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	"title": "Central Intelligence Agency",
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	"plain_text": "Central Intelligence Agency\r\nBy Contributors to Wikimedia projects\r\nPublished: 2001-08-30 · Archived: 2026-04-05 21:07:27 UTC\r\nCentral Intelligence Agency\r\nSeal of the Central Intelligence Agency\r\nFlag of the Central Intelligence Agency\r\nWikimedia | © OpenStreetMap\r\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Intelligence_Agency\r\nPage 1 of 51\n\nGeorge Bush Center for Intelligence in Langley, Virginia\r\nAgency overview\r\nFormed September 18, 1947; 78 years ago\r\nPreceding\r\nagencies\r\nOffice of Strategic Services[2]\r\nStrategic Services Unit\r\nCentral Intelligence Group\r\nType Independent (component of the Intelligence Community)\r\nHeadquarters\r\nGeorge Bush Center for Intelligence, Langley, Virginia, U.S.\r\n38°57′07″N 77°08′46″W / 38.95194°N 77.14611°W\r\nMotto\r\n(Official): The Work of a Nation. The Center of Intelligence.\r\n(Unofficial): And ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free[1]\r\nEmployees 21,575 (estimate)[3]\r\nAnnual budget $15 billion (as of 2013)[3][4][5]\r\nAgency\r\nexecutives\r\nJohn Ratcliffe[6], Director\r\nMichael Ellis, Deputy Director\r\nVacant, General Counsel\r\nParent\r\ndepartment\r\nOffice of the President of the United States\r\nParent agency Office of the Director of National Intelligence\r\nChild agencies\r\nDirectorate of Operations\r\nDirectorate of Science and Technology\r\nOperations Support Branch\r\nWebsite\r\ncia.gov\r\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Intelligence_Agency\r\nPage 2 of 51\n\nciadotgov4sjwlzihbbgxnqg3xiyrg7so2r2o3lt5wz5ypk4sxyjstad.onion\r\n(Accessing link help)[7]\r\nThe Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is a civilian foreign intelligence service of the federal government of the\r\nUnited States tasked with advancing national security through collecting and analyzing intelligence from around\r\nthe world and conducting covert operations. The agency is headquartered in the George Bush Center for\r\nIntelligence in Langley, Virginia, and is sometimes metonymously called \"Langley\". A major member of the\r\nUnited States Intelligence Community (IC), the CIA has reported to the director of national intelligence since\r\n2004, and is focused on providing intelligence for the president and the Cabinet, though it also provides\r\nintelligence for a variety of other entities including the United States Armed Forces and foreign allies.\r\nThe CIA is headed by a director and is divided into various directorates, including a Directorate of Analysis and\r\nDirectorate of Operations. Unlike the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the CIA has no law enforcement\r\nfunction and focuses on intelligence gathering overseas, with only limited domestic intelligence collection.\r\n[8]\r\n The\r\nCIA is responsible for coordinating all human intelligence (HUMINT) activities in the IC. It has been instrumental\r\nin establishing intelligence services in many countries, and has provided support to many foreign organizations.\r\nThe CIA exerts foreign political influence through its paramilitary operations units, including its Special Activities\r\nCenter. It has also provided support to several foreign political groups and governments, including planning,\r\ncoordinating, training and carrying out torture, and technical support. It has been involved in many regime\r\nchanges and carrying out planned assassinations of foreign leaders and terrorist attacks against civilians.\r\nDuring World War II, U.S. intelligence and covert operations had been undertaken by the Office of Strategic\r\nServices (OSS). The office was abolished in 1945 by President Harry S. Truman, who created the Central\r\nIntelligence Group in 1946. Amid the intensifying Cold War, the National Security Act of 1947 established the\r\nCIA, headed by a director of central intelligence (DCI). The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 exempted\r\nthe agency from most Congressional oversight, and during the 1950s, it became a major instrument of U.S.\r\nforeign policy. The CIA employed psychological operations against communist regimes, and backed coups to\r\nadvance American interests. Major CIA-backed operations include the 1953 coup in Iran, the 1954 coup in\r\nGuatemala, the Bay of Pigs Invasion of Cuba in 1961, and the 1973 coup in Chile. In 1975, the Church Committee\r\nof the U.S. Senate revealed illegal operations such as MKUltra and CHAOS, after which greater oversight was\r\nimposed. In the 1980s, the CIA supported the Afghan mujahideen through Pakistan's ISI, and the Nicaraguan\r\nContras, and after the September 11 attacks in 2001, played a role in the Global War on Terrorism.\r\nThe agency has been the subject of numerous controversies, including its use of political assassinations, torture,\r\ndomestic wiretapping, propaganda, mind control techniques, and drug trafficking, among others.\r\nPurpose\r\nWhen the CIA was proposed, its purpose was to create a clearinghouse to collect, analyze, evaluate, disseminate\r\nforeign intelligence and carry out covert operations.[9]\r\nAs of 2013, the CIA had five priorities:[3]\r\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Intelligence_Agency\r\nPage 3 of 51\n\nCounterterrorism\r\nNonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction\r\nIndications and warnings for senior policymakers\r\nCounterintelligence\r\nCyber intelligence\r\nOrganizational structure\r\nThe organization of the Central Intelligence Agency as of 2009.\r\nIn 2015, under the tenure of John Brennan, the CIA underwent its largest organizational\r\nrestructuring since its founding in 1947.[10]\r\nThe CIA has an executive office and five major directorates:\r\nThe Directorate of Digital Innovation\r\nThe Directorate of Analysis\r\nThe Directorate of Operations\r\nThe Directorate of Support\r\nThe Directorate of Science and Technology\r\nExecutive Office\r\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Intelligence_Agency\r\nPage 4 of 51\n\nThe director of the Central Intelligence Agency (D/CIA) is appointed by the president with Senate confirmation\r\nand reports directly to the director of national intelligence (DNI); in practice, the CIA director interfaces with the\r\nDNI, Congress, and the White House, while the deputy director (DD/CIA) is the internal executive of the CIA and\r\nthe chief operating officer (COO/CIA), known as executive director until 2017, leads the day-to-day work[11] as\r\nthe third-highest post of the CIA.[12] The deputy director is formally appointed by the director without Senate\r\nconfirmation,[12][13] but as the president's opinion plays a great role in the decision,[13] the deputy director is\r\ngenerally considered a political position, making the chief operating officer the most senior non-political position\r\nfor CIA career officers.[14]\r\nThe Executive Office also supports the U.S. military, including the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security\r\nCommand, by providing it with information it gathers, receiving information from military intelligence\r\norganizations, and cooperating with field activities. The associate deputy director of the CIA is in charge of the\r\nday-to-day operations of the agency. Each branch of the agency has its own director.\r\n[11]\r\n The Office of Military\r\nAffairs (OMA), subordinate to the associate deputy director, manages the relationship between the CIA and the\r\nUnified Combatant Commands, who produce and deliver regional and operational intelligence and consume\r\nnational intelligence produced by the CIA.[15]\r\nDirectorate of Analysis\r\nThe Directorate of Analysis, through much of its history known as the Directorate of Intelligence (DI), is tasked\r\nwith helping \"the President and other policymakers make informed decisions about our country's national\r\nsecurity\" by looking \"at all the available information on an issue and organiz[ing] it for policymakers\".[16] The\r\ndirectorate has four regional analytic groups, six groups for transnational issues, and three that focus on policy,\r\ncollection, and staff support.[17] There are regional analytical offices covering the Near East and South Asia,\r\nRussia, and Europe; and the Asia–Pacific, Latin America, and Africa.\r\nOffice of Strategic Research\r\nThe DI created the Office of Strategic Research in 1967. CIA official John Paisley served as Deputy Chief of the\r\noffice.[18] The office provided support to the Team B competitive analysis exercise that delved into the threats of\r\nthe Soviet Union. Material supplied by double agent, \"Hero\", Oleg Penkovsky was used by the agency in the early\r\n1970's. The office conducted military analysis, such as whether Iraq had the capabilities to defeat Kuwait.[19] In\r\n1981 the office allegedly dissolved due to a restructuring.\r\nDirectorate of Operations\r\nThe Directorate of Operations is responsible for collecting foreign intelligence (mainly from clandestine\r\nHUMINT sources), and for covert action. The name reflects its role as the coordinator of human intelligence\r\nactivities between other elements of the wider U.S. intelligence community with their HUMINT operations. This\r\ndirectorate was created in an attempt to end years of rivalry over influence, philosophy, and budget between the\r\nUnited States Department of Defense (DOD) and the CIA. In spite of this, the Department of Defense announced\r\nin 2012 its intention to organize its own global clandestine intelligence service, the Defense Clandestine Service\r\n(DCS),[20] under the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Contrary to some public and media misunderstanding,\r\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Intelligence_Agency\r\nPage 5 of 51\n\nDCS is not a \"new\" intelligence agency but rather a consolidation, expansion and realignment of existing Defense\r\nHUMINT activities, which have been carried out by DIA for decades under various names, most recently as the\r\nDefense Human Intelligence Service.[21]\r\nThis Directorate is known to be organized by geographic regions and issues, but its precise organization is\r\nclassified.[22]\r\nDirectorate of Science \u0026 Technology\r\nThe Directorate of Science \u0026 Technology was established to research, create, and manage technical collection\r\ndisciplines and equipment. Many of its innovations were transferred to other intelligence organizations, or, as they\r\nbecame more overt, to the military services.\r\nThe development of the U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft, for instance, was done in cooperation with the\r\nUnited States Air Force. The U-2's original mission was clandestine imagery intelligence over denied areas such\r\nas the Soviet Union.\r\n[23]\r\nDirectorate of Support\r\nThe Directorate of Support has organizational and administrative functions to significant units including:\r\nThe Office of Security\r\nThe Office of Communications\r\nThe Office of Information Technology\r\nDirectorate of Digital Innovation\r\nThe Directorate of Digital Innovation (DDI) focuses on accelerating innovation across the Agency's mission\r\nactivities. It is the Agency's newest directorate. The Langley, Virginia–based office's mission is to streamline and\r\nintegrate digital and cybersecurity capabilities into the CIA's espionage, counterintelligence, all-source analysis,\r\nopen-source intelligence collection, and covert action operations.[24] It provides operations personnel with tools\r\nand techniques to use in cyber operations. It works with information technology infrastructure and practices cyber\r\ntradecraft.\r\n[25]\r\n This means retrofitting the CIA for cyberwarfare. DDI officers help accelerate the integration of\r\ninnovative methods and tools to enhance the CIA's cyber and digital capabilities on a global scale and ultimately\r\nhelp safeguard the United States. They also apply technical expertise to exploit clandestine and publicly available\r\ninformation (also known as open-source data) using specialized methodologies and digital tools to plan, initiate\r\nand support the technical and human-based operations of the CIA.[26] Before the establishment of the new digital\r\ndirectorate, offensive cyber operations were undertaken by the CIA's Information Operations Center.\r\n[27]\r\n Little is\r\nknown about how the office specifically functions or if it deploys offensive cyber capabilities.[24]\r\nThe directorate had been covertly operating since approximately March 2015 but formally began operations on\r\nOctober 1, 2015.[28] According to classified budget documents, the CIA's computer network operations budget for\r\nfiscal year 2013 was $685.4 million. The NSA's budget was roughly $1 billion at the time.[29]\r\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Intelligence_Agency\r\nPage 6 of 51\n\nRep. Adam Schiff, the California Democrat who served as the ranking member of the House Intelligence\r\nCommittee, endorsed the reorganization. \"The director has challenged his workforce, the rest of the intelligence\r\ncommunity, and the nation to consider how we conduct the business of intelligence in a world that is profoundly\r\ndifferent from 1947 when the CIA was founded,\" Schiff said.[30]\r\nOffice of Congressional Affairs\r\nThe Office of Congressional Affairs (OCA) serves as the liaison between the CIA and the U.S. Congress. The\r\nOCA states that it aims to ensure that Congress is fully and currently informed of intelligence activities.[31]\r\nThe office is the CIA's primary interface with congressional oversight committees, leadership, and members. It is\r\nresponsible for all matters pertaining to congressional interaction and oversight of U.S. intelligence activities. It\r\nclaims that it aims to[32]\r\nensure that Congress is kept informed of intelligence issues and activities by providing timely briefings and\r\nnotifications\r\nfacilitate prompt and complete responses to congressional requests for information and inquiries\r\nmaintain a record of the Agency's interaction with Congress\r\ntrack legislation that could affect the Agency\r\neducate Agency personnel about their responsibility to keep Congress fully and currently informed\r\nTraining\r\nThe CIA established its first training facility, the Office of Training and Education, in 1950. Following the end of\r\nthe Cold War, the CIA's training budget was slashed, which had a negative effect on employee retention.\r\n[33][34]\r\nIn response, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet established CIA University in 2002.[33][16] CIA\r\nUniversity holds between 200 and 300 courses each year, training both new hires and experienced intelligence\r\nofficers, as well as CIA support staff.[33][34] The facility works in partnership with the National Intelligence\r\nUniversity, and includes the Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis, the Directorate of Analysis'\r\ncomponent of the university.\r\n[16][35][36]\r\nFor later-stage training of student operations officers, there is at least one classified training area at Camp Peary,\r\nnear Williamsburg, Virginia. Students are selected, and their progress evaluated, in ways derived from the OSS,\r\npublished as the book Assessment of Men, Selection of Personnel for the Office of Strategic Services.\r\n[37]\r\nAdditional mission training is conducted at Harvey Point, North Carolina.\r\n[38]\r\nThe primary training facility for the Office of Communications is Warrenton Training Center, located near\r\nWarrenton, Virginia. The facility was established in 1951 and has been used by the CIA since at least 1955.[39][40]\r\nBudget\r\nDetails of the overall United States intelligence budget are classified.[3] Under the Central Intelligence Agency\r\nAct of 1949, the Director of Central Intelligence is the only federal government employee who can spend\r\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Intelligence_Agency\r\nPage 7 of 51\n\n\"unvouchered\" government money.\r\n[41]\r\n The government showed its 1997 budget was $26.6 billion for the fiscal\r\nyear.\r\n[42]\r\n The government has disclosed a total figure for all non-military intelligence spending since 2007; the\r\nfiscal 2013 figure is $52.6 billion. According to the 2013 mass surveillance disclosures, the CIA's fiscal 2013\r\nbudget is $14.7 billion, 28% of the total and almost 50% more than the budget of the National Security Agency.\r\nCIA's HUMINT budget is $2.3 billion, the SIGINT budget is $1.7 billion, and spending for security and logistics\r\nof CIA missions is $2.5 billion. \"Covert action programs,\" including a variety of activities such as the CIA's drone\r\nfleet and anti-Iranian nuclear program activities, accounts for $2.6 billion.[3]\r\nThere were numerous previous attempts to obtain general information about the budget.[43] As a result, reports\r\nrevealed that CIA's annual budget in Fiscal Year 1963 was $550 million (equivalent to US$5.8 billion in 2025),[44]\r\nand the overall intelligence budget in FY 1997 was US$26.6 billion (equivalent to US$53.3 billion in 2025).