{
	"id": "f2ef67f6-cf02-46f2-9e73-d2366578e2af",
	"created_at": "2026-04-06T00:19:57.467636Z",
	"updated_at": "2026-04-10T13:12:06.849133Z",
	"deleted_at": null,
	"sha1_hash": "7bc7b4099f30921a875a42212f83e8db60f23142",
	"title": "Intrusions Affecting Multiple Victims Across Multiple Sectors | CISA",
	"llm_title": "",
	"authors": "",
	"file_creation_date": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
	"file_modification_date": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
	"file_size": 186422,
	"plain_text": "Intrusions Affecting Multiple Victims Across Multiple Sectors |\r\nCISA\r\nPublished: 2018-12-20 · Archived: 2026-04-05 16:18:28 UTC\r\nSystems Affected\r\nNetworked Systems\r\nOverview\r\nThis Alert has been updated to reflect the U.S. Government's public attribution of this activity to the\r\nChinese government.\r\nThe U.S. Government announced that a group of Chinese cyber actors associated with the Chinese Ministry of\r\nState Security have carried out a campaign of cyber-enabled theft targeting global technology service providers\r\nand their customers. Over the past four years, these actors have gained access to multiple U.S. and global IT\r\nservice providers and their customers in an effort to steal the intellectual property and sensitive data of companies\r\nlocated in at least 12 countries. The U.S. Government is taking steps to hold the Chinese government accountable\r\nfor these unacceptable actions and help victim organizations secure their networks and data. \r\nFor more information related to this activity, go to https://www.us-cert.gov/china.\r\nThe National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC), a part of the Cybersecurity and\r\nInfrastructure Security Agency (CISA), has become aware of an emerging sophisticated campaign, occurring since\r\nat least May 2016, that uses multiple malware implants. Initial victims have been identified in several sectors,\r\nincluding Information Technology, Energy, Healthcare and Public Health, Communications, and Critical\r\nManufacturing.\r\nAccording to preliminary analysis, threat actors appear to be leveraging stolen administrative credentials (local\r\nand domain) and certificates, along with placing sophisticated malware implants on critical systems. Some of the\r\ncampaign victims have been IT service providers, where credential compromises could potentially be leveraged to\r\naccess customer environments. Depending on the defensive mitigations in place, the threat actor could possibly\r\ngain full access to networks and data in a way that appears legitimate to existing monitoring tools.\r\nAlthough this activity is still under investigation, NCCIC is sharing this information to provide organizations\r\ninformation for the detection of potential compromises within their organizations.\r\nNCCIC will update this document as information becomes available.\r\nFor a downloadable copy of this report and listings of IOCs, see:\r\nReport (.pdf)\r\nIOCs (.xlsx)\r\nhttps://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-117A\r\nPage 1 of 20\n\nIOCs (STIX)\r\nTo report activity related to this Incident Report Alert, please contact CISA Central at SayCISA@cisa.dhs.gov\r\nor 1-844-Say-CISA.\r\nRisk Evaluation\r\nNCCIC Cyber Incident Scoring System (NCISS) Rating Priority Level (Color)\r\nYellow (Medium)\r\nA medium priority incident may affect public health or safety, national security, economic security, foreign\r\nrelations, civil liberties, or public confidence.\r\nDetails\r\nWhile NCCIC continues to work with a variety of victims across different sectors, the adversaries in this\r\ncampaign continue to affect several IT service providers. To achieve operational efficiencies and effectiveness,\r\nmany IT service providers often leverage common core infrastructure that should be logically isolated to support\r\nmultiple clients.\r\nIntrusions into these providers create opportunities for the adversary to leverage stolen credentials to access\r\ncustomer environments within the provider network.\r\nFigure 1: Structure of a traditional business network and an IT service provider network\r\nTechnical Analysis\r\nThe threat actors in this campaign have been observed employing a variety of tactics, techniques, and procedures\r\n(TTPs). The actors use malware implants to acquire legitimate credentials then leverage those credentials to pivot\r\nthroughout the local environment. NCCIC is aware of several compromises involving the exploitation of system\r\nadministrators’ credentials to access trusted domains as well as the malicious use of certificates. Additionally, the\r\nadversary makes heavy use of PowerShell and the open source PowerSploit tool to enable assessment,\r\nreconnaissance, and lateral movement.\r\nCommand and Control (C2) primarily occurs using RC4 cipher communications over port 443 to domains that\r\nchange IP addresses. Many of these domains spoof legitimate sites and content, with a particular focus on\r\nspoofing Windows update sites. Most of the known domains leverage dynamic DNS services, and this pattern\r\nadds to the complexity of tracking this activity. Listings of observed domains are found in this document’s\r\nassociated STIX package and .xlsx file. The indicators should be used to observe potential malicious activity on\r\nyour network.\r\nUser impersonation via compromised credentials is the primary mechanism used by the adversary. However, a\r\nsecondary technique to maintain persistence and provide additional access into the victim network is the use of\r\nmalware implants left behind on key relay and staging machines. In some instances, the malware has only been\r\nfound within memory with no on-disk evidence available for examination. To date, the actors have deployed\r\nhttps://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-117A\r\nPage 2 of 20\n\nmultiple malware families and variants, some of which are currently not detected by anti-virus signatures. The\r\nobserved malware includes PLUGX/SOGU and REDLEAVES. Although the observed malware is based on\r\nexisting malware code, the actors have modified it to improve effectiveness and avoid detection by existing\r\nsignatures.