

CopyKittens Attack Group



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Executive Summary

The Middle East has been a cyber warfare hotspot for almost a decade now, a theatre for some of the most advanced threats the world has ever witnessed. In between those highly advanced attacks, more and more attackers possessing only a basic set of skills started to pop up – spreading well known RATs, obfuscated with generic publicly-available packers.

This report focuses on the **CopyKittens**, a mid-level group.

The CopyKittens attacks are effective and advanced in a few ways:

- Infecting of computers is performed in multi-stage, stealthy method
- Data exfiltration is performed over DNS protocol
- They avoid using known RATs and packers, tools are "homemade"
- Constant development is performed to overcome security products improvements

Yet, this group is clearly not made up of dozens of high-end computer and security experts. The CopyKittens assembled major parts of their attack from code snippets carefully picked from public repositories and online forums, hence their nickname. We also named their attack tool "Matryoshka"¹ due to the fact that it was written as a multi-stage framework, with each part of it built to integrate its subsequent step.

We have had only a partial window to the targets of these semi-sophisticated yet highly effective attacks. Among them were high ranking diplomats at Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and some well-known Israeli academic researchers specializing in Middle East Studies. Even if we combine this with the fact that attackers goal seemed to be theft of sensitive data, we still lack the ability to clearly identify who is behind this attacks and if it was sponsored by another major actor.

In our opinion, this will not be the last time we hear from this group. Their constant striving toward improved performance, the fact that they probably executed successful attacks and the current turmoil in the Middle East region leads us to the conclusion that the CopyKittens will keep striking targets with similar profiles in the near future.

¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matryoshka_doll

The Group Attack Cycle

CopyKittens has conducted at least three waves of cyber-attacks in the past year. In each of the attacks the infection method was almost identical and included an extraordinary number of stages used to avoid detection. As with other common threat actors, the group relies on social engineering methods to deceive its targets prior to infection.


Step One – Spear Phishing

The attack is initiated by sending an infected document file as an email attachment. In most cases the email subjects have been carefully chosen to match the target's interests. We were able to retain a copy of an email used to target an Israeli ambassador in a large eastern European country. Some of the emails subjects were:

- 1. Registration form to the United Nations CTITF (Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force).
- 2. [Israeli MFA] questionnaire URGENT- An original paper, probably stolen in previous attacks².




The email contains the first link in the chain, a word document, containing an OLE binary object.



² https://malwr.com/analysis/ZDg3Nzg3MDM3MWQwNDdmNTgwYWRmOTJkNWFhYTQ0ZjY/


The embedded binary objects in the lure documents contained a trailing "fdp.scr" in their names with a special invisible Unicode character. This character officially described as "Right-To-Left Override" flips the directionality of the string from its position and onward.



For example, if we name a file "filename [special flipping char]fdp.scr" it will be displayed as "filename rcs.pdf".

This form of subterfuge has been previously employed by other Middle Eastern threat actors such as "Desert Falcons", reported by Kaspersky³ and by elements operating in Syria⁴.

In other cases, the document includes instructions motivating the victim to enable macro code execution. If the trap is successful and the user played his part, the infection stage begins.



³ https://securelist.com/blog/research/68817/the-desert-falcons-targeted-attacks/

⁴ <u>http://syrianmalware.com/</u>

Step Two - Droppers Matryoshka

Unlike most malwares, CopyKittens' tools are bound to each other. The Matryoshka infection framework is built of three parts:

• Dropper

- \circ $\;$ Obfuscating code and signaling to the C2 that the file has been executed
- \circ $\;$ Launching the loader and using it to execute functions.
- Comparing anti-analysis logic and reporting it back to C2

• Reflective Loader

- o Employing anti-debugging and anti-sandboxing techniques
- Runtime API Address resolver
- Covert DLL injection of the RAT library
- Persistence file on disk
- RAT component
 - Configuring the Reflective Loader to survive reboots and process exits
 - DNS Command and Control communication
 - Common RAT functionalities

Dropper – SCR PE File

Files with *scr* extension are just the same as *exe* executables. Windows screen savers originally used this extension but nowadays medium-level threat actors commonly use it as a way to deceive the average user who might be deterred from an *exe* file extension.

The dropper name always matched the promised content of the spear phishing email.

