

# MakeMoney malvertising campaign adds fake update template

By Threat Intelligence Team


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[Malware](#) authors and distributors are following the ebbs and flow of the threat landscape. One campaign we have tracked for a numbers of years recently introduced a new scheme to possibly completely move away from drive-by downloads via exploit kit.

In this quick blog post, we will look at this new attack chain and link it with previous activity from what we believe are the same threat actors.

## FakeUpdates (SocGholish) lookalike


Our researcher Fillip Mouliatis identified a malvertising campaign leading to a fake Firefox update. The template is strongly inspired from similar schemes and in particular the one distributed by the [FakeUpdates \(SocGholish\)](#) threat actors.



## You firefox is ready for update

Your download should begin automatically.

Didn't work? Try downloading again.



However distribution and implementation are very different. Unlike FakeUpdates which uses compromised websites to push their template, this one is driven via malvertising. Please note the [IP addresses](#) involved in the redirection infrastructure as we will come back to them in a moment.

Server IP	Host	URL	Comments
162.252.21.20	safebrowsdv.com	/?r=...	Ad network
2607:fbe0:1:42::17	ladyphapty.com	/b...	Malvertising
2607:fbe0:1:42::17	ladyphapty.com	/d...	Malvertising
188.225.75.54	cryptosuite.pro	/cryptoland3	Malicious infrastructure
185.220.33.3	adsinside.xyz	/hilltoplands/	Malicious infrastructure
188.225.75.54	www.usemoney.life	/...	Malicious infrastructure
188.227.107.121	188.227.107.121	/_cr//index.php	Payload

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nAwAAEQYAABIAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAALaBAAAAAEZpcmVmb3hfdXBkYXRlXy5qc1BLAQI/
AxQAAgAIAJGgx1SsuJj/
pwMAABEGAAARAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAC2gdcDAABGaXJlZm94X3VwZGF0ZS5qc1BLBQYAAAAAagACAH8A
AACTBwAAAAA='
46     var filename = 'Firefox_update.zip'
47     var browser = 'files';
48     var special = '0';
49     var filePlain = window.atob(file64);
50     var a = document.getElementById('buttonDownload');
51     var isMS = checkMS();
52     var file;
53     if (filename.substr(-4) == '.zip' || filename.substr(-4) == '.rar') {
54         var binArray = new Uint8Array(filePlain.length);
55         for (var i = 0; i < filePlain.length; i++) {
56             binArray[i] = filePlain.charCodeAtAt(i);
57         }
58         file = new Blob([binArray], {
59             type: 'application/octet-stream'
60         });
    