[45]\r\nThere have been accidental disclosures; for instance, Mary Margaret Graham, a former CIA official and deputy\r\ndirector of national intelligence for collection in 2005, said that the annual intelligence budget was $44 billion,[46]\r\nand in 1994, Congress accidentally published a budget of $43.4 billion (in 2012 dollars) in 1994 for the non-military National Intelligence Program, including $4.8 billion for the CIA.[3]\r\nAfter the Marshall Plan was approved, appropriating $13.7 billion over five years, 5% of those funds or\r\n$685 million were secretly made available to the CIA. A portion of the enormous M-fund, established by the U.S.\r\ngovernment during the post-war period for reconstruction of Japan, was secretly steered to the CIA.[47]\r\nRelationship with other intelligence agencies\r\nForeign intelligence services\r\nThe role and functions of the CIA are roughly equivalent to those of the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) in\r\nGermany, MI6 in the United Kingdom, the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) in Australia, the\r\nDirectorate-General for External Security (DGSE) in France, the Foreign Intelligence Service in Russia, the\r\nMinistry of State Security (MSS) in China, the Research and Analysis Wing (R\u0026AW) in India, the Inter-Services\r\nIntelligence (ISI) in Pakistan, the General Intelligence Service in Egypt, Mossad in Israel, and the National\r\nIntelligence Service (NIS) in South Korea.\r\nThe CIA was instrumental in the establishment of intelligence services in several U.S. allied countries, including\r\nGermany's BND and Greece's EYP (then known as KYP).[48][citation needed]\r\nThe closest links of the U.S. intelligence community to other foreign intelligence agencies are to Anglophone\r\ncountries: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. Special communications signals that\r\nintelligence-related messages can be shared with these four countries.[49] An indication of the United States' close\r\noperational cooperation is the creation of a new message distribution label within the main U.S. military\r\ncommunications network. Previously, the marking of NOFORN (i.e., No Foreign Nationals) required the\r\noriginator to specify which, if any, non-U.S. countries could receive the information. A new handling caveat,\r\nUSA/AUS/CAN/GBR/NZL Five Eyes, used primarily on intelligence messages, indicates that the material can be\r\nshared with Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, and New Zealand.\r\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Intelligence_Agency\r\nPage 8 of 51\n\nThe task of the division called \"Verbindungsstelle 61\" of the German Bundesnachrichtendienst is keeping contact\r\nto the CIA office in Wiesbaden.\r\n[50]\r\nHistory\r\nImmediate predecessors\r\nThe 140 stars on the CIA Memorial Wall in the CIA headquarters, each representing a CIA officer\r\nkilled in action\r\nCIA director Allen Dulles on the cover of Time magazine in 1953\r\nDuring World War II, U.S. intelligence and covert operations were undertaken by the Office of Strategic Services\r\n(OSS).[51] Many future CIA officers, including four directors of Central Intelligence, served in the OSS.[52] On\r\nSeptember 20, 1945, shortly after the end of World War II, Truman signed an executive order dissolving the OSS.\r\n[53]\r\n By October 1945, its functions had been divided between the Departments of State and War. The division\r\nlasted only a few months.\r\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Intelligence_Agency\r\nPage 9 of 51\n\nThe first public mention of the \"Central Intelligence Agency\" appeared on a command-restructuring proposal\r\npresented by Jim Forrestal and Arthur Radford to the U.S. Senate Military Affairs Committee at the end of 1945.\r\n[54]\r\n Army Intelligence agent Colonel Sidney Mashbir and Commander Ellis Zacharias worked together for four\r\nmonths at the direction of Fleet Admiral Joseph Ernest King, and prepared the first draft and implementing\r\ndirectives for the creation of what would become the Central Intelligence Agency.\r\n[55][56][57]\r\n Despite opposition\r\nfrom the military establishment, the State Department, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),[58] Truman\r\nestablished the National Intelligence Authority[59] in January 1946. Its operational extension was known as the\r\nCentral Intelligence Group (CIG),[60] which was the direct predecessor of the CIA.[61]\r\nCreation\r\nThe Central Intelligence Agency was created on July 26, 1947, when President Truman signed the National\r\nSecurity Act into law. A major impetus for the creation of the agency was growing tensions with the USSR\r\nfollowing the end of World War II.\r\n[62]\r\nLawrence Houston, head counsel of the SSU, CIG, and, later CIA, was principal draftsman of the National\r\nSecurity Act of 1947,\r\n[63][64][65]\r\n which dissolved the NIA and the CIG, and established both the National Security\r\nCouncil and the Central Intelligence Agency.\r\n[60][66]\r\n In 1949, Houston helped to draft the Central Intelligence\r\nAgency Act (Pub. L. 81–110), which authorized the agency to use confidential fiscal and administrative\r\nprocedures, and exempted it from most limitations on the use of federal funds. The act also exempted the CIA\r\nfrom having to disclose its \"organization, functions, officials, titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed,\"\r\nand created the program \"PL-110\" to handle defectors and other \"essential aliens\" who fell outside normal\r\nimmigration procedures.[67][68]\r\nAt the outset of the Korean War, the CIA still only had a few thousand employees, around one thousand of whom\r\nworked in analysis. Intelligence primarily came from the Office of Reports and Estimates, which drew its reports\r\nfrom a daily take of State Department telegrams, military dispatches, and other public documents. The CIA still\r\nlacked its intelligence-gathering abilities.[69] On August 21, 1950, shortly after, Truman announced Walter Bedell\r\nSmith as the new Director of the CIA. The change in leadership took place shortly after the start of the Korean\r\nWar in South Korea, as the lack of a clear warning to the president and NSC about the imminent North Korean\r\ninvasion was seen as a grave failure of intelligence.[69]\r\nThe CIA had different demands placed on it by the various bodies overseeing it. Truman wanted a centralized\r\ngroup to organize the information that reached him.[70][71] The Department of Defense wanted military\r\nintelligence and covert action, and the State Department wanted to create global political change favorable to the\r\nU.S. Thus, the two areas of responsibility for the CIA were covert action and covert intelligence. One of the main\r\ntargets for intelligence gathering was the Soviet Union, which had also been a priority of the CIA's predecessors.\r\n[70][71][72]\r\nU.S. Air Force General Hoyt Vandenberg, the CIG's second director, created the Office of Special Operations\r\n(OSO) and the Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE).[71] Initially, the OSO was tasked with spying and\r\nsubversion overseas with a budget of $15 million (equivalent to $201 million in 2025),[73] the largesse of a small\r\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Intelligence_Agency\r\nPage 10 of 51\n\nnumber of patrons in Congress. Vandenberg's goals were much like the ones set out by his predecessor: finding\r\nout \"everything about the Soviet forces in Eastern and Central Europe – their movements, their capabilities, and\r\ntheir intentions.\"[74]\r\nOn June 18, 1948, the National Security Council issued Directive 10/2[75] calling for covert action against the\r\nSoviet Union,\r\n[76]\r\n and granting the authority to carry out covert operations against \"hostile foreign states or\r\ngroups\" that could, if needed, be denied by the U.S. government. To this end, the Office of Policy Coordination\r\n(OPC) was created inside the CIA.[77] The OPC was unique; Frank Wisner, the head of the OPC, answered not to\r\nthe CIA Director, but to the secretaries of defense, state, and the NSC. The OPC's actions were a secret even from\r\nthe head of the CIA. Most CIA stations had two station chiefs, one working for the OSO, and one working for the\r\nOPC.[78]\r\nThe agency was unable to provide sufficient intelligence about the Soviet takeovers of Romania and\r\nCzechoslovakia, the Soviet blockade of Berlin, or the Soviet atomic bomb project. In particular, the agency failed\r\nto predict the Chinese entry into the Korean War with 300,000 troops.[79][80] The famous double agent Kim\r\nPhilby was the British liaison to American Central Intelligence.[81] Through him, the CIA coordinated hundreds of\r\nairdrops inside the Iron Curtain, all compromised by Philby. Arlington Hall, the nerve center of CIA cryptanalysis,\r\nwas compromised by Bill Weisband, a Russian translator and Soviet spy.\r\n[82]\r\nHowever, the CIA was successful in influencing the 1948 Italian election in favor of the Christian Democrats.\r\n[83]\r\nThe $200 million Exchange Stabilization Fund (equivalent to $2.7 billion in 2025),[73] earmarked for the\r\nreconstruction of Europe, was used to pay wealthy Americans of Italian heritage. Cash was then distributed to\r\nCatholic Action, the Vatican's political arm, and directly to Italian politicians. This tactic of using its large fund to\r\npurchase elections was frequently repeated in the subsequent years.[84]\r\nKorean War\r\nAt the beginning of the Korean War, CIA officer Hans Tofte claimed to have turned a thousand North Korean\r\nexpatriates into a guerrilla force tasked with infiltration, guerrilla warfare, and pilot rescue.[85] In 1952, the CIA\r\nsent 1,500 more expatriate agents north. Seoul station chief Albert Haney would openly celebrate the capabilities\r\nof those agents and the information they sent.[85] In September 1952, Haney was replaced by John Limond Hart, a\r\nEurope veteran with a vivid memory for bitter experiences of misinformation.\r\n[85]\r\n Hart was suspicious of the\r\nparade of successes reported by Tofte and Haney and launched an investigation which determined that the entirety\r\nof the information supplied by the Korean sources was false or misleading.[86] After the war, internal reviews by\r\nthe CIA corroborated Hart's findings. The CIA's station in Seoul had 200 officers, but not a single speaker of\r\nKorean.\r\n[86]\r\n Hart reported to Washington that Seoul station could not be salvaged. Loftus Becker, deputy director\r\nof intelligence, was sent personally to tell Hart that the CIA had to keep the station open to save face. Becker\r\nreturned to Washington, D.C., pronouncing the situation to be \"hopeless\".[86] He then resigned. Air Force Colonel\r\nJames Kallis stated that CIA director Allen Dulles continued to praise the CIA's Korean force, despite knowing\r\nthat they were under enemy control.[87] When China entered the war in 1950, the CIA attempted a number of\r\nsubversive operations in the country, all of which failed due to the presence of double agents. Millions of dollars\r\nwere spent in these efforts.[88] These included a team of young CIA officers airdropped into China who were\r\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Intelligence_Agency\r\nPage 11 of 51\n\nambushed, and CIA funds being used to set up a global heroin empire in Burma's Golden Triangle following a\r\nbetrayal by another double agent.[88]\r\n1953 Iranian coup d'état\r\nThe CIA aided the British in overthrowing Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh in 1953\r\nIn 1951, Mohammad Mosaddegh, a member of the National Front, was elected Iranian prime minister.\r\n[89]\r\n As\r\nprime minister, he nationalized the Anglo-Persian Oil Company which his predecessor had supported. The\r\nnationalization of the British-funded Iranian oil industry, including the largest oil refinery in the world, was\r\ndisastrous for Mosaddegh. A British naval embargo closed the British oil facilities, which Iran had no skilled\r\nworkers to operate. In 1952, Mosaddegh resisted the royal refusal to approve his Minister of War and resigned in\r\nprotest. The National Front took to the streets in protest. Fearing a loss of control, the military pulled its troops\r\nback five days later, and Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi gave in to Mosaddegh's demands. Mosaddegh quickly\r\nreplaced military leaders loyal to the Shah with those loyal to him, giving him personal control over the military.\r\nGiven six months of emergency powers, Mosaddegh unilaterally passed legislation. When that six months expired,\r\nhis powers were extended for another year. In 1953, Mossadegh dismissed parliament and assumed dictatorial\r\npowers. This power grab triggered the Shah to exercise his constitutional right to dismiss Mosaddegh. Mosaddegh\r\nlaunched a military coup, and the Shah fled the country.\r\nUnder CIA Director Allen Dulles, Operation Ajax was put into motion. Its goal was to overthrow Mossadegh with\r\nmilitary support from General Fazlollah Zahedi and install a pro-Western regime headed by the Shah of Iran.\r\nKermit Roosevelt Jr. oversaw the operation in Iran.[90] On August 16, a CIA-paid mob led by Ayatollah Ruhollah\r\nKhomeini would spark what a U.S. embassy officer called \"an almost spontaneous revolution\"[91], but Mosaddegh\r\nwas protected by his new inner military circle, and the CIA had been unable to gain influence within the Iranian\r\nmilitary. Their chosen man, former General Fazlollah Zahedi, had no troops to call on.[92] After the failure of the\r\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Intelligence_Agency\r\nPage 12 of 51\n\nfirst coup, Roosevelt paid demonstrators to pose as communists and deface public symbols associated with the\r\nShah. This August 19 incident helped foster public support of the Shah and led gangs of citizens on a spree of\r\nviolence intent on destroying Mossadegh.[93] An attack on his house forced Mossadegh to flee. He surrendered the\r\nnext day, and his coup came to an end.[94]\r\n1954 Guatemalan coup d'état\r\nWhen democratically elected President Jacobo Árbenz attempted a modest redistribution of land in\r\nGuatemala, he was overthrown in the 1954 Guatemalan coup d'état.\r\nThe return of the Shah to power, and the impression that an effective CIA had been able to guide that nation to\r\nfriendly and stable relations with the West, triggered planning for Operation PBSuccess, a plan to overthrow\r\nGuatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz.\r\n[95]\r\n The plan was exposed in major newspapers before it happened after a\r\nCIA agent left plans for the coup in his Guatemala City hotel room.[96]\r\nThe Guatemalan Revolution of 1944–54 overthrew the U.S.-backed dictator Jorge Ubico and brought a\r\ndemocratically elected government to power. The government began an ambitious agrarian reform program which\r\nsought to grant land to millions of landless peasants. The program threatened the land holdings of the United Fruit\r\nCompany, who lobbied for a coup by portraying these reforms as communist.[97][98][99][100]\r\nOn June 18, 1954, Carlos Castillo Armas led 480 CIA-trained men across the border from Honduras into\r\nGuatemala. The weapons had also come from the CIA.[101] The CIA mounted a psychological campaign to\r\nconvince the Guatemalan people and government that Armas's victory was a fait accompli. Its largest aspect was a\r\nradio broadcast entitled \"The Voice of Liberation\" which announced that Guatemalan exiles led by Castillo Armas\r\nwere shortly about to liberate the country.\r\n[101]\r\n On June 25, a CIA plane bombed Guatemala City, destroying the\r\ngovernment's main oil reserves. Árbenz ordered the army to distribute weapons to local peasants and workers.[102]\r\nThe army refused, forcing Jacobo Árbenz's resignation on June 27, 1954. Árbenz handed over power to Colonel\r\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Intelligence_Agency\r\nPage 13 of 51\n\nCarlos Enrique Diaz.\r\n[102]\r\n The CIA then orchestrated a series of power transfers that ended with the confirmation\r\nof Castillo Armas as president in July 1954.[102] Armas was the first in a series of military dictators that would\r\nrule the country, leading to the brutal Guatemalan Civil War from 1960 to 1996, in which some 200,000 people\r\nwere killed, mostly by the U.S.-backed military.\r\n[107]\r\nSyria\r\nPresident John F. Kennedy presenting the National Security Medal to Allen Dulles on November 28,\r\n1961\r\nIn 1949, Colonel Adib Shishakli rose to power in Syria in a CIA-backed coup. Four years later, he would be\r\noverthrown by the military, Ba'athists, and communists. The CIA and MI6 started funding right-wing members of\r\nthe military but suffered a huge setback in the aftermath of the Suez Crisis. CIA Agent Rocky Stone, who had\r\nplayed a minor role in the 1953 Iranian coup d'état, was working at the Damascus embassy as a diplomat but was\r\nthe station chief. Syrian officers on the CIA dole quickly appeared on television stating that they had received\r\nmoney from \"corrupt and sinister Americans\" \"in an attempt to overthrow the legitimate government of Syria.\"\r\n[108]\r\n Syrian forces surrounded the embassy and rousted Agent Stone, who confessed and subsequently made\r\nhistory as the first American diplomat expelled from an Arab nation. This strengthened ties between Syria and\r\nEgypt, helping establish the United Arab Republic, and poisoning the well for the U.S. for the foreseeable future.