In the latest version of the dropper, the lure pdf is saved to the user's %TEMP% folder with an "~st" prefix and random number, followed by a ".pdf" extension. Once the file has been successfully saved, the pdf is opened and displayed to the user via ShellExecute API and Open command. This is done to lower the target's suspicions and mask the true functionality of the executable.

While the user unsuspectingly reads the document, the following routine runs hidden in the background:


The malware first unpacks the "Reflective Loader" component into the memory and signals to its "C2 parents" the attack has been executed by downloading an image file from a remote server. The URL of the remote file is built out of two constant strings which again might suggest some kind of builder to this platform.

- We believe the first string to be a unique ID of the target or sample.
- The second is the full URL "HTTP://DOMAIN/"RandomString"/%s(TargetID)/"CampgainIdentifer"/"NameOFFile".png"

After signaling to the attackers, the malware calls a specific export function from the Reflective Loader named "_check". This routine is a copied code from the "Pafish" open source project, led

by Alberto Ortega (@a0rtega)⁵ who describes it as: "A demonstration tool that employs several techniques to detect sandboxes and analysis environments in the same way as malware families do".

Pafish will enumerate and look for known virtualization and sandbox artifacts and then print results back to the researcher screen.



Since the original Pafish code is built to improve security researchers' ability to discover evasive malware, the CopyKittens group has modified the code logic.

Instead of printing the functions' results back to the user, the code will now assign a static number from 1-27 in the case of an artifact being found, and will return that value to the calling function (the SCR dropper in this case).

Upon returning from the "_check" function, the dropper will perform a simple comparison and if an analysis machine has been detected, it will signal the attackers again using almost the same URL as it did before but replacing the name of the ".png" file to the letter "n" concatenated with the number of the artifact found by Pafish.

Below is a table demonstrating the artifacts and their corresponding value:

sandbox usernames and paths1,2Generic sandbox sleep patch5DeleteFile is hooked6	
	1,2
DeleteFile is hooked 6	5
	6
Sandboxie sbiedll is injected 7	7
Wine Linux emulator is present 8	8
Running in Virtualbox VM 9-21	9-21
Running in VMWARE VM 22-2	22-25
Running in QEMU VM 26,27	26,27

⁵ <u>https://github.com/a0rtega/pafish</u>

During our investigation we were able to identify an example of this behavior in a VirusTotal report on one of the domains used by the attackers:

A Lat	est detected URLs		
Latest	URLs hosted in this don	nain detected by at least one URL scanner or malicious URL dataset.	
1/65		http://u.mywindows24.in/	
1/62	2015-04-22 19:20:14	http://u.mywindows24.in/img/513e94bb4c8e1d05014c92ae8a577332/8544b90ed3d7673a	l/n21.png

We believe this URL was submitted by a target or other researchers analyzing the malware.

After alerting the attackers they have been discovered, the dropper will try to delete the temporary files created by him and terminate activity of the infection process.

In the case no analysis machine is found, Reflective Loader will be called again with the "_dec" (possibly abbreviation of the word "decrypt") and the third stage of the attack will commence.

Step Three - Reflective Loader

In an attempt to increase stealthiness, the CopyKittens group has decided to use another open source project⁶ by Stephen Fewer (@stephenfewer). The project implements a remote library injection technique called "Reflective DLL Injection". Fewer describes the method in his paper⁷:

"Reflective DLL injection is a library injection technique in which the concept of reflective programming is employed to perform the loading of a library from memory into a host process". This method enables the RAT library to run on the host machine without a dedicated process and without registration of the library under the loaded modules.

The original project was built as a command line utility with the target process identifier provided as an argument. In a real attack scenario, the injected process identifier is obviously unknown to the attacker and a suitable host process should be located at runtime. The CopyKittens group has implemented this routine by using WTSEnumerateProcess API to get a list of current active processes and then trying to get a handle to each process via OpenProces API, avoiding x64 processes.