\r\nBoth REDLEAVES and PLUGX have been observed being executed on systems via dynamic-link library (DLL)\r\nside-loading. The DLL side-loading technique utilized by these malware families typically involves three files: a\r\nnon-malicious executable, a malicious DLL loader, and an encoded payload file. The malicious DLL is named as\r\none of the DLLs that the executable would normally load and is responsible for decoding and executing the\r\npayload into memory.\r\nREDLEAVES Malware\r\nThe most unique implant observed in this campaign is the REDLEAVES malware. The REDLEAVES implant\r\nconsists of three parts: an executable, a loader, and the implant shellcode. The REDLEAVES implant is a remote\r\nadministration Trojan (RAT) that is built in Visual C++ and makes heavy use of thread generation during its\r\nexecution. The implant contains a number of functions typical of RATs, including system enumeration and\r\ncreating a remote shell back to the C2.\r\nCapabilities\r\nSystem Enumeration. The implant is capable of enumerating the following information about the victim system\r\nand passing it back to the C2:\r\nsystem name,\r\nsystem architecture (x86 or x64),\r\noperating system major and minor versions,\r\namount of available memory,\r\nprocessor specifications,\r\nlanguage of the user,\r\nprivileges of the current process,\r\ngroup permissions of the current user,\r\nsystem uptime,\r\nIP address, and\r\nprimary drive storage utilization.\r\nCommand Execution. The implant can execute a command directly inside a command shell using native\r\nWindows functionality by passing the command to run to cmd.exe with the “/c” option (“cmd.exe /c\r\n\u003ccommand\u003e”).\r\nCommand Window Generation. The implant can also execute commands via a remote shell that is generated\r\nand passed through a named pipe. A command window is piped back to the C2 over the network as a remote shell\r\nor alternatively to another process or thread that can communicate with that pipe. The implant uses the\r\nmutexRedLeavesCMDSimulatorMutex.\r\nhttps://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-117A\r\nPage 3 of 20\n\nFile System Enumeration. The implant has the ability to enumerate data within a specified directory, where it\r\ngathers filenames, last file write times, and file sizes.\r\nNetwork Traffic Compression and Encryption. The implant uses a form of LZO compression to compress data\r\nthat is sent to its C2. After compression, the data for this implant sample is then RC4-ciphered with the key\r\n0x6A6F686E3132333400 (this corresponds to the string “john1234” with the null byte appended).\r\nNetwork Communications REDLEAVES connects to the C2 over TCP port 443, but does not use the secure flag\r\nwhen calling the API function InternetOpenUrlW. The data is not encrypted and there is no SSL handshake as\r\nwould normally occur with port 443 traffic, but rather the data is transmitted in the form that is generated by the\r\nRC4 cipher.\r\nCurrent REDLEAVES samples that have been examined have a hard-coded C2. Inside the implant’s configuration\r\nblock in memory were the strings in Table 1.\r\nTable 1: REDLEAVES Sample Strings Found in C2\r\nQN4869MD – mutex used to determine if the implant is already running (Varies from sample to sample)\r\n2016-5-1-INCO –Unknown\r\n%windir.\\system32\\svchost.exe - process that the implant was injected into\r\njohn1234 (with the null byte afterward) – RC4 Key\r\nWhile the name of the initial mutex, QN4869MD in this sample, varies among REDLEAVES samples, the\r\nRedLeavesCMDSimulatorMutex mutex name appears to be consistent. Table 2 contains a sample of the implant\r\ncommunications to the domain windowsupdates.dnset[.]com over TCP port 443.\r\nTable 2: REDLEAVES Sample Beacon\r\n--- BEGIN SAMPLE BEACON ---\r\n00000000 c1 0c 00 00 7a 8d 9b dc 88 00 00 00 ....z... ....\r\n0000000C 14 6f 68 6e 16 6f 68 6e c4 a4 b1 d1 c4 e6 24 eb .ohn.ohn ......$.\r\n0000001C cf 49 81 a7 a1 c7 96 ff 6d 31 b4 48 8b 3e a3 c1 .I...... m1.H.\u003e..\r\n0000002C 92 e2 c3 7c e4 4c cf e9 e1 fa fb 6a fa 66 2c bf ...|.L.. ...j.f,.\r\n0000004C 7b 13 a7 30 17 3d eb fb d3 16 0e 96 83 21 2e 73 {..0.=.. .....!.s\r\n0000005C dc 44 a2 72 fb f4 5e d0 4d b7 85 be 33 cd 13 21 .D.r..^. M...3..!\r\n0000006C 3f e2 63 da da 5b 5e 52 9a 9c 20 36 69 cb cd 79 ?.c..[^R .. 6i..y\r\n0000007C 13 79 7a d4 ed 63 b7 41 5d 38 b4 c2 84 74 98 cd .yz..c.A ]8...t..\r\n0000008C f8 32 49 ef 2d e7 f2 ed .2I.-...\r\nhttps://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-117A\r\nPage 4 of 20\n\n0000003C 5e 4b 72 6a f9 47 86 cd f1 cd 6d b5 24 79 3c 59 ^Krj.G.. ..m.$y\r\n--- END SAMPLE BEACON ---\r\nREDLEAVES network traffic has two 12-byte fixed-length headers in front of each RC4-encrypted compressed\r\npayload. The first header comes in its own packet, with the second header and the payload following in a separate\r\npacket within the same TCP stream. The last four bytes of the first header contain the number of the remaining\r\nbytes in little-endian format (0x88 in the sample beacon above).\r\nThe second header, starting at position 0x0C, is XOR’d with the first four bytes of the key that is used to encrypt\r\nthe payload. In the case of this sample, those first four bytes would be “john” (or 0x6a6f686e using the ASCII hex\r\ncodes). After the XOR operation, the bytes in positions 0x0C through 0x0F contain the length of the decrypted\r\nand decompressed payload. The bytes in positions 0x10 through 0x13 contain the length of the encrypted and\r\ncompressed payload.\r\nTo demonstrate, in the sample beacon, the second header follows:\r\n0000000C 14 6f 68 6e 16 6f 68 6e c4 a4 b1 d1\r\nThe length of the decrypted and decompressed payload is 0x7e000000 in little-endian format (0x146f686e XOR\r\n0x6a6f686e). The length of the encrypted and compressed payload is 0x7c000000 in little-endian (0x166f686e\r\nXOR 0x6a6f686e). This is verified by referring back to the sample beacon which had the number of remaining\r\nbytes set to 0x88 and subtracting the length of the second header (0x88 – 0xC = 0x7c).\r\nStrings\r\nNote: Use caution when searching based on strings, as common strings may cause a large number of false\r\npositives.