

Medusa Group, Group G1051 | MITRE ATT&CK®

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Enterprise [T1548 .002 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control](#)

[Medusa Group](#) has attempted to bypass UAC using Component Object Model (COM) interface.^[4]

Enterprise [T1087 .001 Account Discovery: Local Account](#)

[Medusa Group](#) has leveraged `net user` for account discovery.^[2]

Enterprise [T1650 Acquire Access](#)

[Medusa Group](#) has purchased user credentials and other sensitive data from Initial Access Brokers (IABs).^{[5][6][1]}
^[4]

Enterprise [T1583 .006 Acquire Infrastructure: Web Services](#)

[Medusa Group](#) has utilized a file hosting service named filemail[.]com to host a zip file that contained malicious payloads that facilitated follow-on actions.^[5]

Enterprise [T1071 .001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols](#)

[Medusa Group](#) has communicated through reverse or bind shells over port 443 (HTTPS).^[1]

Enterprise [T1059 .001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell](#)

[Medusa Group](#) has leveraged PowerShell for execution and defense evasion.^{[6][1][4]} [Medusa Group](#) has also utilized PowerShell to execute a bitsadmin transfer from file hosting site.^[5]

[.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell](#)

[Medusa Group](#) has used Windows Command Prompt to control and execute commands on the system to include ingress, network, and filesystem enumeration activities.^[1]

Enterprise [T1136 .002 Create Account: Domain Account](#)

[Medusa Group](#) has created a domain account within the victim environment.^[1]

Enterprise [T1543 .003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service](#)

[Medusa Group](#) has used vulnerable or signed drivers to modify security solutions on victim devices.^[1]

Enterprise [T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact](#)

[Medusa Group](#) has encrypted files using AES-256 encryption which then appends the file extension ".medusa" to encrypted files and leaves a ransomware note named "!READ_ME_MEDUSA!!!.txt."^{[5][1][2][3]}

Enterprise [T1652 Device Driver Discovery](#)

[Medusa Group](#) has queried drivers on the victim device through the command `driverquery`.^[1]

Enterprise [T1573 .002 Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography](#)

[Medusa Group](#) has used HTTPS for command and control.^[1]

Enterprise [T1585 .001 Establish Accounts: Social Media Accounts](#)

[Medusa Group](#) has created social media accounts including Telegram and X to publicize their activities.^{[5][6]}

[.002 Establish Accounts: Email Accounts](#)

[Medusa Group](#) has created email accounts used in ransomware negotiations.^[1]

Enterprise [T1567 .002 Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage](#)

[Medusa Group](#) has utilized `Rclone` to exfiltrate data from victim environments to cloud storage.^{[1][2]}

Enterprise [T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application](#)

[Medusa Group](#) has leveraged public facing vulnerabilities in their campaigns against victim organizations to gain initial access.^{[5][2]} [Medusa Group](#) has also utilized CVE-2024-1709 in ScreenConnect, and CVE-2023-48788 in Fortinet EMS for initial access to victim environments.^[1]

Enterprise [T1083 File and Directory Discovery](#)

[Medusa Group](#) has searched for files within the victim environment for encryption and exfiltration.^{[5][1][3]}

[Medusa Group](#) has also identified files associated with remote management services.^{[5][1]}

Enterprise [T1657 Financial Theft](#)

[Medusa Group](#) has stolen and encrypted victims' data in order to extort victims into paying a ransom.^{[5][6][1][4][2][3]}

Enterprise [T1564 .003 Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window](#)

[Medusa Group](#) has utilized the `ShowWindow` API function to hide the current window.^[3]

Enterprise [T1562 .001 Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools](#)

[Medusa Group](#) has terminated antivirus services utilizing the `gaze.exe` executable and utilizing `psexec.exe`.^{[5][1][2]} [Medusa Group](#) has also leveraged I/O control codes (IOCTLs) for terminating and deleting processes of identified security tools.^[5]

