

Behavioral Detection of Indicator Removal Across Platforms, Detection Strategy DET0184

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AN0520

Monitors sequences involving deletion/modification of logs, registry keys, scheduled tasks, or prefetch files following suspicious process activity or elevated access escalation.

Log Sources

Mutable Elements

Field	Description
TimeWindow	Correlate indicator removal within X mins after persistence/setup activities
TargetFilePathPattern	Customize detection to log file paths or common registry hives

AN0521

Detects deletion or overwriting of bash history, syslog, audit logs, and .ssh metadata following privilege elevation or suspicious process spawning.

Log Sources

Mutable Elements

Field	Description
MonitoredPaths	Adjust based on syslog/auditd file paths (/var/log/messages, /var/log/audit/audit.log)
UserContext	Scope to root/sudo usage or anomalous user behavior

AN0522

Detects clearing of unified logs, deletion of plist files tied to persistence, and manipulation of Terminal history after initial execution.

Log Sources

Mutable Elements

Field	Description
PlistTargetPaths	Define which plist paths relate to LaunchAgents or LaunchDaemons
ExecutionChainDepth	Allow tuning for multi-process persistence chains

AN0523

Monitors tampering with audit logs, volumes, or mounted storage often used for side-channel logging (e.g., /var/log inside containers) post-compromise.

Log Sources

Mutable Elements

Field	Description
LogMountPaths	Tune based on how logs are exported (bind-mount, overlay)
ContainerLabelScope	Limit detection to suspicious containers or runtime classes

AN0524

Tracks suspicious use of ESXi shell commands or PowerCLI to delete logs, rotate system files, or tamper with hostd/vpxa history.

Log Sources

Mutable Elements

Field	Description
LogSourceType	Tune per vCenter, vSphere, ESXi CLI telemetry collection
LogPathPattern	Target specific high-value log paths (e.g., /var/log/hostd.log)

AN0525

Detects deletion or hiding of security-related mail rules, audit mailboxes, or calendar/log sync artifacts indicative of tampering post-intrusion.

Log Sources

Mutable Elements

Field	Description
TargetMailboxScope	Limit by VIP mailboxes or external-facing users
AuditLogDepth	Tune for log deletion following lateral movement

Source: <https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0184#AN0520>