Recent Dridex activity - SANS Internet Storm Center By SANS Internet Storm Center Archived: 2026-04-06 01:38:29 UTC Introduction For the past month or so, I hadn't had any luck finding active malspam campaigns pushing Dridex malware. That changed starting this week, and I've since found several examples. Today's diary reviews an infection from Wednesday September 9th, 2020. The Word documents While searching VirusTotal, I found three documents with the same template that generated the same type of traffic (read: SHA256 hash - name): fee5bb973112d58445d9e267e0ceea137d9cc1fb8a7140cf9a67472c9499a30f - Info-3948683568.doc 9b747e89874c0b080cf78ed61a1ccbd9c86045dc61b433116461e3e81eee1348 - Inform-34674869.doc' 27379612c139d3c4a0c6614ea51d49f2495213c867574354d7851a86fdec2428 - Rep-Sept2020.doc Shown above:  Screenshot with template used by all three of the above listed Word documents. My lab environment revealed these documents are designed to infect a vulnerable Windows host with Dridex. https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Recent+Dridex+activity/26550/ Page 1 of 9 Enabling macros caused Powershell to retrieve a DLL file from one of the following URLs over encrypted HTTPS traffic: hxxps://teworhfoundation[.]com/4jvmow.zip hxxps://teworhfoundation[.]com/zd0pcc.rar hxxps://thecandidtales[.]com/doakai.zip hxxps://safaktasarim[.]com/7zcsfo.txt hxxps://thecandidtales[.]com/wuom4a.rar After the DLL was saved under the victim's profile, it was run using rundll32.exe.  The DLL is an installer for Dridex, and it was run using the following command: "C:\Windows\system32\rundll32.exe" C:\Users\[username]\Mqfzqp8\Opzvzn2\Qzpic6r.dll 0 Shown above:  Location of the initial DLL to install Dridex on an infected Windows host. Dridex infection traffic Dridex post-infection traffic is all HTTPS. In this case, we saw HTTPS traffic over the following IP addresses and ports: 67.213.75[.]205 port 443 54.39.34[.]26 port 453 https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Recent+Dridex+activity/26550/ Page 2 of 9 Shown above:  Traffic from the Dridex infection filtered in Wireshark. Most of the Dridex post-infection traffic I've seen uses IP addresses without domain names, and issuer data for the SSL/TLS certificates is somewhat unusual.  Certificate issuer data for the Dridex post-infection traffic: CERTIFICATE ISSUER DATA FOR HTTPS TRAFFIC TO 67.213.75[.]205 OVER TCP PORT 443: id-at-countryName=HR id-at-localityName=Zagreb id-at-organizationName=Wageng Unltd. id-at-organizationalUnitName=obendmma id-at-commonName=Livedthtsthw.flights CERTIFICATE ISSUER DATA FOR HTTPS TRAFFIC TO 54.39.34[.]26 OVER TCP PORT 453: id-at-countryName=DE id-at-stateOrProvinceName=Sheso thanthefo id-at-localityName=Berlin id-at-organizationName=Thedelor Tbrra SICAV id-at-organizationalUnitName=5Coiesily Begtherdr istwarscon id-at-commonName=Bath7epran.toshiba https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Recent+Dridex+activity/26550/ Page 3 of 9 Shown above:  Certificate issuer data for HTTPS traffic to 67.213.75[.]205 over TCP port 443 found in Wireshark. Shown above:  Certificate issuer data for HTTPS traffic to 54.39.34[.]26 over TCP port 453 found in Wireshark. Dridex persistent on an infected Windows host https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Recent+Dridex+activity/26550/ Page 4 of 9 Dridex is made persistent on an infected Windows host using 3 methods simultaneously: Windows registry update Scheduled task Windows startup menu shortcut Dridex uses copies of legitimate Windows system files (EXEs) to load and run malware.  Dridex DLL files are named as DLLs that would normally be run by these copied system EXEs. For this infection, all of the persistent Dridex DLL files were 64-bit DLL files. WINDOWS REGISTRY UPDATE: - Registry Key: HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run - Value name: Vwqmkqmr - Value type: REG_SZ - Value data: C:\Users\[username]\AppData\Roaming\Thunderbird\Profiles\1ovarfyl.default-release\ ImapMail\.outlook.com\Uw0NWHoOi\DWWIN.EXE NOTE: DWWIN.EXE loads and runs a Dridex DLL file named VERSION.dll in the same directory. Shown above:  Windows registry update used to keep Dridex persistent on an infected host. Shown above:  Legitimate EXE called by registry update, and Dridex DLL in the same directory. SCHEDULED TASK: - Task name: Qgdopf - Action: Start a program https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Recent+Dridex+activity/26550/ Page 5 of 9 - Details: C:\Users\[username]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Accessories\ 0pFtxbOGXwr\DmNotificationBroker.exe NOTE: DmNotificationBroker.exe loads and runs a Dridex