\r\nTable 3: Strings Appearing in the Analyzed Sample of REDLEAVES\r\n[ Unique Ascii strings ] --------------------\r\nred_autumnal_leaves_dllmain.dll\r\nwindowsupdates.dnset.com windowsupdates.dnset.com\r\nwindowsupdates.dnset.com\r\n2016-5-10-INCO\r\njohn1234\r\nFeb 04 2015\r\n127.0.0.1 169.254\r\ntcp\r\nhttps://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-117A\r\nPage 5 of 20\n\nhttps\r\nhttp\r\n[ Unique Unicode strings ] ------------------\r\nRedLeavesCMDSimulatorMutex\r\nQN4869MD\r\n\\\\\\\\.\\\\pipe\\\\NamePipe_MoreWindows\r\nnetwork.proxy.type\r\nnetwork.proxy.http_port\r\nnetwork.proxy.http network.proxy.autoconfig_url\r\nnetwork.proxy.\r\na([a-zA-Z0-9])\r\nb([ \\\\t])\r\nc([a-zA-Z])\r\nd([0-9])\r\nh([0-9a-fA-F])\r\nn(\\r|(\\r?\\n)) q(\\\"[^\\\"]*\\\")|('[^']*')\r\nw([a-zA-Z]+)\r\nz([0-9]+)\r\nMalware Execution Analysis\r\nFile Name: VeetlePlayer.exe\r\nMD5: 9d0da088d2bb135611b5450554c99672\r\nFile Size: 25704 bytes (25.1 KB)\r\nDescription: This is the executable that calls the exports located within libvlc.dll\r\nFile Name: libvlc.dll\r\nMD5: 9A8C76271210324D97A232974CA0A6A3\r\nFile Size: 33792 bytes (33.0 KB)\r\nhttps://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-117A\r\nPage 6 of 20\n\nDescription: This is the loader and decoder for mtcReport.ktc, the combined shellcode and implant file.\r\nFile Name: mtcReport.ktc\r\nMD5: 3045E77E1E9CF9D9657AEA71AB5E8947\r\nFile Size: 231076 bytes (225.7 KB)\r\nDescription: This is the encoded shellcode and implant file. When this file is decoded, the shellcode precedes the\r\nactual implant, which resides at offset 0x1292 from the beginning of the shellcode in memory. The implant has the\r\nMZ and PE flags replaced with the value 0xFF.\r\nAll three of these files must be present for execution of the malware to succeed.\r\nWhen all files are present and the VeetlePlayer.exe file is executed, it will make calls to the following DLL exports\r\nwithin the libvlc.dll file:\r\nVLC_Version checks to see if its calling file is named “VeetlePlayer.exe”. If the calling file is named\r\nsomething else, execution will terminate and no shellcode will be loaded.\r\nVLC_Create reads in the contents of the file mtcReport.ktc.\r\nVLC_Init takes in the offset in which the encoded shellcode/implant file is located and deobfuscates it.\r\nAfter deobfuscation, this export executes the shellcode.\r\nVLC_Destroy does nothing other than perform a return 0.\r\nVLC_AddIntf and VLC_CleanUp simply call the export VLC_Destroy, which returns 0.\r\nWhen the libvlc.dll decodes the shellcode/implant, it calls the shellcode at the beginning of the data blob in\r\nmemory. The shellcode then activates a new instance of svchost.exe and suspends it. It then makes a call to\r\nWriteProcessMemory() and inserts the implant with the damaged MZ and PE headers into its memory space. It\r\nthen resumes execution of svchost.exe, which runs the implant.\r\nThe resulting decoded shellcode with the implant file below it can have a variable MD5 based on how it is\r\ndumped from memory. The MD5 checksums of two instances of decoded shellcode are:\r\n1. ba4b4087370780dc988d55cbb9de885d\r\n2. 3d032ba5f73cbc398f1a77af92077cd8\r\nTable 4 contains the implant resulting from the original implant’s separation from the shellcode and the repair of\r\nits MZ and PE flags.\r\nTable 4: Resulting Implant from Shellcode Separation\r\nFile Name: red_autumnal_leaves_dllmain.dll\r\nMD5: 3EBBFEEE3A832C92BB60B531F749230E\r\nFile Size: 226304 bytes (221.0 KB)\r\nPE Compile Date: 10 May 2016\r\nhttps://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-117A\r\nPage 7 of 20\n\nDuring execution, the file will create two mutexes called RedLeavesCMDSimulatorMutex and QN4869MD. It\r\nchecks the QN4869MD mutex to see if it is already running. It will then perform initial enumeration of\r\nthe system to include operating system versions, number of processors, RAM, and CPU information.\r\nPLUGX\r\nPLUGX is a sophisticated Remote Access Tool (RAT) operating since approximately 2012. Although there are\r\nnow many variants of this RAT in existence today, there are still characteristics common to most variants.\r\nTypically, PLUGX uses three components to install itself.\r\n1. A non-malicious executable\r\n2. A malicious DLL/installer\r\n3. An encoded payload – the PLUGX RAT.\r\nA non-malicious executable with one or more imports is used to start the installation process. The executable will\r\nlikely exist in a directory not normally associated with its use. In some cases, the actor may use an executable\r\nsigned with a valid certificate, and rename the DLL and encoded payload with file names that suggest they are\r\nrelated to the trusted file. Importantly, the actor seems to vary the encoding scheme used to protect the encoded\r\npayload to stifle techniques used by AV vendors to develop patterns to detect it. The payload is either encoded\r\nwith a single byte or encrypted and decompressed. Recently, NCCIC has observed a case where the encoded\r\npayload contains a decoding stub within itself, beginning at byte zero. The malware simply reads this payload and\r\nexecutes it starting at byte zero. The stub then decodes and executes the rest of itself in memory. Notably, this stub\r\nvaries in its structure and algorithm, again stifling detection by signature based security software. The PLUGX\r\nmalware is never stored on disk in an unencrypted or decoded format.\r\nWhen the initial executable is launched, the imported library, usually a separate DLL, is replaced with a malicious\r\nversion that in turn decodes and installs the third and final component, which is the PLUGX rat itself. Typically,\r\nthe PLUGX component is obfuscated and contains no visible executable code until it is unpacked in memory,\r\nprotecting it from AV/YARA scans while static. During the evolution of these PLUGX compromises, NCCIC\r\nnoted an increasing implementation of protections of the actual decoded PLUGX in memory. For example, the\r\nmost recent version we looked at implements a secure strings method, which hides the majority of the common\r\ncommands used by PLUGX. This is an additional feature designed to thwart signature based security tools.