{
	"id": "d00fa894-f865-4c48-b3f2-fbee46c7ad22",
	"created_at": "2026-11-17T02:16:25.722275Z",
	"updated_at": "2026-11-17T02:21:19.803901Z",
	"deleted_at": null,
	"sha1_hash": "6ecddfadb60631b557d8eb87199d49187b457b5e",
	"title": "Dark Web Profile: n0n Ransomware",
	"llm_title": "",
	"authors": "",
	"file_creation_date": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
	"file_modification_date": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
	"file_size": 5163736,
	"plain_text": "https://socradar.io/blog/dark-web-profile-n0n-ransomware/\n\nDark Web Profile: n0n Ransomware\n\nBy Amir Owda\n\nPublished: 2026-11-12 · Archived: 2026-11-17 02:00:57 UTC\n\nn0n is a data-exfiltration and destructive-extortion group that surfaced on the Dark Web in September 2026 and\n\nscaled to 93 listed victims within roughly five weeks. Its operators exfiltrate data, encrypt or destroy\n\ninfrastructure, and then work victims through keyed negotiation rooms, per-victim Bitcoin wallets and a public\n\nleak site branded with the slogan “n0n | no js | no mercy”.\n\nIn September 2026, the SOCRadar Threat Research Unit (STRU) found an exposed staging server holding the live\n\nworkspace of an n0n operator. The directory exposed the operation end to end: credential stuffing against\n\nFortiGate SSL-VPN appliances, hijacked firewall management centers, mass S3 deletion, a custom C++ locker,\n\nand an AI coding agent backed by more than $7,000 in paid LLM API usage. The findings tie the workspace to at\n\nleast 23 organizations across 14 countries.\n\nThis profile is based on the findings of our prior research into n0n Ransomware.\n\nWho Is n0n Ransomware?\n\nn0n has been actively monitored since September 2026. The group insists on the exact spelling of its name, “two\n\nlowercase n letters with a zero between them,” and its locker appends the .n0n extension to encrypted files.\n\nN0n Ransomware threat actor card\n\nThe operation grew quickly. An inspection of the leak portal on October 15, 2026, showed 93 targeted entities: 52\n\nmarked “exposed,” 21 “leaked,” 15 “pending,” and 5 “honored” after ransom payments. Tracking logged 93\n\nPage 1 of 19\n\nhttps://socradar.io/blog/dark-web-profile-n0n-ransomware/\n\nvictims across 27 countries, with the heaviest concentration in the United States and South Korea. As of October\n\n19, total listed ransom demands reached $283.7M.\n\nn0n shows no ideological, hacktivist or state-directed motive. Every demand is financial, and target selection\n\nfavors organizations whose compromise causes the most operational damage.\n\nHow n0n Runs Its Extortion Operation\n\nn0n’s server codebase describes a three-stage extortion process, and its negotiation rooms present the same stages\n\nto victims:\n\nAttack: Data is exfiltrated and systems are encrypted or destroyed while the incident stays private\n\n(“Nothing is public and only you know about the attack”)\n\nPublic exposure: The victim is listed on the leak site to raise pressure through media and search engine\n\nvisibility\n\nFiles leaked: Archives are released through ZIP downloads and web-seeded torrents, the point at which the\n\ngroup reminds victims that “notification obligations typically apply”\n\nLeak Site and Negotiation Rooms\n\nThe leak site runs as separate onion and clearnet builds, with keyed negotiation rooms for each victim. The\n\nclearnet domain n0n[.]to is now inactive; checks on October 15 and 19 used the onion address. Room paths were\n\nalso used to serve payloads to compromised appliances.\n\nPage 2 of 19\n\nhttps://socradar.io/blog/dark-web-profile-n0n-ransomware/\n\nPublic leak site of the n0n ransomware group\n\nVictims must pay an upfront fee of 10% of the total ransom to access their negotiation portal, which prevents them\n\nfrom inspecting stolen files before paying. During the October wave, n0n dropped negotiation entirely: victims\n\nhad to pay the listed address in full or face automatic publication when the countdown expired, 96 hours for mid-\n\nOctober listings and seven days for the maritime batch.