\r\n[108]\r\nIndonesia\r\nThe United States was suspicious of Sukarno, Indonesia's president, because of his declaration of neutrality in the\r\nCold War.\r\n[109]\r\n After Sukarno hosted the Bandung Conference, promoting the Non-Aligned Movement, the\r\nEisenhower White House responded with NSC 5518, authorizing \"all feasible covert means\" to move Indonesia\r\ninto the Western sphere.[110]\r\nThe U.S. had no clear policy on Indonesia. Eisenhower sent his special assistant for security operations, F. M.\r\nDearborn Jr., to Jakarta. His report that there was high instability, and that the U.S. lacked stable allies, reinforcing\r\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Intelligence_Agency\r\nPage 14 of 51\n\nthe domino theory. Indonesia suffered from what he described as \"subversion by democracy\".[111]\r\n The CIA\r\ndecided to attempt another military coup in Indonesia, where the Indonesian military was trained by the U.S., had\r\na strong professional relationship with the U.S. military, had a pro-American officer corps that strongly supported\r\ntheir government, and a strong belief in civilian control of the military, instilled partly by its close association with\r\nthe U.S. military.\r\n[112]\r\nOn September 25, 1957, Eisenhower ordered the CIA to start a revolution in Indonesia with the goal of regime\r\nchange. Three days later, Blitz, a Soviet-controlled weekly in India,[113] reported that the U.S. was plotting to\r\noverthrow Sukarno. The story was picked up by the media in Indonesia. One of the first parts of the operation was\r\nan 11,500-ton U.S. Navy ship landing at Sumatra, delivering weapons for as many as 8,000 potential\r\nrevolutionaries.[114]\r\nIn support of the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia-Permesta Movement, formed by\r\ndissident military commanders in Central Sumatera and North Sulawesi with the aim of overthrowing the Sukarno\r\nregime, a B-26 piloted by CIA agent Allen Lawrence Pope attacked Indonesian military targets in April and May\r\n1958.[115] The CIA described the airstrikes to the president as attacks by \"dissident planes.\" Pope's B-26 was shot\r\ndown over Ambon, Indonesia, on May 18, 1958, and he bailed out. When he was captured, the Indonesian military\r\nfound his personnel records, after-action reports, and his membership card for the officer's club at Clark Field. On\r\nMarch 9, John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State and brother of DCI Allen Dulles, made a public statement\r\ncalling for a revolt against communist despotism under Sukarno. Three days later, the CIA reported to the White\r\nHouse that the Indonesian Army's actions against the CIA-supported revolution were suppressing communism.\r\n[116]\r\nAfter Indonesia, Eisenhower displayed mistrust of both the CIA and its director, Allen Dulles. Dulles, too,\r\ndisplayed mistrust of the CIA itself. Abbot Smith, a CIA analyst who later became chief of the Office of National\r\nEstimates, said, \"We had constructed for ourselves a picture of the USSR, and whatever happened had to be made\r\nto fit into this picture. Intelligence estimators can hardly commit a more abominable sin.\" On December 16,\r\nEisenhower received a report from his intelligence board of consultants that said the agency was \"incapable of\r\nmaking objective appraisals of its own intelligence information as well as its own operations.\"[117]\r\nDemocratic Republic of the Congo\r\nThe Congo became independent from Belgium in 1960.[118] The United States feared that its new prime minister,\r\nPatrice Lumumba, was susceptible to Soviet influence, so the CIA supported Joseph Mobutu in organizing a coup\r\nthat deposed Lumumba on September 14, 1960.[119] Lumumba was assassinated by his Congolese and Belgian\r\nenemies in 1961, with CIA acquiescence.[120] The CIA continued to back the Mobutu regime throughout the Cold\r\nWar, despite its corruption, mismanagement, and human rights abuses.[121]\r\n1960 U-2 incident\r\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Intelligence_Agency\r\nPage 15 of 51\n\nSuspended from the ceiling of the glass-enclosed atrium: three models of the U-2, Lockheed A-12,\r\nand D-21 drone. These models are exact replicas at one-sixth scale of the real planes. All three had\r\nphotographic capabilities. The U-2 was one of the first espionage planes developed by the CIA. The\r\nA-12 set unheralded flight records. The D-21 drone was one of the first crewless aircraft ever built.\r\nLockheed Martin donated all three models to the CIA.\r\nAfter the bomber gap came the missile gap. Eisenhower wanted to use the U-2 to disprove the missile gap, but he\r\nhad banned U-2 overflights of the USSR after meeting Secretary Khrushchev at Camp David. Another reason the\r\npresident objected to the use of the U-2 was that, in the nuclear age, the intelligence he needed most was on their\r\nintentions, without which the U.S. would face a paralysis of intelligence. He was particularly worried that U-2\r\nflights could be seen as preparations for first-strike attacks. He had high hopes for an upcoming meeting with\r\nKhrushchev in Paris. Eisenhower finally gave in to CIA pressure to authorize a 16-day window for flights, which\r\nwas extended an additional six days because of poor weather. On May 1, 1960, the Soviet Air Forces shot down a\r\nU-2 flying over Soviet territory. To Eisenhower, the ensuing cover-up destroyed his perceived honesty and his\r\nhope of leaving a legacy of thawing relations with Khrushchev. Eisenhower later said that the U-2 cover-up was\r\nthe greatest regret of his presidency.\r\n[122]: 160 \r\nBay of Pigs\r\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Intelligence_Agency\r\nPage 16 of 51\n\nSam Giancana (pictured), Santo Trafficante, and others, who were recruited by the CIA to\r\nassassinate Fidel Castro in Cuba[123]\r\nThe CIA welcomed Fidel Castro on his visit to Washington, D.C., and gave him a face-to-face briefing. The CIA\r\nhoped that Castro would bring about a friendly democratic government and planned to support his government\r\nwith money and guns. By December 11, 1959, however, a memo reached the DCI's desk recommending Castro's\r\n\"elimination.\" Dulles replaced the word \"elimination\" with \"removal,\" and set the scheme into action. By mid-August 1960, Dick Bissell sought, with the full backing of the CIA, to hire the Mafia to assassinate Castro.[124]\r\nThe Bay of Pigs Invasion was a failed military invasion of Cuba undertaken by the CIA-sponsored paramilitary\r\ngroup Brigade 2506 on April 17, 1961. A counter-revolutionary military, trained and funded by the CIA, Brigade\r\n2506 fronted the armed wing of the Democratic Revolutionary Front (DRF) and intended to overthrow Castro's\r\nincreasingly communist government. Launched from Guatemala, the invading force was defeated within three\r\ndays by the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces, under Castro's direct command. U.S. President Dwight D.\r\nEisenhower was concerned at the direction Castro's government was taking, and in March 1960, Eisenhower\r\nallocated $13.1 million to the CIA to plan his overthrow. The CIA proceeded to organize the operation with the aid\r\nof various Cuban counter-revolutionary forces, training Brigade 2506 in Guatemala. Over 1,400 paramilitaries set\r\nout for Cuba by boat on April 13 for a marine invasion. Two days later on April 15, eight CIA-supplied B-26\r\nbombers attacked Cuban airfields. On the night of April 16, the land invasion began in the Bay of Pigs, but by\r\nApril 20, the invaders finally surrendered. The failed invasion strengthened the position of Castro's leadership as\r\nwell as his ties with the USSR. This led eventually to the events of the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. The invasion\r\nwas a major embarrassment for U.S. foreign policy.\r\nThe Taylor Board was commissioned to determine what went wrong in Cuba. The Board came to the same\r\nconclusion that the Jan. '61 President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities had concluded, and\r\nmany other reviews prior, and to come, that covert action had to be completely isolated from intelligence and\r\nanalysis. The Inspector General of the CIA investigated the Bay of Pigs. He concluded that there was a need to\r\nimprove the organization and management of the CIA drastically.\r\nCuba: Terrorism and sabotage\r\nAfter the failure of the attempted invasion at the Bay of Pigs, the CIA proposed Operation Mongoose, a program\r\nof sabotage and terrorist attacks against civilian and military targets in Cuba, with the stated intent to bring down\r\nthe Cuban administration and institute a new government.[125] It also sought to force the Cuban government to\r\nintroduce intrusive civil measures and divert resources to protect its citizens from the attacks.[126] It was\r\nauthorized by President Kennedy in November 1961.[127][128][129][130] The operation saw the CIA engage in an\r\nextensive campaign of terrorist attacks against civilians and economic targets, killing significant numbers of\r\ncivilians, and carry out covert operations against the Cuban government.[128][131][132][133]\r\nThe CIA established a base for the operation, with the cryptonym JMWAVE, at a disused naval facility on the\r\nUniversity of Miami campus. The operation was so extensive that it housed the largest number of CIA officers\r\noutside of Langley, eventually numbering some four hundred. It was a major employer in Florida, with several\r\nthousand agents in clandestine pay of the agency.\r\n[134][135]\r\n The terrorist activities carried out by agents armed,\r\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Intelligence_Agency\r\nPage 17 of 51\n\norganized and funded by the CIA were a further source of tension between the U.S. and Cuban governments. They\r\nwere a major factor contributing to the Soviet decision to place missiles in Cuba, leading to the Cuban Missile\r\nCrisis.\r\n[136][137]\r\nThe attacks continued through 1965.[137] Though the level of terrorist activity directed by the CIA lessened in the\r\nsecond half of the 1960s, in 1969 the CIA was directed to intensify its operations against Cuba.[138] Exile\r\nterrorists were still in the employ of the CIA in the mid-1970s, including Luis Posada Carriles.\r\n[139][140][141]\r\n He\r\nremained on the CIA's payroll until mid-1976,[139][141] and is widely believed to be responsible for the October\r\n1976 Cubana 455 flight bombing, killing 73 people – the deadliest instance of airline terrorism in the Western\r\nHemisphere prior to the attacks of September 2001 in New York.[139][140][141]\r\nDespite the damage done and civilians killed in the CIA's terrorist attacks, by the measure of its stated objective\r\nthe project was a complete failure.[131][132]\r\nBrazil\r\nThe CIA and the United States government were involved in the 1964 Brazilian coup d'état. The coup occurred\r\nfrom March 31 to April 1, which resulted in the Brazilian Armed Forces ousting President João Goulart. The\r\nUnited States saw Goulart as a left-wing threat in Latin America. Secret cables written by the U.S. Ambassador to\r\nBrazil, Lincoln Gordon, confirmed that the CIA was involved in covert action in Brazil. The CIA encouraged\r\n\"pro-democracy street rallies\" in Brazil, for instance, to create dissent against Goulart.[142]\r\nTibet\r\nThe CIA Tibetan program consisted of political plots, propaganda distribution, paramilitary operations, and\r\nintelligence gathering based on U.S. commitments made to the Dalai Lama in 1951 and 1956.[143]\r\nBoth the CIA and the R\u0026AW played important roles in the establishment of the Special Frontier Force (SFF), an\r\nelite Indian special operations unit that operates under the authority of the Cabinet Secretariat. Personnel in the\r\nSFF have traditionally been recruited primarily from Tibetan refugees residing in India, as well as from the\r\nGorkha community. The force was created to conduct specialized operations in high-altitude and mountainous\r\nregions, particularly in the context of India’s strategic concerns regarding the People's Liberation Army of China.\r\nOver time, the SFF has developed into a highly trained and capable unit and is regarded as a significant strategic\r\ndeterrent and an important component of India’s defense posture along the Himalayan frontier.\r\n[144]\r\nIndochina and the Vietnam War (1954–1975)\r\nThe OSS Patti mission arrived in Vietnam near the end of World War II and had significant interaction with the\r\nleaders of many Vietnamese factions, including Ho Chi Minh.\r\n[145]\r\nDuring the period of U.S. combat involvement in the Vietnam War, there was considerable argument about\r\nprogress among the Department of Defense under Robert McNamara, the CIA, and, to some extent, the\r\nintelligence staff of Military Assistance Command Vietnam.\r\n[146]\r\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Intelligence_Agency\r\nPage 18 of 51\n\nSometime between 1959 and 1961, the CIA started Project Tiger, a program of dropping South Vietnam agents\r\ninto North Vietnam to gather intelligence. These were failures; the Deputy Chief for Project Tiger, Captain Do Van\r\nTien, admitted that he was an agent for Hanoi.\r\n[147]\r\nIn the face of the failure of Project Tiger, the Pentagon wanted CIA paramilitary forces to participate in their Op\r\nPlan 64A. This resulted in the CIA's foreign paramilitaries being put under the command of the DOD, a move\r\nseen as a slippery slope inside the CIA, a slide from covert action towards militarization.[148]\r\nThe antiwar movement rapidly expanded across the United States during the Johnson presidency. Johnson wanted\r\nCIA Director Richard Helms to substantiate Johnson's hunch that Moscow and Beijing were financing and\r\ninfluencing the American antiwar movement.[149] Thus, in the fall of 1967, the CIA launched a domestic\r\nsurveillance program code-named Chaos that would linger for a total of seven years. Police departments across the\r\ncountry cooperated in tandem with the agency, amassing a \"computer index of 300,000 names of American people\r\nand organizations, and extensive files on 7,200 citizens.\" Helms hatched a \"Special Operations Group\" in which \"\r\n[eleven] CIA officers grew long hair, learned the jargon of the New Left, and went off to infiltrate peace groups in\r\nthe United States and Europe.\"[150] A CIA analyst's assessment of Vietnam was that the U.S. was \"becoming\r\nprogressively divorced from reality... [and] proceeding with far more courage than wisdom\".[151]\r\nFrom 1968 to 1972, the CIA's Phoenix Program involved the killing of between twenty and forty thousand South\r\nVietnamese civilians that the CIA believed to be members of what they called the \"Infrastructure\": the non-military administrative and political components of the communists' organizational structure. Thousands were\r\ntortured prior to being killed, by such methods as the repeated application of electrical shock to the brain, and the\r\ndrilling of a dowel through the ear canal into the brain until the person died.[152]\r\nAbuses of CIA authority, 1970s\r\nDuration: 7 minutes and 45 seconds.\r\nNixon Oval Office meeting with H.R. Haldeman \"Smoking Gun\" Conversation, June 23, 1972 (full\r\ntranscript)\r\nPresident Gerald Ford meeting with CIA Director–designate George H. W. Bush, December 17,\r\n1975\r\nConditions worsened in the mid-1970s, around the time of Watergate. A dominant feature of political life during\r\nthat period were the attempts of Congress to assert oversight of the U.S. presidency and the executive branch of\r\nthe U.S. government. Revelations about past CIA activities, such as assassinations and attempted assassinations of\r\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Intelligence_Agency\r\nPage 19 of 51\n\nforeign leaders (most notably Fidel Castro and Rafael Trujillo) and illegal domestic spying on U.S. citizens,\r\nprovided the opportunities to increase congressional oversight of U.S. intelligence operations.[153]\r\nIn 1971, the NSA and CIA were engaged in domestic spying; the DOD was eavesdropping on Henry Kissinger.\r\nThe White House and Camp David were wired for sound. Nixon and Kissinger were eavesdropping on their aides,\r\nas well as reporters. Famously, Nixon's Plumbers had in their number many former CIA officers, including\r\nHoward Hunt, Jim McCord, and Eugenio Martinez. On July 7, 1971, John Ehrlichman, Nixon's domestic policy\r\nchief, told DCI Cushman, Nixon's hatchet man in the CIA, to let Cushman \"know that [Hunt] was, in fact, doing\r\nsome things for the President... you should consider he has pretty much carte blanche\".[154]\r\nHastening the CIA's fall from grace was the burglary of the Watergate headquarters of the Democratic Party by\r\nformer CIA officers, and President Richard Nixon's subsequent attempt to use the CIA to impede the FBI's\r\ninvestigation of the burglary. In the famous \"smoking gun\" recording that led to President Nixon's resignation,\r\nNixon ordered his chief of staff, H. R. Haldeman, to tell the CIA that further investigation of Watergate would\r\n\"open the whole can of worms about the Bay of Pigs\".[155][156] In this way, Nixon and Haldeman ensured that the\r\nCIA's No. 1 and No. 2 ranking officials, Richard Helms and Vernon Walters, communicated to FBI Director L.