⁶ <u>https://github.com/stephenfewer/ReflectiveDLLInjection</u>

⁷ http://www.harmonysecurity.com/files/HS-P005 ReflectiveDllInjection.pdf

call test jz mov cmp jbe	WTSEnumerateProcess eax, eax short loc_10003CAA ebx, edi [ebp+var_18], ebx short loc_10003CB0
	; CODE XREF: sub 10003BEA+BAlj
mov	eax, [ebp+var 14]
push	dword ptr [edi+eax+4] ; ProcessId
push	0 ; bInheritHandle
push	412h ; dwDesiredAccess: Create_THREAD VM_READ QUERY_INFORMATION
call	OpenProcess
mov	[ebp+var_20], eax
test	eax, eax
jz	short loc_10003C9D
lea	ecx, [ebp+var_D]
call	sub_10002218
test	eax, eax
jz	short loc_10003C70
lea	eax, [ebp+SystemInfo]
push	eax ; lpSystemInfo
call	ds:GetNativeSystemInfo
push	[ebp+var_20]
lea	ecx, [ebp+var_D]
call	sub_100021D3
jmp	short loc_10003C73

Once a suitable host has been found for infection, the rest of Fewer's project code will be used to inject the malicious library and execute the RAT.

SAC045B2 .√74 3F JE SHORT kernel.6AC045F3 SAC045B4 . 56 PUSH ESI		A 1	Registers (FPU) < < < <
AC44564 - 575 10 PUSH EXILE TOPOHAPS AC44565 - FF75 10 PUSH DUORD PTR SS: (EEP+10] AC44568 - FF75 00 PUSH DUORD PTR SS: (EEP+C] AC44568 - 50 PUSH ERX AC44568 - 50 PUSH ERX			EAX 00930000 ECX 0006F7D8
AC045B5 . FF75 10 PUSH DWORD PTR SS: [EBP+10] AC045B8 . FF75 0C PUSH DWORD PTR SS: [EBP+C]			EDX 772070B4 ntdll.KiFastSystemCallRet
SAC045BB . 50 PUSH EAX SAC045BC . 57 PUSH EDI			EBX FFFFFFF ESP 0006F804
	kernel32.WriteProcessMemory		EBP 0006F84C
59094505		_	ESI 0000000 EDI 0000009C
GAC045C5 .~74 2C JE SHORT kernel.6AC045F3 GAC045C7 .8845 08 HOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:LEBP+81 GAC045C9 .0345 E4 ADD EAX,DWORD PTR SS:LEBP-101			EIP 6AC045BD kernel.6AC045BD
AC045D0 . 51 PUSH ECX AC045D1 . 56 PUSH ESI			P 1 CS 001P 2251+ 0(EEEEEEE)
SAC045D2 . FE75 14 PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+14]			A 0 SS 0023 32bit 0(FFFFFFF) Z 0 DS 0023 32bit 0(FFFFFFF)
AC045D5 . 50 PUSH EAX AC045D6 . 68 00005000 PUSH 500000			A 0 SS 0023 3251t 0(FFFFFFF) 2 0 DS 0023 3251t 0(FFFFFFF) 5 0 FS 0023 3251t 0(FFFFFFFF) 5 0 FS 0038 3251t 7FFFF0F000(14000) T 0 GS 0000 NULL
SOCO450B 56 PUSH EST			2 0 DS 0023 3251t 0(FFFFFFF) S 0 FS 003B 325tt 7FFDF000(14000) T 0 GS 0000 NULL D 0
ACC045DC 57 PUSH EDI ACC045DD FTI5 9C95C46AB CALL DWORD PTR DS:[6ACC4959C] ACC045E3 88F9 MOV ESI.EAX	kernel32.CreateRemoteThread		0 0 LastErr ERROR_SUCCESS (00000000)
AC045DD . FF15 <u>9C95C460</u> CALL DWORD PTR DS:[6AC4959C] AC045E3 . 88F0 MOV ESI,EAX			EFL 00000206 (NO,NB,NE,A,NS,PE,GE,G)
ACC045E5 .~EB 09 JHP SHORT kernel.6AC045F0 SAC045E7 .33C0 XOR EAX,EAX SAC045E7 .40 INC EAX			ST0 empty 0.0
AC045E7 . 33C0 XOR EAX,EAX AC045E9 . 40 INC EAX AC045EA . CS RETN			ST1 empty 0.0 ST2 empty 0.0
AC045EA . C3 RETN AC045EB . 8865 E8 MOV ESP, DWORD PTR SS:[E8P-18]			ST3 emptu 0 0
ARGALEEB - SEAS E8 HOU'ESP.DNORD PTR SS:[EBP-18] ARGALEEF - 38F6 - XCR ESI E5I SACALEFS - 2675 DC HOU DNORD PTR SS:[EBP-24],ESI SACALEFS - 2745 FC FEFFF1HUU DNORD PTR SS:[EBP-24],-2 SACALEFS - 2655 - 20000 HUU FAX.ESI - 20000F5			514 empty 1.000000000000000000 515 empty 1.00000000000000000 516 empty 1.0000000000000000000 517 empty 1.000000000000000000000000000000000000
