

# Detect User Activity Based Sandbox Evasion via Input & Artifact Probing, Detection Strategy DET0420

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## AN1182

Process execution that probes user activity artifacts (e.g., desktop files, registry history) following recent user login/unlock events.

### Log Sources

### Mutable Elements

Field	Description
TimeWindow	Window between user unlock and access to user history
UserContext	Focus on non-system accounts doing user activity probing

## AN1183

Access to shell history or GUI input state (xdotool, xinput) for presence validation prior to payload execution.

### Log Sources

### Mutable Elements

Field	Description
ArtifactCountThreshold	Number of distinct user files accessed before trigger
KnownToolSignatures	Suppress expected automation tools

## AN1184

API usage or filesystem access revealing user state or browser artifacts (e.g., Safari bookmarks, CGEventState).

### Log Sources

<b>Data Component</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>Channel</b>
<a href="#">OS API Execution (DC0021)</a>	macos:unifiedlog	Execution of input detection APIs (e.g., CGEventSourceKeyState)
<a href="#">File Access (DC0055)</a>	macos:unifiedlog	Access to ~/Library/Safari/Bookmarks.plist or recent files

#### Mutable Elements

<b>Field</b>	<b>Description</b>
TimeWindow	Temporal correlation between login and file access
UserContext	Exclude expected UI activity from login agents

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Source: <https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0420#AN1182>