\r\nPatrick Gray that the FBI should not follow the money trail from the burglars to the Committee to Re-elect the\r\nPresident, as it would uncover CIA informants in Mexico. The FBI initially agreed to this due to a long-standing\r\nagreement between the FBI and CIA not to uncover each other's sources of information, though within a couple of\r\nweeks, the FBI resumed its investigation. Nonetheless, when the smoking gun tapes were made public, damage to\r\nthe public's perception of CIA's top officials, and thus to the CIA as a whole, could not be avoided.[157]\r\nOn November 13, 1972, after Nixon's landslide re-election, Nixon told Kissinger \"[I intend] to ruin the Foreign\r\nService. I mean ruin it – the old Foreign Service – and to build a new one.\" He had similar designs for the CIA and\r\nintended to replace Helms with James Schlesinger.\r\n[158]\r\n Nixon had promised that Helms could stay on until his\r\n60th birthday, the mandatory retirement age. On February 2, Nixon broke that promise, carrying through with his\r\nintention to \"remove the deadwood\" from the CIA. \"Get rid of the clowns\" was his order to the incoming DCI.\r\nKissinger had been running the CIA since the beginning of Nixon's presidency, but Nixon impressed on\r\nSchlesinger that he must appear to Congress to be in charge, averting their suspicion of Kissinger's involvement.\r\n[159]\r\n Nixon also hoped that Schlesinger could push through broader changes in the intelligence community that he\r\nhad been working towards for years, the creation of a Director of National Intelligence, and spinning off the covert\r\naction part of the CIA into a separate organ. Before Helms would leave office, he would destroy every tape he had\r\nsecretly made of meetings in his office, and many of the papers on Project MKUltra. In Schlesinger's 17-week\r\ntenure, in his assertion to President Nixon that it was \"imperative to cut back on 'the prominence of CIA\r\noperations' around the world,\" the director fired more than 1,500 employees.[160] As Watergate threw the spotlight\r\non the CIA, Schlesinger, who had been kept in the dark about the CIA's involvement, decided he needed to know\r\nwhat skeletons were in the closet.\r\nThis became the Family Jewels. It included information linking the CIA to the assassination of foreign leaders, the\r\nillegal surveillance of some 7,000 U.S. citizens involved in the antiwar movement (Operation CHAOS), its\r\nexperiments on U.S. and Canadian citizens without their knowledge, and secretly giving them LSD (among other\r\nthings) and observing the results.[153] This prompted Congress to create the Church Committee in the Senate, and\r\nthe Pike Committee in the House. President Gerald Ford created the Rockefeller Commission,\r\n[153]\r\n and issued an\r\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Intelligence_Agency\r\nPage 20 of 51\n\nexecutive order prohibiting the assassination of foreign leaders. DCI Colby leaked the papers to the press; later, he\r\nstated that he believed that providing Congress with this information was the correct thing to do, and ultimately in\r\nthe CIA's interests.[161]\r\nIn December 1974, The New York Times reported that the CIA had collected intelligence files on at least 10,000\r\nAmericans and engaged in dozens of other illegal activities beginning in the 1950s, including break-ins,\r\nwiretapping and mail inspections, in violation of its 1947 charter which prohibited it from taking action on\r\nAmerican soil and against U.S. citizens.[162]\r\nCongressional investigations\r\nActing Attorney General Laurence Silberman learned of the existence of the Family Jewels and issued a subpoena\r\nfor them, prompting eight congressional investigations on the domestic spying activities of the CIA. Bill Colby's\r\nshort tenure as DCI would end with the Halloween Massacre. His replacement was George H. W. Bush. At the\r\ntime, the DOD had control of 80% of the intelligence budget.[163] Communication and coordination between the\r\nCIA and the DOD would suffer greatly under Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. The CIA's budget for hiring\r\nclandestine officers had been squeezed out by the paramilitary operations in Southeast Asia, and the government's\r\npoor popularity further strained hiring. This left the agency bloated with middle management, and anemic in\r\nyounger officers. With employee training taking five years, the agency's only hope would be on the trickle of new\r\nofficers coming to fruition years in the future. The CIA would see another setback as communists would take\r\nAngola. William J. Casey, a member of Ford's Intelligence Advisory Board, obtained Bush's approval to allow a\r\nteam from outside the CIA to produce Soviet military estimates as a \"Team B\". The \"B\" team was composed of\r\nhawks. Their estimates were the highest that could be justified, and they painted a picture of a growing Soviet\r\nmilitary when the Soviet military was indeed shrinking. Many of their reports found their way to the press.\r\nChad\r\nChad's neighbor Libya was a major source of weaponry to communist rebel forces. The CIA seized the\r\nopportunity to arm and finance Chad's prime minister, Hissène Habré, after he created a breakaway government in\r\nwestern Sudan.\r\n[164]\r\nAfghanistan\r\nCritics assert that funding the Afghan mujahideen in Operation Cyclone played a role in causing the\r\nSeptember 11 attacks.\r\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Intelligence_Agency\r\nPage 21 of 51\n\nIn Afghanistan, the CIA funneled several billion dollars' worth of weapons,\r\n[165]\r\n including FIM-92 Stinger surface-to-air missiles,\r\n[166]\r\n to Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)—which funneled them to tens of thousands of\r\nAfghan mujahideen resistance fighters in order to fight the Soviets and the Armed Forces of the Democratic\r\nRepublic of Afghanistan during the Soviet-Afghan War.\r\n[167][168][169]\r\n In total, the CIA sent approximately 2,300\r\nStingers to Afghanistan, creating a substantial black market for the weapons throughout the Middle East, Central\r\nAsia, and even parts of Africa that persisted well into the 1990s. Perhaps 100 Stingers were acquired by Iran. The\r\nCIA later operated a program to recover the Stingers through cash buybacks.[170]\r\nNicaragua\r\nUnder President Jimmy Carter, the CIA was conducting covertly funded support for the Contras in their war\r\nagainst the Sandinistas. In March 1981, Reagan told Congress that the CIA would protect El Salvador by\r\npreventing the Sandinistas from shipping arms to communist rebels in El Salvador. The CIA also began arming\r\nand training the Contras in Honduras in hopes that they could depose the Sandinistas in Nicaragua.\r\n[171]\r\n The CIA\r\nwas involved in the Iran–Contra affair arms smuggling scandal. Repercussions from the scandal included the\r\ncreation of the Intelligence Authorization Act in 1991. It defined covert operations as secret missions in\r\ngeopolitical areas where the U.S. is neither openly nor apparently engaged. This also required an authorizing chain\r\nof command, including an official presidential finding report and the informing of the House and Senate\r\nIntelligence Committees, which, in emergencies, requires only \"timely notification.\" Critics have alleged that the\r\nCIA was also involved in Contra cocaine trafficking.\r\n[172][173]\r\nLebanon\r\nThe CIA's prime source in Lebanon was Bashir Gemayel, a member of the Christian Maronite sect. The uprising\r\nagainst the Maronite minority blindsided the CIA. Israel invaded Lebanon, and, along with the CIA, propped up\r\nGemayel.[174] This secured Gemayel's assurance that Americans would be protected in Lebanon. Thirteen days\r\nlater, he was assassinated. Imad Mughniyah, a Hezbollah assassin, targeted Americans in retaliation for the Israeli\r\ninvasion, the Sabra and Shatila massacre, and the U.S. Marines of the Multi-National Force for their role in\r\nopposing the PLO in Lebanon. On April 18, 1983, a 2,000-pound car bomb exploded in the lobby of the American\r\nembassy in Beirut, killing 63 people, including 17 Americans and 7 CIA officers, including Robert Ames, one of\r\nthe CIA's Middle East experts. America's fortunes in Lebanon suffered more as America's poorly directed\r\nretaliation for the bombing was interpreted by many as support for the Maronite minority. On October 23, 1983,\r\ntwo bombs (1983 Beirut Bombing) were set off in Beirut, including a 10-ton bomb at a U.S. military barracks that\r\nkilled 242 people.\r\nThe embassy bombing killed Ken Haas, the CIA's Station Chief in Beirut. Bill Buckley was sent in to replace him.\r\nEighteen days after the U.S. Marines left Lebanon, Buckley was kidnapped. On March 7, 1984, Jeremy Levin,\r\nCNN's Bureau Chief in Beirut, was kidnapped. Twelve more Americans were captured in Beirut during the\r\nReagan Administration. Manucher Ghorbanifar, a former Savak agent, was an information seller, and was\r\ndiscredited over his record of misinformation. He reached out to the agency offering a back channel to Iran,\r\nsuggesting a trade of missiles that would be lucrative to the intermediaries.[175]\r\nPakistan\r\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Intelligence_Agency\r\nPage 22 of 51\n\nIt has been alleged by such authors as Ahmed Rashid that the CIA and ISI have been waging a clandestine war.\r\nIndia–Pakistan geopolitical tensions\r\nOn May 11, 1998, CIA Director George Tenet and his agency were taken aback by India's second nuclear test. The\r\ntest prompted concerns from its nuclear-capable adversary, Pakistan, and, \"remade the balance of power in the\r\nworld.\" The nuclear test was New Delhi's calculated response to Pakistan previously testing new missiles in its\r\nexpanding arsenal. This series of events subsequently revealed the CIA's \"failure of espionage, a failure to read\r\nphotographs, a failure to comprehend reports, a failure to think, and a failure to see.\"[176]\r\nPoland, 1980–1989\r\nUnlike the Carter administration, the Reagan administration supported the Solidarity movement in Poland, and—\r\nbased on CIA intelligence—waged a public relations campaign to deter what the Carter administration felt was\r\n\"an imminent move by large Soviet military forces into Poland.\" Colonel Ryszard Kukliński, a senior officer on\r\nthe Polish General Staff, was secretly sending reports to the CIA.[177]\r\nThe CIA transferred around $2 million yearly in cash to Solidarity, which suggests that $10 million total is a\r\nreasonable estimate for the five-year total. There were no direct links between the CIA and Solidarność, and all\r\nmoney was channeled through third parties.[178] CIA officers were barred from meeting Solidarity leaders, and the\r\nCIA's contacts with Solidarność activists were weaker than those of the AFL–CIO, which raised $300,000 from its\r\nmembers, which were used to provide material and cash directly to Solidarity, with no control of Solidarity's use\r\nof it. The U.S. Congress authorized the National Endowment for Democracy to promote democracy, and the NED\r\nallocated $10 million to Solidarity.\r\n[179]\r\nWhen the Polish government launched a crackdown in December 1981, Solidarity was not alerted. Explanations\r\nfor this vary; some believe the CIA was caught off guard, while others suggest that American policymakers\r\nviewed an internal crackdown as preferable to an \"inevitable Soviet intervention.\"[180]\r\nCIA support for Solidarity included money, equipment and training, which was coordinated by Special Operations\r\nCIA division.[181] Henry Hyde, U.S. House intelligence committee member, said that the U.S. provided \"supplies\r\nand technical assistance in terms of clandestine newspapers, broadcasting, propaganda, money, organizational help\r\nand advice\".[182] Michael Reisman of Yale Law School named operations in Poland as one of the CIA's Cold War\r\ncovert operations.[183]\r\nInitial funds for covert actions by the CIA were $2 million, but authorization was soon increased and by 1985, the\r\nCIA had successfully infiltrated Poland.[184] Rainer Thiel, in Nested Games of External Democracy Promotion:\r\nThe United States and the Polish Liberalization 1980–1989, mentions how covert operations by the CIA, and spy\r\ngames, among others, allowed the U.S. to proceed with successful regime change.[185]\r\nOperation Gladio\r\nDuring the Cold War, the CIA and NATO were involved in Operation Gladio.\r\n[186][187]\r\n As part of Operation\r\nGladio, the CIA supported the Italian government, and allegedly supported neo-fascist organizations[188][189][190]\r\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Intelligence_Agency\r\nPage 23 of 51\n\nsuch as National Vanguard, New Order and the Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari during the Years of Lead in Italy.\r\nIn Turkey, Gladio was called Counter-Guerrilla. CIA efforts strengthened the Pan-Turkist movement through the\r\nfounding member of the Counter-Guerrilla; Alparslan Türkeş.\r\n[191]\r\n Other far-right individuals employed by the\r\nCIA as part of Counter-Guerilla included Ruzi Nazar, a former SS officer and Pan-Turkist.[192]\r\nOperation Desert Storm\r\nDuring the Iran–Iraq War, the CIA had backed both sides. The CIA had maintained a network of spies in Iran, but\r\nin 1989, a CIA mistake compromised every agent they had in there, and the CIA had no agents in Iraq. In the\r\nweeks before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the CIA downplayed the military buildup. During the war, CIA\r\nestimates of Iraqi abilities and intentions flip-flopped and were rarely accurate. In one particular case, the DOD\r\nhad asked the CIA to identify military targets to bomb. One target the CIA identified was an underground shelter.\r\nThe CIA did not know that it was a civilian bomb shelter. In a rare instance, the CIA correctly determined that the\r\ncoalition forces efforts were coming up short in their efforts to destroy Scud missiles. Congress took away the\r\nCIA's role in interpreting spy-satellite photos, putting the CIA's satellite intelligence operations under the auspices\r\nof the military. The CIA created its office of military affairs, which operated as \"second-echelon support for the\r\nPentagon. .. answering ... questions from military men [like] 'how wide is this road?'\"\r\n[193]\r\nFall of the Soviet Union\r\nMikhail Gorbachev's announcement of the unilateral reduction of 500,000 Soviet troops took the CIA by surprise.\r\nMoreover, Doug MacEachin, the CIA's Chief of Soviet analysis, said that even if the CIA had told the president,\r\nthe NSC, and Congress about the cuts beforehand, it would have been ignored. \"We never would have been able to\r\npublish it.\"[194] All the CIA numbers on the Soviet Union's economy were wrong. Too often, the CIA relied on\r\ninexperienced people supposedly deemed experts. Bob Gates had preceded Doug MacEachin as Chief of Soviet\r\nanalysis, and he had never visited the Soviet Union. Few officers, even those stationed in the country, spoke the\r\nlanguage of the people on whom they spied. And the CIA could not send agents to respond to developing\r\nsituations. The CIA analysis of Russia during the Cold War was either driven by ideology or by politics. William\r\nJ. Crowe, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, noted that the CIA \"talked about the Soviet Union as if they\r\nweren't reading the newspapers, much less developed clandestine intelligence.\"[195]\r\nOn January 25, 1993, Mir Qazi opened fire at the CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, killing two officers and\r\nwounding three others.[196] On February 26, al-Qaeda terrorists led by Ramzi Yousef bombed the parking garage\r\nbelow the North Tower of the World Trade Center in New York City, killing six people and injuring 1,402 others.\r\nDuring the Bosnian War, the CIA ignored signs within and without[clarification needed] of the Srebrenica massacre.\r\nOn July 13, 1995, when the press report about the massacre came out, the CIA received pictures from a spy\r\nsatellite of prisoners guarded by men with guns in Srebrenica.[197] The CIA had no agents on the ground to verify\r\nthe report. Two weeks after news reports of the slaughter, the CIA sent a U-2 to photograph it. A week later, the\r\nCIA completed its report on the matter. The final report came to the Oval Office on August 4, 1995. In short, it\r\ntook three weeks for the agency to confirm that one of the largest mass murders in Europe since the Second World\r\nWar had occurred.[197] Another CIA mistake which occurred in the Balkans during the Clinton presidency was the\r\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Intelligence_Agency\r\nPage 24 of 51\n\nNATO bombing of Serbia. To force Slobodan Milošević to withdraw his troops from Kosovo, the CIA had been\r\ninvited to provide military targets for bombings, wherein the agency's analysts used tourist maps to determine the\r\nlocation.[198] However, the agency incorrectly provided the coordinates of the Chinese Embassy as a target,\r\nresulting in its bombing. The CIA had misread the target as Slobodan Milosevic's military depot.[199]\r\nIn Guatemala, the CIA produced the Murphy Memo, based on audio recordings made by covert listening devices\r\nplanted by Guatemalan intelligence in the bedroom of Ambassador Marilyn McAfee. In the recording,\r\nAmbassador McAfee verbally entreated \"Murphy.