SAC045F3 > C745 FC FEFFFI MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-4],-2			ST6 empty 1.000000000000000000 ST7 empty 1.00000000000000000
			3210 ESPUUZUI
AC045FC . E8 F4670000 CALL kernel.6AC0ADF5 AC04601 . C2 1000 RETN 10			FST 4020 Cond 1 0 0 0 Err 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 (EQ) FCW 027F Prec NEAR,53 Mask 1 1 1 1 1 1
AC04601 : C2 1000 AETN 10 AC04604 [\$ 55 PUSH EBP SAC04605 : 8BEC HOV EBP,ESP			
SAC04607 . 8B45 0C MOV EAX.DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+C]			
5AC0460B . 8B75 08 MOU ESI,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8]			
AC0460E . 57 PUSH EDI AC0460F . 8850 3C MOV EDX, DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+3C]			
SAC04612 . 03D0 ADD EDX, EAX			
SAC04614 . 0FB77A 14 MOV2X EDI,WORD PTR DS:[EDX+14] SAC04618 . 03FA ADD EDI.EDX			
ShC946412 3356 HDD EDX:EAX ShC946414 0FE77A 14 HDUX;EXI.UMORD FTR DS:[EDX+14] ShC946418 0FE77A 14 HDUX;EXI.UMORD FTR DS:[ED1+2C] ShC946417 SE77_2C CTH ES1.UMORD FTR DS:[ED1+2C] ShC946417 VCOS HDUE EDX.ES1.HA			
AC04611 .~73 04 000 SHORT KETTEL. 64004623 AC04621 .~EB 2F 010P SHORT Kernel. 64004652			
SAC04621 .VEB 2F UMP SHORT kernel.6AC04652			
BHC9461F . BBLS THOVERY,ED3 BAC94621			
5HC04629 . 33C9 XOR ECX,ECX 5AC04628 . 53 PUSH EBX			
SAC04631 > 0FB7C1 FMOVZX EAX.CX			
SAC04634 . 6BC0 28 INUL EAX, EAX, 28 SAC04637 . 8B5C38 24 NOV EBX, DWORD PTR DS: [EAX+EDI+24]		-	
30. F/0040/F01-7/0F040F (LL22 W.:		_	2006F804 0000009(hProcess = 0000009C (window)
Address Hex dump020105980 4D 5A 90 00 03 00 00 00 12€.♥			300555804 90090805 1 hProcess = 00008090 (window) 90067803 9093080 Address = 930080 9060510 0010538 Suffer = 00105380 9080510 00042801 ButesToWrite = 42800 (272384.) 90805810 00040801 ButesToWrite = HULL
이 1 6 1 명이 1 6 다 3 연 49 63 69 69 69 69 7 2 2			0006F808 00930001 Address = 930000 0006F807 00105930 Buffer = 00105980 0006F814 00042801 BytesTolkrite = 42800 (272384.) 0006F814 00000001 pBytesWritten = NULL
30105990 B8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 <mark>1</mark> 30105998 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0			0006F814 00000001 LpBytesWritten = NULL
301059A0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00			2006F816 0D342C8 2006F81C 0000000 2006F81C 00000000 2006F82C 00000000
20105780 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00			0006F820 0000009C 0006F824 FFFFFFF
adia55880 da da da da da da da da cold5588 da da da da da da da da adia55980 de la fan de 80 da do00. adia55900 de 1F BA dE da 84 d9 CD ArtilA-1- goid55020 21 B9 di 4-CD 21 54 d6 94 H0L=+Th			0006F828 0006F848
001059C8 21 88 01 4C CD 21 54 68 t⊣0L=†Th 001059D0 69 73 20 70 72 6F 67 72 is progr			8886F838 88880866
20105908 69 73 20 70 72 68 67 72 15 progr 20105908 61 6D 20 63 61 6E 6E 6F am canno			0006F834 0006F818 0006F838 0000000
00106908 400 601 602 601 722 00106958 600 <		Ψ.	0006F83C 0006F8F0 Pointer to next SEH record

Step Four - RAT Component

The main part of "Matryoshka" is a remote administration tool library. It is designed to exist in the infected computer memory and is never written to the computer's physical disk itself.

