

# Trojan banking

## 47d18761d46d8e7c4ad49cc575b0acc2bb3f49bb56a3d29fb1ec600447cb89a4


By Posted by zairon on April 15, 2014

Published: 2014-04-15 · Archived: 2026-04-05 16:11:12 UTC

Two days ago I blogged about the approach I used to start analysing the malware, today I spent some more time on the target trying to get an idea of its behaviours. According to [VirusTotal](#) the file has a 21/51 revelation rate, it was 6/51 six days ago.


It has been designed for the Asian part of the world and, among all the malicious features, I noted an interesting data exchanges between the infected machine and a server behind 192.74.241.104/192.74.241.105 addresses.

### From server to infected machine



Get

File *plus.php* is saved inside the infected machine. Wireshark marks the new file as an “application/zip” file, and I have to admit that at a first glance I thought the same thing:



Misleading header

I was wrong, the file is a not valid archive. To better understand what kind of file is this I put my hands on a debugger. All the bytes starting from offset 0x68 are decrypted by a simple piece of code:

```
10007F10 decrypt_part_of_the_downloaded_file:
10007F10 mov eax, ecx
10007F12 push 2
10007F14 cdq
10007F15 pop edi
10007F16 idiv edi
10007F18 test edx, edx
10007F1A jz short loc_10007F22
10007F1C add byte ptr [ecx+esi], 3Ah
10007F20 jmp short loc_10007F26
10007F22 add byte ptr [ecx+esi], 4Bh
10007F26 inc ecx
```

```
10007F27 cmp ecx, [ebp+var_4]
10007F2A jl short decrypt_part_of_the_downloaded_file
```

It's basically decrypted by an *add* operation, but the result is something I didn't expect, here is a small part of the entire file:

```
126.11.242.224 nAVER.coM
126.11.242.224 kIsA.hoNabenk.coM
126.11.242.224 kIsA.kcB.co.kR
126.11.242.224 kIsA.kfoc.co.kR
126.11.242.224 www.nAVER.co.KR
126.11.242.224 nAVER.co.kR
126.11.242.224 www.NONGhyup.coM
126.11.242.224 BaNKiNg.NONGhyup.coM
126.11.242.224 iBz.NONGhyup.coM
126.11.242.224 www.nAVER.coM
126.11.242.224 nAVER.kR
```


The file is moved under “C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc” directory with the new name *hosts.ics*. It seems to be the same list described inside three articles by [Nshc Security](#). You can find the mentioned pdf report files inside the Red Alert Reports section:

- Internet Bank Pharming – BlackMoon
- Internet Bank Pharming with CVE-2013-3897
- Internet Banking Malware

The malware I'm checking has a lot of common things with the samples used to write the reports: it deletes antivirus exe related files, use a link file to run the malware at startup, create the *hosts.ics* file, steal certificates searching for NPki folders sending them to a specific server in an encrypted format.

On the other hand the infection has slightly changed: dll file runs from rundll32 camouflaged into *ctfmon.exe* and not *csrss.exe*, start link has a different name *V2LiteExp* (the name comes from AhnLab V3 Internet Security suite), *plus.php* file is available in the recent samples only. Little things of course, but these are relevant in the removal process.

### From infected machine to server



Send

A series of bytes are sent away, what's behind this obscure sequence?

Again, a simple xor encryption is used to hide the real information to send. The message in clear view contains some strings revealing info about the infected machine and the infection itself:

- processor type, something like “Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-3770K CPU @ 3.50GHz”
- physical free memory : “3584 MB”
- running OS: “Win XP SP2”

- date of infection: "20140415"
- location of hosts file: "http://192.74.241.104:805/plus.php"

These information are sent following a precise time line.

### 192.74.241.104 and 192.74.241.105

These addresses are under "PEG TECH INC" organization. There are many spam related complaints around the web from this organization, pay attention to 192.74.241.96/192.74.241.111 range addresses.

To end this post, look at the advice of a company named PegTech.

#### Spam from PEG TECH INC

We've received many complaints recently from companies who think that we are port scanning and/or spamming their servers. This is due to the simple fact that our domain name PegTech.com is similar to the real culprit, PEG TECH INC, a company based in Sunnyvale, CA. Their CA ID is C1452099 which you can use to look up on the California Secretary of State's website at <http://sagefor.sos.ca.gov/>.

Our company, Pegasus Technologies, Inc., has absolutely no relation to PEG TECH INC. We just have similar names.

---

Source: <https://zairon.wordpress.com/2014/04/15/trojan-banking-47d18761d46d8e7c4ad49cc575b0acc2bb3f49bb56a3d29fb1ec600447cb89a4/>