# New Campaign Abusing StackBlitz Tool to Host Phishing Pages

zscaler.com/blogs/research/new-campaign-abusing-stackblitz-tool-host-phishing-pages



There are numerous tools available to help individuals create new, exciting webpages. And, there seem to be just as many hackers looking to <u>exploit these tools</u> for their own gain.

Recently, the Zscaler <u>ThreatLabz</u> Team came across various phishing campaigns that leverage the StackBlitz tool, using the preboot library functionality that helps ease the transition of the hosted webpage immediately from the server side to the client side.

<u>StackBlitz</u> is an online integrated development environment (IDE) where anyone can create Angular JavaScript and React TypeScript projects that are immediately posted online. Attackers have targeted this method to host phishing pages. The purpose of the preboot library function is to help manage the transition of state from a server-generated web view to a client-generated web view.

Figure 1 shows the working flow of the StackBlitz tool.



Figure 1: A demonstration workflow of the StackBlitz tool.

# Whois Record for StackBlitz.io

Registrant Org	Registrant of stackblitz.io	
Registrant Country	gb	
Registrar	1API GmbH IANA ID: 1387 URL: http://www.1api.net Whois Server: whois.1api.net abuse@1api.net	
Registrar Status	clientTransferProhibited	
Dates	1,144 days old Created on 2017-04-10 Expires on 2021-04-10 Updated on 2020-04-10	~
Name Servers	IGOR.NS.CLOUDFLARE.COM (has 21,387,271 domains) ZOE.NS.CLOUDFLARE.COM (has 21,387,271 domains)	~
Tech Contact	<u></u>	
IP Address	13.224.13.10 - 1,312 other sites hosted on this server	4
IP Location	📰 - Washington - Seattle - Amazon Technologies Inc.	
ASN	AS16509 AMAZON-02, US (registered May 04, 2000)	
Hosting History	1 change on 2 unique name servers over 3 years	¢
- Website		
Website Title	✤ 500 SSL negotiation failed:	~

500

Whois Record (last updated on 2020-05-28)

```
Domain Name: STACKBLITZ.IO
Registry Domain ID: D503300000040441905-LRMS
Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.lapi.net
Registrar URL: http://www.lapi.net
Updated Date: 2020-04-10T22:32:54Z
Creation Date: 2017-04-10T21:35:06Z
Registry Expiry Date: 2021-04-10T21:35:06Z
Registrar Registration Expiration Date:
Registrar: 1API GmbH
Registrar IANA ID: 1387
Registrar Abuse Contact Email: abuse@1api.net
```

Figure 2: This is the Whois lookup info for the domain StackBlitz.io.

In this blog, we will describe the phishing attacks hosted using the StackBlitz tool and its delivery vector in detail. We found these phishing URLs through our Threat Intelligence collection framework as well as online submissions to ThreatLabZ team for review.

#### Spam method 1

Response Code

In this case, the spam link will be delivered via Microsoft's OneDrive shareware service, pretending to be a document shared by a particular health organization.

Once the user clicks the download link, it redirects the user to the Outlook phishing page.



Figure 3: The spam campaign with the phishing link.

Figure 4 shows the page after the user clicks on the download button. It takes a little bit of time to fetch the web page from the StackBlitz development server.



Finally, it lands to the Outlook phishing campaign, as shown in Figure 5.



Figure 5: The Outlook login phishing page.

The SSL certificate of the hosted domain is shown in Figure 6.

Certificate	23
General Details Certification Path	
Certificate Information	
This certificate is intended for the following purpose(s): • Ensures the identity of a remote computer • Proves your identity to a remote computer • 2.23.140.1.2.1	
Issued to: *.stackblitz.io	_
Issued by: Amazon Valid from 12/ 9/ 2019 to 1/ 9/ 2021	
Learn more about <u>certificates</u>	ent
C	ж

Figure 6: Wildcard SSL certificate applies to all subdomains

Figure 7 shows the source code of the hosted phishing page with the preboot library functionality. As mentioned earlier, this library manages the user experience from the time when a server view is visible until the client view takes over control of the page.



#### Figure 7: The source code of the Outlook phishing page.

The function will be invoked from the (preview-d52be7f9f266a450f65cb.js) JavaScript. Figure 8 shows the source code of the preview JavaScript.