\n\nOrganizations that pay are rebranded as anonymous “HONORED – data destroyed” entries and removed from\n\npublic rosters. Five such cards were logged by October 19, including one previously named US company and one\n\napparent internal test entry, though no transactions have been validated on-chain.\n\nPage 3 of 19\n\nhttps://socradar.io/blog/dark-web-profile-n0n-ransomware/\n\nn0n negotiation room for FinSoft\n\nPressure Tactics\n\nExtortion emails are sent direct to victims’ mail exchangers from notice@n0n-cases[.]net through custom Python\n\nscripts, bypassing standard mail providers. Automated countdown warnings reach union leadership, MSPs, clients\n\nand media outlets, with the line “Silence is read as refusal.” In the Transcom incident, a secondary alert went\n\ndirectly to PayPal’s security team, even though the compromised data sat only on Transcom’s network.\n\nPage 4 of 19\n\nhttps://socradar.io/blog/dark-web-profile-n0n-ransomware/\n\nExtortion email sent to PayPal for third-party leverage\n\nPayment Infrastructure\n\nn0n is Bitcoin-only and generates a unique, single-use address for each victim. The operator derives these\n\naddresses with an Electrum wallet from a single BIP84 seed, using per-victim indexes. SOCRadar collected 55\n\naddresses from ransom notes, maritime cases, operator derivation scripts and leak-site sources. A read-only check\n\nof all 55 found zero transactions, balances or pending mempool activity as of October 16, 2026.\n\nLeak Publication Pipeline\n\nOnce a deadline passes, the operator flips the victim to “leaked.” Builder scripts compress data from the victim’s\n\nharvest folder, and every package passes two release gates first: guard.py blocks releases that contain malformed\n\ndata or internal identifiers, and deepscan.py scrubs operator IPs, hostnames, credentials and AI agent strings.\n\nArchives are hosted on the leak site and seeded as torrents from a VPN-backed seedbox, and a public counter\n\nrecorded 176,901 leak.zip downloads by October 19.\n\nn0n Campaign Timeline\n\nPage 5 of 19\n\nDate (2026)\n\nSeptember 17\n\nSeptember 18\n\nSeptember 23-25\n\nSeptember 25-26\n\nSeptember 27-29\n\nOctober 1-2\n\nOctober 5-7\n\nOctober 12\n\nOctober 19\n\nOctober 22\n\nhttps://socradar.io/blog/dark-web-profile-n0n-ransomware/\n\nActivity\n\nNegotiation portals opened\n\nNetwork of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed\n\nFirst leak wave (10 organizations)\n\nExposed staging server identified by STRU\n\nSecond leak wave (3 organizations)\n\nThird leak wave (2 organizations)\n\nTwo settlements marked “honored”\n\n38 maritime, port and logistics organizations listed\n\nAll 38 maritime listings leaked\n\nPortals rebuilt\n\nPage 6 of 19\n\nhttps://socradar.io/blog/dark-web-profile-n0n-ransomware/\n\nn0n campaign timeline, September-October 2026\n\nInside the Exposed n0n Operator Workspace\n\nSTRU identified a Python HTTP file server at 185.157.161[.]148:8877 exposing the operator’s live working\n\ndirectory across two snapshots on September 25 and 26, 2026. Files were added, moved and deleted between\n\nsnapshots, confirming active use:\n\n1,719 files captured across both snapshots\n\n829 scripts, including 589 Python, 28 PowerShell and 207 shell scripts\n\n5 C++ encryptor sources for Windows and Linux\n\nAn operational window of September 10-28, 2026, based on modification timestamps\n\nThe operator’s infrastructure is segmented across four machines and supporting services:\n\nPage 7 of 19\n\nhttps://socradar.io/blog/dark-web-profile-n0n-ransomware/\n\nAgent box (185.157.161[.]148): Central staging node hosting the AI coding agent and the kserver C2 panel\n\nbehind Cloudflare\n\nraas (188.214.135[.]130): Leak site backend, victim records, Electrum wallet, WinRM strike automation\n\nand C2 listeners\n\nmonster (81.161.239[.]10): Loot vault where all exfiltration terminates, leak builder, implant tools and an\n\nHTTPS C2 listener\n\nSeedbox: Torrent seeding of all leak archives over a commercial WireGuard VPN, with a watchdog that\n\nresets stale tunnels\n\nCover domains, Tor relays, an SSH pivot, residential proxies and third-party AI gateways insulate these core\n\nservers.