\" The CIA circulated a memo in the highest Washington circles\r\naccusing Ambassador McAfee of having an extramarital lesbian affair with her secretary, Carol Murphy. There\r\nwas no affair. Ambassador McAfee was calling to Murphy, her poodle.\r\n[200]\r\nHarold James Nicholson would burn[clarification needed] several serving officers and three years of trainees before\r\nhe was caught spying for Russia. In 1997, the House would pen another report, which said that CIA officers know\r\nlittle about the language or politics of the people they spy on; the conclusion was that the CIA lacked the \"depth,\r\nbreadth, and expertise to monitor political, military, and economic developments worldwide.\"[201] Russ Travers\r\nsaid in the CIA in-house journal that, in five years, \"intelligence failure is inevitable\".[202] In 1997, the CIA's new\r\ndirector George Tenet would promise a new working agency by 2002. The CIA's surprise at India's detonation of\r\nan atom bomb was a failure at almost every level. After the 1998 embassy bombings by al-Qaeda, the CIA offered\r\ntwo targets to be hit in retaliation. One of them was the al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory, where traces of chemical\r\nweapon precursors had been detected. In the aftermath, it was concluded that \"the decision to target al Shifa\r\ncontinues a tradition of operating on inadequate intelligence about Sudan.\" It triggered the CIA to make\r\n\"substantial and sweeping changes\" to prevent \"a catastrophic systemic intelligence failure.\"[203]\r\nAldrich Ames\r\nBetween 1985 and 1986, the CIA lost every spy it had in Eastern Europe. The details of the investigation into the\r\ncause were obscured from the new director, and the investigation had little success and has been widely criticized.\r\nOn February 21, 1994, FBI agents pulled Aldrich Ames out of his Jaguar.\r\n[204]\r\n In the investigation that ensued, the\r\nCIA discovered that many of the sources for its most important analyses of the USSR were based on Soviet\r\ndisinformation fed to the CIA by controlled agents. On top of that, it was discovered that, in some cases, the CIA\r\nsuspected at the time that the sources were compromised, but the information was sent up the chain as genuine.\r\n[205][206]\r\nOsama bin Laden\r\nAgency files show that it is believed Osama bin Laden was funding the Afghan rebels against the USSR in the\r\n1980s.[207] In 1991, bin Laden returned to his native Saudi Arabia protesting the presence of troops, and\r\nOperation Desert Storm. He was expelled from the country. In 1996, the CIA created a team to hunt bin Laden.\r\nThey were trading information with the Sudanese until, on the word of a source that would later be found to be a\r\nfabricator, the CIA closed its Sudan station later that year. In 1998, bin Laden would declare war on America, and,\r\non August 7, strike in Tanzania and Nairobi. On October 12, 2000, al-Qaeda bombed the USS Cole. In the first\r\ndays of George W. Bush's presidency, al-Qaeda threats were ubiquitous in daily presidential CIA briefings, but it\r\nmay have become a case of false alarm. The agency's predictions were dire but carried little weight, and the focus\r\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Intelligence_Agency\r\nPage 25 of 51\n\nof the president and his defense staff were elsewhere. The CIA arranged the arrests of suspected al-Qaeda\r\nmembers through cooperation with foreign agencies, but the CIA could not definitively say what effect these\r\narrests have had, and it could not gain hard intelligence from those captured. The president had asked the CIA if\r\nal-Qaeda could plan attacks in the U.S. On August 6, Bush received a daily briefing with the headline, not based\r\non current, solid intelligence, \"Al Qaeda determined to strike inside the US.\" The U.S. had been hunting bin Laden\r\nsince 1996 and had had several opportunities, but neither Clinton nor Bush had wanted to risk taking an active\r\nrole in a murky assassination plot, and the perfect opportunity had never materialized for a DCI that would have\r\ngiven him the reassurances he needed to take the plunge. That day, Richard A. Clarke sent National Security\r\nAdvisor Condoleezza Rice warning of the risks, and decrying the inaction of the CIA.[208]\r\nAl-Qaeda and the Global War on Terrorism\r\nThe CIA prepared a series of leaflets announcing bounties for those who turned in or denounced\r\nindividuals suspected of association with the Taliban or al-Qaeda.\r\nIn January 1996, the CIA created an experimental \"virtual station,\" the Bin Laden Issue Station, under the\r\nCounterterrorist Center, to track bin Laden's developing activities. Jamal al-Fadl, who defected to the CIA in\r\nspring 1996, began to provide the Station with a new image of the al-Qaeda leader: he was not only a terrorist\r\nfinancier but a terrorist organizer as well. FBI Special Agent Dan Coleman (who, together with his partner Jack\r\nCloonan, had been \"seconded\" to the bin Laden Station) called him al-Qaeda's \"Rosetta Stone\".[209]\r\nIn 1999, CIA chief George Tenet launched a plan to deal with al-Qaeda. The Counterterrorist Center, its new chief,\r\nCofer Black, and the center's bin Laden unit were the plan's developers and executors. Once it was prepared, Tenet\r\nassigned CIA intelligence chief Charles E. Allen to set up a \"Qaeda cell\" to oversee its tactical execution.[210] In\r\n2000, the CIA and USAF jointly ran a series of flights over Afghanistan with a small remote-controlled\r\nreconnaissance drone, the Predator; they obtained probable photos of bin Laden. Cofer Black and others became\r\nadvocates of arming the Predator with missiles to try to assassinate bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders.\r\nSeptember 11 attacks and its aftermath\r\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Intelligence_Agency\r\nPage 26 of 51\n\nU.S. Special Forces helping Northern Alliance troops away from a CIA-operated MI-17 Hip\r\nhelicopter at Bagram Airbase, 2002\r\nOn September 11, 2001, 19 al-Qaeda members hijacked four passenger jets within the Northeastern United States\r\nin a series of coordinated terrorist attacks. Two planes crashed into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in\r\nNew York City, the third into the Pentagon in Arlington County, Virginia, and the fourth inadvertently into a field\r\nnear Shanksville, Pennsylvania. The attacks cost the lives of 2,996 people (including the 19 hijackers), caused the\r\ndestruction of the Twin Towers, and damaged the western side of the Pentagon. Soon after 9/11, The New York\r\nTimes released a story stating that the CIA's New York field office was destroyed in the wake of the attacks.\r\nAccording to unnamed CIA sources, while first responders, military personnel and volunteers were conducting\r\nrescue efforts at the World Trade Center site, a special CIA team was searching the rubble for both digital and\r\npaper copies of classified documents. This was done according to well-rehearsed document recovery procedures\r\nput in place after the Iranian takeover of the United States Embassy in Tehran in 1979.\r\nWhile the CIA insists that those who conducted the attacks on 9/11 were not aware that the agency was operating\r\nat 7 World Trade Center under the guise of another (unidentified) federal agency, this center was the headquarters\r\nfor many notable criminal terrorism investigations. Though the New York field offices' main responsibilities were\r\nto monitor and recruit foreign officials stationed at the United Nations, the field office also handled the\r\ninvestigations of the August 1998 bombings of United States Embassies in East Africa and the October 2000\r\nbombing of the USS Cole.\r\n[211]\r\n Despite the fact that the 9/11 attacks may have damaged the CIA's New York\r\nbranch, and they had to loan office space from the U.S. Mission to the United Nations and other federal agencies,\r\nthere was an upside for the CIA.[211] In the months immediately following 9/11, there was a huge increase in the\r\nnumber of applications for CIA positions. According to CIA representatives that spoke with The New York Times,\r\npre-9/11 the agency received approximately 500 to 600 applications a week; in the months following 9/11, the\r\nagency received that number daily.\r\n[212]\r\nThe intelligence community as a whole, and especially the CIA, were involved in presidential planning\r\nimmediately after the 9/11 attacks. In his address to the nation at 8:30pm on September 11, 2001, George W. Bush\r\nmentioned the intelligence community: \"The search is underway for those who are behind these evil acts, I've\r\ndirected the full resources of our intelligence and law enforcement communities to find those responsible and\r\nbring them to justice.\"[213]\r\nThe involvement of the CIA in the newly coined \"War on Terror\" was further increased on September 15, 2001.\r\nDuring a meeting at Camp David, George W. Bush agreed to adopt a plan proposed by CIA director George Tenet.\r\nThis plan consisted of conducting a covert war in which CIA paramilitary officers would cooperate with anti-Taliban guerrillas inside Afghanistan. They would later be joined by small special operations forces teams which\r\nwould call in precision airstrikes on Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters. This plan was codified on September 16, 2001,\r\nwith Bush's signature of an official Memorandum of Notification that allowed the plan to proceed.[214]\r\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Intelligence_Agency\r\nPage 27 of 51\n\nU.S. Secretary of Defense and former Director of Central Intelligence Robert Gates meeting with\r\nRussian Minister of Defense and ex-KGB officer Sergei Ivanov, 2007\r\nOn November 25–27, 2001, Taliban prisoners revolted at the Qala-i-Jangi prison west of Mazar-e-Sharif. Though\r\nseveral days of struggle occurred between the Taliban prisoners and the Northern Alliance members present, the\r\nprisoners gained the upper hand and obtained North Alliance weapons. At some point during this period, Johnny\r\n\"Mike\" Spann, a CIA officer sent to question the prisoners, was beaten to death. He became the first American to\r\ndie in combat in the war in Afghanistan.[214]\r\nAfter 9/11, the CIA came under criticism for not having done enough to prevent the attacks. Tenet rejected the\r\ncriticism, citing the agency's planning efforts especially over the preceding two years. He also considered that the\r\nCIA's efforts had put the agency in a position to respond rapidly and effectively to the attacks, both in the \"Afghan\r\nsanctuary\" and in \"ninety-two countries around the world\".[215][216] The new strategy was called the \"Worldwide\r\nAttack Matrix\".[217]\r\nAnwar al-Awlaki, a Yemeni American U.S. citizen and al-Qaeda member, was killed on September 30, 2011, by a\r\nCIA drone strike in Yemen.[218][219] Al-Awlaki's 16-year-old son, a noncombatant and U.S. citizen, was also\r\nkilled in a separate strike.[219] Although approved by the Department of Justice, the strikes sparked discussion on\r\nthe legality of killing American citizens without trial.[218]\r\nFailures in intelligence analysis\r\nA major criticism is a failure to forestall the September 11 attacks. The 9/11 Commission Report identified failures\r\nin the IC as a whole. One problem, for example, was the FBI failing to \"connect the dots\" by sharing information\r\namong its decentralized field offices.\r\nThe report concluded that former DCI George Tenet failed to adequately prepare the agency to deal with the\r\ndanger posed by al-Qaeda prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001.[220] The report was finished in June 2005\r\nand was partially released to the public in an agreement with Congress, over the objections of current DCI General\r\nMichael Hayden. Hayden said its publication would \"consume time and attention revisiting ground that is already\r\nwell plowed.\"[221] Tenet disagreed with the report's conclusions, citing his planning efforts vis-à-vis al-Qaeda,\r\nparticularly from 1999.[222] Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence, Carl W. Ford Jr. remarked, \"As long as\r\nwe rate intelligence more for its volume than its quality, we will continue to turn out the $40 billion pile of crap\r\nwe have become famous for.\" He further stated, \"[The CIA is] broken. It's so broken that nobody wants to believe\r\nit.\"[223]\r\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Intelligence_Agency\r\nPage 28 of 51\n\nYugoslav wars\r\nIn 1989, Yugoslavia officially dissolved into six republics, with borders drawn along ethnic and historical lines:\r\nBosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia. This quickly dissolved into\r\nethnic tensions between Serbs and other Balkan ethnicities. In 1991, the CIA predicted that tension in the region\r\nwould evolve into a full-blown civil war.\r\n[224]\r\n In 1992, the U.S. embargoed the trafficking of weapons into both\r\nBosnia and Serbia in order to not prolong the war and the destruction of impacted communities. In May 1994, the\r\nCIA reported that the embargo had been ignored by countries such as Malaysia and Iran, who moved weapons into\r\nBosnia.[225]\r\nIraq War\r\nSeventy-two days after the 9/11 attacks, President Bush told Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to update the U.S.\r\nplan for an invasion of Iraq, but not to tell anyone. Rumsfeld asked Bush if he could bring DCI Tenet into the\r\nloop, to which Bush agreed.[226]\r\nThe CIA had put eight of their best officers in Kurdish territory in Northern Iraq. By December 2002, the CIA had\r\nclose to a dozen functional networks in Iraq[226]: 242  and would penetrate Iraq's SSO, tap the encrypted\r\ncommunications of the deputy prime minister, and recruit the bodyguard of Hussein's son[which?] as an agent. As\r\ntime passed, the CIA would become more frantic about the possibility of their networks being compromised. To\r\nthe CIA, the invasion had to occur before the end of February 2003 if their sources inside Hussein's government\r\nwere to survive. The rollup would happen as predicted; 37 CIA sources were recognized by their Thuraya satellite\r\ntelephones provided for them by the CIA.[226]: 337 \r\nFormer CIA deputy director Michael Morell apologized to Colin Powell for the CIA's erroneous\r\nassessments of Iraq's WMD programs.\r\n[227]\r\nThe case Colin Powell presented before the United Nations (purportedly proving an Iraqi WMD program) was\r\ninaccurate. DDCI John E. McLaughlin was part of a long discussion in the CIA about equivocation. McLaughlin,\r\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Intelligence_Agency\r\nPage 29 of 51\n\nwho would make, among others, the \"slam dunk\" presentation to the President, \"felt that they had to dare to be\r\nwrong to be clearer in their judgments\".[226]: 197  The al-Qaeda connection, for instance, was from a single source,\r\nextracted through torture, and was later denied. The sole source for the allegations of Iraqi mobile weapons\r\nlaboratories, code-named Curveball, was a known liar.\r\n[228]\r\n A postmortem of the intelligence failures in the lead-up to Iraq led by former DDCI Richard Kerr would conclude that the CIA had been a casualty of the Cold War,\r\nwiped out in a way \"analogous to the effect of the meteor strikes on the dinosaurs.\"[229]\r\nThe Senate Intelligence Committee report on CIA torture that details the use of torture during CIA\r\ndetention and interrogation\r\nThe opening days of the invasion of Iraq would see successes and defeats for the CIA. With its Iraq networks\r\ncompromised, and its strategic and tactical information shallow, and often wrong, the intelligence side of the\r\ninvasion itself would be a black eye for the agency. The CIA would see some success with its \"Scorpion\"\r\nparamilitary teams composed of CIA Special Activities Division paramilitary officers, along with friendly Iraqi\r\npartisans. CIA SAD officers would also help the U.S. 10th Special Forces.\r\n[226][230][231]\r\n The occupation of Iraq\r\nwould be a low point in the history of the CIA. At the largest CIA station in the world, officers would rotate\r\nthrough 1–3-month tours. In Iraq, almost 500 transient officers would be trapped inside the Green Zone while Iraq\r\nstation chiefs would rotate with only a little less frequency.\r\n[232]\r\nSenior functions transferred to Director of National Intelligence\r\nThe Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 created the office of the Director of National\r\nIntelligence (DNI), who took over some of the government and intelligence community (IC)-wide functions that\r\nhad previously been the CIA's.[233] The DNI manages the United States Intelligence Community and in so doing\r\nit manages the intelligence cycle. Among the functions that moved to the DNI were the preparation of estimates\r\nreflecting the consolidated opinion of the 16 IC agencies, and preparation of briefings for the president. On July\r\n30, 2008, President Bush issued Executive Order 13470[234], amending Executive Order 12333 to strengthen the\r\nrole of the DNI.