{
	"id": "29393b5e-cd9e-4498-a65e-d97a4a8a5eb2",
	"created_at": "2026-04-06T01:30:32.421337Z",
	"updated_at": "2026-04-10T03:27:02.106495Z",
	"deleted_at": null,
	"sha1_hash": "6ca2003518398f40191fe95de89cd785d52b7630",
	"title": "Pegasus: The new global weapon for silencing journalists",
	"llm_title": "",
	"authors": "",
	"file_creation_date": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
	"file_modification_date": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
	"file_size": 67746,
	"plain_text": "Pegasus: The new global weapon for silencing journalists\r\nBy webmaster\r\nPublished: 2021-07-18 · Archived: 2026-04-06 00:27:12 UTC\r\nThe Pegasus Project\r\nIsmayilova is one of nearly 200 journalists around the world whose phones have been selected as targets by NSO\r\nclients, according to the Pegasus Project, an investigation released today by a global consortium of more than 80\r\njournalists from 17 media outlets in 10 countries, coordinated by Forbidden Stories with the technical support of\r\nAmnesty International’s Security Lab.\r\nForbidden Stories and Amnesty International had access to a leak of more than 50,000 records of phone numbers\r\nthat NSO clients selected for surveillance. According to an analysis of these records by Forbidden Stories and its\r\npartners, the phones of at least 180 journalists were selected in 20 countries by at least 10 NSO clients. These\r\ngovernment clients range from autocratic (Bahrain, Morocco and Saudi Arabia) to democratic (India and Mexico)\r\nand span the entire world, from Hungary and Azerbaijan in Europe to Togo and Rwanda in Africa. As the Pegasus\r\nProject will show, many of them have not been afraid to select journalists, human rights defenders, political\r\nopponents, businesspeople and even heads of state as targets of this invasive technology.\r\nStating “contractual and national security considerations” NSO Group wrote in a letter to Forbidden Stories and\r\nits media partners that it “cannot confirm or deny the identity of our government customers.” Forbidden Stories\r\nand its media partners reached out to each of the government clients cited in this project, all of whom either failed\r\nto respond to the questions by the deadline or denied being clients of NSO Group.\r\nIt is impossible to know whether a specific phone number appearing in the list was successfully compromised\r\nwithout analyzing the device. However, Amnesty International’s Security Lab, in partnership with Forbidden\r\nStories, was able to perform forensics analyses on the phones of more than a dozen of these journalists – and 67\r\nphones in total – revealing successful infections through a security flaw in iPhones as recently as this month.\r\nThe leaked phone numbers, which Forbidden Stories and its partners analyzed over months, reveal for the first\r\ntime the staggering scale of surveillance of journalists and human rights defenders – despite NSO Group’s\r\nrepeated claims that its tools are exclusively used for targeting serious criminals and terrorists – and confirm the\r\nfears of press advocates about the scope of spyware being used against journalists.\r\n“The numbers vividly show the abuse is widespread, placing journalists’ lives, those of their families and\r\nassociates in danger, undermining freedom of the press and shutting down critical media,” said Agnes Callamard,\r\nsecretary general of Amnesty International. “It is about controlling public narrative, resisting scrutiny, suppressing\r\nany dissenting voice.”\r\nJournalists appearing in these records have received legal threats, others have been arrested and defamed, and\r\nsome have had to flee their countries due to persecution – only to later find that they were still under surveillance.\r\nIn rare cases journalists have been killed after having been selected as targets. Today’s revelations make clear that\r\nhttps://forbiddenstories.org/pegasus-the-new-global-weapon-for-silencing-journalists/\r\nPage 1 of 8\n\nthe technology has emerged as a key tool in the hands of repressive government actors and the intelligence\r\nagencies that work for them.\r\n“Putting surveillance on a journalist has a very strong chilling effect,” Carlos Martinez de la Serna, program\r\ndirector at the Committee to Protect Journalists, told Forbidden Stories. “This is a very, very important problem\r\nthat everyone needs to take seriously, not only in context of where journalists are working in a hostile environment\r\nfor journalism, but in the US and Western Europe and other places.”