{
	"id": "c84ab3d6-c22c-4510-8ab6-e83e90004f36",
	"created_at": "2026-04-06T00:14:27.480618Z",
	"updated_at": "2026-04-10T03:20:54.718343Z",
	"deleted_at": null,
	"sha1_hash": "7ce2159ced7dff176b905af54534bde415a8af97",
	"title": "BatLoader Continues to Abuse Google Search Ads to Deliver Vidar Stealer and Ursnif",
	"llm_title": "",
	"authors": "",
	"file_creation_date": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
	"file_modification_date": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
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	"plain_text": "BatLoader Continues to Abuse Google Search Ads to Deliver Vidar\r\nStealer and Ursnif\r\nBy eSentire Threat Response Unit (TRU)\r\nArchived: 2026-04-05 14:50:13 UTC\r\nAdversaries don’t work 9-5 and neither do we. At eSentire, our 24/7 SOCs are staffed with Elite Threat Hunters\r\nand Cyber Analysts who hunt, investigate, contain and respond to threats within minutes.\r\nWe have discovered some of the most dangerous threats and nation state attacks in our space – including the\r\nKaseya MSP breach and the more_eggs malware.\r\nOur Security Operations Centers are supported with Threat Intelligence, Tactical Threat Response and Advanced\r\nThreat Analytics driven by our Threat Response Unit – the TRU team.\r\nIn TRU Positives, eSentire’s Threat Response Unit (TRU) provides a summary of a recent threat investigation. We\r\noutline how we responded to the confirmed threat and what recommendations we have going forward.\r\nHere’s the latest from our TRU Team…\r\nWhat did we find?\r\nIn December, we published a summary of BatLoader activity whereby Google Search Ads were used to\r\nimpersonate software such as WinRAR to deliver malicious Windows Installer files. The installer files contained\r\ncustom action commands which used PowerShell to download and execute payloads (Redline Stealer, Ursnif, etc.)\r\nhosted on legitimate websites.\r\nThroughout February 2023, TRU has observed a series of newly registered websites impersonating various\r\napplications and brands. Included among these are:\r\nChatGPT (chatgpt-t[.]com)\r\nZoom (zoomvideor[.]com)\r\nSpotify (spotify-uss[.]com)\r\nTableau (tableau-r[.]com)\r\nAdobe (adobe-l[.]com)\r\nIn addition to comparable domain registration attributes, these websites tend to follow a similar naming\r\nconvention where one or more characters are appended to the impersonated brand name (e.g., adobe-l[.]com vs\r\nadobe.com). These sites were used to host imposter download pages and all likely stem from malicious\r\nadvertisements on Google Search Ads. A more complete list can be found at the end of this post.\r\nBatLoader continues to see changes and improvement since it first emerged in 2022. Recent samples analyzed by\r\nTRU utilize Windows Installer files masquerading as the above applications to launch embedded Python scripts.\r\nhttps://www.esentire.com/blog/batloader-continues-to-abuse-google-search-ads-to-deliver-vidar-stealer-and-ursnif\r\nPage 1 of 11\n\nBatLoader's Python Loader\r\nIn mid-February 2023, eSentire MDR for Endpoint blocked an attempt to execute Ursnif via code injection on a\r\nmanufacturing customer’s endpoint. A subsequent investigation traced the infection to a Google search result for\r\nAdobe Reader by the victim user.\r\nThe user had clicked on a top-of-page ad on the search results page where they were directed via an intermediary\r\nwebsite (adolbe[.]website) to adobe-e[.]com, a webpage masquerading as Adobe Acrobat Reader (Figure 1). As a\r\nresult, the user unknowingly downloaded and executed AdobeSetup.msi(9ebbe0a1b79e6f13bfca014f878ddeec),\r\nBatLoader’s Windows Installer file.\r\nFigure 1 adobe-e[.]com, Adobe Acrobat Reader lookalike webpage.\r\nLike previous versions of BatLoader, the MSI file contains Custom Actions to execute commands. In this case, the\r\ncommand executed an embedded batch file (seen here as InstallPython.bat, also observed as\r\nPythonFramework.bat) with admin privileges in a hidden window.