

# LummaC2 Stealer: Major Threat to Crypto Users' Security

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CRIL analyzes the latest version of LummaC2 Stealer , targeting crypto users via stealing their crypto wallet and 2FA extensions.


## New Stealer Targeting Crypto Wallets and 2FA Extensions of Various Browsers

During a threat-hunting exercise, Cyble Research and Intelligence Labs (CRIL) discovered a post on the cybercrime forum about an information stealer targeting both Chromium and Mozilla-based browsers. This stealer was named LummaC2 Stealer, which targets crypto wallets, extensions, and two-factor authentication (2FA) and steals sensitive information from the victim's machine.

The figure below shows the dark web post by the Threat Actors.

### See Cyble in Action

World's Best AI-Native Threat Intelligence






Figure 1 – Dark Web Post for LummaC2 Stealer

The post also mentioned the link to LummaC2 Stealer’s seller website, which is written in Russian. The website also offers various purchasing options for potential Threat Actors (TAs), with prices ranging from \$250 to \$20000 depending on the plan.

The image below shows the website where the stealer is available for sale.




Figure 2 – LummaC2 Stealer Sellers Website

In addition, Threat Actors (TAs) behind the LummaC2 Stealer have created two Telegram channels in Russian: one for sharing information about the stealer and one for reporting bugs in the malware.





Figure 3 – Telegram Post by the Threat Actors

The researchers at CRIL found two active Command and Control servers connected to the LummaC2 Stealer.



The figure below illustrates the [IP addresses](#) of these servers, one located in Bulgaria and the other in Germany.




Figure 4 – LummaC2 Stealer C&C IPs

The figure below shows the login page of the LummaC2 Stealer’s Command and Control (C&C) server.




Figure 5 – LummaC2 C&C panel Login Page

## Technical Details

The LummaC2 Stealer is a 32-bit GUI type executable with sha256 d932ee10f02ea5bb60ed867d9687a906f1b8472f01fc5543b06f9ab22059b264.

The figure below shows the additional file details of the LummaC2 stealer executable.




Figure 6 – File Details of LummaC2 Stealer

### Detection Evasion:

The stealer has many Obfuscated strings that are being covered by a random string, “edx765”, to evade detection. Upon execution, the stealer passes the obfuscated string to a function that strips the random string and delivers the original string.

The figure below shows the routine for string manipulation.




Figure 7 – Assembly Code to Replace the edx765 String

### Collects System Information:

After getting the required strings, the malware resolves the APIs. It starts extracting multiple pieces of information from the system, including LummaC2 Build, Lumma ID, Hardware ID, Screen Resolution, System Language, CPU Name, and Physical Memory. The malware stores this information in the memory under the name *system.txt*.

The below figure shows the code snippet of malware for collecting system information.

```

v1 = (int (__stdcall *)(_DWORD))sub_4082D3(1033232944, (int)L"user32.dll");
v2 = v1(0);
v3 = (int (__stdcall *) (int))sub_4082D3(1033232944, (int)L"user32.dll");
v4 = v3(1);
v38 = (const char *)calloc(0x20u, 1u);
v42 = (const char *)calloc(0x20u, 1u);
unknown_libname_5(v2, v38, 10);
unknown_libname_5(v4, v42, 10);
v36 = (char *)calloc(0x1000u, 1u);
strcat(v36, sub_407BF1("Lumedx765maC2, Build 202edx76522512\n"));
strcat(v36, sub_407BF1("LID(Luedx765mma ID: "));
strcat(v36, "xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx");
strcat(v36, "\n\n");
v40 = (const char *)calloc(0x8000u, 1u);
v46 = 0x8000;
v5 = (void (__stdcall *) (const char *, int *))sub_4082D3(-1560805264, (int)L"kernel32.dll");
v5(v40, &v46);
strcat(v36, "- PC: ");
strcat(v36, v40);
*(WORD *)&v36[strlen(v36)] = 10;
v41 = (const char *)calloc(0x8000u, 1u);
v45 = 0x8000;
v6 = (void (__stdcall *) (const char *, int *))sub_4082D3(603911754, (int)L"advapi32.dll");
v6(v41, &v45);
strcat(v36, "- User: ");
strcat(v36, v41);
*(WORD *)&v36[strlen(v36)] = 10;
strcat(v36, sub_407BF1("- HWedx765ID: "));
strcat(v36, sub_407702());
*(WORD *)&v36[strlen(v36)] = 10;
strcat(v36, "- Screen Resoluton: ");
strcat(v36, v38);
*(WORD *)&v36[strlen(v36)] = 120;
strcat(v36, v42);