\r\nOne of the digital intrusions occurred when he was meeting with a Hungarian photojournalist who had been\r\nserving as a fixer for a reporter from a US-based news outlet working on a story about the International\r\nInvestment Bank, a Russia-backed bank that in 2019 was pushing to establish branches in Budapest.\r\nAround that time, the photojournalist fixer was also selected as a target, according to the records accessed by\r\nForbidden Stories.\r\n“It’s real likely that those who are operating this system were interested in what these Hungarian and American\r\njournalists were going to write about this Russian bank,” Panyi said.\r\nLike Panyi, many journalists who are the subject of digital threats and cyber surveillance are interesting to\r\nstate intelligence agencies on account of their sources, according to Igor Ostrovskiy, a private investigator in New\r\nYork City who previously spied on journalists including Ronan Farrow, Jodi Kantor and Wall Street Journal\r\nreporter Bradley Hope as a subcontractor for the Israeli company Black Cube and now trains journalists in\r\ninformation security.\r\n“We all know that journalists have a ton of information passing through their hands so that could be why state\r\nsecurity could be interested,” he said. “State security could be interested in who’s leaking inside the government,\r\nor inside of a business that’s vital to the government, and they might be looking for that source.”\r\nHalfway around the world, the phone of Paranjoy Guha Thakurta, an Indian investigative journalist and author of\r\na number of books about Indian business and politics, was hacked in 2018. Thakurta told Forbidden Stories that he\r\noften spoke with sources on the condition of anonymity, and said that at the time of his targeting he was working\r\non an investigation into the finances of the late Drirubhai Ambani, formerly the richest man in India.\r\n“They would know who our sources were,” Thakurta said. “The purpose of getting into my phone and looking at\r\nwho are the people I’m speaking to would be to find out who are the individuals who have been providing\r\ninformation to me and my colleagues.”\r\nThakurta is one of at least 40 Indian journalists selected as targets of an NSO client that appears to be the Indian\r\ngovernment, based on the consortium’s analysis of the leaked data.\r\nThe Indian government has never confirmed nor denied being a client of NSO Group. “The allegations regarding\r\ngovernment surveillance on specific people has no concrete basis or truth associated with it whatsoever,” wrote a\r\nspokesperson for the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology in a response to detailed questions sent\r\nby Forbidden Stories and its partners.\r\nhttps://forbiddenstories.org/pegasus-the-new-global-weapon-for-silencing-journalists/\r\nPage 2 of 8\n\nWhile previous reporting showed four journalists among the 121 Pegasus targets revealed in India in 2019, the\r\nrecords accessed by Forbidden Stories show that this surveillance may have been much more extensive. More than\r\n2,000 Indian and Pakistani numbers were selected as targets between 2017 and 2019, among them Indian\r\njournalists from nearly every major media outlet, including The Hindu, Hindustan Times, the Indian Express,\r\nIndia Today, Tribune, and The Pioneer. Local journalists were also selected as targets, including Jaspal Singh\r\nHeran, the editor in chief of a Punjab-based outlet that publishes only in Punjabi.\r\nThe phones of two of the three cofounders of the independent online news outlet The Wire – Siddharth\r\nVaradarajan and MK Venu – were both infected by Pegasus, with Venu’s phone hacked as recently as July. A\r\nnumber of other journalists who work for or have contributed to the independent news outlet – including\r\ncolumnist Prem Shankar Jha, investigative reporter Rohini Singh, diplomatic editor Devirupa Mitra and\r\ncontributor Swati Chaturvedi – were all selected as targets, according to the records accessed by Forbidden Stories\r\nand its partners, which include The Wire.\r\n“It was alarming to see so many names of people linked to The Wire, but then there are lots of people not linked to\r\nthe Wire,” Varadarajan, whose phone was compromised in 2018, said. “So this seems to be a general\r\npredisposition towards subjecting journalists to high level surveillance on the part of the government.”\r\nMany of the journalists who spoke with Forbidden Stories and its partner news organizations expressed dismay at\r\nhaving learned that despite the precautions they had taken to secure their devices – such as using encrypted\r\nmessaging services and updating their phones regularly – their private information was still not secure.