-4e9d-b474-784f336f58c9}\r\nYandex\r\nBrowser\r\n%localappdata%\\Yandex\\YandexBrowser\\User\r\nData\\Default\\Extensions\\fcppdfelojakeahklfgkjegnpbgndoch\r\nDespite targeting different extensions on each browser, the malware adds the same malicious scripts to these\r\nextensions. In some cases, the malware modifies the default extension by adding seven JavaScript files and one\r\nmanifest.json file to the target extension’s file path. In other cases, it creates a new folder with the same malicious\r\ncomponents.\r\nFigure 6. JavaScript and JSON files added to the target extension’s file path\r\nThese malicious scripts connect to the attacker’s server to fetch additional scripts, which are responsible for\r\ninjecting advertisements into search results. The domain name of the remote server is specified in the extension’s\r\nscripts. The malware also sends information about the device to the said remote server.\r\nhttps://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2020/12/10/widespread-malware-campaign-seeks-to-silently-inject-ads-into-search-results-affects-multiple-browsers/\r\nPage 5 of 12\n\nFigure 7. Additional downloaded script\r\nBrowser DLLs\r\nThe malware also tampers with certain browser DLLs. For instance, on Microsoft Edge, it modifies MsEdge.dll to\r\nturn off security controls that are crucial for detecting any changes in the Secure Preferences file.\r\nFigure 8. Comparison of original and tampered with MsEdge.dll.\r\nThis technique impacts not only Microsoft Edge but other Chromium-based browsers. These browsers store user\r\nsettings and preferences, such as home page and default search engine, in the Preferences file. For each of the four\r\ntarget browsers, it modifies the relevant DLL:\r\nBrowser Modified files\r\nMicrosoft Edge\r\n%PROGRAMFILES%\\Microsoft\\Edge\\Application\\\u003cversion\u003e\\msedge.dll\r\n%localappdata%\\Microsoft\\Edge\\User Data\\Default\\Secure Preferences\r\n%localappdata%\\Microsoft\\Edge\\User Data\\Default\\Preferences\r\nGoogle\r\nChrome\r\n%PROGRAMFILES%\\Google\\Chrome\\Application\\\u003cversion\u003e\\chrome.dll\r\n%localappdata%\\Google\\Chrome\\User Data\\Default\\Secure Preferences\r\n%localappdata%\\Google\\Chrome\\User Data\\Default\\Preferences\r\nYandex\r\nBrowser\r\n%PROGRAMFILES%\\Yandex\\YandexBrowser\\\u003cversion\u003e\\browser.dll\r\n%localappdata%\\Yandex\\YandexBrowser\\User Data\\Default\\Secure\r\nhttps://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2020/12/10/widespread-malware-campaign-seeks-to-silently-inject-ads-into-search-results-affects-multiple-browsers/\r\nPage 6 of 12\n\nPreferences\r\n%localappdata%\\Yandex\\YandexBrowser\\User Data\\Default\\Preferences\r\nFirefox\r\n%PROGRAMFILES%\\Mozilla Firefox\\omni.ja\r\n%appdata%\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\\u003cprofile\u003e\\extensions.json\r\n%appdata%\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\\u003cprofile\u003e\\prefs.js\r\nBrowser security settings\r\nBrowsers have security settings that defend against malware tampering. The Preferences file, for example,\r\ncontains sensitive data and security settings. Chromium-based browsers detects any unauthorized modifications to\r\nthese settings through signatures and validation on several preferences. These preferences, as well as configuration\r\nparameters, are stored in JSON file name Secure Preferences.\r\nThe Secure Preferences file is similar in structure to the Preferences file except that the former adds hash-based\r\nmessage authentication code (HMAC) for every entry in the file. This file also contains a key named super_mac\r\nthat verifies the integrity of all HMACs. When the browser starts, it validates the HMAC values and the\r\nsuper_mac key by calculating and comparing with the HMAC SHA-256 of some of the JSON nodes. If it finds\r\nvalues that don’t match, the browser resets the relevant preference to its default value.\r\nIn the past, browser modifiers calculated the hashes like browsers do and update the Secure Preferences\r\naccordingly. Adrozek goes one step further and patches the function that launches the integrity check. The two-byte patch nullifies the integrity check, which makes the browser potentially more vulnerable to hijacking or\r\ntampering.