[.003 Impair Defenses: Impair Command History Logging](#)

[Medusa Group](#) has removed PowerShell command history through the use of the PSReadLine module by running the PowerShell command `Remove-Item (Get-PSReadLineOption).HistorySavePath` .^[1]

[.004 Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify System Firewall](#)

[Medusa Group](#) has utilized [PsExec](#) to execute batch scripts that modify firewall settings.^[1] [Medusa Group](#) has also enabled and modified firewall rules to allow for RDP connections for lateral movement and device interactions.^[1]

Enterprise [T1070 .003 Indicator Removal: Clear Command History](#)

[Medusa Group](#) has cleared command history by running the PowerShell command `Remove-Item (Get-PSReadlineOption).HistorySavePath` .^[1]

[.004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion](#)

[Medusa Group](#) has deleted previously installed tools.^[1]

Enterprise [T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer](#)

[Medusa Group](#) has leveraged [certutil](#), PowerShell, and Windows Command to download additional tools to include RMM services.^[1] [Medusa Group](#) has also engaged in "Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver" (BYOVD) and downloaded vulnerable or signed drivers to the victim environment to disable security tools.^{[1][2]}

Enterprise [T1490 Inhibit System Recovery](#)

[Medusa Group](#) has deleted recovery files such as shadow copies using `vssadmin.exe` .^{[5][1][2][3]}

Enterprise [T1559 .001 Inter-Process Communication: Component Object Model](#)

[Medusa Group](#) has leveraged Component Object Model (COM) to bypass UAC.^[4]

Enterprise [T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer](#)

[Medusa Group](#) has utilized legitimate software services such as PDQ Deploy to transfer malicious binaries and tools to other victimized hosts within the target environment.^[2]

Enterprise [T1112 Modify Registry](#)

[Medusa Group](#) has modified Registry keys to elevate privileges, maintain persistence and allow remote access.^[1]

Enterprise [T1106 Native API](#)

[Medusa Group](#) has leveraged Windows Native API functions to execute payloads.^[3]

Enterprise [T1046 Network Service Discovery](#)

[Medusa Group](#) has the capability to use living off the land (LOTL) binaries to perform network enumeration.^[1]

[Medusa Group](#) has also utilized the publicly available scanning tool SoftPerfect Network Scanner (`netscan.exe`) to discover device hostnames and network services.^[2]

Enterprise [T1135 Network Share Discovery](#)

[Medusa Group](#) has identified network shares using `cmd.exe /c net share` .^[1]

Enterprise [T1027 .002 Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing](#)

[Medusa Group](#) has packed the code of dropped kernel drivers using the packer ASM Guard.^[5]

[.010 Obfuscated Files or Information: Command Obfuscation](#)

[Medusa Group](#) has obfuscated PowerShell scripts with Base64 encoding.^[1] [Medusa Group](#) has also obfuscated the code of dropped kernel drivers using a software known as Safengine Shielden which randomized the code through code mutations and then leveraged an embedded virtual machine interpreter to execute the code.^[5]

Enterprise [T1588 .002 Obtain Capabilities: Tool](#)

[Medusa Group](#) has obtained and leveraged numerous RMM services, along with publicly available tools used for scanning.^{[5][1][2]} [Medusa Group](#) has utilized tools such as Advanced IP Scanner and SoftPerfect Network scanner for user, system and network discovery.^[1] [Medusa Group](#) has also acquired tools for command and control and defense evasion which include tunneling tools Ligolo and Cloudflared.^[1]

Enterprise [T1003 .001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory](#)

[Medusa Group](#) has leveraged [Mimikatz](#) to dump LSASS to harvest credentials.^[1]

[.003 OS Credential Dumping: NTDS](#)

[Medusa Group](#) has accessed the ntds.dit file to engage in credential dumping.^[2]

Enterprise [T1069 .002 Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups](#)

[Medusa Group](#) has utilized the `net group` command to query domain groups within the victim environment.^[1]