\r\n“We’ve been recommending each other this tool or that tool, how to keep [our phones] more and more secure\r\nfrom the eyes of the government,” Ismayilova said. “And yesterday I realized that there is no way. Unless you\r\nlock yourself in [an] iron tent, there is no way that they will not interfere into your communications.”\r\nPanyi worried that the public knowledge of his targeting could dissuade sources from getting in contact with him\r\nin the future.\r\n“It’s every journalist who has been targeted’s concern that once it’s revealed that you were surveilled and even our\r\nconfidential messages could have been compromised, who the hell is going to talk to us in the future?” he asked.\r\n“Everyone will think that we’re toxic, that we’re a liability.”\r\n“Reading over your shoulder”: How Pegasus is used to spy on journalists in zero\r\nclicks\r\nAmnesty International Security Lab’s forensics analyses of cell phones targeted with Pegasus as part of the\r\nPegasus Project are consistent with past analyses of journalists targeted through NSO’s spyware, including the\r\ndozens of journalists allegedly hacked in the UAE and Saudi Arabia and identified by Citizen Lab in December of\r\nlast year.\r\n“There are a bunch of different pieces, essentially, and they all fit together very well,” Claudio Guarnieri, director\r\nof Amnesty International’s Security Lab, said. “There’s no doubt in my mind that what we’re looking at is Pegasus\r\nbecause the characteristics are very distinct and all of the traces that we see confirm each other.”\r\nhttps://forbiddenstories.org/pegasus-the-new-global-weapon-for-silencing-journalists/\r\nPage 3 of 8\n\nIn all, the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) had previously documented 38 cases of spyware – developed by\r\nsoftware companies in four countries – used against journalists in nine countries since 2011.\r\nEva Galperin, the director of cybersecurity at the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), was one of the first\r\nsecurity researchers to identify and document cyber attacks against journalists and human rights defenders in\r\nMexico, Vietnam and elsewhere in the early 2010s.\r\nAt the time, in the early 2010s, most malware attacks were less sophisticated than they are today, she explained.\r\n“Back in 2011, you would receive an email and the email would go to your computer and the malware would be\r\ndesigned to install itself on your computer,” she said.\r\nIt wasn’t until around 2014 that a “mobile-first” approach to spying on journalists gained popularity, as\r\nsmartphones became more ubiquitous, she said. Clients of companies like NSO, Hacking Team and FinFisher\r\nused “social engineering” to send specifically-crafted messages to targets, often baiting them with information\r\nabout potential scoops or targeted information about members of their families. Targets would have to click a link\r\nin order for the malware to be installed onto their phones.\r\nJournalists are obvious targets for intelligence agencies, Ostrovskiy said, because they are always seeking new\r\nsources of information – opening themselves up to phishing attempts – and because many often don’t follow\r\n“industry best practices on digital security.”\r\nSome of the first Pegasus infections of journalists were identified in Mexico in 2015 and 2016.\r\nIn January 2016, Carmen Aristegui, an investigative journalist in Mexico and the founder of Aristegui Noticias,\r\nbegan to receive messages with suspicious links after she published an investigation into property owned by\r\nformer Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto.\r\nAristegui received more than 20 text messages containing malicious Pegasus links, digital rights group Citizen\r\nLab would later reveal in the 2017 Gobierno Espia (“Government Spying”) report. According to the report, the\r\nphones of a number of her colleagues and family members were also targeted with text messages containing\r\nmalicious links during that same time period, including those of colleagues Sebastian Barragan and Rafael\r\nCabrera and her son Emilio Aristegui – just 16-years-old at the time.\r\nForbidden Stories and its partners were able to identify for the first time three other people close to Aristegui who\r\nwere selected as targets for surveillance in 2016: her sister Teresa Aristegui, her CNN producer Karina Maciel and\r\nher former assistant Sandra Nogales.\r\n“It was a huge shock to see others close to me in the list,” Aristegui, who was part of the Pegasus Project, said. “I\r\nhave six siblings, but at least one of them, my sister, was entered into the system. My assistant Sandra Nogales,\r\nwho knew everything about me – who had access to my schedule, all of my contacts, my day-to-day, my hour-to-hour – was also entered into the system.”