\r\nFigure 9. Two-byte patch to the function in Secure Preferences file that launches the integrity check\r\nWith the integrity check disabled, Adrozek proceeds to modify security settings. On Google Chrome or Microsoft\r\nEdge, the malware modifies the following entries in the Secure Preferences file to add permissions that enable the\r\nmalicious extensions to have more control over Chrome APIs:\r\nEntry in Secure Preferences\r\nfile\r\nValue Result\r\nhttps://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2020/12/10/widespread-malware-campaign-seeks-to-silently-inject-ads-into-search-results-affects-multiple-browsers/\r\nPage 7 of 12\n\nbrowser_action_visible false Plugin not visible in the browser toolbar\r\nextension_can_script_all_urls true\r\nAllows the extension to script on all URLs\r\nwithout explicit permission\r\nincognito true The extension can run in the incognito mode\r\nsafebrowsing false Turns off safe browsing\r\nThe screenshot below shows the permissions added to the Secure Preferences file:\r\nFigure 10. Permissions added to the Secure Preferences file\r\nOn Mozilla Firefox, Adrozek modifies the following security settings:\r\nModified file name Content Purpose\r\nprefs.js\r\nuser_pref(“app.update.auto”, false); \r\nuser_pref(“app.update.enabled”, false); \r\nuser_pref(“app.update.service.enabled”,\r\nfalse)\r\nTurn off updates\r\nextensions.json\r\n(appends details about the malicious\r\nextension)\r\nRegister the\r\nextension to the\r\nbrowser\r\nOmni.ja\r\n(XPIDatabase.jsm\r\nmodule)\r\nisNewInstall = false Load the extension\r\nBrowser updates\r\nTo prevent the browsers from being updated with the latest versions, which could restore modified settings and\r\ncomponents, Adrozek adds a policy to turn off updates.\r\nhttps://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2020/12/10/widespread-malware-campaign-seeks-to-silently-inject-ads-into-search-results-affects-multiple-browsers/\r\nPage 8 of 12\n\nFigure 11. Policy added to turn off updates\r\nPersistence\r\nIn addition to modifying browser setting and components, Adrozek also changes several systems settings to have\r\neven more control of the compromised device. It stores its configuration parameters at the registry key\r\nHKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Wow6432Node\\\u003cprogramName\u003e. The ‘tag’ and ‘did’ entries contain the\r\ncommand-line arguments that it uses to launch the main payload. More recent variants of Adrozek use random\r\ncharacters instead of ‘tag’ or ‘did’.\r\nFigure 12. Registry entries with command-line arguments that launch the main payload\r\nTo maintain persistence, the malware creates a service named “Main Service”.\r\nhttps://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2020/12/10/widespread-malware-campaign-seeks-to-silently-inject-ads-into-search-results-affects-multiple-browsers/\r\nPage 9 of 12\n\nFigure 13. Service created to maintain persistence\r\nAd injection\r\nAfter tampering with multiple browser components and settings, the malware gains the capability to inject ads on\r\nsearch results on affected browsers. The injection of ads is performed by malicious scripts downloaded from\r\nremote servers.\r\nDepending on the search keyword, scripts add related ads at the top of legitimate ads and search results. The\r\nnumber of ads inserted and the sites they point to vary. And while we have not seen these ads point to malware-hosting and other malicious sites, the attackers can presumably make that change anytime. The Adrozek attackers,\r\nhowever, operate the way other browser modifiers do, which is to earn through affiliate ad programs, which pay\r\nfor referral traffic to certain websites.\r\nFigure 14. Comparison of search results pages on an affected machine and one with Adrozek running\r\nCredential theft\r\nhttps://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2020/12/10/widespread-malware-campaign-seeks-to-silently-inject-ads-into-search-results-affects-multiple-browsers/\r\nPage 10 of 12\n\nOn Mozilla Firefox, Adrozek takes things further. It makes the most of its foothold by performing credential theft.