[235]\r\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Intelligence_Agency\r\nPage 30 of 51\n\nPreviously, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) oversaw the Intelligence Community, serving as the\r\npresident's principal intelligence advisor, additionally serving as head of the CIA. The DCI's title now is \"Director\r\nof the Central Intelligence Agency\" (D/CIA), serving as head of the CIA.\r\nCurrently, the CIA reports to the Director of National Intelligence. Before the establishment of the DNI, the CIA\r\nreported to the president, with informational briefings to congressional committees. The National Security Advisor\r\nis a permanent member of the National Security Council, responsible for briefing the president with pertinent\r\ninformation collected by all U.S. intelligence agencies, including the National Security Agency, the Drug\r\nEnforcement Administration, etc. All 16 Intelligence Community agencies are under the authority of the Director\r\nof National Intelligence.\r\nOperation Neptune Spear\r\nOn May 1, 2011, President Barack Obama announced that Osama bin Laden was killed earlier that day by \"a\r\nsmall team of Americans\" operating in Abbottabad, Pakistan, during a CIA operation.[236][237] The raid was\r\nexecuted from a CIA forward base in Afghanistan by elements of the U.S. Navy's Naval Special Warfare\r\nDevelopment Group and CIA paramilitary operatives.[238]\r\nThe operation was a result of years of intelligence work that included the CIA's capture and interrogation of\r\nKhalid Sheik Mohammad, which led to the identity of a courier of bin Laden's,[239][240][241] the tracking of the\r\ncourier to the compound by Special Activities Division paramilitary operatives and the establishing of a CIA safe\r\nhouse to provide critical tactical intelligence for the operation.[242][243][244]\r\nThe CIA ran a fake vaccination clinic in an attempt to locate Osama bin Laden. This may have negatively affected\r\nthe campaign against polio in Pakistan and Afghanistan. In some rural areas, vaccination workers were banned by\r\nthe Taliban or chased away by locals.[245][246] There have been many deadly attacks by militants against\r\nvaccination workers in Pakistan.[247] Efforts to eradicate polio have furthermore been disrupted by American\r\ndrone strikes.\r\n[245]\r\nSyrian Civil War\r\nPresident Barack Obama and CIA Director John Brennan at the GCC-U.S. Summit in Riyadh in\r\nApril 2016. Saudi Arabia was involved in the CIA-led Timber Sycamore covert operation.\r\nUnder the aegis of operation Timber Sycamore and other clandestine activities, CIA operatives and U.S. special\r\noperations troops have trained and armed nearly 10,000 rebel fighters at a cost of $1 billion a year.\r\n[248]\r\n The CIA\r\nhas been sending weapons to anti-government rebels in Syria since at least 2012.[249] These weapons have been\r\n0:00\r\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Intelligence_Agency\r\nPage 31 of 51\n\nreportedly falling into hands of extremists, such as al-Nusra Front and ISIL.\r\n[250][251][252]\r\n Around February 2017,\r\nthe CIA was instructed to halt military aid to Syrian rebels (Free Syrian Army or FSA), which also included\r\ntraining, ammunition, guided missiles, and salaries. Sources believe that the aid freeze was related to concerns that\r\nweapons and funds will fall into the hands of ISIL. On April 6, 2017, Al Jazeera reported that funding to the FSA\r\nwas partially restored. Based on the information provided by two FSA sources, the new military operation room\r\nwill receive its funds from the coalition \"Friends of Syria.\" The coalition consists of members from the U.S.,\r\nTurkey, Western Europe, and Gulf states, which previously supported the military operation known as MOM.[253]\r\nIt was reported in July 2017 that President Donald Trump had ordered a \"phasing out\" of the CIA's support for\r\nanti-Assad rebels.[254]\r\nReorganization\r\nOn 6 March 2015, the office of the D/CIA issued an unclassified edition of a statement by the director, titled \"Our\r\nAgency's Blueprint for the Future\", as a press release for public consumption. The press release announced\r\nsweeping plans for the reorganization and reform of the CIA, which the director believes will bring the CIA more\r\nin line with the Agency doctrine called the \"Strategic Direction\". Among the principal changes disclosed include\r\nthe establishment of a new directorate, the Directorate of Digital Innovation. Other changes which were\r\nannounced include the formation of a Talent Development Center of Excellence, the enhancement and expansion\r\nof the CIA University and the creation of the office of the Chancellor to head the CIA University in order to\r\nconsolidate and unify recruitment and training efforts. The National Clandestine Service (NCS) will be reverting\r\nto its original Directorate name, the Directorate of Operations. The Directorate of Intelligence is also being\r\nrenamed; it will now be the Directorate of Analysis.[255]\r\nDrones\r\nA new policy introduced by President Barack Obama removed the authority of the CIA to launch drone attacks\r\nand allowed these attacks only under Department of Defense command. This change was reversed by President\r\nDonald Trump, who authorized CIA drone strikes on suspected terrorists.[256]\r\nCrypto AG ownership\r\nFor decades, until 2018, the CIA secretly owned Crypto AG, a small Swiss company that made encryption\r\ndevices, in association with West German intelligence. The company sold compromised encryption devices to\r\nover 120 countries, allowing Western intelligence to eavesdrop on communications that the users believed to be\r\nsecure.[257][258]\r\nOpen-source intelligence\r\nUntil the 2004 reorganization of the intelligence community, one of the \"services of common concern\" that the\r\nCIA provided was open-source intelligence from the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS).[259] FBIS,\r\nwhich had absorbed the Joint Publication Research Service, a military organization that translated documents,[260]\r\nmoved into the National Open Source Enterprise under the Director of National Intelligence.\r\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Intelligence_Agency\r\nPage 32 of 51\n\nDuring the Reagan administration, Michael Sekora (assigned to the DIA), worked with agencies across the\r\nintelligence community, including the CIA, to develop and deploy a technology-based competitive strategy system\r\ncalled Project Socrates. Project Socrates was designed to utilize open-source intelligence gathering almost\r\nexclusively. The technology-focused Socrates system supported such programs as the Strategic Defense Initiative\r\nin addition to private sector projects.[261][262]\r\nIncreasingly, the CIA is a major consumer of social media intelligence.[263] CIA launched a Twitter account in\r\nJune 2014.[264] CIA also launched its own .onion website to collect anonymous feedback.[265]\r\nOutsourcing and privatization\r\nMany of the duties and functions of Intelligence Community activities, not the CIA alone, are being outsourced\r\nand privatized. Mike McConnell, former Director of National Intelligence, was about to publicize an investigation\r\nreport of outsourcing by U.S. intelligence agencies, as required by Congress.[266] However, this report was then\r\nclassified.[267][268] Hillhouse speculates that this report includes requirements for the CIA to report:[267][269]\r\ndifferent standards for government employees and contractors;\r\ncontractors providing similar services to government workers;\r\nanalysis of costs of contractors vs. employees;\r\nan assessment of the appropriateness of outsourced activities;\r\nan estimate of the number of contracts and contractors;\r\ncomparison of compensation for contractors and government employees;\r\nattrition analysis of government employees;\r\ndescriptions of positions to be converted back to the employee model;\r\nan evaluation of accountability mechanisms;\r\nan evaluation of procedures for \"conducting oversight of contractors to ensure identification and\r\nprosecution of criminal violations, financial waste, fraud, or other abuses committed by contractors or\r\ncontract personnel\"; and\r\nan \"identification of best practices of accountability mechanisms within service contracts.\"\r\nAccording to investigative journalist Tim Shorrock:\r\n...what we have today with the intelligence business is something far more systemic: senior officials\r\nleaving their national security and counterterrorism jobs for positions where they essentially perform\r\nthe same jobs they once held at the CIA, the NSA, and other agencies – but for double or triple the\r\nsalary and profit. It's a privatization of the highest order, in which our collective memory and\r\nexperience in intelligence – our crown jewels of spying, so to speak – are owned by corporate America.\r\nThere is essentially no government oversight of this private sector at the heart of our intelligence\r\nempire. And the lines between public and private have become so blurred as to be nonexistent.[270][271]\r\nCongress had required an outsourcing report by March 30, 2008:[269]\r\nThe Director of National Intelligence has been granted the authority to increase the number of positions\r\n(FTEs) on elements in the Intelligence Community by up to 10% should there be a determination that\r\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Intelligence_Agency\r\nPage 33 of 51\n\nactivities performed by a contractor should be done by a U.S. government employee.\"[269]\r\nPart of the problem, according to author Tim Weiner, is that political appointees designated by recent presidential\r\nadministrations have sometimes been underqualified or overzealous politically. Large purges have taken place in\r\nthe upper echelons of the CIA, and when those talented individuals are pushed out the door, they have frequently\r\ngone on to found new independent intelligence companies which can suck up CIA talent.[122] Another part of the\r\ncontracting problem comes from congressional restrictions on the number of employees within the IC. According\r\nto Hillhouse, this resulted in 70% of the de facto workforce of the CIA's National Clandestine Service being made\r\nup of contractors. \"After years of contributing to the increasing reliance upon contractors, Congress is now\r\nproviding a framework for the conversion of contractors into federal government employees – more or less.\"[269]\r\nThe number of independent contractors hired by the federal government across the intelligence community has\r\nskyrocketed. So, not only does the CIA have trouble hiring, but those hires will frequently leave their permanent\r\nemploy for shorter-term contract gigs which have much higher pay and allow for more career mobility.\r\n[122]\r\nAs with most government agencies, building equipment often is contracted. The National Reconnaissance Office\r\n(NRO), responsible for the development and operation of airborne and spaceborne sensors, long was a joint\r\noperation of the CIA and the United States Department of Defense. The NRO, then under DCI authority,\r\ncontracted more of the design that had been their tradition, and to a contractor without extensive reconnaissance\r\nexperience, Boeing. The next-generation satellite Future Imagery Architecture project \"how does heaven look,\"\r\nwhich missed objectives after $4 billion in cost overruns, was the result of this contract.[272][273]\r\nSome of the cost problems associated with intelligence come from one agency, or even a group within an agency,\r\nnot accepting the compartmented security practices for individual projects, requiring expensive duplication.[274]\r\nControversies\r\nThe CIA has been the subject of numerous controversies. The agency ran an operation code-named \"CHAOS\" that\r\nran from 1967 to 1974 where they routinely performed surveillance on Americans who were a part of various\r\npeace groups protesting the Vietnam War. The operation was authorized by order of President Lyndon B. Johnson\r\nin October 1967, as the CIA gathered the information of 300,000 American people and organizations and\r\nextensive files on 7,200 citizens. The program was exposed by the Church Committee in 1975 as a part of the\r\ninvestigation into the Watergate scandal.\r\n[223][275]\r\nThe CIA also conducted a secret program called MKUltra, which ran from the early 1950s to the 1970s and\r\ninvolved illegal human experimentation to develop mind-control techniques. Subjects were often unaware they\r\nwere part of the experiments, which included the administration of psychoactive drugs like LSD and other\r\nmethods of psychological manipulation.\r\n[276][277]\r\n The program, exposed in the 1970s, led to widespread public\r\noutrage and calls for greater oversight of intelligence agencies.[278]\r\nThe CIA was also linked to the Iran–Contra Affair wherein missiles were sold to the Iranian government as an\r\nexchange for the release of hostages and the profits the agency made from selling the weapons at a marked-up\r\nprice went towards assisting the contras in Nicaragua.\r\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Intelligence_Agency\r\nPage 34 of 51\n\nAnother source of controversy has been the CIA's role in Operation Condor, which was a United States-backed\r\ncampaign of repression and state terrorism involving intelligence operations, CIA-backed coup d'états and\r\nassassinations against leaders in South America from 1968 to 1989. By the Operation's end in 1989, up to 80,000\r\npeople had been killed.[279] Similarly, the CIA was complicit in the actions of death squads in El Salvador and\r\nHonduras.\r\n[280][281]\r\nAn additional controversy surrounds the Bush Administration's claim that Iraq had \"weapons of mass destruction\"\r\nin 2002, and again in 2003 as justification for invading the Middle Eastern country. The CIA went along with the\r\nclaim despite contradicting the president in testimony to the Senate Intelligence Committee in 2002. They\r\nproduced a national intelligence estimate claiming that if the Iraqi government was able to acquire \"sufficient\r\nfissile material from abroad, it could make nuclear weapons within a year\".[282]\r\nSee also\r\nAbu Omar case\r\nBlue sky memo\r\nChurch Committee\r\nCIA's relationship with the United States Military\r\nClassified information in the United States\r\nEnhanced interrogation techniques\r\nFreedom of Information Act (United States)\r\nIntellipedia\r\nKryptos\r\nList of intelligence agencies\r\nNational Intelligence Board\r\nOperation Peter Pan\r\nReagan Doctrine\r\nTitle 32 of the Code of Federal Regulations\r\nU.S. Army and CIA interrogation manuals\r\nUnited States Department of Homeland Security\r\nUnited States Intelligence Community\r\nVault 7\r\nThe World Factbook, published by the CIA\r\nProject Endgame\r\nNotes\r\n1. ^ \"CIA Observes 50th Anniversary of Original Headquarters Building Cornerstone Laying\". Central\r\nIntelligence Agency. 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Retrieved September 30, 2020.\r\n100. ^ Jones, Maggie (June 30, 2016). \"The Secrets in Guatemala's Bones\". The New York Times. Archived from\r\nthe original on December 15, 2016. Retrieved February 15, 2017.\r\n101. ^ Jump up to: a\r\n \r\nb\r\n Immerman 1982, pp. 161–170.\r\n102. ^ Jump up to: a\r\n \r\nb\r\n \r\nc\r\n Immerman 1982, pp. 173–178.\r\n103. ^ Cullather, Nick (October 9, 2006). Secret History: The CIA's Classified Account of Its Operations in\r\nGuatemala, 1952–1954 (Second ed.). Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-0-8047-5468-2. Archived from\r\nthe original on March 20, 2016. Retrieved April 17, 2016.\r\n104. ^ Gleijeses, Piero (1992). Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944–1954.\r\nPrinceton University Press. ISBN 0-691-02556-8. Archived from the original on August 31, 2023.\r\nRetrieved August 31, 2023.\r\n105. ^ Streeter, Stephen M. (2000). Managing the Counterrevolution: The United States and Guatemala, 1954–\r\n1961. Ohio University Press. ISBN 978-0-89680-215-5. Archived from the original on June 3, 2016.\r\nRetrieved April 17, 2016.\r\n106. ^ Navarro, Mireya (February 26, 1999). \"Guatemalan Army Waged 'Genocide,' New Report Finds\". The\r\nNew York Times. Archived from the original on February 27, 2017. Retrieved February 15, 2017.\r\n107. ^\r\n[97][103][104][105][106]\r\n108. ^ Jump up to: a\r\n \r\nb\r\n Weiner 2007, p. 139.\r\n109. ^ Wilford 2024, p. 91.\r\n110. ^ Weiner 2007, p. 143.\r\n111. ^ Weiner 2007, p. 145.\r\n112. ^ Weiner 2007, p. 146.\r\n113. ^ Weiner 2007, p. 170.\r\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Intelligence_Agency\r\nPage 40 of 51\n\n114. ^ Weiner 2007, p. 148.\r\n115. ^ Roadnight, Andrew (2002). United States Policy towards Indonesia in the Truman and Eisenhower Years.\r\nNew York: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 162. ISBN 978-0-333-79315-2.\r\n116. ^ Weiner 2007, p. 153.\r\n117. ^ Weiner 2007, p. 154.\r\n118. ^ Reid 2023, p. 4.\r\n119. ^ Reid 2023, pp. 261, 303.\r\n120. ^ Reid 2023, pp. 385, 397–398.\r\n121. ^ Weiner 2007, p. 163.\r\n122. ^ Jump up to: a\r\n \r\nb\r\n \r\nc\r\n Weiner, Tim (2007). Legacy of ashes: The history of the CIA (1st ed.). New York:\r\nDoubleday. ISBN 978-0-385-51445-3.\r\n123. ^ Snow, Anita (June 27, 2007). \"CIA Plot to Kill Castro Detailed\". The Washington Post. Washington, DC.\r\nAP. Archived from the original on March 20, 2022. Retrieved April 17, 2018.\r\n124. ^ Weiner 2007, p. 161.\r\n125. ^ Jeffreys-Jones 2022, p. 68.