\r\nSince those early days, the installation of Pegasus spyware on smartphones has become more subtle, Guarnieri\r\nsaid. Instead of the target having to click on a link to install the spyware, so-called “zero-click” exploits allow the\r\nclient to take control of the phone without any engagement on the part of the target.\r\nhttps://forbiddenstories.org/pegasus-the-new-global-weapon-for-silencing-journalists/\r\nPage 4 of 8\n\n“The complexity of performing these attacks has increased exponentially,” he said.\r\nOnce successfully installed on the phone, Pegasus spyware gives NSO clients complete device access and thereby\r\nthe ability to bypass even encrypted messaging apps like Signal, WhatsApp and Telegram. Pegasus can be\r\nactivated at will until the device is shut off. As soon as it’s powered back on, the phone can be reinfected.\r\n“If someone is reading over your shoulder, it doesn’t matter what kind of encryption was used,” said Bruce\r\nSchneier, a cryptologist and a fellow at Harvard’s Berkman Klein Center for Internet and Society.\r\nAccording to Guarnieri, Pegasus operators are able to remotely record audio and video, extract data from\r\nmessaging apps, use the GPS for location tracking, and recover passwords and authentication keys, among other\r\nthings. Spying governments have moved in recent years toward a more “hit and run” strategy to avoid detection,\r\nGalperin said: infecting phones, exfiltrating the data and quickly exiting the device.\r\nThese types of digital technologies go hand-in-hand with physical surveillance, according to Ostrovskiy.\r\n“Digital intrusions are extremely valuable,” he said. “If we could, for instance, have known your calendar, if we\r\ncould have known that you’re going to have a certain meeting or we could take a look at your email, your notes to\r\nwhatever the materials that most of us have on our phones, we’d have a huge leg up in being more successful in\r\nwhatever goal we’re trying to achieve.”\r\nIn 2014, he was beaten by two unknown assailants after leaving a meeting with human rights defenders, including\r\nhistorian Maati Monjib, who was later targeted with Pegasus. A year later, armed intelligence agents raided his\r\nhome at 9 a.m., finding him and a female friend in his bedroom together. They stripped him naked and arrested\r\nhim for “adultery,” which is a crime in Morocco. He spent 10 months in a Rabat prison (a previous version of this\r\narticle stated that Mansouri was imprisoned in Casablanca), in a cell reserved for the most serious criminals that\r\ninmates had nicknamed “La Poubelle,” or “The Trash Bin.” The day after he was released from prison, Mansouri\r\nleft Morocco for France, where he applied for and was granted asylum.\r\nFive years later, Mansouri found out he was still a target of the Moroccan government.\r\n“Every authoritarian regime sees danger everywhere,” Mansouri told Forbidden Stories. “We don’t see ourselves\r\nas dangerous because we do things that we consider to be legitimate, that we know are in our rights, but to them\r\nthey’re dangerous.”\r\n“They’re afraid of the sparks, because they know they’re flammable,” he added.\r\nAt least 35 journalists in four countries were selected as targets by an NSO client that appears to be the Moroccan\r\ngovernment, based on the consortium’s analysis of the leaked data. Many of the Moroccan journalists selected as\r\ntargets have been at some point arrested, defamed or targeted in some way by intelligence services. Others who\r\nwere selected as targets – including most notably newspaper editors Taoufik Bouachrine and Soulaimane\r\nRaissouni – are currently in prison on charges that human rights defense organizations contend were\r\ninstrumentalized in an effort to shut down independent journalism in Morocco.\r\nIn a statement shared with Forbidden Stories and its partners, a Moroccan embassy representive wrote that it did\r\nnot “understand the context” of the questions sent by the consortium and was “waiting for material proof” of “any\r\nhttps://forbiddenstories.org/pegasus-the-new-global-weapon-for-silencing-journalists/\r\nPage 5 of 8\n\nrelationship between Morocco and the stated Israeli company.”\r\nBouachrine, the editor of Akhbar al-Youm, was arrested in February 2018 on charges of human trafficking, sexual\r\nassault, rape, prostitution, and harassment. Of 14 women who allegedly accused Bouachrine, 10 showed up to\r\ncourt and five declared that Bouachrine was innocent, according to CPJ. The publisher had previously penned op-eds critical of the Moroccan regime, accusing various high level government officials of corruption. He was\r\nsentenced to 15 years in prison, and spent more than a year in solitary confinement.