\r\nIt downloads an additional randomly named .exe file, which collects device information and the currently active\r\nusername. It sends this information to the attacker.\r\nFigure 15. Additional executable file written to the %temp% folder\r\nIt then starts locating specific files, including login.json. On Mozilla Firefox, the said file, which is located at\r\n%appdata%\\Roaming\\Mozilla\\Firefox \\Profiles\\\u003cprofile\u003e\\logins.json, stores user credentials in encrypted form\r\nand the browsing history.\r\nFigure 16. JSON file containing stolen credentials\r\nThe malware looks for specific keywords like encryptedUsername and encryptedPassword to locate encrypted\r\ndata. It then decrypts the data using the function PK11SDR_Decrypt() within the Firefox library and sends it to\r\nattackers.\r\nWith this additional function, Adrozek sets itself apart from other browser modifiers and demonstrates that there’s\r\nno such thing as low-priority or non-urgent threats. Preventing the full range of threat from gaining access in the\r\nfirst place is of utmost importance.\r\nDefending against sophisticated browser modifiers\r\nAdrozek shows that even threats that are not thought of as urgent or critical are increasingly becoming more\r\ncomplex. And while the malware’s main goal is to inject ads and refer traffic to certain websites, the attack chain\r\ninvolves sophisticated behavior that allow attackers to gain a strong foothold on a device. The addition of\r\ncredential theft behavior shows that attackers can expand their objectives to take advantage of the access they’re\r\nable to gain.\r\nThese complex behaviors, and the fact that the campaign uses polymorphic malware, require protections that\r\nfocus on identifying and detecting malicious behavior. Microsoft Defender Antivirus, the built-in endpoint\r\nhttps://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2020/12/10/widespread-malware-campaign-seeks-to-silently-inject-ads-into-search-results-affects-multiple-browsers/\r\nPage 11 of 12\n\nprotection solution on Windows 10, uses behavior-based, machine learning-powered detections to block Adrozek.\r\nEnd users who find this threat on their devices are advised to re-install their browsers. Considering the massive\r\ninfrastructure that was used to distribute this threat on the web, users should also educate themselves about\r\npreventing malware infections and the risks of downloading and installing software from untrusted sources and\r\nclicking ads or links on suspicious websites. Users should also take advantage of URL filtering solutions, such as\r\nMicrosoft Defender SmartScreen on Microsoft Edge. Configuring security software to automatically download\r\nand install updates, as well as running the latest versions of the operating system and applications and deploying\r\nthe latest security updates help harden endpoints from threats.\r\nFor enterprises, defenders should look to reduce the attack surface for these types of threats. Application control\r\nallows organizations to enforce the use of only authorized apps and services. Enterprise-grade browsers like\r\nMicrosoft Edge provide additional security features like conditional access and Application Guard that defend\r\nagainst threats on the browser.\r\nIt’s also important for enterprises to gain deep visibility into malicious behaviors on endpoints and the capability\r\nto correlate with threat data from other domains like cloud apps, email and data, and identities. Microsoft 365\r\nDefender delivers coordinated protection across domains and provides rich investigation tools that empower\r\ndefenders to respond to attacks. Learn how your organization can stop attacks through automated, cross-domain\r\nsecurity and built-in AI with Microsoft Defender 365.\r\nMicrosoft 365 Defender Research Team\r\nTalk to us\r\nQuestions, concerns, or insights on this story? Join discussions at the Microsoft 365 Defender tech community.\r\nRead all Microsoft security intelligence blog posts.\r\nFollow us on Twitter @MsftSecIntel.\r\nSource: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2020/12/10/widespread-malware-campaign-seeks-to-silently-inject-ads-into-search-res\r\nults-affects-multiple-browsers/\r\nhttps://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2020/12/10/widespread-malware-campaign-seeks-to-silently-inject-ads-into-search-results-affects-multiple-browsers/\r\nPage 12 of 12",