\n\nn0n operator’s infrastructure\n\nn0n Attack Lifecycle\n\nThe operator applies the same lifecycle to every case, but the primary impact shifts between exfiltration,\n\nencryption, destruction and network disruption depending on the target.\n\nInitial Access Through Credentials\n\nSTRU found no exploit payloads or CVE references in the workspace. Every documented intrusion relied on weak\n\nor compromised credentials:\n\nFortiGate SSL-VPN credential stuffing: A 15-thread routine through residential proxy pools against an\n\nindex of 305 appliances, with every request carrying the header Cookie: APBSID=n0n\n\nRDP and WinRM: Sequential sweeps for default or weak passwords, driven by OCR-assisted RDP scripts\n\nCloud credentials: Long-lived AWS IAM keys with list, read and delete rights\n\nPage 8 of 19\n\nand monitoring portals\n\npipelines\n\nFortiGate SSL-VPN credential checker used for credential stuffing\n\nvector remains unknown.\n\nPersistence and Credential Harvesting\n\nhttps://socradar.io/blog/dark-web-profile-n0n-ransomware/\n\nHosting provider sessions: Stored administrative browser sessions used to take over management, billing\n\nSaaS and CI/CD secrets: API tokens and cloud credentials harvested from source code and deployment\n\nThree cloud-database cases were staged under the label “gl-0day,” but no exploit code was found and their access\n\nAfter access, the operator creates hidden administrator accounts disguised as services, such as svc_upd (“Software\n\nUpdate”) and svc_reg (“Registry Service”), with non-expiring passwords. Other persistence includes root resets\n\nthrough GRUB init=/bin/bash over OCR-driven VNC consoles, a gost SOCKS5 proxy disguised as a scheduled\n\ntask, and OpenSSH on port 2222. Collection targets Chrome profiles and credential stores, session tokens, full\n\nIMAP mailboxes and incoming MFA codes.\n\nPage 9 of 19\n\nhttps://socradar.io/blog/dark-web-profile-n0n-ransomware/\n\nCreation of the hidden admin account svc_upd\n\nExfiltration\n\nEach victim gets a dedicated pipeline with per-target byte budgets, from 1 GB to 110 GB per cloud bucket and an\n\n8 GiB cap for in-band Windows exfiltration. Data leaves through Base64-encoded ZIP POSTs to C2, SigV4\n\nrequests over Tor, SSH-tunneled TAR archives and public file-hosting services, and always ends up on monster\n\nunder /root/harvest/\u003cvictim\u003e/.\n\nEncryption and Data Destruction\n\nThe n0n locker runs inside wrapper scripts that stop database and security services, delete shadow copies and wipe\n\nfree space. Destruction is a deliberate lever on its own: the operator purges source files after exfiltration, flips\n\nfirewall rules to BLOCK, and in one case claimed to have removed 46 servers and their backups. The pitch to\n\nvictims is direct: “the only restore path is the disk images we hold.”\n\nThe n0n Encryptor\n\nThe original C++ source of the locker was recovered from the staging server; the compiled binaries were not. The\n\nlocker is a lightweight AES-256-CBC file encryptor with no network capability, key exchange, per-victim keys,\n\nransom note logic, persistence or anti-analysis. All of that comes from external operator wrapper scripts.