\r\nOnce the PLUGX RAT is installed on the victim, the actors has complete C2 capabilities of the victim system,\r\nincluding the ability to take screenshots and download files from the compromised system. The communications\r\nbetween the RAT (installed on the victim system) and the PLUGX C2 server are encoded to secure the\r\ncommunication and stifle detection by signature based network signature tools.\r\nThe advanced capabilities of PLUGX are implemented via a plugin framework. Each plugin operates\r\nindependently in its own unique thread within the service. The modules may vary based on variants. Table 5 lists\r\nthe modules and capabilities contained within one sample recently analyzed by NCCIC.\r\nTable 5: Modules and Capabilities of PLUGX\r\nhttps://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-117A\r\nPage 8 of 20\n\nModule\r\nName\r\nCapability\r\nDisk\r\nwide range of system-related capabilities including file / directory / drive enumeration, file /\r\ndirectory creation, create process, and obtain environment variables\r\nKeylog logs keystrokes and saves data to log file\r\nNethood enumerates the host's network resources via the Windows multiple provider router DLL\r\nNetstat\r\nset the state of a TCP connection or obtain the extended TCP or UDP tables (lists of network\r\nendpoints available to a process) of each active process on the host\r\nOption\r\nprovides the ability to initiate a system shutdown, adjust shutdown-related privileges for a\r\ngiven process, and lock the user's workstation\r\nPortmap port mapping\r\nProcess\r\nprocess enumeration, termination, and capability to obtain more in-depth information\r\npertaining to each process (e.g. CompanyName, FileDescription, FileVersion of each module\r\nloaded by the process)\r\nRegedit create, read, update \u0026 delete registry entries\r\nScreen capability to capture screenshots of the system\r\nService start, stop, remove, configure \u0026 query services\r\nShell remote shell access\r\nSQL enumerate SQL databases and available drivers; execute SQL queries\r\nTelnet provides a telnet interface\r\nThe PLUGX operator may dynamically add, remove, or update PLUGX plugins during runtime. This provides the\r\nability to dynamically adjust C2 capabilities based on the requirements of the C2 operator.\r\nNetwork activity is often seen as POST requests similar to that shown in table 6. Network defenders can look to\r\ndetect non-SSL HTTP traffic on port 443, which can be indicative of malware traffic. The PLUGX malware is also\r\nseen using TCP ports 80, 8080, and 53.\r\nTable 6: Sample PLUGX Beacon\r\nPOST /D15DB9E25ADA34EC9E559736 HTTP/1.1\r\nAccept: */*\r\nHX1: 0\r\nHX2: 0\r\nhttps://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-117A\r\nPage 9 of 20\n\nHX3:\r\n61456\r\nHX4:1\r\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 9.0; Windows NT 6.1; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727;\r\n.NET4.0C; .NET4.0E)\r\nHost: sc.weboot.info:443\r\nContent-Length: 0\r\nCache-Control: no-cache\r\nEven though the beacon went to port 443, which is commonly used for encrypted HTTP communications, this\r\ntraffic was plaintext HTTP, as is common for this variant of PLUGX.\r\nFor IT Service Providers\r\nAll organizations that provide IT services as a commodity for other organizations should evaluate their\r\ninfrastructure to determine if related activity has taken place. Active monitoring of network traffic for the\r\nindicators of compromise (IOCs) provided in this report, as well as behavior analysis for similar activity, should\r\nbe conducted to identify C2 traffic. In addition, frequency analysis should be conducted at the lowest level\r\npossible to determine any unusual fluctuation in bandwidth indicative of a potential data exfiltration. Both\r\nmanagement and client systems should be evaluated for host indicators provided. If an intrusion is suspected,\r\nplease reach out to the NCCIC at the contact information provided at the end of this report.\r\nFor Private Organizations and Government Agencies\r\nAll organizations should include the IOCs provided in their normal intrusion detection systems for continual\r\nanalysis. Organizations that determine their risk to be elevated due to alignment to the sectors being targeted,\r\nunusual detected activity, or other factors, should conduct a dedicated investigation to identify any related activity.\r\nOrganizations which leverage external IT service providers should validate with their providers that due diligence\r\nis being conducted to validate if there are security concerns with their specific provider. If an intrusion is\r\nsuspected, please reach out to the NCCIC at the contact information provided at the end of this report.\r\nDetection\r\nNCCIC is providing a compilation of IOCs from a variety of sources to aid in the detection of this malware. The\r\nIOCs provided in the associated STIX package and .xlsx file were derived from various government, commercial,\r\nand publically available sources. The sources provided does not constitute an exhaustive list and the U.S.\r\nGovernment does not endorse or support any particular product or vendor’s information listed in this report.\r\nHowever, NCCIC includes this compilation here to ensure the distribution of the most comprehensive\r\ninformation. This alert will be updated as additional details become available.\r\nTable 7: Sources Referenced\r\nhttps://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-117A\r\nPage 10 of 20\n\nSource Title\r\nPaloAltoNetworks\r\n“menuPass Returns with New Malware and New Attacks Against Japanese\r\nAcademics and Organizations”\r\nFireEye\r\n“APT10 (Menupass Team) Renews Operations Focused on Nordic Private Industry;\r\noperations Extend to Global Partners”. February 23, 2017 10:14:00 AM,17-\r\n00001858, Version: 2\r\nCyLance “The Deception Project: A New Japanese-Centric Threat”\r\nPwC/BAE Systems\r\n“Operation Cloud Hopper: Exposing a systematic hacking operation with an\r\nunprecedented web of global victims: April 2017”\r\nJPCERT/CC\r\n“RedLeaves-Malware Based on Open Source Rat”\r\nhttp://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2017/04/redleaves---malware-based-on-open-source-rat.html\r\nNCC Group “RedLeaves Implant-Overview”\r\nNational Cyber\r\nSecurity Centre\r\n“Infrastructure Update Version 1.0” Reference: March 17, 2017\r\nFireEye\r\n“BUGJUICE Malware Profile”. April 05, 2017 11:45:00 AM, 17-00003261,\r\nVersion: 1\r\nJPCERT/CC\r\n“ChChes- Malware that Communicates with C\u0026C Servers Using Cookie Headers”\r\nhttp://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2017/02/chches-malware--93d6.html\r\nNCCIC recommends monitoring activity to the following domains and IP addresses, and scanning for evidence of\r\nthe file hashes as potential indicators of infection. Some of the IOCs provided may be associated with legitimate\r\ntraffic. Nevertheless, closer evaluation is warranted if the IOCs are observed. If these IOCs are found, NCCIC can\r\nprovide additional assistance in further investigations. A comprehensive listing of IOCs can be found in the\r\nassociated STIX package and .xlsx file.