	"extraction_quality": 1,
	"language": "EN",
	"sources": [
		"MITRE"
	],
	"origins": [
		"web"
	],
	"references": [
		"https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2020/12/10/widespread-malware-campaign-seeks-to-silently-inject-ads-into-search-results-affects-multiple-browsers/"
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			"main_name": "Lead",
			"aliases": [
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				"TG-3279"
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				"Cobalt Strike",
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				"RbDoor",
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			"main_name": "Earth Lusca",
			"aliases": [
				"CHROMIUM",
				"ControlX",
				"TAG-22",
				"BRONZE UNIVERSITY",
				"AQUATIC PANDA",
				"RedHotel",
				"Charcoal Typhoon",
				"Red Scylla",
				"Red Dev 10",
				"BountyGlad"
			],
			"source_name": "MISPGALAXY:Earth Lusca",
			"tools": [
				"RouterGod",
				"SprySOCKS",
				"ShadowPad",
				"POISONPLUG",
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			"main_name": "BRONZE UNIVERSITY",
			"aliases": [
				"Aquatic Panda",
				"Aquatic Panda ",
				"CHROMIUM",
				"CHROMIUM ",
				"Charcoal Typhoon",
				"Charcoal Typhoon ",
				"Earth Lusca",
				"Earth Lusca ",
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				"Red Dev 10",
				"Red Dev 10 ",
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				"RedHotel ",
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				"Tag-22 "
			],
			"source_name": "Secureworks:BRONZE UNIVERSITY",
			"tools": [
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				"Fishmaster",
				"FunnySwitch",
				"Spyder",
				"njRAT"
			],
			"source_id": "Secureworks",
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			"created_at": "2022-10-25T16:07:23.565337Z",
			"updated_at": "2026-04-10T02:00:04.668393Z",
			"deleted_at": null,
			"main_name": "Earth Lusca",
			"aliases": [
				"Bronze University",
				"Charcoal Typhoon",
				"Chromium",
				"G1006",
				"Red Dev 10",
				"Red Scylla"
			],
			"source_name": "ETDA:Earth Lusca",
			"tools": [
				"Agentemis",
				"AntSword",
				"BIOPASS",
				"BIOPASS RAT",
				"BadPotato",
				"Behinder",
				"BleDoor",
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				"CobaltStrike",
				"Doraemon",
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				"Fast Reverse Proxy",
				"FunnySwitch",
				"HUC Port Banner Scanner",
				"KTLVdoor",
				"Mimikatz",
				"NBTscan",
				"POISONPLUG.SHADOW",
				"PipeMon",
				"RbDoor",
				"RibDoor",
				"RouterGod",
				"SAMRID",
				"ShadowPad Winnti",
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				"WinRAR",
				"Winnti",
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				"cobeacon",
				"fscan",
				"lcx",
				"nbtscan"
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			"source_id": "ETDA",
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		{
			"id": "d53593c3-2819-4af3-bf16-0c39edc64920",
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			"updated_at": "2026-04-10T02:00:05.272802Z",
			"deleted_at": null,
			"main_name": "Earth Lusca",
			"aliases": [
				"Earth Lusca",
				"TAG-22",
				"Charcoal Typhoon",
				"CHROMIUM",
				"ControlX"
			],
			"source_name": "MITRE:Earth Lusca",
			"tools": [
				"Mimikatz",
				"PowerSploit",
				"Tasklist",
				"certutil",
				"Cobalt Strike",
				"Winnti for Linux",
				"Nltest",
				"NBTscan",
				"ShadowPad"
			],
			"source_id": "MITRE",
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		}
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	"ts_creation_date": 0,
	"ts_modification_date": 0,
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