When we "dumped" the RAT to the disk, some of the AV tools detect it with the following signatures:

Trojan.Jectin identified on April 9th 2015 by Symantec⁸.

Troj/Agent-AMEY that was identified on March 25th 2015 by Sophos⁹.

This, however, is not the case while the RAT is injected into a legitimate host process.

Runtime API Address Resolution

Since the library is injected into memory, the imported functions must be resolved in runtime, to solve this problem the CopyKittens group used a method called "Runtime API Address Resolution"¹⁰ using the LoadLibrary and GetProcAddress APIs. In order to evade static virus scanners in new version of the RAT, the attackers obfuscated the names of the API functions. They resolve them in runtime using a simple substitute cipher combined with Base64 encoding. The same trick was used in the Reflective Loader component. We retrieved the original functions names as plaintext strings by using a simple Python script. A list of decrypted API strings and the python code can be found in the Appendix and Minerva Labs Research GitHub repository¹¹.

Installation and Persistence

Since the RAT library was built to run from the memory of a host process, it relies on the loader to survive system restart. The first time the RAT runs, it will copy the reflective loader, named "kernel.dll" to one of Windows' common folders and will create a registry key named {0355F5D0-467C-30E9-894C-C2FAEF522A13} under "SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" with the value of "C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe "\%LOCATION%\kernel.dll" _dec" to rerun the injection routine after each boot.

In addition, to make sure the RAT always runs (since host process might be closed or crash), the RAT creates a task in the Windows task scheduler named "Microsoft Boost Kernel Optimization" which will re-run the injection routine every 20 minutes. The task scheduler method has also been added to the newest version of the RAT.

⁸ <u>http://www.symantec.com/security_response/earthlink_writeup.jsp?docid=2015-040923-3643-99</u>

⁹ <u>https://www.sophos.com/en-us/threat-center/threat-analyses/viruses-and-spyware/Troj~Agent-AMEY/detailed-analysis.aspx</u>

https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/a_museu m_of_api_obfuscation_on_win32.pdf

¹¹ <u>https://github.com/MinervaLabsResearch/BlogPosts</u>

Name:	Microsoft Boost Kernel Optimization
Location:	\Windows
Author:	Microsoft Corporation co.

This makes the RAT unstable as multiple instances may be executed simultaneously on the same host machine causing unexpected behavior. To reduce this risk, the authors have used a global mutex.

DNS Command & Control

The RAT uses DNS protocol to communicate with the attackers C2 server.

DNS	111 Standard query 0x8527 A bcafae.biaj.iu2jjjrjjj
DNS	138 Standard query response 0x8527 A 134.170.185.23
DNS	105 Standard query 0xb510 A ibeafi.a.gu2cdrb.
DNS	132 Standard query response 0xb510 A 161.69.29.251
DNS	105 Standard query 0x1e99 A fbeage.a.hu2cdrc
DUC	00 standard superv 0.255s, mys and stans 15204000 valls likely

The DNS queries are constructed from the following sections:

- 1. C2 domain name
- 2. The unique ID of the infected machine (computer name + HD serial
- 3. Random string
- 4. Data to be transmitted.

To make traffic analysis and detection more difficult, the group uses a substitute cipher to obfuscate the data before it is sent to the C2:

.text:6C6B95E6 Caes	arCipher proc ne	ar :	CODE	XREF:	H EncryptBeforeExfiltrate+591p
.text:6C6B95E6					··_····
.text:6C6B95E6 arg	0 = dword	ptr 8			
.text:6C6B95E6		•			
.text:6C6B95E6	push	ebp			
.text:6C6B95E7	mov	ebp, esp			
.text:6C6B95E9	mov	ecx, [ebp+arg 0]			
.text:6C6B95EC	lea	eax, [ecx-61h]			
.text:6C6B95EF	стр	eax, 9			
.text:6C6B95F2	ja	short loc 6C6B95F	9		
.text:6C6B95F4	lea	eax, [ecx-31h]			
.text:6C6B95F7	jmp	short loc_6C6B961	9		
.text:6C6B95F9 ;					
.text:6C6B95F9					
.text:6C6B95F9 loc_			CODE	XREF:	CaesarCipher+C†j
.text:6C6B95F9	lea	eax, [ecx-30h]			
.text:6C6B95FC	cmp	eax, 9			
.text:6C6B95FF	ja	short loc_6C6B960	16		
.text:6C6B9601	lea	eax, [ecx+31h]			
.text:6C6B9604	jmp	short loc_6C6B961	19		
.text:6C6B9606					
.text:6C6B9606 loc_			CODE	XREF:	CaesarCipher+19†j
.text:6C6B9606	lea	eax, [ecx-6Bh]			
.text:6C6B9609	cmp	eax, OFh			
.text:6C6B960C	ja	short loc_6C6B961	17		
.text:6C6B960E	mov	eax, 0E5h			
.text:6C6B9613	sub	eax, ecx			
.text:6C6B9615	jmp	short loc_6C6B961	19		
.text:6C6B9617 ;					
.text:6C6B9617					o ot i or t i
.text:6C6B9617 loc_			CUDE	XREF:	CaesarCipher+26†j
.text:6C6B9617	mov	al, cl			
.text:6C6B9619	10/00/40-	_		VDEE -	0
.text:6C6B9619 loc_	00083013:				CaesarCipher+11†j
.text:6C6B9619			, caesa	arcipne	er+1E†j
.text:6C6B9619 .text:6C6B961A	pop	ebp			
	retn	4			
.text:6C6B961A Caes .text:6C6B961A	arCipher endp				
.LEXT:000RA01H					

Another way used to disguise the DNS traffic and lower the suspicions of SOC and NOC teams was the use IPs from address blocks of Microsoft and McAfee in the C2 responses:

```
      NetRange:
      161.69.0.0 - 161.69.255.255

      CIDR:
      161.69.0.0/16

      NetName:
      NETWORK-ASSOCIATES-INC

      NetHandle:
      NET-161-69-0-0-1

      Parent:
      NET161 (NET-161-0-0-0-0)

      NetType:
      Direct Assignment

      OriginAS:
      Organization:

      McAfee, Inc. (MCAFE-2)

      NetRange:
      134.170.0.0 - 134.170.255.255

      CIDR:
      134.170.0.0/16

      NetName:
      MICROSOFT

      NetHandle:
      NET-134-170-0-0-1

      Parent:
      NET134 (NET-134-0-0-0-0)

      NetType:
      Direct Assignment

      OriginAS:
      Organization:
```

Once a command is received from the C2 server in the DNS response, the RAT will translate it to a corresponding command.

For example, when the C2 sends a DNS response with the IP address 134.170.185.13, the RAT will try and steal outlook passwords.

Common RAT Capabilities

Outlook passwords

This functionality resembles a method described by SecurityExploded ¹² for "Recovering Passwords from Outlook 2002-2013". We can assume that the group has copied this code as well.

push push mov push push call test jnz push mov call	<pre>eax ; phkResult 20019h ; samDesired ebx ; ulDptions ebx, ds:RegOpenKeyExW offset SubKey ; "SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\Curren" 80000001h ; hKey ebx ; RegOpenKeyExW eax, eax short loc_1000668DA [esp+278h+phkResult]; hKey ecx, esi sub_1000661EB</pre>
	; CODE XREF: ≤ub_1000682F+9E↑j
push	[esp+278h+phkResult] ; hKey
mov	edi, ds:RegCloseKey
call	edi ; RegCloseKey
lea	eax, [esp+278h+phkResult]
push	eax ; phkResult
push	20019h ; samDesired 0 ; ulOptions
push push	0 ; ulOptions offset aSoftwareMicr 2 ; "Software\\Microsoft\\Windows Messaqinq "
push	80000001h ; hKey
call	ebx ; RegOpenKevExW
test	eax, eax
jnz	short loc_1000690D
push	[esp+278h+phkResult] ; hKey
mov	ecx, esi
call	sub_100061EB
	; CODE XREF: sub 1000682F+D11j
push	[esp+278h+phkResult] ; hKey
call	edi ; ReqCloseKey
lea	eax, [esp+278h+phkResult]
push	eax ; phkResult
push	20019h ; samDesired
push	0 ; uloptions
push	offset aSoftwareMicr_3 ; "Software\\Microsoft\\Office\\15.0\\Outl"
push call	8000001h ; hKey ebx ; Reg0penKeyExW
test	eax, eax
jnz	short loc 1000693A
push	[esp+278h+phkResult] ; hKey
mov	ecx, esi
call	sub_100061EB

Screen Grabbing and Keylogging

This RAT is also capable of screen grabbing and keylogging. Unsurprisingly, here too we were able to trace back a portion of the original source code from the popular rohitab.com online forum¹³.