\r\nA decoy application was written to C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Chat Mapper along with BatLoader scripts and\r\nsupporting files (Figure 2).\r\nFigure 2 BatLoader Python scripts and supporting files.\r\nThe batch file (figure 3, insert) performs the following actions:\r\n1. Installs Python 3.9.9 using an included setup binary.\r\n2. Uses pip to install pywin32 and wmi packages.\r\n3. Unpacks the compressed OpenSSL library files using PowerShell into multiple locations.\r\n4. Starts two Python files in sequence after a short timeout.\r\nhttps://www.esentire.com/blog/batloader-continues-to-abuse-google-search-ads-to-deliver-vidar-stealer-and-ursnif\r\nPage 2 of 11\n\nFigure 3 Batch file execution via Windows Installer custom action.\r\nBatLoader's Python Files\r\nIn this case, two Python files (framework.py and frameworkb.py) were included in the package. These were\r\nprotected using PyArmor and require unpacking with tools such as PyArmor-Unpacker (Figure 4). The files use a\r\nscript copied from a Stack Overflow question as a template for executing Python code with elevated privileges.\r\nFigure 4 Decoded Python Loader “framework.py”\r\nBatLoader’s instruction set is inserted into the main function of the Stack Overflow Python script. The code\r\nretrieves an encrypted payload as control.exe.enc then executes a series of Windows commands. The instructions\r\nexecuted by both Python files were nearly identical except for a change in the payload URL.\r\nhttps://www.esentire.com/blog/batloader-continues-to-abuse-google-search-ads-to-deliver-vidar-stealer-and-ursnif\r\nPage 3 of 11\n\nThe commands shown in Figure 5 are summarized as follows:\r\n1. Download encrypted payload control.exe.enc from https://shvarcnegerhistory[.]com/ The payload is saved\r\nunder %appdata% or %userprofile%.\r\n2. Modify Defender settings to exclude paths, processes, and file extensions.\r\n3. Decrypt control.exe.enc using the OpenSSL library installed by the previous batch file. The password\r\ntor9232jds is used and the file is saved as control.exe.\r\n4. WorkFolders.exe is called, leveraging a signed execution LOLBAS technique to execute control.exe.\r\nFigure 5 Windows commands from “framework.py” and “frameworkb.py”, summarized\r\nIn the above-mentioned case, the payload intercepted by MDR for Endpoint was Ursnif (md5hash\r\n0cb75b1192b23b8e03d955f1156ad19e), specifically isfb_v2.14+ variant configured to connect to the following\r\nC2 domains:\r\nuelcoskdi[.]ru\r\niujdhsndjfks[.]ru\r\nisoridkf[.]ru\r\ngameindikdowd[.]ru\r\nhttps://www.esentire.com/blog/batloader-continues-to-abuse-google-search-ads-to-deliver-vidar-stealer-and-ursnif\r\nPage 4 of 11\n\njhgfdlkjhaoiu[.]su\r\nreggy506[.]ru\r\nreggy914[.]ru\r\nUrsnif’s persistence was achieved using a registry run key (VirtualStop) under\r\nHKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run. This value executed a shortcut\r\n(LineType.lnk) which in turn launches a PowerShell script (CharReturn.ps1), as seen in Figure 6.\r\nFigure 6 CharReturn.ps1\r\nCharReturn.ps1 executed a staged PowerShell loader from registry at\r\nHKEY_USERS\\Software\\AppDataLow\\Software\\Microsoft\\[randomstring]. The loader contained the embedded\r\nUrsnif binary which is injected into the Explorer process.\r\nIn this incident, MDR for Endpoint identified and blocked PowerShell execution of the Ursnif loader stored in\r\nregistry.\r\nOther Batloader Observations\r\nObserved URL structures would suggest multiple payloads are available for download:\r\n/t1s1j1/index/c1/?servername=msi\r\n/t1s1j1/index/c2/?servername=msi\r\n/t1s1j1/index/c3/?servername=msi\r\n/t1s1j1/index/c4/?servername=msi\r\n/t1s1j1/index/b1/?servername=msi\r\nBatLoader has historically been linked to payloads such as Redline Stealer, SystemBC RAT, Syncro RMM, Vidar\r\nStealer, Ursnif and Cobalt Strike. Analysis of more recent samples in March 2023 has yielded both Vidar Stealer\r\nand Ursnif trojans.