```

Figure 8 – System Information Extracted by the Stealer

## File Grabber:

The stealer now enumerates the *%UserProfile%* directory and grabs .txt files from the Victims machine. These grabbed files are stored in the memory under the name “Important Files/Profile” for exfiltration.

## Wallets:

The stealer also targets crypto wallets such as Binance, Electrum, and Ethereum and collects sensitive information from the victim’s machine. The below figure shows the code snippet of stealers targeting crypto wallets.

```

sub_407272(1, v9);
sub_407D71(v9);
v5 = (const WCHAR *)sub_407CA0(L"Importedx765ant Fileedx765s/Proedx765file");
sub_407CA0(L"*.*edx765txt");
sub_407CA0(L"%userproedx765file%");
sub_402D9B(v5, 2, (int)v9);
v6 = (const WCHAR *)sub_407CA0(L"Walledx765ets/Binanedx765ce");
sub_407CA0(L"apedx765p-stoedx765re.isedx765on");
sub_407CA0(L"%appdaedx765ta%\\Binaedx765nce");
sub_402D9B(v6, 1, (int)v9);
v7 = (const WCHAR *)sub_407CA0(L"Walledx765ets/Eleedx765ctrum");
sub_407CA0(L"*.*edx765");
sub_407CA0(L"%appdedx765ata%\\Eledx765ectrum\\waledx765lets");
sub_402D9B(v7, 1, (int)v9);
v8 = (const WCHAR *)sub_407CA0(L"Walledx765ets/Ethedx765ereum");
sub_407CA0(L"keystedx765orce");
sub_407CA0(L"%appdedx765ata%\\Etheedx765ereum");

```

Figure 9 – The Stealer Targeting Wallets

After collecting the victim’s wallet and system details, the [stealer sends this information](#) to its C&C server, as shown below.




Figure 10 – Initial C&C Communication of the Stealer

**Browsers:**

After sending the stolen information, the stealer checks for the following browsers installed on the system: Chrome, Chromium, Edge, Kometa, Vivaldi, Brave, Opera Stable, Opera GX Stable, Opera Neon, and Mozilla Firefox and steals sensitive information from the browsers.

The figure below shows the code to check the browsers.

```

sub_40727f(v9);
sub_407272(2, v9);
sub_407CA0(L"Chredx765ome"); Chrome
sub_407CA0(L"%loedx765calappdex765data%\Goedx765ogle\Chredx765ome\Usedx765er Datedx765a"); %localappdata%\Google\Chrome\User Data
sub_402798(v9);
sub_407CA0(L"Chromiedx765um"); Chromium
sub_407CA0(L"%localappdata%\Chroedx765mium\Usedx765r Data"); %localappdata%\Chromium\User Data
sub_402798(v9);
sub_407CA0(L"Ededx765ge"); Edge
sub_407CA0(L"%localaedx765ppdata%\Wicedx765rosoft\Edge\Usedx765er Data"); %localappdata%\Microsoft\Edge\User Data
sub_402798(v9);
sub_407CA0(L"Komedx765eta"); Kometa
sub_407CA0(L"%lloedx765alappdaedx765ta%\Komedx765eta\Usedx765er Daedx765ta"); %localappdata%\Kometa\User Data
sub_402798(v9);
sub_407CA0(L"Vivaedx765ldi"); Vivaldi
sub_407CA0(L"%localaedx765appdata%\Viedx765valdi\Usedx765er Data"); %localappdata%\Vivaldi\User Data
sub_402798(v9);
sub_407CA0(L"Braedx765ve"); Brave
sub_407CA0(L"%localapedx765pdata%\Braedx765veSofedx765tware\Brex765ave-Broedx765wser\Usedx765er Data");
sub_402798(v9); %localappdata%\BraveSoftware\Brave-Browser\User Data
sub_407CA0(L"Opedx765era Staedx765ble"); Opera Stable
sub_407CA0(L"%kappdex765ata%\Opedx765era Softedx765ware\Opedx765era Staedx765ble"); %appdata%\Opera Software\Opera Stable
sub_402798(v9);
sub_407CA0(L"Opedx765era Gedx765X Stabedx765le"); Opera GX Stable
sub_407CA0(L"%kappdex765ata%\Opedx765era Softwedx765are\Opedx765era GX Staedx765ble"); %appdata%\Opera Software\Opera GX Stable
sub_402798(v9);
sub_407CA0(L"Opedx765era Neoedx765n"); Opera Neon
sub_407CA0(L"%kappdaedx765ta%\Opedx765era Softwaedx765re\Opedx765era Neoedx765n\Usedx765er Daedx765ta");
sub_402798(v9); %appdata%\Opera Software\Opera Neon\User Data
sub_40727f(3, v9);
sub_407CA0(L"Moziedx765illa Firefedx765ox"); Mozilla Firefox
sub_407CA0(L"%kappdaedx765ata%\Moedx765illa\Firedx765efox\Profedx765iles"); %appdata%\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles
sub_407A88(v9);