Figure: 8: The (preview-d52be7f9f266a450f65cb) script invokes the preboot function.

While analyzing the preboot function, we also identified that the preboot library functionality uses the CachedFetch() module to check if a cached copy of the page is available or not.



Figure 9: The preboot functionality with CachedFetch().

The preboot function returns the hosted webpage as a JSON file as shown in Figure 10.



Figure 10: The original source code of the hosted webpage in JSON format.



Figure 11: The post-infection web traffic that is sent to the cybercriminals.

Result	Protocol	Host	URL	Body	Caching	Content-Type	Comments
200	HTTPS	js-pgrnce.stackbl	1	1,049	max-a	text/html; chars	StackBlitz_site
200	HTTPS	ogs.google.co.in	/widget/app/so?origin=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.googl	14,114	private	text/html; charset	
200	HTTPS	www.google.co.in	/_/chrome/newtab-serviceworker.js	1,069	no-cac	text/javascript; ch	
200	HTTPS	www.google.co.in	1	61,020	private	text/html; charset	
200	HTTP	Tunnel to	clients2.google.com:443	0			
200	HTTP	Tunnel to	fonts.googleapis.com:443	0			
200	HTTP	Tunnel to	c.staticblitz.com:443	0			
200	HTTP	Tunnel to	c.staticblitz.com:443	0			
200	HTTP	Tunnel to	c.staticblitz.com:443	0			
200	HTTP	Tunnel to	c.staticblitz.com:443	0			
200	HTTP	Tunnel to	c.staticblitz.com:443	0			
200	HTTPS	clients2.google.com	/service/update2/crx?os=win&arch=x86&os_arch=x8	1,292	no-cac	text/xml; charset=	
200	HTTPS	fonts.googleapis.com	/css?family=Source+Code+Pro:400,700 Lato:400,700	998	private	text/css; charset=	
200	HTTP	Tunnel to	fonts.gstatic.com:443	0			
200	HTTPS	c.staticblitz.com	/assets/css/preview-a87b6571.css	9,213	public,	text/css	
200	HTTPS	c.staticblitz.com	/assets/common-4d7c9cb9ba16fb33cf80b.js	17,504	public,	application/javascript	=
200	HTTPS	c.staticblitz.com	/assets/ext-a11db262df84fd1204deb.js	118,299	public,	application/javascript	
200	HTTPS	c.staticblitz.com	/d/webcontainer.b8cb3965d30f7aa9372.js	164,806	public,	application/javascript	
200	HTTPS	c.staticblitz.com	/assets/preview-d52be7f9f266a450f65cb.js	34,939	public,	application/java	Invokes_Preboot_
200	HTTP	Tunnel to	clients2.googleusercontent.com:443	0			
200	HTTPS	clients2.googleuser	/crx/blobs/QgAAAC6zw0qH2DJtnXe8Z7rUJP0Vo-3UIIR	93,171	public,	application/x-chro	
200	HTTP	Tunnel to	l.staticblitz.com:443	0			
200	HTTP	Tunnel to	js-pgrnce.stackblitz.io:443	0			
200	HTTP	Tunnel to	www.googleapis.com:443	0			
200	HTTP	Tunnel to	stackblitz.firebaseio.com:443	0			
200	HTTPS	l.staticblitz.com	/b/v1/js-pgrnce/a46c6617aab	16,848	public,	application/json;	Webpage_JSON
200	HTTPS	js-pgrnce.stackblitz.io	/favicon.ico	1,049	max-ag	text/html; charset	
302	HTTP	redirector.gvt1.com	/edgedl/chromewebstore/L2Nocm9tZV9leHRlbnNpb24v	552	no-cac	text/html; charset	
200	HTTPS	www.googleapis.com	/identitytoolkit/v3/relyingparty/signupNewUser?key=A	0		text/html	
200	HTTPS	clients1.google.com	/tbproxy/af/query?q=Chc2LjEuMTcxNS4xNDQyL2VuIC	41	private	text/proto	
200	HTTPS	js-pgrnce.stackblitz.io	/owa/auth/15.0.1473/themes/resources/favicon.ico	1,049	max-ag	text/html; charset	
200	HTTP	Tunnel to	www.google.co.in:443	0			
200	HTTPS	wny.asia	/images/download.png	2,503		image/png	
200	HTTPS	www.google.co.in	/domainreliability/upload	0		application/javascri	
200	HTTP	Tunnel to	safebrowsing.googleapis.com:443	0			
200	HTTPS	safebrowsing.googl	/v4/threatListUpdates:fetch?\$req=Ch0KDGdvb2dsZW	4,496	private	application/x-proto	
200	HTTP	Tunnel to	clients1.google.com:443	0			
200	HTTPS	clients1.google.com	/tools/pso/ping?as=chrome&brand=CHBF&pid=&hl=en	248	private	text/html; charset	
200	HTTP	Tunnel to	wny.asia:443	0			
200	HTTP	Tunnel to	wny.asia:443	0			
302	HTTPS	wny.asia	/a/linkage.php	5		text/html; chars	Post_Infection_ca
200	HTTP	Tunnel to	google.com:443	0			
301	HTTPS	google.com	1	220	public,	text/html; charset	