\r\n126. ^ Bolender, Keith (2012). Cuba Under Siege: American Policy, the Revolution, and its People. New York:\r\nPalgrave Macmillan. pp. x, 14, 18–20, 53–57, 63–64, et passim. doi:10.1057/9781137275554. ISBN 978-1-\r\n137-27554-7.\r\n127. ^ Domínguez, Jorge I. (April 2000). \"The @#$%\u0026 Missile Crisis\" (PDF). Diplomatic History. 24 (2).\r\nOxford/Malden: Blackwell Publishers/Oxford University Press: 305–316. doi:10.1111/0145-2096.00214.\r\nISSN 0145-2096. Archived (PDF) from the original on September 7, 2020. Retrieved September 6, 2019.\r\n“On the afternoon of 16 October... Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy convened in his office a meeting\r\non Operation Mongoose, the code name for a U.S. policy of sabotage and related covert operation aimed\r\nat Cuba... The Kennedy administration returned to its policy of sponsoring terrorism against Cuba as the\r\nconfrontation with the Soviet Union lessened... Only once in these nearly thousand pages of documentation\r\ndid a U.S. official raise something that resembled a faint moral objection to U.S.-government sponsored\r\nterrorism.”\r\n128. ^ Jump up to: a\r\n \r\nb\r\n Schoultz, Lars (2009). \"State Sponsored Terrorism\". That infernal little Cuban republic:\r\nthe United States and the Cuban Revolution. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. pp. 170–211.\r\nISBN 9780807888605. Archived from the original on August 15, 2021. Retrieved February 2, 2020. “What\r\nmore could be done? How about a program of sabotage focused on blowing up 'such targets as refineries,\r\npower plants, micro wave stations, radio and TV installations, strategic highway bridges and railroad\r\nfacilities, military and naval installations and equipment, certain industrial plants and sugar refineries.'\r\nThe CIA proposed just that approach a month after the Bay of Pigs, and the State Department endorsed the\r\nproposal... In early November, six months after the Bay of Pigs, JFK authorized the CIA's 'Program of\r\nCovert Action', now dubbed Operation Mongoose, and named Lansdale its chief of operations. A few days\r\nlater, President Kennedy told a Seattle audience, 'We cannot, as a free nation, compete with our\r\nadversaries in tactics of terror, assassination, false promises, counterfeit mobs and crises.' Perhaps – but\r\nthe Mongoose decision indicated that he was willing to try.”\r\n129. ^ Prados, John; Jimenez-Bacardi, Arturo, eds. (October 3, 2019). Kennedy and Cuba: Operation\r\nMongoose. National Security Archive (Report). Washington, D.C.: The George Washington University.\r\nArchived from the original on November 2, 2019. Retrieved April 3, 2020. “The Kennedy administration\r\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Intelligence_Agency\r\nPage 41 of 51\n\nhad been quick to set up a Cuba Task Force—with strong representation from CIA's Directorate of Plans—\r\nand on August 31 that unit decided to adopt a public posture of ignoring Castro while attacking civilian\r\ntargets inside Cuba: 'our covert activities would now be directed toward the destruction of targets\r\nimportant to the [Cuban] economy' (Document 4)...While acting through Cuban revolutionary groups with\r\npotential for real resistance to Castro, the task force 'will do all we can to identify and suggest targets\r\nwhose destruction will have the maximum economic impact.' The memorandum showed no concern for\r\ninternational law or the unspoken nature of these operations as terrorist attacks.”\r\n130. ^ Lansdale, Edward (January 18, 1962). Smith, Louis J. (ed.). Program Review by the Chief of Operations,\r\nOperation Mongoose. Foreign Relations of the United States (Report). 1961–1963. Vol. X, Cuba.\r\nWashington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office. Archived from the original on October 12,\r\n2017. Retrieved February 19, 2020.\r\n131. ^ Jump up to: a\r\n \r\nb\r\n Franklin, Jane (2016). Cuba and the U.S. empire: a chronological history. New York:\r\nNew York University Press. pp. 45–63, 388–392, et passim. ISBN 9781583676059. Archived from the\r\noriginal on October 19, 2020. Retrieved February 2, 2020.\r\n132. ^ Jump up to: a\r\n \r\nb\r\n Erlich, Reese (2008). Dateline Havana: the real story of U.S. policy and the future of\r\nCuba. Abingdon/New York: Routledge. pp. 26–29. ISBN 9781317261605. Archived from the original on\r\nOctober 20, 2020. Retrieved February 2, 2020. “Officially, the United States favored only peaceful means\r\nto pressure Cuba. In reality, U.S. leaders also used violent, terrorist tactics... Operation Mongoose began\r\nin November 1961... U.S. operatives attacked civilian targets, including sugar refineries, saw mills, and\r\nmolasses storage tanks. Some 400 CIA officers worked on the project in Washington and Miami...\r\nOperation Mongoose and various other terrorist operations caused property damage and injured and\r\nkilled Cubans. But they failed to achieve their goal of regime change.”\r\n133. ^ Brenner, Philip (2002). \"Turning History on its Head\". National Security Archive. Washington, D.C.: The\r\nGeorge Washington University. Archived from the original on August 24, 2017. Retrieved January 2, 2020.\r\n“..in October 1962 the United States was waging a war against Cuba that involved several assassination\r\nattempts against the Cuban leader, terrorist acts against Cuban civilians, and sabotage of Cuban\r\nfactories.”\r\n134. ^ Stepick, Alex; Stepick, Carol Dutton (2002). \"Power and Identity\". In Suárez-Orozco, Marcelo M.; Páez,\r\nMariela M. (eds.). Latinos: Remaking America. Berkeley/London: University of California Press, Harvard\r\nUniversity Center for Latin American Studies. pp. 75–81. ISBN 978-0520258273. Archived from the\r\noriginal on June 9, 2020. Retrieved February 2, 2020. “Through the 1960s, the private University of\r\nMiami had the largest Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) station in the world, outside of the organization's\r\nheadquarters in Virginia. With perhaps as many as twelve thousand Cubans in Miami on its payroll at one\r\npoint in the early 1960s, the CIA was one of the largest employers in the state of Florida. It supported what\r\nwas described as the third largest navy in the world and over fifty front businesses: CIA boat shops, gun\r\nshops, travel agencies, detective agencies, and real estate agencies”\r\n135. ^ Bohning, Don (2005). The Castro obsession: U.S. covert operations against Cuba, 1959-1965 (1st ed.).\r\nWashington, D.C.: University of Nebraska Press/Potomac Books. pp. 1, 84. ISBN 9781574886757.\r\nArchived from the original on October 25, 2020. Retrieved February 2, 2020. “By the end of 1962 the CIA\r\nstation at an abandoned Navy air facility south of Miami had become the largest in the world outside its\r\nLangley, Virginia headquarters... Eventually some four hundred clandestine service officers toiled there...\r\nAdditional CIA officers worked the Cuba account at Langley and elsewhere.”\r\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Intelligence_Agency\r\nPage 42 of 51\n\n136. ^ Miller, Nicola (2002). \"The Real Gap in the Cuban Missile Crisis: The Post-Cold-War Historiography\r\nand Continued Omission of Cuba\". In Carter, Dale; Clifton, Robin (eds.). War and Cold War in American\r\nforeign policy, 1942–62. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 211–237. doi:10.1057/9781403913852.\r\nISBN 9781403913852. Archived from the original on August 29, 2022. Retrieved February 2, 2020.\r\n137. ^ Jump up to: a\r\n \r\nb\r\n Brenner, Philip (March 1990). \"Cuba and the Missile Crisis\". Journal of Latin American\r\nStudies. 22 (1–2). Cambridge University Press: 115–142. doi:10.1017/S0022216X00015133.\r\nS2CID 145075193. Archived (PDF) from the original on September 7, 2020. Retrieved September 2, 2019.\r\n“While Operation Mongoose was discontinued early in 1963, terrorist actions were reauthorised by the\r\npresident. In October 1963, 13 major CIA actions against Cuba were approved for the next two months\r\nalone, including the sabotage of an electric power plant, a sugar mill and an oil refinery. Authorised CIA\r\nraids continued at least until 1965.”\r\n138. ^ Garthoff, Raymond (2011). Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings\r\nInstitution. p. 144. ISBN 9780815717393. Archived from the original on August 8, 2020. Retrieved\r\nFebruary 2, 2020. “One of Nixon's first acts in office in 1969 was to direct the CIA to intensify covert\r\noperations against Cuba”\r\n139. ^ Jump up to: a\r\n \r\nb\r\n \r\nc\r\n \"Cuba 'plane bomber' was CIA agent\". BBC News. London: BBC. May 11, 2005.\r\nArchived from the original on February 22, 2006. Retrieved September 7, 2020. “The documents, released\r\nby George Washington University's National Security Archive, show that Mr Posada, now in his 70s, was\r\non the CIA payroll from the 1960s until mid-1976.”\r\n140. ^ Jump up to: a\r\n \r\nb\r\n Weiner, Tim (May 9, 2005). \"Cuban Exile Could Test U.S. Definition of Terrorist\". The\r\nNew York Times. Archived from the original on July 15, 2015. Retrieved September 8, 2019.\r\n141. ^ Jump up to: a\r\n \r\nb\r\n \r\nc\r\n Kornbluh, Peter; White, Yvette, eds. (October 5, 2006). Bombing of Cuban Jetliner 30\r\nYears Later. National Security Archive (Report). Washington, D.C.: The George Washington University.\r\nArchived from the original on August 24, 2017. Retrieved April 3, 2020. “Among the documents posted is\r\nan annotated list of four volumes of still-secret records on Posada's career with the CIA, his acts of\r\nviolence, and his suspected involvement in the bombing of Cubana flight 455 on October 6, 1976, which\r\ntook the lives of all 73 people on board, many of them teenagers.”\r\n142. ^ Gordon, Lincoln (March 27, 1964). \"Top Secret Cable from Rio de Janeiro\" (PDF). NSA Archives.\r\nArchived (PDF) from the original on March 22, 2019. Retrieved May 4, 2019.\r\n143. ^ \"Status Report on Tibetan Operations\". Office of the Historian. January 26, 1968. Archived from the\r\noriginal on November 11, 2020. Retrieved June 14, 2017.\r\n144. ^ Arpi, Claude (January 8, 2003). \"The Phantoms of Chittagong\". Rediff.com. Archived from the original\r\non February 10, 2003.\r\n145. ^ Patti, Archimedes L. A. (1980). Why Viet Nam?: Prelude to America's albatross. University of California\r\nPress. ISBN 0-520-04156-9.\r\n146. ^ Adams, Sam (1994). War of Numbers: An Intelligence Memoir. Steerforth Press. ISBN 1-883642-23-X.\r\n147. ^ Weiner 2007, p. 213.\r\n148. ^ Weiner 2007, p. 237.\r\n149. ^ Jeffreys-Jones 2022, p. 82.\r\n150. ^ Weiner 2007, p. 285.\r\n151. ^ Weiner 2007, p. 248.\r\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Intelligence_Agency\r\nPage 43 of 51\n\n152. ^ Brysk, Meade \u0026 Shafir 2016; Gordon 2014; Jeffreys-Jones 2022, p. 85; Kuzmarov 2009; McCoy 2007;\r\nSchwab 2014; Simpson 2003; Valcourt 1989.\r\n153. ^ Jump up to: a\r\n \r\nb\r\n \r\nc\r\n Frum, David (2000). How We Got Here: The '70s. New York: Basic Books. pp. 49–51.\r\nISBN 0-465-04195-7.\r\n154. ^ Weiner 2007, p. 319.\r\n155. ^ \"Transcript of a recording of a meeting between President Richard Nixon and H. R. Haldeman in the\r\noval office\". Wyzant. June 23, 1972. Archived from the original on January 12, 2012. Retrieved July 4,\r\n2008.\r\n156. ^ \"Nixon Explains His Taped Cryptic Remark About Helms\". The New York Times. March 12, 1976.\r\nArchived from the original on August 9, 2019. Retrieved June 13, 2019.\r\n157. ^ Gray III, L. Patrick; Gray, Ed (2008). In Nixon's Web: A Year in the Crosshairs of Watergate. Times\r\nBooks/Henry Holt. ISBN 978-0-8050-8256-2. Archived from the original on July 20, 2008. Retrieved June\r\n19, 2010.\r\n158. ^ Weiner 2007, p. 322.\r\n159. ^ Weiner 2007, p. 323.\r\n160. ^ Weiner Tim 2007A Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA New York Doubleday p. 339\r\n161. ^ Carl Colby (director) (September 2011). The Man Nobody Knew: In Search of My Father, CIA Spymaster\r\nWilliam Colby (Motion picture). New York City: Act 4 Entertainment. Archived from the original on April\r\n9, 2019. Retrieved September 18, 2011.\r\n162. ^ Perlstein, Rick (2014). The invisible bridge : the fall of Nixon and the rise of Reagan. Internet Archive.\r\nNew York : Simon \u0026 Schuster. p. 330. ISBN 978-1-4767-8241-6.\r\n163. ^ Weiner 2007, p. 347.\r\n164. ^ Bronner, Michael (December 11, 2014). \"Our Man in Africa\". Foreign Policy. Archived from the original\r\non April 16, 2017. Retrieved March 6, 2017.\r\n165. ^ Coll, Steve (2004). Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the\r\nSoviet Invasion to September 10, 2001. Penguin Group. p. 238. ISBN 9781594200076.\r\n166. ^ Walsh, Declan (July 25, 2010). \"Afghanistan war logs: US covered up fatal Taliban missile strike on\r\nChinook\". The Guardian. Archived from the original on December 5, 2016. Retrieved December 14, 2016.\r\n167. ^ Coll, Steve (2004). Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the\r\nSoviet Invasion to September 10, 2001. Penguin Group. pp. 144–145. ISBN 9781594200076.\r\n168. ^ \"Story of US, CIA and Taliban\". The Brunei Times. 2009. Archived from the original on December 5,\r\n2013. Retrieved December 16, 2013.\r\n169. ^ West, Julian (September 23, 2001). \"Pakistan's 'godfathers of the Taliban' hold the key to hunt for bin\r\nLaden\". The Daily Telegraph. London. Archived from the original on January 10, 2022. Retrieved April 9,\r\n2011.\r\n170. ^ Coll, Steve (2004). Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the\r\nSoviet Invasion to September 10, 2001. Penguin Group. pp. 233, 337–338. ISBN 9781594200076.\r\n171. ^ Weiner 2007, p. 380.\r\n172. ^ \"US Concedes Contras Linked to Drugs, But Denies Leadership Involved\". Associated Press. April 17,\r\n1986. Archived from the original on January 29, 2017. Retrieved May 22, 2017.\r\n173. ^ Delaval, Craig (2000). \"Cocaine, Conspiracy Theories \u0026 the C.I.A. in Central America\". Frontline. PBS.\r\nArchived from the original on April 27, 2017. Retrieved May 22, 2017.\r\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Intelligence_Agency\r\nPage 44 of 51\n\n174. ^ Campbell, Colin (September 30, 1982). \"Key Phalangist Aides Implicated in Operation that Led to\r\nKillings\". The New York Times. Retrieved January 19, 2026. “Bashir Gemayel, Mr. Hobeika, who was his\r\nintelligence chief, and at least one close political adviser later had regular contacts with American officials\r\nand members of the Central Intelligence Agency.”\r\n175. ^ Weiner 2007, p. 397.\r\n176. ^ Weiner 2007, p. 468.\r\n177. ^ Davies, Richard T. (2004). \"The CIA and the Polish Crisis of 1980–1981\". Journal of Cold War Studies.\r\n6 (3): 120–123. doi:10.1162/1520397041447346. S2CID 57563775.\r\n178. ^ Domber, Gregory F. (2008). Supporting the Revolution: America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold\r\nWar in Poland, 1981–1989. George Washington University. p. 199. ISBN 9780549385165. Archived from\r\nthe original on November 19, 2016. Retrieved April 17, 2016., revised as Domber 2014, p. 110 Archived\r\nJuly 27, 2020, at the Wayback Machine.\r\n179. ^ Domber, Gregory F. (August 28, 2014). \"What Putin Misunderstands about American Power\". University\r\nof California Press Blog. University of North Carolina Press. Archived from the original on September 2,\r\n2014. Retrieved April 17, 2016.\r\n180. ^ MacEachin, Douglas J. (June 28, 2008). \"US Intelligence and the Polish Crisis 1980–1981\". Central\r\nIntelligence Agency. Archived from the original on June 13, 2007.\r\n181. ^ Bernstein, Carl (June 24, 2001). \"The Holy Alliance\". Time. Archived from the original on September 5,\r\n2017. Retrieved August 26, 2017 – via CarlBernstein.com.\r\n182. ^ Sussman, Gerald (2010). Branding Democracy: U.S. Regime Change in Post-Soviet Eastern Europe.\r\nNew York: Peter Lang. p. 128. ISBN 978-1-43310-530-2.\r\n183. ^ Arsanjani, Mahnoush H.; Cogan, Jacob Katz; Sloane, Robert D.; Wiessner, Siegfried, eds. (2011).\r\nLooking to the Future: Essays on International Law in Honor of W. Michael Reisman. Leiden \u0026 Boston:\r\nMartinus Nijhoff Publishers. ISBN 978-9-00417-361-3.\r\n184. ^ Daugherty, William J. (2004). Executive Secrets: Covert Action and the Presidency. Lexington:\r\nUniversity Press of Kentucky. pp. 201–203. ISBN 978-0-81312-334-9.\r\n185. ^ Thiel, Rainer (2010). Nested Games of External Democracy Promotion: The United States and the Polish\r\nLiberalization 1980–1989. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. p. 273. ISBN 978-3-53117-769-\r\n4.\r\n186. ^ Pedrick, Clare (November 14, 1990). \"CIA Organized Secret Army in Western Europe\". The Washington\r\nPost. ISSN 0190-8286. Archived from the original on March 24, 2023. Retrieved January 14, 2021.\r\n187. ^ Agee, Philip; Wolf, Louis (1978). Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe.\r\n188. ^ \"Terrorists 'helped by CIA' to stop rise of left in Italy\". TheGuardian.com. March 26, 2001. Archived\r\nfrom the original on May 29, 2015. Retrieved July 30, 2023.\r\n189. ^ \"Strage di Piazza Fontana spunta un agente Usa\". February 11, 1998. Archived from the original on\r\nMarch 18, 2023. Retrieved July 30, 2023.\r\n190. ^ \"Il Terrorismo, le stragi ed il contesto storico-politico\" (PDF). August 19, 2006. Archived from the\r\noriginal (PDF) on August 19, 2006.\r\n191. ^ Mehtap Söyler (2015). The Turkish Deep State State Consolidation, Civil Military Relations And\r\nDemocracy.