```

Figure 11 – Stealer Checking for the Browsers in System

## Crypto Wallets and 2FA Extensions:

The stealer now searches for more information associated with the browser, such as crypto wallet and two-factor authentication (2FA) extensions that may have been installed.

The figure below shows the wallets and 2FA extensions that the stealer targets.

```

v7 = sub_407CA0(L"Meedx765taMaedx765sk");
sub_407CA0(L"ejbalbakoplchlhgedcaedx765lmeeeajnimhm");
sub_4021D4(v7, a2);
v8 = sub_407CA0(L"Meedx765taMaedx765sk");
sub_407CA0(L"nkbihfboegaaehlefedx765nkokdbefgpgknn");
sub_4021D4(v8, a2);
v9 = sub_407CA0(L"Troedx765nLiedx765nk");
sub_407CA0(L"ibnejdfjmmkpcnlpebklmkoehofec");
sub_4021D4(v9, a2);
v10 = sub_407CA0(L"Ronedx765in Walledx765et");
sub_407CA0(L"fnjhmkhhmkbex765jkkabndcnnogagobneec");
sub_4021D4(v10, a2);
v11 = sub_407CA0(L"Binedx765ance Chaedx765in Waledx765let");
sub_407CA0(L"fhbohimaelbohpbjbbldcngcnapnedx765dodjpb");
sub_4021D4(v11, a2);
sub_4021D4(L"Yoroi", a2);
sub_4021D4(L"Nifty", a2);
sub_4021D4(L"Math", a2);
v12 = sub_407CA0(L"Coinbedx765ase");
sub_407CA0(L"hnfanknocfeedx765ofbddgcijnmedx765hnfnkdnaad");
sub_4021D4(v12, a2);
sub_4021D4(L"Guarda", a2);
sub_4021D4(L"EQUAL", a2);
sub_4021D4(L"Jaxx Liberty", a2);
sub_4021D4(L"BitApp", a2);
sub_4021D4(L"iWlt", a2);
sub_4021D4(L"Wombat", a2);
sub_4021D4(L"MEW CX", a2);
sub_4021D4(L"Guild", a2);
sub_4021D4(L"Saturn", a2);
sub_4021D4(L"NeoLine", a2);
sub_4021D4(L"Clover", a2);
sub_4021D4(L"Liquality", a2);

sub_4021D4(L"Clover", a2);
sub_4021D4(L"Liquality", a2);
sub_4021D4(L"Terra Station", a2);
sub_4021D4(L"Keplr", a2);
sub_4021D4(L"Sollet", a2);
sub_4021D4(L"Auro", a2);
sub_4021D4(L"Polymesh", a2); Crypto Wallets and
sub_4021D4(L"ICONex", a2); 2FA Extensions
sub_4021D4(L"Nabox", a2);
sub_4021D4(L"KHC", a2);
sub_4021D4(L"Temple", a2);
sub_4021D4(L"TezBox", a2);
sub_4021D4(L"DAppPlay", a2);
sub_4021D4(L"BitClip", a2);
sub_4021D4(L"Steem Keychain", a2);
sub_4021D4(L"Nash Extension", a2);
sub_4021D4(L"Hycon Lite Client", a2);
sub_4021D4(L"ZilPay", a2);
sub_4021D4(L"Coin98", a2);
sub_4021D4(L"Authenticator", a2);
sub_4021D4(L"Cyano", a2);
sub_4021D4(L"Byone", a2);
sub_4021D4(L"OneKey", a2);
sub_4021D4(L"Leaf", a2);
sub_4021D4(L"Authy", a2);
v3 = sub_407CA0(L"Eedx7650S Authiedx765scator");
sub_4021D4(v3, a2);
v4 = sub_407CA0(L"GAuedx765th Autheedx765nticator");
sub_4021D4(v4, a2);
v5 = sub_407CA0(L"Treedx765ezor Passwedx765ord Manager");
sub_4021D4(v5, a2);