\r\nNetwork Signatures\r\nTable 8: REDLEAVES Network Signatures\r\n  alert tcp any any -\u003e any any (msg: \"REDLEAVES Implant\"; content: \"|00 00 7a 8d 9b dc|\"; offset: 2;\r\ndepth: 6; content: \"|00 00|\"; offset: 10; depth: 2; sid: 314;)\r\nhttps://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-117A\r\nPage 11 of 20\n\nalert tcp any -\u003e any any (msg:”Suspicious PLUGX URI String”; content:”POST”; http_method;\r\ncontent:”/update?id=”; http_uri; fast_pattern:only; pcre:”/update\\?id=[a-fA-F0-9]{8} HTTP/”;\r\nsid:101;)\r\nTable 9: REDLEAVES YARA Signatures\r\nrule Dropper_DeploysMalwareViaSideLoading {\r\n meta:\r\n description = \"Detect a dropper used to deploy an implant via side loading. This\r\ndropper has specifically been observed deploying REDLEAVES \u0026 PlugX\"\r\n author = \"USG\"\r\n true_positive = \"5262cb9791df50fafcb2fbd5f93226050b51efe400c2924eecba97b7ce437481:\r\ndrops REDLEAVES. 6392e0701a77ea25354b1f40f5b867a35c0142abde785a66b83c9c8d2c14c0c3: drops plugx. \"\r\n strings:\r\n $UniqueString = {2e 6c 6e 6b [0-14] 61 76 70 75 69 2e 65 78 65} // \".lnk\" near\r\n\"avpui.exe\"\r\n $PsuedoRandomStringGenerator = {b9 1a [0-6] f7 f9 46 80 c2 41 88 54 35 8b 83 fe 64}\r\n// Unique function that generates a 100 character pseudo random string.\r\n condition:\r\n any of them\r\n}\r\nrule REDLEAVES_DroppedFile_ImplantLoader_Starburn {\r\n meta:\r\n description = \"Detect the DLL responsible for loading and deobfuscating the DAT file\r\ncontaining shellcode and core REDLEAVES RAT\"\r\n author = \"USG\"\r\n true_positive = \"7f8a867a8302fe58039a6db254d335ae\" // StarBurn.dll\r\n strings:\r\n $XOR_Loop = {32 0c 3a 83 c2 02 88 0e 83 fa 08 [4-14] 32 0c 3a 83 c2 02 88 0e 83 fa\r\n10} // Deobfuscation loop\r\nhttps://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-117A\r\nPage 12 of 20\n\ncondition:\r\nany of them\r\n}\r\nrule REDLEAVES_DroppedFile_ObfuscatedShellcodeAndRAT_handkerchief {\r\n meta:\r\n description = \"Detect obfuscated .dat file containing shellcode and core REDLEAVES RAT\"\r\n author = \"USG\"\r\n true_positive = \"fb0c714cd2ebdcc6f33817abe7813c36\" // handkerchief.dat\r\n strings:\r\n $RedleavesStringObfu = {73 64 65 5e 60 74 75 74 6c 6f 60 6d 5e 6d 64 60 77 64 72 5e 65 6d\r\n6d 6c 60 68 6f 2f 65 6d 6d} // This is 'red_autumnal_leaves_dllmain.dll' XOR'd with 0x01\r\n condition:\r\n any of them\r\n}\r\nrule REDLEAVES_CoreImplant_UniqueStrings {\r\n meta:\r\n description = \"Strings identifying the core REDLEAVES RAT in its deobfuscated state\"\r\n author = \"USG\"\r\n strings:\r\n $unique2 = \"RedLeavesSCMDSimulatorMutex\" nocase wide ascii\r\n $unique4 = \"red_autumnal_leaves_dllmain.dll\" wide ascii\r\n $unique7 = \"\\\\NamePipe_MoreWindows\" wide ascii\r\n condition:\r\n any of them\r\n}\r\nhttps://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-117A\r\nPage 13 of 20\n\nTable 10: PLUGX Network Signatures\r\nalert tcp any any -\u003e any any (msg:\"Non-Std TCP Client Traffic contains 'HX1|3a|' 'HX2|3a|'\r\n'HX3|3a|' 'HX4|3a|' (PLUGX Variant)\"; sid:XX; rev:1; flow:established,to_server;\r\ncontent:\"Accept|3a 20 2a 2f 2a|\"; nocase; content:\"HX1|3a|\"; distance:0; within:6; fast_pattern;\r\ncontent:\"HX2|3a|\"; nocase; distance:0; content:\"HX3|3a|\"; nocase; distance:0; content:\"HX4|3a|\";\r\nnocase; distance:0; classtype:nonstd-tcp; priority:X;)\r\nalert tcp any any -\u003e any any (msg:\"Non-Std TCP Client Traffic contains 'X-Session|3a|''X-Status|3a|''X-Size|3a|''X-Sn|3a|'(PLUGX)\"; sid:XX; rev:1; flow:established,to_server; content:\"X-Session|3a|\"; nocase; fast_pattern; content:\"X-Status|3a|\"; nocase; distance:0; content:\"X-Size|3a|\"; nocase; distance:0; content:\"X-Sn|3a|\"; nocase; distance:0; classtype:nonstd-tcp;\r\npriority:X;)\r\nalert tcp any any -\u003e any any (msg:\"Non-Std TCP Client Traffic contains 'MJ1X|3a|' 'MJ2X|3a|'\r\n'MJ3X|3a|' 'MJ4X|3a|' (PLUGX Variant)\"; sid:XX; rev:1; flow:established,to_server;\r\ncontent:\"MJ1X|3a|\"; nocase; fast_pattern; content:\"MJ2X|3a|\"; nocase; distance:0;\r\ncontent:\"MJ3X|3a|\"; nocase; distance:0; content:\"MJ4X|3a|\"; nocase; distance:0; classtype:nonstd-tcp; priority:X;)\r\nalert tcp any any -\u003e any any (msg:\"Non-Std TCP Client Traffic contains 'Cookies|3a|' 'Sym1|2e|'\r\n'|2c|Sym2|2e|' '|2c|Sym3|2e|' '|2c|Sym4|2e|' (Chches Variant)\"; sid:XX; rev:1;\r\nflow:established,to_server; content:\"Cookies|3a|\"; nocase; content:\"Sym1|2e|0|3a|\"; nocase;\r\ndistance:0; fast_pattern; content:\"|2c|Sym2|2e|\"; nocase; distance:0; content:\"|2c|Sym3|2e|\";\r\nnocase; distance:0; content:\"|2c|Sym4|2e|\"; nocase; distance:0; classtype:nonstd-tcp;\r\npriority:X;)\r\nHost Signatures\r\nTable 11: PLUGX and REDLEAVES YARA Signatures\r\nrule PLUGX_RedLeaves\r\n{\r\nmeta:\r\nauthor = \"US-CERT Code Analysis Team\"\r\ndate = \"03042017\"\r\nincident = \"10118538\"\r\ndate = \"2017/04/03\"\r\nMD5_1 = \"598FF82EA4FB52717ACAFB227C83D474\"\r\nhttps://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-117A\r\nPage 14 of 20\n\nMD5_2 = \"7D10708A518B26CC8C3CBFBAA224E032\"\r\nMD5_3 = \"AF406D35C77B1E0DF17F839E36BCE630\"\r\nMD5_4 = \"6EB9E889B091A5647F6095DCD4DE7C83\"\r\nMD5_5 = \"566291B277534B63EAFC938CDAAB8A399E41AF7D\"\r\ninfo = \"Detects specific RedLeaves and PlugX binaries\"\r\nstrings:\r\n$s0 = { 80343057403D2FD0010072F433C08BFF80343024403D2FD0010072F4 }\r\n$s1 = \"C:\\\\Users\\\\user\\\\Desktop\\\\my_OK_2014\\\\bit9\\\\runsna\\\\Release\\\\runsna.pdb\"\r\n$s2 = \"d:\\\\work\\\\plug4.0(shellcode)\"\r\n$s3 = \"\\\\shellcode\\\\shellcode\\\\XSetting.h\"\r\n$s4 = { 42AFF4276A45AA58474D4C4BE03D5B395566BEBCBDEDE9972872C5C4C5498228 }\r\n$s5 = { 8AD32AD002D180C23830140E413BCB7CEF6A006A006A00566A006A00 }\r\n$s6 = { EB055F8BC7EB05E8F6FFFFFF558BEC81ECC8040000535657 }\r\n$s7 = { 8A043233C932043983C10288043283F90A7CF242890D18AA00103BD37CE2891514AA00106A006A006A0056 }\r\n$s8 = { 293537675A402A333557B05E04D09CB05EB3ADA4A4A40ED0B7DAB7935F5B5B08 }\r\n$s9 = \"RedLeavesCMDSimulatorMutex\"\r\ncondition:\r\n$s0 or $s1 or $s2 and $s3 or $s4 or $s5 or $s6 or $s7 or $s8 or $s9\r\n}\r\nOther Detection Methods\r\nExamine Port/Protocol Mismatches: Examine network traffic where the network port and protocol do not\r\nmatch, such as plaintext HTTP over port 443.