

# Detect Access or Search for Unsecured Credentials Across Platforms, Detection Strategy DET0412

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## AN1153

Unusual access to bash history, registry credentials paths, or private key files by unauthorized or scripting tools, with correlated file and process activity.

### Log Sources

### Mutable Elements

| Field                 | Description  |
|-----------------------|--|
| TimeWindow            | Defines the threshold time for accessing multiple sensitive files indicating automation. |
| SuspiciousProcessList | Process names to monitor (e.g., reg.exe, cmd.exe, powershell.exe, etc.)                  |

## AN1154

Reading of sensitive files like .bash\_history, /etc/shadow, or private key directories by unauthorized users or unusual processes.

### Log Sources

### Mutable Elements

| Field          | Description  |
|----------------|--|
| SensitivePaths | Paths to credential files such as /etc/shadow or ~/.bash_history       |
| UserContext    | Whether the process runs under a privileged or non-interactive session |

## AN1155

Unusual access to ~/Library/Keychains, ~/.bash\_history, or Terminal command history by unauthorized processes or users.

### Log Sources

| Data Component                             | Name             | Channel   |
|--|------------------|---|
| <a href="#">File Access (DC0055)</a>       | macos:unifiedlog | read access to ~/Library/Keychains or history files by terminal processes       |
| <a href="#">Command Execution (DC0064)</a> | macos:unifiedlog | execution of 'security', 'cat', or 'grep' commands accessing credential storage |

**Mutable Elements**

| Field       | Description  |
|-------------|--|
| ProcessName | Tool or command used to query credentials (e.g., security, grep) |
| TargetPath  | Credential file paths (e.g., ~/Library/Keychains)                |

**AN1156**

Unusual web-based access or API scraping of password managers, single sign-on sessions, or credential sync services via browser automation or anomalous API tokens.

**Log Sources**

**Mutable Elements**

| Field                 | Description   |
|-----------------------|---|
| TokenAnomalyThreshold | Scoring threshold for access token entropy, reuse, or bot-like patterns |
| AccessGeoLocation     | Region anomalies in SaaS portal access                                  |

**AN1157**

Unauthorized API or console calls to retrieve or reset password credentials, download key material, or modify SSO settings.

**Log Sources**

**Mutable Elements**

| Field           | Description   |
|-----------------|---|
| SSOSettingScope | Subset of IdP settings monitored for unauthorized changes |
| SecretType      | Which secrets (passwords, keys, tokens) are monitored     |

**AN1158**

Access to container image layers or mounted secrets (e.g., Docker secrets) by processes not tied to endpoint or orchestration context.

**Log Sources**

| Data Component                            | Name              | Channel  |
|---|-------------------|--|
| <a href="#">File Access (DC0055)</a>      | auditd:SYSCALL    | read of /run/secrets or docker volumes by non-entrypoint process |
| <a href="#">Process Creation (DC0032)</a> | containerd:Events | unusual process spawned from container image context             |

**Mutable Elements**

| Field               | Description  |
|---------------------|--|
| EntrypointAllowlist | Container endpoints that are permitted to read secrets |
| VolumeMountPath     | Paths to credentials/secrets inside container images   |

**AN1159**

Use of configuration backup utilities or CLI access to dump plaintext passwords, local user hashes, or SNMP strings.

**Log Sources****Mutable Elements**

| Field                  | Description                                      |
|------------------------|--|
| ManagementInterfaceIPs | IP ranges authorized to perform credential dumps |
| CommandPattern         | Regex patterns for suspicious CLI commands       |

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Source: <https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0412#AN1155>