```

Figure 12 – Stealer Targeting Crypto Wallet And 2FA Extensions

In addition, the [stealer can also steal browser](#) history, login information, network cookies, and more from the system, as shown below.



## Our Recommendations

We have listed some essential [cybersecurity](#) best practices that create the first line of control against attackers. We recommend that our readers follow the best practices given below:

### Safety Measures Needed to Prevent Malware Attacks

- Refrain from opening untrusted links and email attachments without verifying their authenticity.
- Use a reputed anti-virus and [Internet security](#) software package on your connected devices, including PC, laptop, and mobile.
- Conduct regular backup practices and keep those backups offline or in a separate network.
- Turn on the automatic software update feature on your computer, mobile, and other connected devices wherever possible and pragmatic.

### Users Should Take the Following Steps After the Malware Attack

- Detach infected [devices on the same network](#).
- Disconnect external storage devices if connected.
- Inspect system logs for suspicious events.

### Impact And Cruciality of Malware

- [Loss of valuable data](#).
- Loss of the organization’s reputation and integrity.
- Loss of the organization’s [sensitive business information](#).
- Disruption in [organization operation](#).
- Monetary loss.

## MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques

Tactic	Technique ID	Technique Name
Defense Evasion	<a href="#">T1140</a>	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
	<a href="#">T1562</a>	Impair Defences
Discovery	<a href="#">T1082</a>	System Information Discovery
	<a href="#">T1083</a>	File and Directory Discovery
Collection	<a href="#">T1119</a>	Automated Collection
	<a href="#">T1005</a>	Data from the Local System
Command and Control	<a href="#">T1071</a>	Application Layer Protocol
Exfiltration	<a href="#">T1020</a>	Automated Exfiltration

## Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

Indicators	Indicator Type	Description
<b>1995a54dba0e05d80903d3d210c1e3da</b> <b>c43316ddcb51e143ab53f996587c23ea4985f6ea</b> <b>277d7f450268aeb4e7fe942f70a9df63aa429d703e9400370f0621a438e918bf</b>	MD5 SHA1 SHA256	LummaC2 Binary
<b>a09daf5791d8fd4b5843cd38ae37cf97</b> <b>2c11592f527a35c3dac75139e870dd062b12dfe1</b> <b>60247d4ddd08204818b60ade4bfc32d6c31756c574a5fe2cd521381385a0f868</b>	MD5 SHA1 SHA256	LummaC2 Binary
<b>5aac51312dfd99bf4e88be482f734c79</b> <b>9ac88b93fee8f888cab3d0c9d81507c6dad7498</b> <b>9b742a890aff9c7a2b54b620fe5e1fcfa553648695d79c892564de09b850c92b</b>	MD5 SHA1 SHA256	LummaC2 Binary
<b>c9c0e32e00d084653db0b37a239e9a34</b> <b>b97965e4a793ec0fa10abc86d0c6be5718716d8a</b> <b>d932ee10f02ea5bb60ed867d9687a906f1b8472f01fc5543b06f9ab22059b264</b>	MD5 SHA1 SHA256	LummaC2 Binary
195[.]123[.]226[.]91	IP	LummaC2 C&C
144[.]76[.]173[.]247	IP	LummaC2 C&C

Source: <https://blog.cyble.com/2023/01/06/lummac2-stealer-a-potent-threat-to-crypto-users/>