\r\nAdministrative Share Mapping: When a malicious actor tries to move laterally on a network, one of the\r\ntechniques is to mount administrative shares to perform operations like uploading and downloading resources or\r\nexecuting commands. In addition, tools like System Internals PSEXEC will mount the shares automatically for the\r\nuser. Since administrators may map administrative shares legitimately while managing components of the\r\nnetwork, this must be taken into account.\r\nhttps://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-117A\r\nPage 15 of 20\n\nFilter network traffic for SMB mapping events and group the events by source IP, destination IP, the\r\nmounted path (providing a count of total mounts to that path), the first map time, and the last map time\r\nCollect Windows Event Logs – Event ID 5140 (network share object was accessed) can be used to track C$\r\nand ADMIN$ mounts by searching the Share Name field\r\nVPN User authentication mismatch: A VPN user authentication match occurs when a user account authenticates\r\nto an IP address but once connected the internal IP address requests authentication tokens for other users. This\r\nmay create false positives for legitimate network administrators but if this is detected, organizations should verify\r\nthat the administrative accounts were legitimately used.\r\nVPN activity from VPS providers: While this may also produce false positives, VPN logins from Virtual Private\r\nServer (VPS) providers may be an indicator of VPN users attempting to hide their source IP and should be\r\ninvestigated.\r\nImpact\r\nA successful network intrusion can have severe impacts, particularly if the compromise becomes public and\r\nsensitive information is exposed. Possible impacts include:\r\ntemporary or permanent loss of sensitive or proprietary information,\r\ndisruption to regular operations,\r\nfinancial losses incurred to restore systems and files, and\r\npotential harm to an organization’s reputation.\r\nSolution\r\nProperly implemented defensive techniques and programs make it more difficult for an adversary to gain access to\r\na network and remain persistent yet undetected. When an effective defensive program is in place, actors should\r\nencounter complex defensive barriers. Actor activity should also trigger detection and prevention mechanisms that\r\nenable organizations to contain and respond to the intrusion more rapidly. There is no single or set of defensive\r\ntechniques or programs that will completely avert all malicious activities. Multiple defensive techniques and\r\nprograms should be adopted and implemented in a layered approach to provide a complex barrier to entry,\r\nincrease the likelihood of detection, and decrease the likelihood of a successful compromise. This layered\r\nmitigation approach is known as defense-in-depth.\r\nNCCIC mitigations and recommendations are based on observations made during the hunt, analysis, and network\r\nmonitoring for threat actor activity, combined with client interaction.\r\nWhitelisting\r\nEnable application directory whitelisting through Microsoft Software Restriction Policy (SRP) or\r\nAppLocker;\r\nUse directory whitelisting rather than trying to list every possible permutation of applications in an\r\nenvironment. Safe defaults allow applications to run from PROGRAMFILES, PROGRAMFILES(X86),\r\nand SYSTEM32. All other locations should be disallowed unless an exception is granted.\r\nhttps://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-117A\r\nPage 16 of 20\n\nPrevent the execution of unauthorized software by using application whitelisting as part of the security\r\nhardening of operating systems insulating.\r\nEnable application directory whitelisting via the Microsoft SRP or AppLocker.\r\nAccount Control\r\nDecrease a threat actor’s ability to access key network resources by implementing the principle of least\r\nprivilege.\r\nLimit the ability of a local administrator account to login from a local interactive session (e.g., “Deny\r\naccess to this computer from the network”) and prevent access via a Remote Desktop Protocol session.\r\nRemove unnecessary accounts, groups, and restrict root access.\r\nControl and limit local administration.\r\nMake use of the Protected Users Active Directory group in Windows Domains to further secure privileged\r\nuser accounts against pass-the-hash compromises.\r\nWorkstation Management\r\nCreate a secure system baseline image and deploy to all workstations.\r\nMitigate potential exploitation by threat actors by following a normal patching cycle for all operating\r\nsystems, applications, software, and all third-party software.\r\nApply asset and patch management processes.\r\nReduce the number of cached credentials to one if a laptop, or zero if a desktop or fixed asset.\r\nHost-Based Intrusion Detection\r\nConfigure and monitor system logs through host-based intrusion detection system (HIDS) and firewall.\r\nDeploy an anti-malware solution to prevent spyware, adware, and malware as part of the operating system\r\nsecurity baseline.\r\nMonitor antivirus scan results on a regular basis.\r\nServer Management\r\nCreate a secure system baseline image, and deploy to all servers.\r\nUpgrade or decommission end-of-life non Windows servers.\r\nUpgrade or decommission servers running Windows Server 2003 and older versions.\r\nImplement asset and patch management processes.