

PDF Analysis of Lokibot malware

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4 minute read

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Introducion[Permalink](#)

This sample is from Lokibot trojan which steals the credential information from web browser, FTP server, SMTP server. This sample is a **PDF** file and our purpose of this blog is how to analyze a PDF file.

About PDF[Permalink](#)

Ability of a PDF file[Permalink](#)

A PDF file can implement droppers, downloader, or exploit PDF reader application's vulnerabilities.

PDF structure[Permalink](#)

- PDF header: Contains info about the version of the PDF such as %PDF-1.6
- Body:
 - Streams: a sequence of bytes such as images or data, which comes in encoded data.
 - Objects: How to render documents which can include text or javascript.
 - Others such as names, dictionaries, strings, and arrays.
- Cross-reference table: contains the offsets of file's objects.
- Trailer: contains the offset of xref table, and number of objects, /Root.

Dictionary entry is an item between « » and starts with slash / such as /Root which is the first object will be processed after loading the PDF file, /Root could be found in the Trailer section.

Suspicious keywords found when analyzing and their indications:

- /Js, /JavaScript: To execute embedded javascript
- /Launch, /EmbeddedFiles: To launch external or embedded files
- /URI: To interact with URLs

- /OpenAction, /AA: To open an action
- /FlateDecode: uses the zlib/deflate decompression method.

A comment in PDF starts with %

About objects:

```
obj 1 0: % first number is ID, second number is version

type: catalog % catalog is an example, type can be empty.

Referencing: 3 0 R % object 1 0 refernces to 3 0, R indicates of referencing

..... % content of the object

endobj % the object ends with
```

For more info about PDF see [this](#).

Methodology[Permalink](#)

use pdfid.py or peepdf.py:

- to perform an initial assessment by summarizing risky aspects

pdf-parser.py:

- to locate objects in file.pdf that include JavaScript
- to examine the contents of objects
- to decode the stream embedded from object
- to extract only the list of URL
- Follow object referencing to find the goal.

If you use peepdf.py and found that it has /EmbeddedFiles, start analyzing the object where is /EmbeddedFiles belongs to.

If you find /FlateDecode, go and try to analyze it which decodes stream.

PDF analysis[Permalink](#)

In this sample, We received a malicious PDF file which downloads Lokibot malware. So we need to start our analysis quickly using REMnux.

We first use `pdfid.py` to get info about the PDF and what is there. As we see, it has 8 streams and 1 /EmbeddedFiles and 0 javascript files. We can use `peepdf.py` to get which object contains the /EmbeddedFiles but an error occurred running.

```
remnux@remnux:~/Downloads$ pdfid.py da9c3deb08bfc6a2e7930a4c8f1bd81b5ebffbb09b44027c74ea41ebf7149f8b.pdf
PDFiD 0.2.1 da9c3deb08bfc6a2e7930a4c8f1bd81b5ebffbb09b44027c74ea41ebf7149f8b.pdf
PDF Header: %PDF-1.6
obj                10
endobj             10
stream            8 ←
endstream         8
xref              0
trailer           0
startxref         1
/Page             0
/Encrypt          0
/ObjStm           1
/JS               0 ←
/JavaScript       0 ←
/AA               0
/OpenAction       1
/AcroForm         1
/JBIG2Decode      0
/RichMedia        0
/Launch          0 ←
/EmbeddedFile     1 ←
/XFA              0
/Colors > 2^24    0
```

Figure(1): pdfid.py output

So we will use `pdf-parser.py` and to get our embedded file. We see many objects, Then start with objects which contains /FlateDecode and if we found /EmbeddedFiles go for it.

```
remnux@remnux:~/Downloads$ pdf-parser.py da9c3deb08bfc6a2e7930a4c8f1bd81b5ebffbb09b44027c74ea41ebf7149f8b.pdf
PDF Comment '%PDF-1.6\n'

PDF Comment '%\xa7\xe3\xf1\xf1\n'

obj 2 0
Type: /Catalog
Referencing: 4 0 R, 5 0 R, 6 0 R, 7 0 R, 8 0 R

<<
  /Type /Catalog
  /Outlines 4 0 R
  /Pages 5 0 R
  /Names 6 0 R
  /OpenAction 7 0 R
  /AcroForm 8 0 R
>>


obj 12 0
Type:
Referencing:
Contains stream
```

Figure(2): pdf-parser.py output

After scrolling down, we see object 12 contains /FlateDecode. We try to decode it and dumping using


```
remnux@remnux:~/Downloads$ pdf-parser.py --object 12 --filter --raw --dump file12
da9c3deb08bfc6a2e7930a4c8f1bd81b5ebffbb09b44027c74ea41ebf7149f8b.pdf
obj 12 0
Type:
Referencing:
Contains stream

<<
  /Filter /FlateDecode
  /Length 10
>>
```




Figure(3): After dumping the object 12

If we use `file` command to see its type, it's an ASCII text. Then we open `file12` using `scite` we it's useless. Some objects are useless, it takes time to find the payload. We examine another object. When we get to object `22`, we see `/EmbeddedFiles` which is an indicator that the PDF launches an embedded file which has a big length. Dump it to `file22` to see its content and its type. After that we use `file` command, we notice that it's **Composite Document File V2 Document** [CFBF](#) is a compound document file format for storing numerous files and streams within a single file on a disk. In our case, this PDF stores an XLS file.



Figure(4): After dumping the object 22 and it's an xls excel spreadsheet

If we uploaded file22 to [VirusTotal](#) we will find it already uploaded and it's malicious. Our purpose is to get the main payload and that's it.



Figure(5): Virustotal analysis of xls dumped from PDF


Dynamic analysis [Permalink](#)

We will open FlareVM which has our installed tools. We need to install PDF reader such as Foxit reader, and Microsoft office.

First, open `fakenet-ng`, if the malicious PDF tries to connect and download from internet, this PDF sample opens an xls spreadsheet.

Then open the PDF. In foxit reader, disable safe mode and run the malicious PDF in privilege mode.

We open `Attachments`, we see there's an attachment which will be our `xls` spreadsheet file. You can open it manually. Double click on it and allow to open an xls excel spreadsheet. **Save** this attachment on your `Desktop` from foxit reader as shown.



Figure(6): When opening the PDF

IoCs [Permalink](#)

PDF file: `da9c3deb08bfc6a2e7930a4c8f1bd81b5ebffbb09b44027c74ea41ebf7149f8b`

xls sheet: `825b7a64db82a61656c8004bef49823d5b9fe4f52fae744f5dc927b3e75a994b`

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