\n\nVariant\n\nnenc.cpp (v1)\n\nnenc2.cpp (v2)\n\nnenc2l.cpp /\n\nnenc2l_main.cpp\n\nfinenc3-5.ps1, denc.ps1,\n\ndatasweep.ps1\n\nPlatform\n\nWindows, CNG / AES-\n\nNI\n\nWindows, CNG\n\nLinux, OpenSSL EVP or\n\ntiny-AES-c\n\nPowerShell / .NET\n\nPage 10 of 19\n\nUsed Against\n\nAFRICA-TECH; FinSoft\n\nStaged against a medical-\n\nlaboratory database server\n\nDediserve\n\nFinSoft\n\nhttps://socradar.io/blog/dark-web-profile-n0n-ransomware/\n\nVariant Platform Used Against\n\nCisco FMC (Linux),\nFMC appliance stage Firewall-manager victims\nOpenSSL\n\nn0n execution chain on Windows, Linux and Cisco FMC\n\nThe Windows wrapper stages tooling in C:\\Users\\Public\\n0n\\, stops MSSQL, MySQL and W3SVC, disables\n\nSymantec Endpoint Protection, runs vssadmin delete shadows /all /quiet, wipes free space with cipher /w, and\n\nreruns encryption every 5 minutes as a SYSTEM scheduled task. It drops n0n_READ_ME.txt across roots, shares\n\nand desktops, sets a Run key that opens the note at logon, and finally overwrites the toolkit three times before\n\ndeleting it.\n\nThe Linux variant is the most cautious build: it writes to a .n0n.tmp file, decrypts and verifies the result against an\n\nMD5 checksum, and only then renames the file. At FinSoft, the first two PowerShell versions failed because a\n\nBase64 key decoded to 33 bytes, and a third version fixed the bug mid-attack.\n\nEach build uses a single hardcoded 32-byte key. nenc.cpp and the FinSoft PowerShell encryptor share an identical\n\nkey, so a decryptor obtained by one victim would likely unlock the other’s files. Paid “decryptors” are this static\n\nkey.\n\nAI-Assisted Operations\n\nThe operator works with opencode, an open-source AI coding agent, configured with 154 model entries across 7\n\nproviders, including commercial gateways, “uncensored” and “abliterated” models with safety training removed,\n\nand a self-hosted Qwen 27B model on a rented GPU server. Billing records confirm active use of three gateways,\n\nand key-status checks show more than $7,216 in API spending as of October 22, 2026, with spending focused\n\nmainly on safety-removed models.\n\nThe agent produced hundreds of numbered, iteratively patched scripts, stored encryption keys in its own memory\n\nfile, and drove the C2 panel through saved session cookies. The configuration defines no automatic failover\n\nPage 11 of 19\n\nhttps://socradar.io/blog/dark-web-profile-n0n-ransomware/\n\nbetween models, and STRU observed a human-directed operation supported by AI, with no fully autonomous\n\nattack system.\n\nDecoy login page of the operator’s kserver C2 panel\n\nNotable n0n Cases\n\nDediserve (cloud hosting, Ireland/Germany): Stolen admin browser credentials led to takeover of the\n\nprovider’s management stack; the operator ran commands through Zabbix scripts and OnApp recipes\n\nnamed “disk usage check” and “maintenance check,” converted tenant backups into VM templates, and\n\ndeployed the only Linux n0n locker variant\n\nInter (ISP, Venezuela): The operator ran inter_lock.py directly on the ISP’s Cisco Firepower Management\n\nCenter, switched all access-control rules to BLOCK, and claimed to have severed national network traffic\n\non September 18, 2026, alongside a 15 BTC demand\n\nn0n’s note on its control of the Inter network\n\nFanatics (sports e-commerce, US): An exposed AWS access key enabled exfiltration from 40 S3 buckets,\n\nfollowed by deletion of a bank-transaction archive and twelve confidential buckets without any encryptor;\n\nthe group claimed 217.7 GB and demanded 30 BTC\n\nChiBiTek (managed IT services, US): Reached through the FortiGate credential-stuffing pipeline,\n\nprofiled in operator scripts, and listed on the leak site on October 11\n\nPage 12 of 19\n\nhttps://socradar.io/blog/dark-web-profile-n0n-ransomware/\n\nn0n Targets and Victimology\n\nn0n scales initial access through RDP scanning and FortiGate credential stuffing, then selects targets from\n\nsuccessful intrusions. High-profile entities were reached through deliberate scouting. Its typical target is a mid-\n\nsized organization with sensitive internal assets and edge services protected by weak or compromised credentials.\n\nThe staging server’s data covers 23 organizations across 14 countries in 15 distinct sectors, with Software/SaaS\n\nand retail tied at three victims each. As of October 19, 15 of them were published on the leak site, 4 were\n\ncompromised but not published, and for 4 more, access was attempted with no outcome shown. Demands ranged\n\nfrom 0.5 BTC for a government ministry to 33.04 BTC for the United Federation of Teachers.