\r\nAudit for and disable unnecessary services.\r\nServer Configuration and Logging\r\nEstablish remote server logging and retention.\r\nReduce the number of cached credentials to zero.\r\nConfigure and monitor system logs via a centralized security information and event management (SIEM)\r\nappliance.\r\nhttps://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-117A\r\nPage 17 of 20\n\nAdd an explicit DENY for “%USERPROFILE%”.\r\nRestrict egress web traffic from servers.\r\nIn Windows environments, utilize Restricted Admin mode or remote credential guard to further secure\r\nremote desktop sessions against pass-the-hash compromises.\r\nRestrict anonymous shares.\r\nLimit remote access by only using jump servers for such access.\r\nChange Control\r\nCreate a change control process for all implemented changes.\r\nNetwork Security\r\nAn Intrusion Detection System (IDS) should:\r\nImplement continuous monitoring.\r\nSend alerts to a SIEM tool.\r\nMonitor internal activity (this tool may use the same tap points as the netflow generation tools).\r\nNetflow Capture should:\r\nSet a minimum retention period of 180 days.\r\nCapture netflow on all ingress and egress points of network segments, not just at the Managed\r\nTrusted Internet Protocol Services (MTIPS) or Trusted Internet Connections (TIC) locations.\r\nNetwork Packet Capture (PCAP):\r\nRetain PCAP data for a minimum of 24 hours.\r\nCapture traffic on all ingress and egress points of the network.\r\nUse a virtual private network (VPN):\r\nMaintain site-to-site VPN with customers.\r\nAuthenticate users utilizing site-to-site VPNs through adaptive security appliance (ASA).\r\nUse authentication, authorization, and accounting (AAA) for controlling network access.\r\nRequire Personal Identity Verification (PIV) authentication to an HTTPS page on the ASA in order\r\nto control access. Authentication should also require explicit rostering of PIV distinguished names\r\n(DNs) that are permitted to enhance the security posture on both networks participating in the site-to-site VPN.\r\nEstablish appropriate secure tunneling protocol and encryption.\r\nStrengthen router configuration (e.g., avoid enabling remote management over the Internet and\r\nusing default IP ranges; automatically logout after configuring routers; use encryption).\r\nTurn off Wi-Fi protected setup (WPS), enforce the use of strong passwords, keep router firmware\r\nup-to-date; and\r\nImprove firewall security (e.g., enable auto updates, revise firewall rules as appropriate, implement\r\nwhitelists, establish packet filtering, enforce the use of strong passwords, and encrypt networks).\r\nConduct regular vulnerability scans of the internal and external networks and hosted content to identify and\r\nmitigate vulnerabilities.\r\nDefine areas within the network that should be segmented to increase visibility of lateral movement by an\r\nadversary and increase the defense in-depth posture.\r\nhttps://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-117A\r\nPage 18 of 20\n\nDevelop a process to block traffic to IP addresses and domain names that have been identified as being\r\nused to aid previous malicious activities.\r\nNetwork Infrastructure Recommendations\r\nEnsure you are following National Security Agency (NSA) network device integrity (NDI) best practices.\r\nEnsure your networking equipment has the latest available operating system and patches.\r\nHost Recommendations\r\nImplement policies to block workstations-to-workstation remote desktop protocol (RDP) connections\r\nthrough group policy object (GPO) on Windows, or a similar mechanism.\r\nStore system logs of mission critical systems for at least one year within a SIEM.\r\nReview the configuration of application logs to verify fields being recorded will contribute to an incident\r\nresponse investigation.\r\nUsers Management\r\nImmediately set the password policy to require complex passwords for all users (minimum of 15\r\ncharacters); this new requirement should be enforced as user passwords expire.\r\nReduce the number of domain and enterprise administrator accounts.\r\nCreate non-privileged accounts for privileged users and ensure they use the non-privileged account for all\r\nnon-privileged access (e.g., web browsing, email access);\r\nIf possible, use technical methods to detect or prevent browsing by privileged accounts (authentication to\r\nweb proxies would enable blocking of domain administrators).\r\nUse two-factor authentication (e.g., security tokens for remote access and to any sensitive data\r\nrepositories);\r\nIf soft tokens are used, they should not exist on the same device that is requesting remote access (laptop),\r\nand instead should be on a telephone or other out-of-band device.\r\nCreate privileged role tracking;\r\nCreate a change control process to all privilege escalations and role changes on user accounts;\r\nEnable alerts on privilege escalations and role changes; and\r\nLog privileged user changes in the environment and alert on unusual events.\r\nEstablish least privilege controls; and\r\nImplement a security-awareness training program.\r\nBest Practices\r\nImplement a vulnerability assessment and remediation program.\r\nEncrypt all sensitive data in transit and at rest.\r\nCreate an insider threat program.\r\nAssign additional personnel to review logging and alerting data.\r\nComplete independent security (not compliance) audit.\r\nCreate an information sharing program.\r\nhttps://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-117A\r\nPage 19 of 20\n\nComplete and maintain network and system documentation to aid in timely incident response, including:\r\nnetwork diagrams,\r\nasset owners,\r\ntype of asset, and\r\nan up-to-date incident response plan.\r\nReferences\r\nJPCERT/CC: “RedLeaves-Malware Based on Open Source Rat”\r\nJPCERT/CC: “ChChes- Malware that Communicates with C\u0026C Servers Using Cookie Headers”\r\nRevisions\r\nApril 27, 2017: Initial post|April 28, 2017: Updated guidance under the sub-section: Network Infrastructure\r\nRecommendations|May 2, 2017: In table 11, fixed trailing quote on date|May 11, 2017: STIX and XLSX package\r\nwas updated|December 20, 2018: Added attribution of activity covered in this Alert to Chinese cyber actors\r\nassociated with the Chinese Ministry of State Security\r\nSource: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-117A\r\nhttps://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-117A\r\nPage 20 of 20\n\nTable 2: REDLEAVES --- BEGIN Sample SAMPLE BEACON Beacon ---   \n00000000 c1 0c 00 00 7a 8d 9b dc 88 00 00 00 ....z... .... \n0000000C 14 6f 68 6e 16 6f 68 6e c4 a4 b1 d1 c4 e6 24 eb .ohn.ohn ......