\r\nForbidden Stories and its partners have been able to confirm that the numbers of at least two women involved in\r\nthe case were selected as targets of Pegasus.\r\nBouachrine’s successor, Soulaimane Raissouni, was also arrested on sexual assault charges in May 2020, and was\r\nsentenced to five years in prison in July 2021. Raissouni was accused of assault by an LGBTQ activist, Adil Ait\r\nOuchraa, who told CPJ that he hadn’t previously felt comfortable filing a public claim because of his sexual\r\nidentity.\r\nJournalists and press freedom advocates told CPJ they believed the claim had been filed as retaliation against\r\nRaissouni’s critical reporting. In 2021, still awaiting trial, Raissouni began a hunger strike that as of this writing,\r\nhad lasted more than 100 days. His family members said that after 76 days he was in critical condition.\r\n“The point [of surveillance] is presumably to track the private lives of individuals in order to find a hook on which\r\nthey can hang any big trial,” said Ahmed Benchemsi, a former journalist and founder of the independent media\r\norganizations TelQuel and Nichane who now leads communications for the MENA region at Human Rights\r\nWatch.\r\nWhile in the past Moroccan journalists were routinely hit with legal attacks for things they wrote – such as\r\ndefamation or disrespecting the king – the new tactic was to accuse them of more serious crimes such as\r\nespionnage and later rape and sexual assault, he said. Surveillance emerged as a key tool in gleaning personal\r\ninformation that could be used to those ends.\r\n“There’s often a sliver of truth to a large mass of slander, but that sliver of truth is usually something personal and\r\nconfidential that can only come from surveillance,” he said.\r\nForeign journalists who have covered the plight of Moroccan journalists have also been selected as targets and in\r\nsome cases their phones were successfully infected.\r\nThe phone of Edwy Plenel, the director and one of the cofounders of Mediapart, a French investigative journalism\r\noutlet, was compromised in the summer of 2019, according to an analysis by Amnesty International’s Security\r\nLab that was peer-reviewed by the digital rights organization Citizen Lab.\r\nIn June of that year, Plenel had attended a two-day conference in Essaouira, Morocco, at the request of a journalist\r\npartner of Mediapart – Ali Amar, the founder of the Moroccan investigative magazine LeDesk – whose phone\r\nnumber also appears in the records accessed by Forbidden Stories. At the event, Plenel gave a number of\r\ninterviews in which he spoke about human rights violations committed by the Moroccan state. Upon his return to\r\nParis, suspicious processes began appearing on his device.\r\nhttps://forbiddenstories.org/pegasus-the-new-global-weapon-for-silencing-journalists/\r\nPage 6 of 8\n\n“We worked with Ali Amar; we published some investigations together and I knew Ali Amar, a bit like I know\r\nmany of the journalists fighting for a free press in Morocco,” Plenel said in an interview with Forbidden Stories.\r\n“So when I learned about my surveillance, all of this made sense.”\r\n“As NSO has previously stated, our technology was not associated in any way with the heinous murder of Jamal\r\nKhashoggi,” NSO Group wrote in its letter to Forbidden Stories. “We can confirm that our technology was not\r\nused to listen, monitor, track or collect information regarding him or his family members mentioned in your\r\ninquiry.”\r\nKhashoggi’s death, and the spyware lingering on the margins of it, security experts say, was not necessarily a\r\nunique case.\r\n“[Khashoggi is] certainly not the first journalist to have been killed by an angry government. And he’s not the first\r\njournalist to have been killed by an angry government for his journalism with some element of malware and\r\nsurveillance involved,” Galperin, at EFF, said. “These are things that very frequently go together.”\r\nOn March 2, 2017, local Mexican journalist Cecilio Pineda took out his phone and recorded his final broadcast. In\r\nit, the reporter from the city of Altamirano, who ran a Facebook with more than 50,000 followers, spoke about\r\nalleged collusion between state and local police and the leader of a drug cartel.\r\nTwo hours later, he was dead – shot at least six times by two men on a motorcycle as he lay in a hammock outside\r\nof a car wash.\r\nWhen Pineda was assassinated in 2017, at the age of 38, the world blinked and moved on. His death was seen as\r\njust another reporter killed in Mexico – the deadliest non-conflict zone in the world to be a journalist. But Pineda’s\r\ndeath may have been more than a drive-by job by a local cartel, according to the records accessed by Forbidden\r\nStories and its partners.