Figure 12: Fiddler capture of the Outlook phishing campaign.

#### Spam method 2:

In this case, the spam link will host a web page with a message stating that you received a shared document with the associated document download link. Once the user clicks the download link, it redirects them to the OneDrive phishing campaign.

thtps://wtojov/44.com/usa.html x +	× 0 0
Of 2 file-141.8 MB     Intel You have one shared document     DownLoad Document	

Figure 13: The spam campaign with phishing link.

If the user clicks the download document button, it will redirect the user to the OneDrive login phishing page (angular-ivy-aabnsh(.)stackblitz(.)io).



Figure 14: The redirection traffic of the spam link.



Figure 15: The OneDrive login page for the phishing campaign.

Figure 16 shows the source code of the hosted phishing campaign with the preboot library functionality.

D GreGrive Decoment. X D view-sourcet/tip://argular-hy- X +	- 0	x	۲
🗧 🔶 🕐 🔺 Dangerous: View-source-Nilles/Jangular-viy-aabinsh.stackbiltz.jo	\$ E	э о	,
<pre>1 (JOCTOPE Male) ( dtab) ( dtab)</pre>			

Figure 16: The source code of the hosted phishing page.

If the user unknowingly clicks any of the phishing login methods to view the document, it will redirect the user to relevant phishing page.

Here, we clicked on the Office365 login method to view the document, which redirected us to a webpage that looks exactly like a legit Office365 site.



Figure 17: The Office365 login phishing campaign.

As we mentioned earlier, the source code of the webpage will be common to all the websites hosted using the StackBlitz tool, except for the URL link, which is passed as parameter for the preboot function.



Figure 18: The source code of the Office365 login phishing page.

Here, we have accessed the hosted phishing campaign a second time to showcase the working functionality of the CachedFetch() and observe the overall web traffic.