$.\n0000001C cf 49 81 a7 a1 c7 96 ff 6d 31 b4 48 8b 3e a3 c1 .I...... m1.H.\u003e..\n0000002C 92 e2 c3 7c e4 4c cf e9 e1 fa fb 6a fa 66 2c bf ...|.L.. ...j.f,.\n0000004C 7b 13 a7 30 17 3d eb fb d3 16 0e 96 83 21 2e 73 {..0.=.. .....!.s\n0000005C dc 44 a2 72 fb f4 5e d0 4d b7 85 be 33 cd 13 21 .D.r..^. M...3..!\n0000006C 3f e2 63 da da 5b 5e 52 9a 9c 20 36 69 cb cd 79 ?.c..[^R .. 6i..y\n0000007C 13 79 7a d4 ed 63 b7 41 5d 38 b4 c2 84 74 98 cd .yz..c.A ]8...t..\n0000008C f8 32 49 ef 2d e7 f2 ed .2I.-...   \n    Page 4 of 20",
	"extraction_quality": 1,
	"language": "EN",
	"sources": [
		"ETDA",
		"Malpedia"
	],
	"origins": [
		"web"
	],
	"references": [
		"https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-117A"
	],
	"report_names": [
		"TA17-117A"
	],
	"threat_actors": [
		{
			"id": "ec14074c-8517-40e1-b4d7-3897f1254487",
			"created_at": "2023-01-06T13:46:38.300905Z",
			"updated_at": "2026-04-10T02:00:02.918468Z",
			"deleted_at": null,
			"main_name": "APT10",
			"aliases": [
				"Red Apollo",
				"HOGFISH",
				"BRONZE RIVERSIDE",
				"G0045",
				"TA429",
				"Purple Typhoon",
				"STONE PANDA",
				"Menupass Team",
				"happyyongzi",
				"CVNX",
				"Cloud Hopper",
				"ATK41",
				"Granite Taurus",
				"POTASSIUM"
			],
			"source_name": "MISPGALAXY:APT10",
			"tools": [],
			"source_id": "MISPGALAXY",
			"reports": null
		},
		{
			"id": "ba9fa308-a29a-4928-9c06-73aafec7624c",
			"created_at": "2024-05-01T02:03:07.981061Z",
			"updated_at": "2026-04-10T02:00:03.750803Z",
			"deleted_at": null,
			"main_name": "BRONZE RIVERSIDE",
			"aliases": [
				"APT10 ",
				"CTG-5938 ",
				"CVNX ",
				"Hogfish ",
				"MenuPass ",
				"MirrorFace ",
				"POTASSIUM ",
				"Purple Typhoon ",
				"Red Apollo ",
				"Stone Panda "
			],
			"source_name": "Secureworks:BRONZE RIVERSIDE",
			"tools": [
				"ANEL",
				"AsyncRAT",
				"ChChes",
				"Cobalt Strike",
				"HiddenFace",
				"LODEINFO",
				"PlugX",
				"PoisonIvy",
				"QuasarRAT",
				"QuasarRAT Loader",
				"RedLeaves"
			],
			"source_id": "Secureworks",
			"reports": null
		},
		{
			"id": "04b07437-41bb-4126-bcbb-def16f19d7c6",
			"created_at": "2022-10-25T16:07:24.232628Z",
			"updated_at": "2026-04-10T02:00:04.906097Z",
			"deleted_at": null,
			"main_name": "Stone Panda",
			"aliases": [
				"APT 10",
				"ATK 41",
				"Bronze Riverside",
				"CTG-5938",
				"CVNX",
				"Cuckoo Spear",
				"Earth Kasha",
				"G0045",
				"G0093",
				"Granite Taurus",
				"Happyyongzi",
				"Hogfish",
				"ITG01",
				"Operation A41APT",
				"Operation Cache Panda",
				"Operation ChessMaster",
				"Operation Cloud Hopper",
				"Operation Cuckoo Spear",
				"Operation New Battle",
				"Operation Soft Cell",
				"Operation TradeSecret",
				"Potassium",
				"Purple Typhoon",
				"Red Apollo",
				"Stone Panda",
				"TA429",
				"menuPass",
				"menuPass Team"
			],
			"source_name": "ETDA:Stone Panda",
			"tools": [
				"Agent.dhwf",
				"Agentemis",
				"Anel",
				"AngryRebel",
				"BKDR_EVILOGE",
				"BKDR_HGDER",
				"BKDR_NVICM",
				"BUGJUICE",
				"CHINACHOPPER",
				"ChChes",
				"China Chopper",
				"Chymine",
				"CinaRAT",
				"Cobalt Strike",
				"CobaltStrike",
				"DARKTOWN",
				"DESLoader",
				"DILLJUICE",
				"DILLWEED",
				"Darkmoon",
				"DelfsCake",
				"Derusbi",
				"Destroy RAT",
				"DestroyRAT",
				"Ecipekac",
				"Emdivi",
				"EvilGrab",
				"EvilGrab RAT",
				"FYAnti",
				"Farfli",
				"Gen:Trojan.Heur.PT",
				"Gh0st RAT",
				"Ghost RAT",
				"GreetCake",
				"HAYMAKER",
				"HEAVYHAND",
				"HEAVYPOT",
				"HTran",
				"HUC Packet Transmit Tool",
				"Ham Backdoor",
				"HiddenFace",
				"Impacket",
				"Invoke the Hash",
				"KABOB",
				"Kaba",
				"Korplug",
				"LODEINFO",
				"LOLBAS",
				"LOLBins",
				"Living off the Land",
				"MiS-Type",
				"Mimikatz",
				"Moudour",
				"Mydoor",
				"NBTscan",
				"NOOPDOOR",
				"Newsripper",
				"P8RAT",
				"PCRat",
				"PlugX",
				"Poison Ivy",
				"Poldat",
				"PowerSploit",
				"PowerView",
				"PsExec",
				"PsList",
				"Quarks PwDump",
				"Quasar RAT",
				"QuasarRAT",
				"RedDelta",
				"RedLeaves",
				"Rubeus",
				"SNUGRIDE",
				"SPIVY",
				"SharpSploit",
				"SigLoader",
				"SinoChopper",
				"SodaMaster",
				"Sogu",
				"TIGERPLUG",
				"TVT",
				"Thoper",
				"Trochilus RAT",
				"UpperCut",
				"Vidgrab",
				"WinRAR",
				"WmiExec",
				"Wmonder",
				"Xamtrav",
				"Yggdrasil",
				"Zlib",
				"certutil",
				"certutil.exe",
				"cobeacon",
				"dfls",
				"lena",
				"nbtscan",
				"pivy",
				"poisonivy",
				"pwdump"
			],
			"source_id": "ETDA",
			"reports": null
		},
		{
			"id": "ba3fff0c-3ba0-4855-9eeb-1af9ee18136a",
			"created_at": "2022-10-25T15:50:23.298889Z",
			"updated_at": "2026-04-10T02:00:05.316886Z",
			"deleted_at": null,
			"main_name": "menuPass",
			"aliases": [
				"menuPass",
				"POTASSIUM",
				"Stone Panda",
				"APT10",
				"Red Apollo",
				"CVNX",
				"HOGFISH",
				"BRONZE RIVERSIDE"
			],
			"source_name": "MITRE:menuPass",
			"tools": [
				"certutil",
				"FYAnti",
				"UPPERCUT",
				"SNUGRIDE",
				"P8RAT",
				"RedLeaves",
				"SodaMaster",
				"pwdump",
				"Mimikatz",
				"PlugX",
				"PowerSploit",
				"ChChes",
				"cmd",
				"QuasarRAT",
				"AdFind",
				"Cobalt Strike",
				"PoisonIvy",
				"EvilGrab",
				"esentutl",
				"Impacket",
				"Ecipekac",
				"PsExec",
				"HUI Loader"
			],
			"source_id": "MITRE",
			"reports": null
		}
	],
	"ts_created_at": 1775434797,
	"ts_updated_at": 1775826726,
	"ts_creation_date": 0,
	"ts_modification_date": 0,
	"files": {
		"pdf": "https://archive.orkl.eu/7bc7b4099f30921a875a42212f83e8db60f23142.pdf",
		"text": "https://archive.orkl.eu/7bc7b4099f30921a875a42212f83e8db60f23142.txt",
		"img": "https://archive.orkl.eu/7bc7b4099f30921a875a42212f83e8db60f23142.jpg"
	}
}