\n\nGeographic distribution of victims\n\nThe operation extends well beyond that server. On October 12, 2026, n0n listed 38 maritime, port and logistics\n\norganizations across 18 countries in a single batch, with demands from $0.4M to $28M and a combined $275.8M.\n\nMaritime security research tied at least 21 of the 38 to customers of South Korean maritime software provider\n\nCyberLogitec, but CyberLogitec has not confirmed an incident, and one listing reuses another victim’s sample\n\nfile, so the supply-chain link remains unverified. After the October 19 deadline, none of the 38 were marked\n\nsettled, none of their payment addresses showed any transaction, and all were published.\n\nPage 13 of 19\n\nhttps://socradar.io/blog/dark-web-profile-n0n-ransomware/\n\nSector distribution of victims\n\nAttribution\n\nSOCRadar STRU assesses with medium confidence that n0n is a multi-operator, large-scale cybercrime operation,\n\nand that the exposed server is a private workspace belonging to core operators or administrators rather than hired\n\naffiliates. The evidence includes collective language in extortion notes, an operational tempo above single-\n\noperator bandwidth, the absence of the maritime campaign from this server’s artifacts, direct patch scripts for the\n\nleak site backend, and seed-level control of the wallet derivation tooling.\n\nNo affiliate recruitment material or revenue-sharing logs were found, and the corpus offers no geographic or\n\nnational attribution. All custom tooling is written in English; the only Cyrillic artifact is a localized desktop folder\n\npath on a victim endpoint.\n\nTactic\n\nReconnaissance\n\nMITRE ATT\u0026CK Techniques Used by n0n\n\nTechnique\n\nT1595.001 – Active\n\nScanning: Scanning IP\n\nBlocks\n\nPage 14 of 19\n\nProcedure\n\nRDP batch scans and a ranked list of 305\n\nFortiGate SSL-VPN appliances\n\nhttps://socradar.io/blog/dark-web-profile-n0n-ransomware/\n\nTactic Technique Procedure\n\nWeak or default RDP/WinRM\n\nInitial Access T1078 – Valid Accounts administrator credentials; firewall-\n\nmanager admin accounts\n\nT1078.004 – Valid Accounts: Exposed long-lived AWS IAM access\nInitial Access\nCloud Accounts keys\n\nT1133 – External Remote Internet-facing FortiGate SSL-VPN,\nInitial Access\nServices RDP and WinRM\n\nT1059.001 – Command and\n\nExecution Scripting Interpreter:\n\nPowerShell\n\nT1053.005 – Scheduled\nExecution\nTask/Job: Scheduled Task\n\nT1651 – Cloud\nExecution\nAdministration Command\n\nT1053.005 – Scheduled\nPersistence\nTask/Job: Scheduled Task\n\nStrike, exfiltration and implant scripts\n\npasted into RDP sessions\n\nLocker and audit runs as SYSTEM tasks\n\nevery 5-10 minutes\n\nAWS SSM commands, hosting-panel\n\nrecipes and Zabbix script execution\n\nAfricaSync, FinSoftSync*, SvcSync,\n\nNetAssist\n\nT1547.001 – Boot or Logon\nn0nNote opens the ransom note at every\nPersistence Autostart Execution: Registry\nlogon\nRun Keys\n\nT1136.001 – Create Account: Hidden administrators svc_upd, svc_reg,\nPersistence\nLocal Account svc\u003cslug\u003e\n\nT1098.004 – Account Operator keys installed via VNC console\n\nPersistence Manipulation: SSH on cloud clones; root@3090-AI on FMC\n\nAuthorized Keys appliances\n\nT1562.001 – Impair\nSymantec Endpoint Protection stopped\nDefense Evasion Defenses: Disable or Modify\nand disabled\nTools\n\nT1564.002 – Hide Artifacts: SpecialAccounts\\UserList value 0 for the\nDefense Evasion\nHidden Users cover accounts\n\nT1070.004 – Indicator Toolkit overwritten three times and\nDefense Evasion\nRemoval: File Deletion deleted; launchers self-delete\n\nCredential T1110.004 – Brute Force: FortiGate /remote/logincheck credential\n\nAccess Credential Stuffing stuffing via residential proxies\n\nPage 15 of 19\n\nhttps://socradar.io/blog/dark-web-profile-n0n-ransomware/\n\nTactic