\r\nJust a few weeks before he was killed, Pineda’s work cell phone was selected as a target of an NSO client in\r\nMexico.\r\nForbidden Stories has been able to confirm that not just Pineda, but also the state prosecutor who investigated the\r\ncase, Xavier Olea Pelaez, were selected as targets of Pegasus in the weeks and months before his murder.\r\nForbidden Stories was unable to analyze Pineda’s phone because it disappeared immediately after his death.\r\nPelaez did not keep his phone from the time, so it was not possible to confirm an infection by Pegasus.\r\nPineda’s reporting, however, gives traces as to why Pineda’s work could have troubled Mexican authorities who\r\nmay have had access to this technology. At the time of his selection, Pineda was investigating links between the\r\nlocal crime boss, known as El Tequilero, and the governor of the state of Guerrero, Hector Astudillo. Friends and\r\nfamily who spoke with Forbidden Stories and its partners said that Pineda had received threats and had asked to be\r\nplaced in a federal mechanism for the protection of journalists.\r\n“Cecilio received many serious threats but he would play them down,” Israel Flores, a friend of Pineda’s, said in a\r\nrecent interview. “He’d always say ‘nothing will happen.’”\r\nhttps://forbiddenstories.org/pegasus-the-new-global-weapon-for-silencing-journalists/\r\nPage 7 of 8\n\nAs Pineda continued to report on the nexus of local politicians and drug traffickers, the threats came ever closer to\r\nhim. A few days before his death, men in a white car took photos of his home, his mother said.\r\nThe day he was killed, he stopped by his mother’s house before meeting a friend at a political rally. That was the\r\nlast time she saw him.\r\n“He told me ‘the bad guys aren’t going to kill me, they know me, they’re my friends. If they kill me it will be the\r\ngovernment,” her mother said in an interview.\r\nPineda’s wife, Marisol Toledo, told a member of the Forbidden Stories consortium that the day after Pineda’s\r\ndeath she received a call from a government employee who told her he was investigating the murder. He never\r\nfollowed up.\r\n“We don’t know what happened in the investigation,” Toledo said. “We don’t want trouble. People with power can\r\ndo what they want, to who they want.”\r\nPineda’s phone was also never found – as it had disappeared from the crime scene by the time the authorities had\r\narrived. But when told about the possible role of spyware in tracking Pineda’s movements, Toledo was not\r\nsurprised.\r\n“If they succeeded, they would have known where he was at all times,” she said.\r\nSource: https://forbiddenstories.org/pegasus-the-new-global-weapon-for-silencing-journalists/\r\nhttps://forbiddenstories.org/pegasus-the-new-global-weapon-for-silencing-journalists/\r\nPage 8 of 8",
	"extraction_quality": 1,
	"language": "EN",
	"sources": [
		"Malpedia"
	],
	"references": [
		"https://forbiddenstories.org/pegasus-the-new-global-weapon-for-silencing-journalists/"
	],
	"report_names": [
		"pegasus-the-new-global-weapon-for-silencing-journalists"
	],
	"threat_actors": [
		{
			"id": "a3687241-9876-477b-aa13-a7c368ffda58",
			"created_at": "2022-10-25T16:07:24.496902Z",
			"updated_at": "2026-04-10T02:00:05.010744Z",
			"deleted_at": null,
			"main_name": "Hacking Team",
			"aliases": [],
			"source_name": "ETDA:Hacking Team",
			"tools": [],
			"source_id": "ETDA",
			"reports": null
		},
		{
			"id": "e90c06e4-e3e0-4f46-a3b5-17b84b31da62",
			"created_at": "2023-01-06T13:46:39.018236Z",
			"updated_at": "2026-04-10T02:00:03.183123Z",
			"deleted_at": null,
			"main_name": "Hacking Team",
			"aliases": [],
			"source_name": "MISPGALAXY:Hacking Team",
			"tools": [],
			"source_id": "MISPGALAXY",
			"reports": null
		},
		{
			"id": "cf02412a-041a-4c8d-8ffa-3bff7dd812b5",
			"created_at": "2024-02-02T02:00:04.018717Z",
			"updated_at": "2026-04-10T02:00:03.524693Z",
			"deleted_at": null,
			"main_name": "Blue Tsunami",
			"aliases": [
				"Black Cube"
			],
			"source_name": "MISPGALAXY:Blue Tsunami",
			"tools": [],
			"source_id": "MISPGALAXY",
			"reports": null
		}
	],
	"ts_created_at": 1775439032,
	"ts_updated_at": 1775791622,
	"ts_creation_date": 0,
	"ts_modification_date": 0,
	"files": {
		"pdf": "https://archive.orkl.eu/6ca2003518398f40191fe95de89cd785d52b7630.pdf",
		"text": "https://archive.orkl.eu/6ca2003518398f40191fe95de89cd785d52b7630.txt",
		"img": "https://archive.orkl.eu/6ca2003518398f40191fe95de89cd785d52b7630.jpg"
	}
}