Result	Protocol	Host	URL	Body	Co	Comments	*
200	HTTP	Tunnel to	autojovi4x4.com:443	906		[#1265]	
304	HTTPS	autojovi4x4.com	/usa.html	0		Spam_webpage	
200	HTTP	Tunnel to	angular-ivy-aabnsh.stack	750		[#1267]	
200	HTTP	Tunnel to	fonts.googleapis.com:443	987		[#1268]	
200	HTTP	Tunnel to	c.staticblitz.com:443	791		[#1269]	_
304	HTTPS	angular-ivy-aabnsh.stackblitz	1	0		OneDrive_Phishing	
200	HTTP	Tunnel to	fonts.gstatic.com:443	761		[#1271]	
200	HTTP	Tunnel to	safebrowsing.googleapis	987		[#1272]	
200	HTTP	Tunnel to	angular-ivy-aabnsh.stack	750		[#1273]	
200	HTTP	Tunnel to	www.googleapis.com:443	987		[#1274]	
200	HTTP	Tunnel to	s-usc1c-nss-264.firebasei	729		[#1275]	
304	HTTPS	angular-ivy-aabnsh.stackblitz.io	/favicon.ico	0		[#1276]	
200	HTTP	Tunnel to	angular-ivy-yfhcr3.stackbl	750		[#1299]	
200	HTTP	, Tunnel to	angular-ivy-yfhcr3.stackbl	750		[#1300]	
200	HTTP	Tunnel to	fonts.googleapis.com:443	987		[#1301]	
200	HTTP Da	ta directly fetched from cache n	nemory not from the ser	ver(1791	ckblitz	[#1302]	
200	HTTP	Tunnel to	safebrowsing.googleapis	987	citorica	[#1303]	
200	HTTP	Tunnel to	safebrowsing.googleapis	987		[#1304]	
200	HTTPS	safebrowsing.googleapis.com	/v4/fullHashes:find?\$req=	328	ap	[#1305]	
200	HTTPS	safebrowsing.googleapis.com	/v4/fullHashes:find?\$req=	242	ap	[#1306]	
304	HTTPS	angular-ivy-yfhcr3.stackblitz.io	1	0		Office365_Phishing	
200	HTTP	Tunnel to	fonts.gstatic.com:443	761		[#1308]	
200	HTTP	Tunnel to	angular-ivy-yfhcr3.stackbl	750		[#1309]	
200	HTTP	Tunnel to	www.googleapis.com:443	987		[#1310]	
200	HTTP	Tunnel to	s-usc1c-nss-264.firebasei	729		[#1311]	
200	HTTPS	www.googleapis.com	/identitytoolkit/v3/relying	0	tex	[#1312]	
304	HTTPS	angular-ivy-yfhcr3.stackblitz.io	/favicon.ico	0		[#1313]	
200	HTTPS	www.googleapis.com	/identitytoolkit/v3/relying	977	ap	[#1314]	
101	HTTPS	s-usc1c-nss-264.firebaseio.com	/.ws?v=5&ns=stackblitz	0		[#1315]	
200	HTTPS	www.googleapis.com	/identitytoolkit/v3/relying	0	tex	[#1316]	
200	HTTPS	www.googleapis.com	/identitytoolkit/v3/relying	275	ap	[#1317]	_
200	HTTP	Tunnel to	notas.dyndns.dk:443	868		[#1318]	
200	HTTP	Tunnel to	notas.dyndns.dk:443	868		[#1319]	
302	HTTPS	notas.dyndns.dk	/del3/login.php	0	tex	Post_Infection	
200	HTTP	Tunnel to	openknowledge.worldban	1,064		[#1321]	
200	HTTPS	openknowledge.worldbank.org	/bitstream/handle/10986/	5,579	ap	[#1322]	
200	HTTP	Tunnel to	openknowledge.worldban	1,064		[#1323]	

Figure 19: The overall traffic of the phishing campaign captured in the Fiddler tool.

Once the login information has been entered by the user, the form will post the user's credential details to malicious sites that are operated by the cybercriminals.



Figure 20: The post-infection web traffic.

Figure 21-26 shows different phishing pages that are hosted using the StackBlitz tool (StackBlitz.io).



Figure 21: The Microsoft login phishing campaign.

Gmail Login     x     +       ←     →     C     ■       https://angular-cmjdm7.stackblitz.id			
	. Google		
	One account. All of Google. <sub>Sign in to continue to Gmail</sub>		
	Email Patsword Sign in		
	One Google Account for everything Google		
About Google Privacy Terms Help		English (United States)	

Figure 22: The Gmail login phishing campaign.



Figure 23: The Yahoo login phishing campaign.

D AOL × +			000
			☆ 0 0
Aol.		Help	
	Aol.		
	Sign in		
	Username or Email		
	Password		
	Sign in		
	Don't have an account? Sign up		
Sense Repaired ( Procey (Restand)			

Figure 24: The AOL login phishing campaign.

Document	× +			1 2	1.0	
$\  \   \leftrightarrow \  \   G$	A https://angular-ivy-xkuivv.stackblitz.io					☆ <b>0</b> 0
() racks	pace				Webmail   Control Panel	
		Packsnace Webmail Login				
		Rackspace webmail Login				
		Email Address				
		Password				
		Log In Forgot Password?				
		Remember this info				
		Vise SSL				
		Need webmail for your business? Learn	more about <u>Hosted Email</u> from Rackspace			
		Privacy Statemer	nt   Website Terms			

Figure 25: The Rackspace login phishing campaign.

🗅 Login 🛛 🗙 🕂		
← → C		☆ <b>0</b>
	Other Email	
	Microsoft account What's this?	
	Email	
	Password	
	Keep me signed in	
	Sign in	
	Can't access your account?	
	Sign in with a single-use code	

Figure 26: The Other Email login phishing campaign.