Technique Procedure\n\n(APBSID=n0n)\n\nCredential T1110.002 – Brute Force: Offline cracking of stolen SaaS user\n\nAccess Password Cracking hashes and encrypted 7z archives\n\nT1555.003 – Credentials\n\nCredential from Password Stores: Chrome/Edge stores decrypted,\n\nAccess Credentials from Web including Chrome’s app-bound key\n\nBrowsers\n\nCredential T1539 – Steal Web Session Live administrator Chrome profiles\n\nAccess Cookie copied and driven over DevTools\n\nCredential T1111 – Multi-Factor Billing-panel MFA codes read from the\n\nAccess Authentication Interception staff mailbox\n\nCredential T1003.003 – OS Credential NTDS.dit copy from a shadow copy\n\nAccess Dumping: NTDS (scripted)\n\nT1046 – Network Service\nDiscovery Internal sweeps of 445/3389/5985/1433\nDiscovery\n\nT1580 – Cloud Infrastructure EC2/ECS/SSM mapping and hosting-\nDiscovery\nDiscovery panel VM inventories\n\nT1619 – Cloud Storage\nDiscovery S3 bucket listing and prefix census\nObject Discovery\n\nT1021.001 – Remote\nLateral Headless xfreerdp sessions driven by key\nServices: Remote Desktop\nMovement injection and OCR\nProtocol\n\nT1021.006 – Remote\nLateral\nServices: Windows Remote pywinrm strikes, triage and browser theft\nMovement\nManagement\n\nT1530 – Data from Cloud\nCollection S3 bulk pulls with per-bucket byte caps\nStorage\n\nT1114.002 – Email\nFull IMAP dump of a provider staff\nCollection Collection: Remote Email\nmailbox\nCollection\n\nRDP results returned through the\nCollection T1115 – Clipboard Data\nclipboard\n\nPage 16 of 19\n\nTactic\n\nCollection\n\nCommand and\n\nControl\n\nCommand and\n\nControl\n\nCommand and\n\nControl\n\nCommand and\n\nControl\n\nExfiltration\n\nExfiltration\n\nImpact\n\nImpact\n\nImpact\n\nImpact\n\nImpact\n\nhttps://socradar.io/blog/dark-web-profile-n0n-ransomware/\n\nTechnique\n\nT1113 – Screen Capture\n\nT1071.001 – Application\n\nLayer Protocol: Web\n\nProtocols\n\nT1001 – Data Obfuscation\n\nT1572 – Protocol Tunneling\n\nT1090.003 – Proxy: Multi-\n\nhop Proxy\n\nT1041 – Exfiltration Over C2\n\nChannel\n\nT1567.002 – Exfiltration\n\nOver Web Service:\n\nExfiltration to Cloud Storage\n\nT1486 – Data Encrypted for\n\nImpact\n\nT1485 – Data Destruction\n\nT1490 – Inhibit System\n\nRecovery\n\nT1489 – Service Stop\n\nT1565.001 – Data\n\nManipulation: Stored Data\n\nManipulation\n\nn0n Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)\n\nThe full IOC set is available in the SOCRadar STRU threat intelligence repository.\n\nHow to Defend Against n0n Ransomware\n\nPage 17 of 19\n\nProcedure\n\nRemote screen captured and read with\n\nOCR to drive logons\n\nHTTPS implant C2 (c2srv.py) and the\n\nkserver panel\n\nStatus beacon disguised as card-payment\n\nJSON to /x/i\n\nSSH -D SOCKS tunnels over Tor\n\nTor, SSH pivots, gost exits on\n\ncompromised hosts, residential proxies\n\nZip-base64 POSTs to /c2/…/out (8 GiB\n\nbudget)\n\nUploads to a public file-hosting service\n\nn0n locker (Windows/Linux) and the\n\nOpenSSL stage on FMC appliances\n\nS3 mass deletion; a provider’s servers\n\nand backups removed\n\nShadow copies deleted; free space wiped\n\nMSSQL, MySQL and IIS stopped before\n\nencryption\n\nFirewall rules flipped to BLOCK in the\n\nFMC configuration database\n\nhttps://socradar.io/blog/dark-web-profile-n0n-ransomware/\n\nHarden remote access: Enforce phishing-resistant MFA on RDP, SSL-VPN and admin portals, monitor\n\n/remote/logincheck for credential stuffing, and invalidate credentials found in infostealer logs\n\nLock down firewall management: Restrict FortiManager and FMC interfaces with IP allow-lists and\n\nMFA, require formal approval for policy changes, remove shared or default credentials, and flag REST\n\ntoken creation from unknown IPs\n\nReduce cloud key risk: Replace long-lived cloud keys with short-lived roles, keep list, read and delete S3\n\npermissions off a single IAM identity, enable Object Lock and versioning, and alert on high-volume\n\nDeleteObjects