\r\nTRU has reviewed samples from public malware repositories which exhibited slightly different behavior than\r\nwhat was seen in the February incident described above. This sample from mid-February contained a third Python\r\nfile named ‘networkframework.py’:\r\nhttps://www.esentire.com/blog/batloader-continues-to-abuse-google-search-ads-to-deliver-vidar-stealer-and-ursnif\r\nPage 5 of 11\n\nFigure 7 BatLoader's batch file containing a third Python file \"networkframework.py\"\r\nLike the others, it is obfuscated with PyArmor and contains an identical series of commands to handle payload\r\nretrieval, decryption and execution via WorkFolder.exe. In addition, netframework.py contains checks for curating\r\npayloads for domain-joined systems with more than 2 IP neighbors in the system’s ARP table.\r\nFigure 8 Snippet of BatLoader Python script showing system profiling.\r\nThis behavior has been previously observed whereby BatLoader executed Cobalt Strike in addition to the standard\r\npayloads such as Ursnif or Vidar. We assess this is done to prep systems residing in business networks for further\r\ninfiltration.\r\nAs of time of writing, the payload URLs were no longer available for retrieval, but given that this fits into\r\nBatLoader’s known historical target selection patterns, we assess that Cobalt Strike is the probable candidate.\r\nHow did we find it?\r\neSentire MDR for Endpoint identified and blocked BatLoader’s payload execution.\r\nWhat did we do?\r\nOur team of 24/7 SOC Cyber Analysts investigated the blocked behavior and worked with the customer on\r\nremediating the system.\r\nhttps://www.esentire.com/blog/batloader-continues-to-abuse-google-search-ads-to-deliver-vidar-stealer-and-ursnif\r\nPage 6 of 11\n\nWhat can you learn from this TRU positive?\r\nUse of Google Search Ads by various malware families has been widely observed in early 2023. We wrote\r\nabout this tactic in a previous TRU Positive post.\r\nDespite overall observations diminishing in February 2023, BatLoader’s use continues to persist.\r\nThis assertion is supported by observations in our own telemetry but also by the continued\r\nregistration of website infrastructure throughout the month of February.\r\nBatLoader targets various popular applications for impersonation, such as ChatGPT, Zoom, Adobe,\r\nAnyDesk, Microsoft Teams, Java, etc. This is no accident, as these applications are commonly found in\r\nbusiness networks and thus, they would yield more valuable footholds for monetization via fraud or hands-on-keyboard intrusions.\r\nCobalt Strike, a known BatLoader payload, enables hands-on-keyboard access to footholds and facilitates\r\nnetwork intrusion actions. BatLoader should be considered a precursor threat to ransomware and any\r\nobservation prioritized for treatment.\r\nA November 2022 report by Microsoft linked Royal Ransomware to BatLoader.\r\nRecommendations from our Threat Response Unit (TRU) Team:\r\nRaise awareness of malware masquerading as legitimate applications, and include relevant examples within\r\nyour Phishing and Security Awareness Training (PSAT) program to educate your employees on how to\r\nprotect themselves against similar cyber threats.\r\nRemember – an effective PSAT program emphasizes building cyber resilience by increasing risk\r\nawareness, rather than trying to turn everyone into security experts.\r\nProtect endpoints against malware.\r\nEnsure antivirus signatures are up-to-date.\r\nUse a Next-Gen AV (NGAV) or Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) product to detect and\r\ncontain threats.