¹² <u>http://securityxploded.com/outlookpasswordsecrets.php</u> (Recovering Passwords from Outlook 2002-2013)

¹³ <u>http://www.rohitab.com/discuss/topic/40069-keylogging-all-users-across-windows-7-professional/</u>

<pre>//keybard hook callback function. //wsdn.microstf.com(env:slibbary.ms644959.aspx LRESULT CALLBACK LowLevelKeyboarddroc(int nCode, MPARAM WParam, LPARAM IParam){ // Get new info. KBDLHOOKSTRUCT "pkeyBoard = (KBDLHOOKSTRUCT ")IParam; switch(wParam){ case MP.EFUP:{ detWindow()pkyBoard->vkCode; uf(code == 8) fputs(" [EACKSPACE] ", keyLog); else if(code == 8) fputs(" [EACKSPACE] ", keyLog); else if(code == 3) fputs(" Page Up] ", keyLog); else if(code == 3) fputs(" Page Up] ", keyLog); else if(code == 3) fputs(" [Page Up] ", keyLog); else if(code == 3) fputs(" [Pare Up] ", keyLog); else if(code == 3) fputs(" [Inrow Left]", keyLog); else if(code == 3) fputs(" [Inrow Left]", keyLog); else if(code == 4) fputs(" [Inrow Up]", keyLog); else if(code == 4) fputs(" [Inrow Dum]", keyLog); else if(code == 2) fputs(" [Inrow]", keyLog); else i</pre>	
} return 0; }	

👟 sub_1000BBC6:1000BC4E	1003AD08	Unicode	[Page Up]
K sub_1000BBC6:1000BC63	1003AD20	Unicode	[Page Down]
K sub_1000BBC6:1000BC78	1003AD3C	Unicode	[END]
K sub_1000BBC6:1000BC8D	1003AD4C	Unicode	[HOME]
K sub_1000BBC6:1000BCA2	1003AD60	Unicode	[Arrow Left]
K sub_1000BBC6:1000BCB7	1003AD7C	Unicode	[Arrow Up]
K sub_1000BBC6:1000BCCC	1003AD94	Unicode	[Arrow Right]
K sub_1000BBC6:1000BCE1	1003ADB4	Unicode	[Arrow Down]
sub_1000BBC6:1000BCF6	1003ADD0	Unicode	[INSERT]
sub_1000BBC6:1000BD08	1003ADE8	Unicode	[DELETE]
🛰 sub_1000BBC6:1000BD1A	1003AE00	Unicode	[L Windows Key]
K sub_1000BBC6:1000BD2C	1003AE24	Unicode	[R Windows Key]
👟 sub_1000BBC6:1000BD3E	1003AE48	Unicode	[R Menu]
K sub_1000BBC6:1000BD53	1003AE60	Unicode	[NUM LOCK]
K sub_1000BBC6:1000BD68	1003AE7C	Unicode	[ACUTE/CEDILLA]

Another interesting fact is that the author also copied the registry key described in the installation stage above, replacing only a single character of the original randomly generated unique ID.

```
//Add the exe to the registry to run on startup.
LONG AddRegistry(void){
HKEY hKey = nullptr;
// Cet the HKEY handle with write permission.
// Check to see if we can write to run and if run exists.
if( RegDenKeyEx( HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, _T("SOFTMARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run"), 0, KEY_ALL_ACCESS, &hKey ) == ERROR_SUCCESS ){
TCHAR FileName[MAX_PATH];
// C:\Vprogram Files (x86)\Temp
__tcscpy( fileName, 1("C:\\tkl.exe"));
size_t pathlen = ( [ _tcslen(fileName) + 1 ) * sizeof( TCHAR ) );
TCHAR FykeyName = (*035F5D0-467C-308-9342-C2FAEF522A12)";
if( RegSetValueEx( hKey, pKeyName, 0, REG_SZ, (LPBVTE)&FileName, pathLen ) == ERROR_SUCCESS ){
RegCloseKey(hKey);
return = TL;
}
else{
RegCloseKey(hKey);
return = TL;
}
```

Improvement Over Time

In comparing samples from different attack cycles, we can easily see that the attackers have spent time improving their tool, making it more persistent and harder to detect.

For example, between the first versions of the RAT and the latest, the group started to resolve more API during runtime, using obfuscated strings. A comparison of the outlook password extraction function from previous and current RAT versions can be seen below.



