# An Update for a Very Active DDos Botnet: Moobot **blog.netlab.360.com/ddos-botnet-moobot-en/** Hui Wang July 9, 2020 9 July 2020 / [0-day](https://blog.netlab.360.com/tag/0-day/) ## Overview Moobot is a Mirai based botnet. We first discovered its activity in July 2019. Here is our log [about it[0]. And ever since then, its sample updates, DDoS attacks and other activities have](https://blog.netlab.360.com/the-botnet-cluster-on-185-244-25-0-24-en/) never stopped.Recently we saw it participated in some very high profile DDoS attacks, we got asked quite a few times in the security community regarding to what botnet is behind the attacks, so here is some more details. ## Sample dissemination Moobot samples are mainly spread through weak telnet passwords and some nday and 0day [[1][2]vulnerabilities. The vulnerabilities we observed using Moobot are as follows:](https://blog.netlab.360.com/multiple-fiber-routers-are-being-compromised-by-botnets-using-0-day/) **Vulnerability** **Affected Aevice** [HiSilicon DVR/NVR Backdoor](https://habr.com/en/post/486856/) Firmware for Xiaongmai-based DVRs, NVRs and IP cameras [CVE-2020-8515](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/48268) DrayTek Vigor router JAWS Webserver unauthenticated shell command execution MVPower DVR [LILIN DVR](https://www.meritlilin.com/assets/uploads/support/file/M00158-TW.pdf) LILIN DVRs [GPON Router RCE](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/48225) Netlink GPON Router 1.0.11 [TVT OEM API RCE](https://github.com/mcw0/PoC/blob/master/TVT-PoC.py) TVT Digital Technology Co. Ltd & OEM {DVR/NVR/IPC} API RCE [ThinkPHP 5.0.23/5.1.31 RCE](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/45978) Android Debug Bridge Remote Payload Execution AVTECH [Devices Multiple Vulnerabilities](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/40500/) AVTECH IP Camera / NVR / DVR Devices [CVE-2017-17215](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/43414/) Huawei Router HG532 [Netcore Router Udp 53413 Backdoor](https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/linux/misc/netcore_udp_53413_backdoor) Netcore Router ----- **Vulnerability** **Affected Aevice** [CVE-2014-8361](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/37169/) Devices using the Realtek SDK [CVE_2020_5722](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/48247) Grandstream UCM6202 [CVE-2017-8225](https://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2017-03-08-camera-goahead-0day.html) The Wireless IP Camera (P2P) WIFICAM [DVRIP backdoor](https://blog.netlab.360.com/the-new-developments-of-the-fbot-en/) ## Sample analysis In the previous article, we introduced many variants of Moobot. We believe that its author is more inclined to develop and use new methods than to simply change C2. The authors of Moobot had made many attempts at the sample binary level & network traffic level. Generally, samples used multiple combinations of the following methods to make job difficult for security researchers. Use DNS TXT to carry C2/ manually construct DNS TXT request Packing with the new UPX magic number Hidden sensitive resources using encryption method of code table replacement Use SOCKS PROXY, TOR PROXY Since Jan 2020, another variant we called Moobot_xor became active. Moobot_xor doesn't adopt mothods metioned above,but just only modified the register message?). Maybe the author of Moobot has found that only one such simple modification and the constant replacement of C2 is needed to achieve very good benefits during the operation for up to 1 year, there is no need to invest in new technology research. ### Sample information ``` MD5:98c8326b28163fdaeeb0b056f940ed72 ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped Packer:None Lib:uclibc Verdict: Moobot_xor ``` Moobot_xor is very close to Mirai, so we are not going to cover things folks already knew. We will only introduce Moobot_xor’s encryption method and the communication protocol, understanding the encryption method will help extract the bot's configuration information, knowing the communication protocol should facility tracking C2 to obtain the attack instructions, we hope that these contents can help the community to better fight the Moobot family. ### Encryption method ----- Moobot_xor uses Mirai s classic Xor encryption and decryption method, the key is ``` 0DEADBEEFh, ### Communication protocol ``` Moobot_xor has made some minor modifications on the basis of the Mirai communication protocol. Let’s look at a few of them here. Registration packet ``` msg parsing ---------------------------------------------------------------33 66 99 -----> hardcoded magic 06 -----> group string length 67 6c 61 69 76 65 -----> group string,here it is "glaive" ``` Heartbeat packet ----- ``` msg parsing ---------------------------------------------------------------00 00 -----> hardcoded msg from bot 00 00 -----> hardcoded msg from c2 ``` Attack command ``` msg parsing ---------------------------------------------------------------similar to Mirai 01 -----> number of targets 77 a7 B5 CB 20 ----->target/mask, 119.167.181.203/32 02 -----> number of flags 00 -----> flag type 02 -----> flag length 32 30 -----> flag data 07 -----> flag type 02 -----> flag length 38 30 -----> flag data ## Moobot DDoS activity ``` Since we started tracking Moobot, its attack activity has never stopped. There are only a handful of C2s, but attack targets are all over the world, with about 100 targets per day. ### Moobot's target ----- The trend of Moobot s daily attack targets is shown in the figure below:： It can be seen from the above figure that Moobot's DDoS attack activity has obvious anomalies from the end of March 2020 to the beginning of May 2020, and the daily attack target of Moobot has increased from a few hundred to nearly 20,000. When we took a close look, we found that Moobot's attack target surged because Moobot attacked about 48k of Brazilian IP during this period. We don’t know what was reason behind that. After taking ----- Brazil our from the attack targets. Moobot s daily live attack targets are as follows, about 100 attack targets per day: ### Moobot attack target geographic location distribution ----- Moobot s attack targets are all over the world.The geographical distribution of its attack targets is as follows: ### Moobot attacks the affected domain name We were able to confirm that Moobot has been behind some very high profile DDos [attacks.We cannot disclose more detail here, but we had a tag cloud in our prior blog here[3].](https://blog.netlab.360.com/the-botnet-cluster-on-185-244-25-0-24-en/) ## Contact us [Readers are always welcomed to reach us on Twitter, WeChat 360Netlab or email to netlab](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) at 360 dot cn. ## IOC C2 ----- ``` 190.115.18.238 AS262254|DANCOM_LTD Russian_Federation|Moscow|Unknown 31.13.195.56 AS34224|Neterra_Ltd. Bulgaria|Sofia|Unknown 37.49.226.216 AS208666|Estro_Web_Services_Private_Limited Netherlands|Overijssel|Enschede 45.95.168.90 AS42864|Giganet_Internet_Szolgaltato_Kft Hungary|SzabolcsSzatmar-Bereg_County|Nyiregyhaza abcdefg.elrooted.com audi.n1gger.com botnetisharam.com cykablyat.raiseyourdongers.pw dbkjbueuvmf5hh7z.onion frsaxhta.elrooted.com gcc.cyberium.cc n1gger.com nd3rwzslqhxibkl7.onion nlocalhost.wordtheminer.com park.cyberium.cc park.elrooted.com proxy.2u0apcm6ylhdy7s.com rr442myy7yz4.osrq.xyz sisuugde7gzpef2d.onion typicalniggerdayatthecoolaidparty.n1gger.com wor.wordtheminer.com zrqq.xyz tbpsboy.com ``` -----