# Conclusion

Cybercriminals use tools, such as <u>StackBlitz</u>, to come up with smarter ways to start phishing campaigns and make it harder for security vendors to detect such campaigns. The Zscaler ThreatLabZ team is actively tracking these kinds of phishing attacks to ensure coverage for and to keep our customer safe.

IOC:

# Spam 1

js-pgrnce(.)stackblitz(.)io

wny(.)asia/a/linkage(.)php

# Spam 2

autojovi4x4(.)com/usa(.)html

angular-ivy-aabnsh(.)stackblitz(.)io

angular-ivy-yfhcr3(.)stackblitz(.)io

notas(.)dyndns(.)dk/del3/login(.)php

# Other phishing domains observed:

1nxbcc-hedxe8(.)stackblitz(.)io

2podk-ff4mtn(.)stackblitz(.)io

6eyyd-zjrnne(.)stackblitz(.)io

7djnd-jzc89e(.)stackblitz(.)io angualar-ivy-aabnsh(.)stackblitz(.)io angula-ivy-epksfd(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-4ulsja(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-4vjbos(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-9gejbd(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-c8ebxa(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-e9ebhj(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-e9hqf9(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-emu4e4(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-exrste(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-f6xehy(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-ivy-1tsaka(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-ivy-2nghsv(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-ivy-3etd9y(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-ivy-4pk3st(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-ivy-62mfgk(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-ivy-8vrgfg(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-ivy-aabnsh(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-ivy-ayzk51(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-ivy-bkvyy7(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-ivy-c8ebrc(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-ivy-d55ugm(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-ivy-dug3fr(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-ivy-epksfd(.)stackblitz(.)io

angular-ivy-feppa5(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-ivy-ikp1nd(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-ivy-jtatnb(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-ivy-jxxbb8(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-ivy-kxyakr(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-ivy-rsphh3(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-ivy-rv7ggo(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-ivy-tphvml(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-ivy-uvhyey(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-ivy-wwnxei(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-ivy-xkuivv(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-ivy-yfhcr3(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-ivy-zbaxnt(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-ivy-zff34d(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-jwnijt(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-kc1uhi(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-lcj5yi(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-lvy-bkvyy7(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-n21op8(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-nujspf(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-nvavzw(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-ojbaxu(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-pcn7ny(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-qx5ttm(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-soswe4(.)stackblitz(.)io

angular-tjrwpf(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-vdwkgy(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-vv96yb(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-xeqzqy(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-xm7khp(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-zinz3v(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-zpsmud(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-zxmgsz(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-zzrtvx(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-vv96yb(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-pnpebe(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-cmjdm7(.)stackblitz(.)io angular-ivy-6d2vss(.)stackblitz(.)io hjgjhjn-csg4mf(.)stackblitz(.)io js-1withj(.)stackblitz(.)io js-2dfx8svt(.)stackblitz(.)io js-3jeoen(.)stackblitz(.)io js-6jce4b(.)stackblitz(.)io js-7tkbpg(.)stackblitz(.)io js-8j8wbj(.)stackblitz(.)io js-azirnd(.)stackblitz(.)io js-bfwssp(.)stackblitz(.)io js-bggenm(.)stackblitz(.)io js-fx8svt(.)stackblitz(.)io js-iqgiwv(.)stackblitz(.)io

js-iqqiwv(.)stackblitz(.)io

js-kfkbak(.)stackblitz(.)io

js-mdurny(.)stackblitz(.)io

js-pgrnce(.)stackblitz(.)io

js-pihxqe(.)stackblitz(.)io

js-rzhdtg(.)stackblitz(.)io

js-tk13zi(.)stackblitz(.)io

js-v4zgeb(.)stackblitz(.)io

js-xerqcn(.)stackblitz(.)io

officeloginaccount(.)stackblitz(.)io

react-ba2roi(.)stackblitz(.)io

rxjs-lv18nb(.)stackblitz(.)io

typescript-byr97k(.)stackblitz(.)io

typescript-dbnwsw(.)stackblitz(.)io

typescript-nxgptb(.)stackblitz(.)io

typescript-qeklm1(.)stackblitz(.)io

typescript-qgtbfk(.)stackblitz(.)io