Enterprise [T1057 Process Discovery](#)

[Medusa Group](#) has utilized a hard-coded security tool process list that identifies and terminates using an undocumented IOCTL code 0x222094.^[5]

Enterprise [T1090 .003 Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy](#)

[Medusa Group](#) has used TOR nodes for communications.^{[5][6][2]}

Enterprise [T1219 Remote Access Tools](#)

[Medusa Group](#) has leveraged Remote Access Software for lateral movement and data exfiltration. ^{[5][1][2][3]}

[Medusa Group](#) has also been known to utilize Remote Access Software such as AnyDesk, Atera, ConnectWise, eHorus, N-Able, PDQ Deploy, PDQ Inventory, SimpleHelp and Splashtop. ^[1]

Enterprise [T1021 .001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol](#)

[Medusa Group](#) has used RDP to conduct lateral movement and exfiltrate data. ^[1] [Medusa Group](#) has also utilized the Windows executable `mstsc.exe` for RDP activities through the command `mstsc.exe /v:{hostname/ip}`. ^[1]

Enterprise [T1018 Remote System Discovery](#)

[Medusa Group](#) has used PDQ Inventory to get an inventory of the endpoints on the network. ^[2]

Enterprise [T1505 .003 Server Software Component: Web Shell](#)

[Medusa Group](#) has utilized webshells to an exploited Microsoft Exchange Server. ^[5]

Enterprise [T1489 Service Stop](#)

[Medusa Group](#) has terminated services related to backups, security, databases, communication, filesharing and websites. ^{[1][2][3]}

Enterprise [T1072 Software Deployment Tools](#)

[Medusa Group](#) has utilized software deployment and management solutions to deploy their encryption payload to include BigFix and PDQ Deploy. ^[1]

Enterprise [T1518 .001 Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery](#)

[Medusa Group](#) has detected security solutions for termination or deletion within the victim device using hard-coded lists of strings containing security product executables. ^[5]

Enterprise [T1608 .002 Stage Capabilities: Upload Tool](#)

[Medusa Group](#) has utilized a file hosting service called filemail[.]com to host a zip file that contained a RMM service such as ConnectWise. ^[5]

Enterprise [T1553 .002 Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing](#)

[Medusa Group](#) has utilized vulnerable or signed drivers to kill or delete services associated with endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools. ^[1]

Enterprise [T1218 .014 System Binary Proxy Execution: MMC](#)

[Medusa Group](#) has leveraged Microsoft Management Console (MMC) to facilitate lateral movement and to interact locally or remotely with victim devices using the command `mmc.exe compmgmt.msc /computer:{hostname/ip}`. ^[1]

Enterprise [T1082 System Information Discovery](#)

[Medusa Group](#) has leveraged `cmd.exe` to identify system info `cmd.exe /c systeminfo`.^[1]

Enterprise [T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery](#)

[Medusa Group](#) has obtained host network details utilizing the command `cmd.exe /c ipconfig /all`.^[1]

Enterprise [T1033 System Owner/User Discovery](#)

[Medusa Group](#) has utilized [PsExec](#) to execute `quser` to discover the user session information.^[2]

Enterprise [T1569 .002 System Services: Service Execution](#)

[Medusa Group](#) has utilized [PsExec](#) to execute scripts and commands within victim environments.^{[5][1][2]} [Medusa Group](#) has also used the Windows service RoboCopy to search and copy data for exfiltration.^[2]

Enterprise [T1529 System Shutdown/Reboot](#)

[Medusa Group](#) has manually turned off and encrypted virtual machines.^[1]

Enterprise [T1078 Valid Accounts](#)

[Medusa Group](#) has utilized compromised legitimate local and domain accounts within the victim environment to facilitate remote access and lateral movement sometimes in combination with [PsExec](#).^[1]

Enterprise [T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation](#)

[Medusa Group](#) has utilized Windows Management Instrumentation to query system information.^{[5][1][4]}

Source: <https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051>