\r\nIndicators of Compromise\r\nSuspected BatLoader Domains Registered in February 2023:\r\nDomain Creation Date\r\nchatgpt-t[.]com 2023-02-28\r\nzoomvideor[.]com 2023-02-27\r\nadobe-l[.]com 2023-02-22\r\nfreecad-l[.]com 2023-02-22\r\nmicroso-t[.]com 2023-02-22\r\nspotify-uss[.]com 2023-02-21\r\nhttps://www.esentire.com/blog/batloader-continues-to-abuse-google-search-ads-to-deliver-vidar-stealer-and-ursnif\r\nPage 7 of 11\n\nquickbooks-q[.]com 2023-02-21\r\nfreecad-f[.]com2 2023-02-20\r\njava-s[.]com 2023-02-13\r\nadobe-e[.]com 2023-02-13\r\nanydesk-o[.]com 2023-02-13\r\nanydesk-r[.]com 2023-02-09\r\njava-r[.]com 2023-02-09\r\ntableau-r[.]com 2023-02-09\r\njava-a[.]com 2023-02-07\r\nbasecamp-a[.]com 2023-02-07\r\nadobe-a[.]com 2023-02-03\r\nvisualstudio-t[.]com 2023-02-03\r\nopenoffice-a[.]com 2023-02-03\r\nbitwarden-t[.]com 2023-02-01\r\ngimp-t[.]com 2023-02-01\r\nfigma-t[.]com6 2023-02-01\r\nOther Indicators of Compromise\r\nIndicator Note\r\n3db1edc5b5550f54abdcb5520cf91d75 Vidar\r\n0cb75b1192b23b8e03d955f1156ad19e Ursnif\r\n85fbc743bb686688ce05cf3289507bf7 Ursnif\r\n11ae3dabdb2d2458da43558f36114acb AdobeSetup.msi (BatLoader)\r\n9ebbe0a1b79e6f13bfca014f878ddeec AdobeSetup.msi (BatLoader)\r\nshvarcnegerhistory[.]com BatLoader C2\r\nPixelarmada[.]su BatLoader C2\r\nuelcoskdi[.]ru Ursnif C2\r\nhttps://www.esentire.com/blog/batloader-continues-to-abuse-google-search-ads-to-deliver-vidar-stealer-and-ursnif\r\nPage 8 of 11\n\niujdhsndjfks[.]ru\r\nisoridkf[.]ru\r\ngameindikdowd[.]ru\r\njhgfdlkjhaoiu[.]su\r\nreggy506[.]ru\r\nreggy914[.]ru\r\neSentire’s Threat Response Unit (TRU) is a world-class team of threat researchers who develop new detections\r\nenriched by original threat intelligence and leverage new machine learning models that correlate multi-signal data\r\nand automate rapid response to advanced threats.\r\nIf you are not currently engaged with an MDR provider, eSentire MDR can help you reclaim the advantage and\r\nput your business ahead of disruption.\r\nLearn what it means to have an elite team of Threat Hunters and Researchers that works for you. Connect with an\r\neSentire Security Specialist.\r\nTo learn how your organization can build cyber resilience and prevent business disruption with eSentire’s Next\r\nLevel MDR, connect with an eSentire Security Specialist now.\r\nhttps://www.esentire.com/blog/batloader-continues-to-abuse-google-search-ads-to-deliver-vidar-stealer-and-ursnif\r\nPage 9 of 11\n\nGET STARTED\r\nABOUT ESENTIRE’S THREAT RESPONSE UNIT (TRU)\r\nThe eSentire Threat Response Unit (TRU) is an industry-leading threat research team committed to helping your\r\norganization become more resilient. TRU is an elite team of threat hunters and researchers that supports our 24/7\r\nSecurity Operations Centers (SOCs), builds threat detection models across the eSentire XDR Cloud Platform, and\r\nworks as an extension of your security team to continuously improve our Managed Detection and Response\r\nservice. By providing complete visibility across your attack surface and performing global threat sweeps and\r\nproactive hypothesis-driven threat hunts augmented by original threat research, we are laser-focused on defending\r\nyour organization against known and unknown threats.\r\nhttps://www.esentire.com/blog/batloader-continues-to-abuse-google-search-ads-to-deliver-vidar-stealer-and-ursnif\r\nPage 10 of 11\n\nSource: https://www.esentire.com/blog/batloader-continues-to-abuse-google-search-ads-to-deliver-vidar-stealer-and-ursnif\r\nhttps://www.esentire.com/blog/batloader-continues-to-abuse-google-search-ads-to-deliver-vidar-stealer-and-ursnif\r\nPage 11 of 11",
	"extraction_quality": 1,
	"language": "EN",
	"sources": [
		"Malpedia"
	],
	"references": [
		"https://www.esentire.com/blog/batloader-continues-to-abuse-google-search-ads-to-deliver-vidar-stealer-and-ursnif"
	],
	"report_names": [
		"batloader-continues-to-abuse-google-search-ads-to-deliver-vidar-stealer-and-ursnif"
	],
	"threat_actors": [],
	"ts_created_at": 1775434467,
	"ts_updated_at": 1775791254,
	"ts_creation_date": 0,
	"ts_modification_date": 0,
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