DLL file named DUI70.dll in the same directory. Shown above:  Scheduled task on the same infected Windows host also used to keep Dridex persistent. Shown above:  Legitimate EXE called by scheduled task, and Dridex DLL in the same directory. WINDOWS STARTUP MENU SHORTCUT: Shortcut: C:\Users\[username]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Somdjvzvjfch.lnk Target: C:\Users\[username]\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Extensions\r0F\msinfo32.exe NOTE: msinfo32.exe loads and runs a Dridex DLL file named MFC42u.dll in the same directory. https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Recent+Dridex+activity/26550/ Page 6 of 9 Shown above:  Windows start menu shortcut also used to keep Dridex persistent on the same infected Windows host. Shown above:  Legitimate EXE called by start menu shortcut, and Dridex DLL in the same directory. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) Three examples of Microsoft Word documents with macros for Dridex: SHA256 hash: fee5bb973112d58445d9e267e0ceea137d9cc1fb8a7140cf9a67472c9499a30f File size: 136,262 bytes File name: Info-3948683568.doc SHA256 hash: 9b747e89874c0b080cf78ed61a1ccbd9c86045dc61b433116461e3e81eee1348 https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Recent+Dridex+activity/26550/ Page 7 of 9 File size: 136,182 bytes File name: Inform-34674869.doc SHA256 hash: 27379612c139d3c4a0c6614ea51d49f2495213c867574354d7851a86fdec2428 File size: 135,053 bytes File name: Rep-Sept2020.doc Installer DLL for Dridex called by Word macro: SHA256 hash: 790b0d9e2b17f637c3e03e410aa22d16eccfefd28d74b226a293c9696edb60ad File size: 331,776 bytes File location: hxxps://thecandidtales[.]com/doakai.zip File location: C:\Users\[username]\MqFZqp8\OpZVzn2\Qzpic6r.dll Run method: rundll32.exe [file name] 0 Dridex 64-bit DLL files persistent on the infected Windows host: SHA256 hash: fd8049d573c056b92960ba7b0949d9f3a97416d333fa602ce683ef822986ad58 File size: 1,580,032 bytes File location: C:\Users\[username]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Accessories\0pFtxbOGXwr\DUI70.dll Run method: Loaded and run by legitimate system file DmNotificationBroker.exe in the same directory Note: Made persistent through scheduled task SHA256 hash: 719a8634a16beb77e6d5c6bb7f82a96c6a49d5cfa64463754fd5f0e5eb0581be File size: 1,325,056 bytes File location: C:\Users\[username]\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Extensions\r0F\MFC42u.dll Run method: Loaded and run by legitimate system file msinfo32.exe in the same directory Note: Made persistent through start menu shortcut SHA256 hash: 4d7d8d1790d494a1a29dae42810a3a10864f7c38148c3600c76491931c767c5c File size: 1,297,920 bytes File location: C:\Users\[username]\AppData\Roaming\Thunderbird\Profiles\1ovarfyl.default-release\ImapMail\.outlook.com\Uw0NWHoOi\VERSION.dll Run method: Loaded and run by legitimate system file DWWIN.EXE in the same directory Note: Made persistent through Windows registry update URLs from Word macro to retrieve Dridex DLL installer: hxxps://teworhfoundation[.]com/4jvmow.zip hxxps://teworhfoundation[.]com/zd0pcc.rar hxxps://thecandidtales[.]com/doakai.zip https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Recent+Dridex+activity/26550/ Page 8 of 9 hxxps://safaktasarim[.]com/7zcsfo.txt hxxps://thecandidtales[.]com/wuom4a.rar Certificate data for Dridex HTTPS traffic to 67.213.75[.]205 port 443: id-at-countryName=HR id-at-localityName=Zagreb id-at-organizationName=Wageng Unltd. id-at-organizationalUnitName=obendmma id-at-commonName=Livedthtsthw.flights Certificate data for Dridex HTTPS traffic to 54.39.34[.]26 port 453: id-at-countryName=DE id-at-stateOrProvinceName=Sheso thanthefo id-at-localityName=Berlin id-at-organizationName=Thedelor Tbrra SICAV id-at-organizationalUnitName=5Coiesily Begtherdr istwarscon id-at-commonName=Bath7epran.toshiba Final words After a period of inactivity, malspam pushing Dridex malware is back, so this blog post reviewed traffic and malware from an infected Windows host.  While not much has changed, it's always good to have a refresher. As usual, up-to-date Windows hosts with the latest security patches and users who follow best security practices are not likely to get infected with this malware.  However, I've seen so much come through in the past two or three days that even a small percentage of success will likely be profitable for the criminals behind it. --- Brad Duncan brad [at] malware-traffic-analysis.net Source: https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Recent+Dridex+activity/26550/ https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Recent+Dridex+activity/26550/ Page 9 of 9