

Static unpacker and decoder for Hello Kitty Packer

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During a recent incident response engagement, the Profero IR team observed a sample of Hello Kitty ransomware. This version of ransomware is intriguing as this sample is packed with a packer written in Go. This packer decrypts the final Hello Kitty payload, which is written in C++, before executing it in memory. The Hello Kitty ransomware is written as a simple tool that an attacker can use to encrypt data on the victim's machine and not as a full-fledged malware with persistence methods of its own. This malware has been covered by previous researchers in-depth, however, there is much less information about the packer used by this ransomware gang.

Due to this fact, we are releasing this report along with a tool that can be used to unpack the payload contained within the Go packer.

Analysis

Overview


The use of a Go packer makes it hard for reverse engineers to analyze the binary and assists the malware in evading detection by antivirus and other detection systems. This is due to the low detection rate on Go binaries and due to the nature of packers themselves, as they encrypt the final malicious payload to prevent signature-based detections.

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Below is an example of the ransom note used by HelloKitty (extracted using the <https://hatching.io/> sandbox):



Ransom note used in this attack

When analyzing the unpacked payload, we can see that the ransomware is not written to install on a machine but rather it is written as a command-line tool that attackers will use after gaining access to target machines. The unpacked tool even provides a command-line help message. This can be seen in the screenshot below.

Press enter or click to view image in full size

```
OUTPUT: Registered ctrl handlers
OUTPUT: Help usage:
OUTPUT: -path | select path; bin.exe -path "c:\temp"
OUTPUT: -limit | limit file offset; bin.exe -limit 10 (limit first 10 megabytes of file)
OUTPUT: -blocks | use random blocks encryption; bin.exe -blocks
OUTPUT: -maxrand | maximum random block range[0..maxrand); bin.exe -maxrand 10
OUTPUT: -nosum | no use checksum in enc/dec; bin.exe -nosum
OUTPUT: -norecycle | do not clear recycle; bin.exe -norecycle
OUTPUT: -noshadows | do not remove shadows; bin.exe -noshadows
OUTPUT: -log | log output to file format 'log_%pid%.log'; bin.exe -log
OUTPUT: -key |
OUTPUT: -visible | do not hide console window
OUTPUT: -test | run self tests
OUTPUT: -tests | run self tests
OUTPUT: -tempfile | set temp file name
OUTPUT: --help | print this help
OUTPUT: -help | print this help
```


Command help message

Packer Decryption

The packer's decryption process is as follows:

- The packed binary is executed and passed a 16-byte decryption key as a command-line parameter which the packer will use to decrypt the payload
- The encrypted blob is located at the overlay of the packed binary. The location in the file is obtained by parsing the PE header from the binary:

Press enter or click to view image in full size



Parsing PE headers

- This encrypted blob is then decrypted using the AES-128-CBC algorithm with IV passed as an embedded string from the binary, this can be seen in the image below:

```

mov     [esp+6Ch+var_44], ebx
mov     [esp+6Ch+TotalFileSize], ecx
mov     [esp+6Ch+PeFileBaseBuf], edx

OverlaySection:
mov     [esp+6Ch+OverlaySectionBuf], eax
lea     eax, unk_4E26E0
mov     [esp+6Ch+var_6C], eax
call    runtime_newobject
mov     edi, [esp+6Ch+var_68]
mov     [esp+6Ch+var_10], edi
lea     esi, aRuntimeErrorRu+107h ; "
call    copy32bytes ; copy IV
mov     eax, [esp+6Ch+var_4]
mov     ecx, [eax]
mov     eax, [eax+4]
lea     edx, [esp+6Ch+var_40]
mov     [esp+6Ch+var_6C], edx
mov     [esp+6Ch+var_68], ecx
mov     [esp+6Ch+var_64], eax
call    runtime_stringtoslicebyte ; Convert Byte to String
mov     eax, [esp+6Ch+totalFileLen]
mov     ecx, [esp+6Ch+var_5C]
    
```

Locating the IV

- The packer then resolves the entry point of the payload and passes execution to it:

<pre> .text:0048B938 neg ecx .text:0048B93A sar ecx, 1Fh .text:0048B93D and ecx, edx .text:0048B93F mov ebp, [esp+6Ch+var_C] .text:0048B943 add ecx, ebp .text:0048B945 mov [esp+6Ch+var_14], ecx .text:0048B949 mov [esp+6Ch+var_68], ecx .text:0048B94D mov ebp, [esp+6Ch+var_48] .text:0048B951 sub ebp, edx .text:0048B953 mov [esp+6Ch+var_50], ebp .text:0048B957 mov [esp+6Ch+var_64], ebp .text:0048B95B mov [esp+6Ch+var_60], ebx .text:0048B95F mov [esp+6Ch+var_5C], ecx .text:0048B963 mov [esp+6Ch+var_58], ebp .text:0048B967 mov [esp+6Ch+var_54], ebx .text:0048B96B call eax .text:0048B96D mov ecx, [esp+6Ch+var_50] .text:0048B971 test ecx, ecx .text:0048B973 jbe short loc_48B9D4 .text:0048B975 mov eax, [esp+6Ch+var_14] .text:0048B979 mov [esp+6Ch+var_6C], eax .text:0048B97C call sub_48B270 .text:0048B981 add esp, 6Ch .text:0048B984 retn </pre>	<pre> 145 v50 = v19; 146 v41 = v5; 147 sub_408800(&unk_4E26E0); 148 v49 = v15; 149 sub_45A248(); 150 sub_445AB0(v44, *v52, v52[1], v22, v26, 0); 151 sub_48E070(v23, v29, v34, v23, v29, v34, v38); 152 sub_48CA70(v24, v30, v49, 16, 16, v35, v39); 153 v6 = *(void (**)(void))(v36 + 20); 154 v48 = v50 + (v41 & ((int)(v41 - v43) >> 31)); 155 v16 = v48; 156 v6(); 157 if (v42 == v41) 158 sub_4598F0(v40, v16); 159 result = sub_48B270(v48); 160 } 161 } 162 } 163 return result; 164 } </pre>
--	--

Finding and jumping to the entry point of the packed binary

Unpacking Tool

To assist in the analysis, the Profero team has developed a tool that can be used to unpack the binary and do the following:

- Check if the packed binary is a hello kitty binary
- Extracts the RSA key, C2 server used, IV, etc
- Unpacks the packed file

The tool can be executed as follows:

```
./HelloKittyUnpacker.exe [input] [key] [dump]
```

We hope that this tool will assist in speeding up analysis in any future incidents involving this malware. In addition, we wanted to open source the code so it can be used as a blueprint for similar malware.

It can be found on GitHub:

<https://github.com/proferosec/HelloKittyUnpacker>

Source: <https://medium.com/proferosec-osm/static-unpacker-and-decoder-for-hello-kitty-packer-91a3e8844cb7>