calls\n\nKeep offline, immutable backups: n0n purges shadow copies, zero-fills free space and deletes provider-\n\nhosted backups, so air-gapped or immutable copies are the reliable recovery path\n\nIsolate administrative browsers: Hosting and SaaS operators should run management portals from\n\nisolated workstations with hardware-backed session controls, and keep MFA passcodes out of local admin\n\nmailboxes\n\nHunt for n0n behavior: Search EDR, CloudTrail, WinRM/RDP and firewall logs for the IOCs above and\n\nfor C:\\Users\\Public\\n0n\\, .n0n renames after MSSQL/W3SVC/MySQL stops, SYSTEM tasks such as\n\nSvcSync or NetAssist, Chrome launched with –remote-debugging-port, Snort rule “n0n-lock” (sid\n\n2100001), authorized_keys ending in root@3090-AI, and JSON POSTs to /x/i containing “ippay-web”\n\nFrequently Asked Questions\n\nWhat Is n0n Ransomware?\n\nn0n is a financially motivated data-exfiltration and destructive-extortion group active since September 2026. It\n\nencrypts files with its own AES-256-CBC locker, appends the .n0n extension, destroys data and backups, and\n\npublishes stolen files on a Tor and clearnet leak site. By October 19, 2026, it had listed 93 victims with $283.7M\n\nin combined ransom demands.\n\nHow Does n0n Gain Initial Access?\n\nEvery intrusion documented in the operator’s workspace used weak or compromised credentials. The main vectors\n\nwere FortiGate SSL-VPN credential stuffing against 305 appliances, RDP and WinRM password sweeps, exposed\n\nAWS IAM keys, hijacked hosting-provider browser sessions and secrets taken from SaaS and CI/CD pipelines.\n\nNo exploit code or CVE references were found.\n\nDoes n0n Use AI in Its Attacks?\n\nYes. The operator uses the opencode AI coding agent with 154 configured models, including uncensored and\n\nsafety-removed models and a self-hosted Qwen 27B model, and spent more than $7,216 on LLM APIs by October\n\n22, 2026. The agent wrote and patched hundreds of attack scripts, but the operation remains human-directed.\n\nCan Files Encrypted by n0n Be Recovered?\n\nEach n0n build uses a single hardcoded 32-byte key, and the same key appears in two builds used against different\n\nvictims, so one victim’s decryptor would likely decrypt another’s files. The wrapper scripts still delete shadow\n\nPage 18 of 19\n\noption.\n\nWho Does n0n Target?\n\nhttps://socradar.io/blog/dark-web-profile-n0n-ransomware/\n\ncopies, wipe free space and overwrite originals, which makes offline or immutable backups the reliable recovery\n\nn0n targets organizations ranging from small IT firms to global enterprises across at least 27 countries, with the\n\nhighest concentration in the United States and South Korea. Victims include SaaS vendors, retailers, ISPs, cloud\n\nproviders, a teachers’ union, a government ministry, pharmaceutical and gambling companies, and 38 maritime,\n\nport and logistics organizations listed in a single October batch.\n\nIs n0n Linked to a Specific Country?\n\nNo. SOCRadar STRU found no geographic or national attribution in the operator’s files. All custom tooling is\n\nwritten in English, and the only Cyrillic artifact was a localized folder path on a victim’s endpoint.\n\nAmir Owda\n\nAmir Owda is a Cybersecurity Content Development Specialist at SOCRadar. His work spans cybersecurity\n\nwriting, workflow automation, and website operations. There's usually an article to finish, a page to fix, or\n\nsomething he's convinced can be automated.\n\nSource: https://socradar.io/blog/dark-web-profile-n0n-ransomware/\n\nPage 19 of 19",
	"extraction_quality": 1,
	"language": "EN",
	"sources": [
		"MISPGALAXY"
	],
	"origins": [
		"web"
	],
	"references": [
		"https://socradar.io/blog/dark-web-profile-n0n-ransomware/"
	],
	"report_names": [
		"dark-web-profile-n0n-ransomware"
	],
	"threat_actors": [],
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	"ts_creation_date": 0,
	"ts_modification_date": 0,
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