```

The template itself is much more simplified and appears to be in development with a fake Firefox update that contains a couple of scripts that pull down an encrypted payload. The initial executable consists of a loader which retrieves a piece of Adware detected as BrowserAssistant. This payload was [seen before](#) and interestingly through a similar malvertising campaign involving the RIG exploit kit.

## MakeMoney connection

The malvertising infrastructure is essentially the same one that was used in numerous drive-by campaigns with exploit kits since late 2019. For some reason the threat actors are reusing the same servers in Russia and naming their malvertising gates after different ad networks.

Security researcher [@na0\\_sec](#) saw the “MakeMoney gate”, named after the domain makemoneywith[.]work (188.225.75.54), [redirect to the Fallout exploit kit](#) in October 2020, although it [mostly used RIG EK](#) for several years. Probably the earliest instance of this threat group was [seen in December 2019](#) via the gate gettime[.]xyz (185.220.35.26).

[https://twitter.com/na0\\_sec/status/1332097156434391040?s=20&t=GPCjh2Ik3L84ZFICcs31yg](https://twitter.com/na0_sec/status/1332097156434391040?s=20&t=GPCjh2Ik3L84ZFICcs31yg)

Looking at this infrastructure shows that the group reused a few servers quite predictably during these years between AS59504 vpsville and AS9123 TimeWeb. For example, gettime[.]xyz was hosted on the same server (185.220.35.26) as makemoneyeazzywith[.]me. Staying with the MakeMoney theme, we see makemoneywith[.]us

on 188.225.75[.]54. That server was likely hosting a Keitaro TDS (*traffic distribution system*) given such hostnames as keitarotrafficdelivery[.]xyz.

There is also activity on **185.220.33.3**, **185.230.140.210** and **188.225.75.54** hosting a number of impersonation hostnames such as magicpropeller[.]xyz (PropellerAds), magicpopcash[.]xyz (PopCash).

[https://twitter.com/MBThreatIntel/status/1483235125827571715?s=20&t=VdtEqjtpe\\_XT1TG6rAWVQ](https://twitter.com/MBThreatIntel/status/1483235125827571715?s=20&t=VdtEqjtpe_XT1TG6rAWVQ)

We find it interesting that the same threat actors remained faithful to RIG EK for so long during a period where exploit kits were going out of business. They also seemed to poke fun at the same ad networks they were abusing, unless the choice for names associated with their gates was motivated by sorting out their upstream traffic.

We don't believe we have seen the last of this threat group. Having said that, their latest social engineering scheme could use some improvements to remove some blatant typos while their server-side infrastructure could be tidied up.

## Indicators of Compromise

### IP addresses (malvertising domains, gates)

185.220.35.26  
188.225.75.54  
185.220.33.3  
185.230.140.210

### IP addresses (fake template)

188.227.107.121  
188.227.107.92

### Domains (malvertising domains, gates)

adcashtds2[.]xyz  
adcashtdssystem[.]site  
adsinside[.]xyz  
adsterramagic[.]me  
adstexx[.]xyz  
allmagnew[.]xyz  
alltomag[.]xyz  
an-era[.]shop  
ankgomag[.]xyz  
anklexit[.]online  
ankltrafficexit[.]xyz  
ankmagicgo[.]xyz  
blackexit[.]xyz

ccgmaining[.]life  
ccgmaining[.]live  
ccgmaining[.]work  
clickadusweep[.]vip  
clickadusweeps[.]vip  
clickadutds[.]xyz  
clicksdeliveryserver[.]space  
clicktds2[.]xyz  
cryptomoneyinside[.]xyz  
cryptomoneyinsider[.]biz  
cryptomoneyinsider[.]link  
cryptomoneyinsider[.]site  
cryptomoneyinsider[.]work  
cryptomoneyinsiders[.]com  
cryptomoneyinsiders[.]site  
cryptomoneyinsiders[.]work  
cryptomoneytds[.]xyz  
cryptopaycard[.]shop  
cryptosuite[.]pro  
cryptosuitetds[.]com  
cryptotraffic[.]vip  
cryptotraffictds[.]online  
cryptotraffictds[.]xyz  
cryptozerotds[.]xyz  
daiichisankyo-hc[.]live  
earncryptomoney[.]info  
exitmagall[.]xyz  
extradeliverytraffic[.]com  
extramoneymaker[.]vip  
familylabs[.]xyz  
fujimi[.]fun

gettime[.]xyz  
hilldeliveryexit[.]xyz  
hillex[.]xyz  
hilllandings[.]xyz  
hillmag[.]xyz  
hillmagnew[.]xyz  
hilltopmagic[.]xyz  
hilltoptds[.]xyz  
hilltoptdserver[.]xyz  
hilltoptdservers[.]fun  
hilltoptrafficedelivery[.]com

hilltoptrafficdelivery[.]xyz  
jillstuart-floranotisjillstu[.]art  
k-to-kd[.]me  
keitarotrafficdelivery[.]com  
keitarotrafficdelivery[.]xyz  
lahsahal[.]site  
magcheckall[.]me  
magicadss[.]xyz  
magicadsterra[.]xyz  
magicclickadu[.]xyz  
magickhill[.]xyz  
magickpeoplenew[.]xyz  
magicpopcash[.]xyz  
magicpropeller[.]xyz  
magicself[.]xyz  
magiczero[.]xyz  
makemoneyeazzywith[.]me  
makemoneynowwith[.]me  
makemoneywith[.]us  
makemoneywithus[.]work  
mizuno[.]casa  
money365[.]xyz  
myallexit[.]xyz  
myjobsy[.]com  
nawa-store[.]com  
newallfrommag[.]xyz  
newzamenaadc[.]xyz  
newzamenaclick[.]xyz  
newzamenaself[.]xyz  
newzamenazero[.]xyz  
nippon-mask[.]site  
northfarmstock[.]xyz  
offers[.]myjobsy[.]com  
  
offersstudioex[.]live  
openphoto[.]xyz  
partners[.]usemoney[.]xyz  
prelandingpages[.]xyz  
promodigital[.]me  
propellermagic[.]xyz  
sberbank[.]hourscareer[.]com  
sberjob[.]hourscareer[.]com  
selfadtracker1[.]online

selfadtrackerexit[.]xyz  
selftraffictds[.]xyz  
selfyourads[.]xyz  
shop[.]mizuno[.]casa  
supersports[.]fun  
surprise[.]yousweeps[.]vip  
tracker[.]usemoney[.]xyz  
traffic[.]selfadtracker1[.]online  
traffic[.]usemoney[.]xyz  
trafficedeliveryclick[.]xyz  
trafficedeliveryoffers[.]com  
trafficedeliverysystem[.]world  
traffictrackerself[.]xyz  
tryphoto[.]xyz  
trytime[.]xyz  
usehouse[.]xyz  
usemoney[.]life  
usemoney[.]xyz  
ymalljp[.]com  
yousweeps[.]vip  
zamenaad[.]xyz  
zamenaclick[.]xyz  
zamenahil[.]xyz  
zamenazer[.]xyz  
zapasnoiadc[.]xyz  
zapasnoiclick[.]xyz  
zapasnoiself[.]xyz  
zapasnoizero[.]xyz  
zermag[.]xyz  
zernewmagcheck[.]xyz  
zerocryptocard[.]shop  
zeroexit[.]xyz  
zerok2exit[.]xyz  
zeroparktraffic[.]xyz  
zeroparktrakeroutside[.]shop  
zerotdspark[.]space  
zerotracker[.]shop

## References

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Source: <https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2022/06/makemoney-malvertising-campaign-adds-fake-update-template/>