In addition, the group has been adding anti sandboxing techniques, such as the code from Pafish described above and anti-debugging methods:



This anti-debugging code seems to have been copied from CodeProject¹⁴, a well-known online source.

¹⁴ <u>http://www.codeproject.com/Articles/30815/An-Anti-Reverse-Engineering-Guide</u>

About Us

Minerva Labs

Minerva offers a low footprint endpoint protection platform. Minerva brings a completely new paradigm to the malware detection problem, focusing on preventing malware execution by using the malware's strengths against it. The security platform simultaneously empowers existing security products and improves detection rates, thus exponentially improving the client organization's overall return on security investment. Time is of the essence; when it comes to data breaches there is often significant damage by the time a threat is detected.

Minerva -Don't chase, Prevent!

info@minerva-labs.com

http://www.minerva-labs.com

ClearSky Cyber Security

Clearsky is a cybersecurity consulting and intelligence company. We provide strategic consulting, threat intelligence, solutions and services – all in the cyber domain. Our team of highly experienced cyber infoworkers, analysts and researchers constantly run a targeted and extensive evaluation of cyber threats and risks. They generate breaking alerts, updates, advisories and notifications for security and operations centers, IT, risk officers, and management. We help our customers stay ahead of threats, make the necessary adjustments to organizational policies and procedures, and re-configure and adapt security and IT systems. We assist and coach the organization to formulate and implement a cyber-event handling program and crisis level situation assessment and decision making.

info@clearskysec.com

http://www.clearskysec.com





Appendix A – Spear Phishing Examples


April 2015: "Registration Form to the United Nations CTITF"




February 2015: "Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs Questionnaire"




Embedded in the Word document was Quest fdp.scr, disguised as PDF



Early 2015: "Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs Diplomatic List"



Early 2015: "Strike in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs"



Appendix B – Indicators of Compromise

C2 Domains

img.gmailtagmanager[.]com

windowkernel[.]com

windowslayer[.]in

windowkernel[.]com

wheatherserviceapi[.]info

wethearservice[.]com

windowslayer[.]in

u[.]mywindows24[.]in

main[.]windowskernel14[.]com

walla[.]link

heartax[.]info

haaretz[.]link

Haaretz-News[.]com

gmailtagmanager[.]com

fbstatic-a[.]xyz

fbstatic-a[.]space

fbstatic-akamaihd[.]com

alhadath[.]mobi

big-windowss[.]com

kernel4windows[.]in

micro-windows[.]in

mywindows24[.]in

patch7-windows[.]com

patch8-windows[.]com

patchthiswindows[.]com

windows-10patch[.]in

windows-drive20[.]com

windows-india[.]in
windows-kernel[.]in
windows-my50[.]com
windows24-kernel[.]in
windowskernel[.]in
windowslayer[.]in
windowssup[.]in
windowsupup[.]com
mswordupdate15[.]com (currently sinkholed by Kaspersky)
mswordupdate17[.]com (currently sinkholed by Kaspersky)
cacheupdate14[.]com (currently sinkholed by Kaspersky)
windowskernel14[.]com (currently sinkholed by Kaspersky)

C2 IP Addresses

(All of the IP addresses bellow are hosted in XLHost.com)

209.190.20.147

209.190.20.149

209.190.20.148

Hashes

0feb0b50b99f0b303a5081ffb3c4446d cfb4be91d8546203ae602c0284126408 d2c117d18cb05140373713859803a0d6 1cef128513c05837f24796042b8e1cd9 f10135e03df18462c2e35eac13d61435 4765369d8ae52f2dd9b318e0c8b27054 5e545dae692ecb4bddacdb9c526b1f16 8734f46d932f179161042ef5b4a7b8a8 9853fc1f4d7ba23d728f4ee80842faf9 9db2719a3dde09ae260def9cd0d46dbe 1f9910cafe0e5f39887b2d5ab4df0d10 577577d6df1833629bfd0d612e3dbb05 da529e0b81625828d52cd70efba50794 098e8dd0e874e59817f2e78cd48e58f3 32261fe44c368724593fbf65d47fc826 38cb64ba0aafb86585d9bcbd1c500416 6d8d0f7d73a9afaee667d71273e6e5e2 bad36581f72aa2d8597dd2b1bc7b2a7f bcf93595ba4586b6324963e989349319