{ "id": "88f0116d-e4cb-4a2b-b4dd-316b10b9977b", "created_at": "2026-04-06T00:18:47.855623Z", "updated_at": "2026-04-10T13:12:27.388816Z", "deleted_at": null, "sha1_hash": "66eb098adcdea8349198fa03d0de49f45c5ab722", "title": "7z*.exe allows remote code execution with escalation of privilege", "llm_title": "", "authors": "", "file_creation_date": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z", "file_modification_date": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z", "file_size": 70868, "plain_text": "7z*.exe allows remote code execution with escalation of privilege\nBy Stefan Kanthak\nArchived: 2026-04-05 19:38:18 UTC\nFull Disclosure mailing list archives\nExecutable installers are vulnerable^WEVIL (case 7): 7z*.exe allows remote code\nexecution with escalation of privilege\nFrom: \"Stefan Kanthak\" Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2015 18:33:48 +0100\nHi @ll,\nthe executable installers [°] of 7-Zip (see )\nand ALL self-extracting archives created with 7-Zip are vulnerable:\n1. They load and execute a rogue/bogus/malicious UXTheme.dll [']\n eventually found in the directory they are started from (the\n \"application directory\").\n For software downloaded with a web browser this is typically the\n \"Downloads\" directory: see , and If UXTheme.dll gets planted in the users \"Downloads\" directory\n per \"drive-by download\" this vulnerability becomes a remote code\n execution.\n Due to an application manifest embedded in the executable which\n specifies \"requireAdministrator\" or the \"installer detection\" (see )\n of Windows' \"user account control\" executable installers are\n typically started with administrative privileges (\"protected\"\n administrators are prompted for consent, unprivileged standard\n users are prompted for an administrator password); execution of\nhttps://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2015/Dec/34\nPage 1 of 4\n\nUXTheme.dll then results in an escalation of privilege!\r\nProof of concept/demonstration:\r\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\r\n1. visit \u003chttp://home.arcor.de/skanthak/sentinel.html\u003e, download\r\n \u003chttp://home.arcor.de/skanthak/download/SENTINEL.DLL\u003e and store\r\n it as UXTheme.dll in your \"Downloads\" directory;\r\n Note: this is the 32-bit DLL; the 64-bit DLL is available in\r\n \u003chttp://home.arcor.de/skanthak/download/SENTINEL.CAB\u003e\r\n2. download \u003chttp://www.7-zip.org/a/7z1512.exe\u003e and store it in the\r\n \"Downloads\" directory;\r\n3. run 7z1512.exe from the \"Downloads\" directory;\r\n4. notice the message box displayed from UXTheme.dll placed in step 1.\r\nMitigation(s):\r\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\r\n0. DON'T USE EXECUTABLE INSTALLERS [°]!\r\n If your favourite applications are not distributed in the native\r\n installer package format of the resp. target platform: ask^WURGE\r\n their vendors/developers to provide native installation packages.\r\n If they don't: dump these applications, stay away from such cruft!\r\n1. Turn off UAC's privilege elevation for standard users and installer\r\n detection for all users:\r\n [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System]\r\n \"ConsentPromptBehaviorUser\"=dword:00000000 ; Automatically deny elevation requests\r\n \"EnableInstallerDetection\"=dword:00000000\r\n See \u003chttps://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd835564.aspx#BKMK_RegistryKeys\u003e\r\n2. NEVER execute files in UNSAFE directories (like \"Downloads\" and\r\n and \"%TEMP%\")!\r\n3. Deny execution (at least) in the \"Downloads\" directories and all\r\n \"%TEMP%\" directories and their subdirectories:\r\n * Add the NTFS ACE \"(D;OIIO;WP;;;WD)\" meaning \"deny execution of\r\nhttps://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2015/Dec/34\r\nPage 2 of 4\n\nfiles in this directory for everyone, inheritable to all files\n in all subdirectories\" (use CACLS.EXE /S: for example);\n * Use \"software restriction policies\" resp. AppLocker.\n Consider to apply either/both to every \"%USERPROFILE%\" as well as\n \"%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\" alias %ProgramData%\" and \"%PUBLIC%\": Windows\n doesn't place executables in these directories and beyond.\n See as well as plus , or and finally !\nstay tuned\nStefan Kanthak\nPS: see (resp. the\n not yet finished )\n for more details!\nPPS: the case numbers are not in chronological order.\n[°] Self-extracting archives and executable installers are flawed^W\n b(rainde)ad in concept and dangerous in practice.\n DON'T USE SUCH CRUFT!\n ALWAYS use the resp. target platforms native package and archive\n format.\n For Windows these are .INF (plus .CAB) and .MSI (plus .CAB),\n introduced 20 years ago (with Windows 95 and Windows NT4) resp.\n 16 years ago (with Office 2000).\n Both .INF and .MSI are \"opened\" by programs residing in\n %SystemRoot%\\System32\\ which are therefore immune to this kind\n of \"DLL and EXE Search Order Hijacking\" attack.\n Since both .INF and .MSI access the contents of .CAB directly\n they eliminate the attack vector \"unsafe temporary directory\"\n too.\n['] A well-known (trivial, easy to exploit and easy to avoid) and\nhttps://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2015/Dec/34\nPage 3 of 4\n\nwell-documented vulnerability: see , , and Timeline:\n~~~~~~~~~\n2015-11-18 vulnerability report sent to author\n NO ANSWER, not even an acknowledgement of receipt\n2015-12-05 vulnerability report resent to author\n2015-12-05 response from author:\n \"What about another exe installers?\n Firefox, Chrome, Skype, WinRAR and others.\n All of them use exe installers.\"\n2015-12-05 other executable installers don't matter here; see\n but and 2015-12-06 several more lame and COMPLETELY clueless responses\n from author showing that he didn't even read the\n sources referenced here\n2015-12-08 report published\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/\nCurrent thread:\nExecutable installers are vulnerable^WEVIL (case 7): 7z*.exe allows remote code execution with\nescalation of privilege Stefan Kanthak (Dec 09)\nSource: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2015/Dec/34\nhttps://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2015/Dec/34\nPage 4 of 4", "extraction_quality": 1, "language": "EN", "sources": [ "MITRE" ], "origins": [ "web" ], "references": [ "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2015/Dec/34" ], "report_names": [ "34" ], "threat_actors": [], "ts_created_at": 1775434727, "ts_updated_at": 1775826747, "ts_creation_date": 0, "ts_modification_date": 0, "files": { "pdf": "https://archive.orkl.eu/66eb098adcdea8349198fa03d0de49f45c5ab722.pdf", "text": "https://archive.orkl.eu/66eb098adcdea8349198fa03d0de49f45c5ab722.txt", "img": "https://archive.orkl.eu/66eb098adcdea8349198fa03d0de49f45c5ab722.jpg" } }