\r\n192. ^ Fernandes, Desmond; Ozden, Iskender (Spring 2001). \"United States and NATO Inspired 'Psychological\r\nWarfare Operations' Against The 'Kurdish Communist Threat' in Turkey\" (PDF). Variant. 12. Archived\r\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Intelligence_Agency\r\nPage 45 of 51\n\n(PDF) from the original on January 17, 2023. Retrieved July 30, 2023.\r\n193. ^ Weiner 2007, p. 428.\r\n194. ^ Weiner 2007, p. 429.\r\n195. ^ Weiner 2007, p. 430.\r\n196. ^ Jeffreys-Jones 2022, pp. 142–143.\r\n197. ^ Jump up to: a\r\n \r\nb\r\n Weiner, Tim (2008). Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA. New York: Anchor Books.\r\np. 527.\r\n198. ^ Weiner, Tim (2008). The Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA. New York: Anchor Books. p. 546.\r\n199. ^ Weiner, Tim (2008). The Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA. New York: Anchor Books. p. 547.\r\n200. ^ Weiner 2007, p. 459.\r\n201. ^ Weiner 2007, p. 465.\r\n202. ^ Weiner 2007, p. 466.\r\n203. ^ Weiner 2007, p. 470.\r\n204. ^ Weiner 2007, p. 448.\r\n205. ^ Weiner 2007, p. 450.\r\n206. ^ \"FBI History: Famous Cases – Aldrich Hazen Ames\". Federal Bureau of Investigation. Archived from the\r\noriginal on June 11, 2008. Retrieved July 4, 2008.\r\n207. ^ Weiner 2007, p. 460.\r\n208. ^ Weiner 2007, p. 480.\r\n209. ^ Mayer, Jane (September 11, 2006). \"Junior: The clandestine life of America's top Al Qaeda source\". The\r\nNew Yorker. Archived from the original on March 4, 2014. Retrieved February 28, 2014.\r\n210. ^ Tenet, George; Harlow, Bill (2007). At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA. New York:\r\nHarperCollins. pp. 119–120. ISBN 978-0-06-114778-4. OCLC 71163669. Archived from the original on\r\nApril 14, 2021. Retrieved September 30, 2020.\r\n211. ^ Jump up to: a\r\n \r\nb\r\n Risen, James (November 4, 2001). \"A Nation Challenged: The Intelligence Agency;\r\nSecret C.I.A. Site in New York Was Destroyed on Sept. 11\". The New York Times. Archived from the original\r\non December 20, 2013. Retrieved December 3, 2013.\r\n212. ^ Schmitt, Eric (October 22, 2001). \"A Nation Challenged: The Intelligence Agencies; Job Seekers Flood\r\nSpy Agencies\". The New York Times. Archived from the original on December 20, 2013. Retrieved\r\nDecember 3, 2013.\r\n213. ^ Bush, George W. \"President George W. Bush's Address To The Nation on September 11, 2001\". YouTube.\r\nArchived from the original on September 13, 2013. Retrieved December 3, 2013.\r\n214. ^ Jump up to: a\r\n \r\nb\r\n \"Fighting on Two Fronts: A Chronology\". PBS Frontline. Archived from the original on\r\nJuly 25, 2018. Retrieved December 3, 2013.\r\n215. ^ Tenet, George; Harlow, Bill (2007). At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA. New York:\r\nHarperCollins. pp. 121–122. ISBN 978-0-06-114778-4. OCLC 71163669. Archived from the original on\r\nJuly 27, 2020. Retrieved September 30, 2020.\r\n216. ^ Tenet, George; Harlow, Bill (April 30, 2007). At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA. Harper\r\nCollins. ISBN 9780061147784. Archived from the original on September 6, 2015. Retrieved June 27, 2015\r\n– via Google Books.\r\n217. ^ \"Foreign network at front of CIA's terror fight\". NBC News. n.d. Retrieved August 5, 2024.\r\n218. ^ Jump up to: a\r\n \r\nb\r\n Jeffreys-Jones 2022, pp. 189–190.\r\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Intelligence_Agency\r\nPage 46 of 51\n\n219. ^ Jump up to: a\r\n \r\nb\r\n Wilford 2024, p. 296.\r\n220. ^ Jones, Milo L. \u0026 Silberzahn, Philippe (2013). Constructing Cassandra, Reframing Intelligence Failure\r\nat the CIA, 1947–2001. Stanford University Press. pp. 198–202. ISBN 978-0-80479-336-0.\r\n221. ^ Stout, David; Mazzetti, Mark (August 21, 2007). \"Tenet's C.I.A. Unprepared for Qaeda Threat, Report\r\nSays\". The New York Times. Archived from the original on April 16, 2009. Retrieved July 4, 2008.\r\n222. ^ \"CIA criticises ex-chief over 9/11\". BBC News online. August 22, 2007. Archived from the original on\r\nJanuary 12, 2009. Retrieved December 31, 2009.\r\n223. ^ Jump up to: a\r\n \r\nb\r\n Tim Winer. Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA. New York: Doubleday, 2007.\r\n224. ^ \"Yugoslavia: Military Dynamics of a Potential Civil War\" (PDF). cia.gov. March 1991.\r\n225. ^ \"Lifting the Arms Embargo: Impact on the War in Bosnia\" (PDF). cia.gov.\r\n226. ^ Jump up to: a\r\n \r\nb\r\n \r\nc\r\n \r\nd\r\n \r\ne\r\n Woodward, Bob (2004). Plan of Attack. New York: Simon \u0026 Schuster. p. 467.\r\nISBN 074325547X.\r\n227. ^ \"Morell 'wanted to apologize' to Powell about WMD evidence\". CBS News. May 11, 2015. Archived from\r\nthe original on November 30, 2016. Retrieved December 18, 2016.\r\n228. ^ Weiner 2007, p. 491.\r\n229. ^ Weiner 2007, p. 496.\r\n230. ^ Tucker, Mike; Faddis, Charles (2008). Operation Hotel California: The Clandestine War inside Iraq. The\r\nLyons Press. ISBN 978-1-59921-366-8.\r\n231. ^ \"An interview on public radio with the author\". 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Retrieved December 5, 2015.\r\n251. ^ Mahmood, Mona (November 23, 2014). \"US air strikes in Syria driving anti-Assad groups to support\r\nIsis\". The Guardian. Archived from the original on December 21, 2016. Retrieved December 14, 2016.\r\n252. ^ Hersh, Seymour (January 7, 2016). \"Military to Military\". London Review of Books. 38 (1). Archived\r\nfrom the original on November 29, 2019. Retrieved November 29, 2016.\r\n253. ^ Petkova, Mariya (April 6, 2017). \"Syria's 'moderate rebels' to form a new alliance\". Al Jazeera. Archived\r\nfrom the original on May 6, 2017. Retrieved May 6, 2017.\r\n254. ^ Jaffe, Greg; Entous, Adam (July 19, 2017). \"Trump ends covert CIA program to arm anti-Assad rebels in\r\nSyria, a move sought by Moscow\". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on July 20, 2017.\r\nRetrieved July 21, 2017.\r\n255. ^ \"Unclassified Version of March 6, 2015 Message to the Workforce from CIA Director John Brennan: Our\r\nAgency's Blueprint for the Future\". 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Archived from the original on February 16, 2017.\r\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Intelligence_Agency\r\nPage 49 of 51\n\nRetrieved May 22, 2017.\r\n281. ^ Lakhani, Nina (October 23, 2015). \"Confidential files on El Salvador human rights stolen after legal\r\naction against CIA\". The Guardian. London. Archived from the original on February 28, 2017. Retrieved\r\nMay 22, 2017.\r\n282. ^ \"(Est Pub Date) Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs\" (PDF). CIA Reading Room: Iraq's\r\nWeapons of Mass Destruction Programs. November 19, 2009. Retrieved May 1, 2024.\r\nReferences\r\nAnderson, Scott (2020). The Quiet Americans: Four CIA Spies at the Dawn of the Cold War. Knopf\r\nDoubleday Publishing Group. ISBN 978-0-385-54046-9.\r\nBrysk, Alison; Meade, Everard; Shafir, Gershon (2016). \"Constructing National and Global Insecurity\". In\r\nAceves, William; Meade, Everard; Shafir, Gershon (eds.). Lessons and Legacies of the War on Terror.\r\nLondon/New York: Routledge. p. 6. ISBN 978-0-415-63841-8.\r\nGordon, Rebecca (2014). Mainstreaming Torture: Ethical Approaches in the Post-9/11 United States.\r\nOxford/New York: Oxford University Press. p. 2. ISBN 9780199336432.\r\nImmerman, Richard H. (1982). The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention. University of\r\nTexas Press. ISBN 978-0-292-71083-2.\r\nJeffreys-Jones, Rhodri (2022). A Question of Standing: The History of the CIA. Oxford University Press.\r\ndoi:10.1093/oso/9780192847966.001.0001. ISBN 978-0-19-284796-6.\r\nKuzmarov, Jeremy (April 2009). \"Modernizing Repression: Police Training, Political Violence, and Nation-Building in the 'American Century'\". Diplomatic History. 33 (2). Oxford University Press: 191–221.\r\ndoi:10.1111/j.1467-7709.2008.00760.x.\r\nMcCoy, Alfred W. (2007). A Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation, from the Cold War to the War on\r\nTerror. London: Macmillan Publishers. pp. 63–71. ISBN 9780805082487.\r\nReid, Stuart A. (2023). The Lumumba Plot: The Secret History of the CIA and a Cold War Assassination.\r\nKnopf Doubleday Publishing Group. ISBN 978-1-5247-4881-4.\r\nSchwab, Stephen Irving Max (June 2014). \"Once a Jedburgh Always a Jedburgh\". International Journal of\r\nIntelligence and CounterIntelligence. 27 (2). Taylor \u0026 Francis: 405–412.\r\ndoi:10.1080/08850607.2014.872540.\r\nSimpson, Christopher (2003). \"U.S. Mass Communication Research, Counterinsurgency, and Scientific\r\n'Reality'\". In Braman, Sandra (ed.). Communication Researchers and Policy-making. Cambridge, Mass:\r\nMIT Press. pp. 253–292. ISBN 9780262523400.\r\nValcourt, Richard R. (January 1989). \"Tossing Wins Away: Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of America's\r\nSixteen-Year Involvement in Vietnam\". International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence. 3 (4).\r\nTaylor \u0026 Francis: 567–605. doi:10.1080/08850608908435122.\r\nWeiner, Tim (2007). Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA. Doubleday. ISBN 978-0-385-51445-3.\r\nOCLC 82367780.\r\nWilford, Hugh (2024). The CIA: An Imperial History. Basic Books. ISBN 978-1-541-64591-2.\r\nExternal links\r\nOfficial website\r\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Intelligence_Agency\r\nPage 50 of 51\n\nCentral Intelligence Collection at the Internet Archive\r\nSource: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Intelligence_Agency\r\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Intelligence_Agency\r\nPage 51 of 51\n\nThe directorate October 1, 2015.[28] had been covertly According operating to classified since approximately budget documents, March 2015 the CIA's computer but formally began network operations operations budget on for\nfiscal year 2013 was $685.4 million. The NSA's budget was roughly $1 billion at the time.[29]\n   Page 6 of 51  \n\nU.S. Air Force (OSO) and the General Hoyt Office of Reports Vandenberg, the and Estimates CIG's second director, (ORE).[71] Initially, created the Office the OSO was of Special tasked with Operations spying and\nsubversion overseas with a budget of $15 million (equivalent to $201 million in 2025),[73] the largesse of a small\n   Page 10 of 51   \n\nApril Under the aegis 2016. Saudi Arabia of operation was involved Timber Sycamore in the CIA-led and other clandestine Timber Sycamore activities, covert operation. CIA operatives and U.S. special\noperations troops have trained and armed nearly 10,000 rebel fighters at a cost of $1 billion a year. [248] The CIA\nhas been sending weapons to anti-government rebels in Syria since at least 2012.[249] These weapons have been\n   Page 31 of 51    \n\n175. ^ Weiner 176. ^ Weiner 2007, p. 397. 2007, p. 468.     \n177. ^ Davies, Richard T. (2004). \"The CIA and the Polish Crisis of 1980-1981\". Journal of Cold War Studies.\n6 (3): 120-123. doi:10.1162/1520397041447346.  S2CID 57563775.   \n178. ^ Domber, Gregory F. (2008). Supporting the Revolution: America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold\nWar in Poland, 1981-1989. George Washington University. p. 199. ISBN 9780549385165.  Archived from\nthe original on November 19, 2016. Retrieved April 17, 2016., revised as Domber 2014, p. 110 Archived\nJuly 27, 2020, at the Wayback Machine.    \n179. ^ Domber, Gregory F. (August 28, 2014). \"What Putin Misunderstands about American Power\". University\nof California Press Blog. University of North Carolina Press. Archived from the original on September 2,\n2014. Retrieved April 17, 2016.    \n180. ^ MacEachin, Douglas J. (June 28, 2008). \"US Intelligence and the Polish Crisis 1980-1981\". Central\nIntelligence Agency. Archived from the original on June 13, 2007.  \n181. ^ Bernstein, Carl (June 24, 2001). \"The Holy Alliance\". Time. Archived from the original on September 5,\n2017. Retrieved August 26, 2017-via CarlBernstein.com.    \n182. ^ Sussman, Gerald (2010). Branding Democracy: U.S. Regime Change in Post-Soviet Eastern Europe.\nNew York: Peter Lang. p. 128. ISBN 978-1-43310-530-2.    \n183. ^ Arsanjani, Mahnoush H.; Cogan, Jacob Katz; Sloane, Robert D.; Wiessner, Siegfried, eds. (2011).\nLooking to the Future: Essays on International Law in Honor of W. Michael Reisman. Leiden \u0026 Boston:\nMartinus Nijhoff Publishers. ISBN 978-9-00417-361-3.    \n184. ^ Daugherty, William J. (2004). Executive Secrets: Covert Action and the Presidency. Lexington: \nUniversity Press of Kentucky. pp. 201-203. ISBN 978-0-81312-334-9.   \n185. ^ Thiel, Rainer (2010). Nested Games of External Democracy Promotion: The United States and the Polish\nLiberalization 1980-1989. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. p. 273. ISBN 978-3-53117-769- \n4.      \n186. ^ Pedrick, Clare (November 14, 1990). \"CIA Organized Secret Army in Western Europe\". The Washington\nPost. ISSN 0190-8286. Archived from the original on March 24, 2023. Retrieved January 14, 2021.\n187. ^ Agee, Philip; Wolf, Louis (1978). Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe.  \n188. ^ \"Terrorists 'helped by CIA' to stop rise of left in Italy\". TheGuardian.com. March 26, 2001. Archived\nfrom the original on May 29, 2015. Retrieved July 30, 2023.   \n189. ^ \"Strage di Piazza Fontana spunta un agente Usa\". February 11, 1998. Archived from the original on\nMarch 18, 2023. Retrieved July 30, 2023.    \n190. ^ \"Il Terrorismo, le stragi ed il contesto storico-politico\" (PDF). August 19, 2006. Archived from the\noriginal (PDF) on August 19, 2006.    \n191. ^ Mehtap Söyler (2015). The Turkish Deep State State Consolidation, Civil Military Relations And\nDemocracy.      \n192. ^ Fernandes, Desmond; Ozden, Iskender (Spring 2001). \"United States and NATO Inspired 'Psychological\nWarfare Operations' Against The 'Kurdish Communist Threat' in Turkey\" (PDF). Variant. 12. Archived\n   Page 45 of 51   \n\nProgram Have Journal of Inhibited Polio Health Services: Eradication Planning, Administration, in Pakistan: An Evaluation. Analysis of National 47 (4): 807–25. Level Data\". International\ndoi:10.1177/0020731417722888.  ISSN 1541-4469. PMID 28764582. S2CID 25844860. Archived from the\noriginal on October 20, 2021. Retrieved October 17, 2021.   \n246. ^ McNeil, Donald G. Jr. (July 9, 2012). \"C.I.A. Vaccine Ruse May Have Harmed the War on Polio\". The\nNew York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Archived from the original on July 10, 2012. Retrieved July 3, 2020.\n247. ^ Aizenman, Nurith (January 23, 2018). \"Pakistan Raises Its Guard After 2 Polio Vaccinators Are Gunned\nDown\". NPR. Archived from the original on November 16, 2019. Retrieved October 17, 2021. \n248. ^ Miller, Greg; DeYoung, Karen (June 12, 2015). \"Secret CIA effort in Syria faces large funding cut\". The\nWashington Post. Archived from the original on May 7, 2019. Retrieved December 5, 2015. \n249. ^ Cloud, David S.; Abdulrahim, Raja (June 21, 2013). \"U.S. has secretly provided arms training to Syria\nrebels since 2012\". Los Angeles Times. Archived from the original on November 29, 2018. Retrieved\nDecember 5, 2015.     \n250. ^ Mekhennet, Souad (August 18, 2014). \"The terrorists fighting us now? We just finished training them\".\nThe Washington Post. Archived from the original on September 5, 2019. Retrieved December 5, 2015.\n251. ^ Mahmood, Mona (November 23, 2014). \"US air strikes in Syria driving anti-Assad groups to support\nIsis\". The Guardian. Archived from the original on December 21, 2016. Retrieved December 14, 2016.\n252. ^ Hersh, Seymour (January 7, 2016). \"Military to Military\". London Review of Books. 38 (1). Archived\nfrom the original on November 29, 2019. Retrieved November 29, 2016.  \n253. ^ Petkova, Mariya (April 6, 2017). \"Syria's 'moderate rebels' to form a new alliance\". Al Jazeera. Archived\nfrom the original on May 6, 2017. Retrieved May 6, 2017.   \n254. ^ Jaffe, Greg; Entous, Adam (July 19, 2017). \"Trump ends covert CIA program to arm anti-Assad rebels in\nSyria, a move sought by Moscow\". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on July 20, 2017.\nRetrieved July 21, 2017.     \n255. ^ \"Unclassified Version of March 6, 2015 Message to the Workforce from CIA Director John Brennan: Our\nAgency's Blueprint for the Future\". March 6, 2015. Archived from the original on March 9, 2015.\n256. ^ Welna, David (March 14, 2017). \"Trump Restores CIA Power To Launch Drone Strikes\". NPR. Archived\nfrom the original on September 22, 2018. Retrieved August 26, 2017.  \n257. ^ \"The CIA secretly bought a company that sold encryption devices across the world. Then its spies sat\nback and listened\". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on February 11, 2020. Retrieved\nFebruary 11, 2020.     \n258. ^ \"The CIA's 'Minerva' Secret | National Security Archive\". nsarchive.gwu.edu. February 11, 2020.\nArchived from the original on September 27, 2020. Retrieved February 12, 2020. \n259. ^ Mercado, Stephen (April 15, 2007). \"Reexamining the Distinction Between Open Information and\nSecrets\". Center for the Study of Intelligence. Archived from the original on June 13, 2007. Retrieved July\n4, 2008.      \n260. ^ \"Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS)\". Harvard College Library. Archived from the original on\nJuly 9, 2010. Retrieved July 1, 2011.    \n   Page 48 of 51",
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